New Fuel Rules! Land in a "field" what a joke!
The Definition of Additional Fuel is 90 words long with NO punctuation!
I'd like to personally thank a certain Westwind Pilot who ran out of fuel and dropped it in the drink for these new rules! The Definition of Additional Fuel is 90 words long with NO punctuation! A new record from the Flight and Duty CAO which previously had 76 words to say "Take one day off a week!"
If these rules had been in place at the time:
- a MAYDAY from NGA at calculated 30 minutes remaining on board would have resulted in a safe landing, and
- the weather information provided to NGA would not have been misleadingly selective.
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Folks,
If I was "in CASA", it would not be "objective truths", but for every rule proposed it would be a risk analysis process, and cost/benefit justification, and many of the "rools" would never see the light of day.
The 1998 draft of CASA Part 91 was an example of that process, if you can find a copy, you will be very surprised as what a concise and clear document resulted. Its page and word count is significantly less than the FAA or NZ CAA equivalents -- it is amazing what a bit of ruthless pruning (without the double p) can do, without reducing the utility of the document for its the core purpose --- General Operating and Flight Rules. Of course, in total contrast to the current draft, about five times the page count, and often bordering on the indecipherable.
Indeed, at one point, when I did have some influence, CASA did a very instructive exercise, in part with two performance based rules consultants from the ATO, of all places.
The rules set chosen for the exercise was a slab of the maintenance rules. Using outcome based performance criteria, risk analysis based on probable "air safety outcomes" and benefit/cost analysis, something in the order of 70% of the maintenance rules would have been scrubbed, leaving what "common sense" said most people would probably do, anyway, but things like "ICAO" still required a minimum.
Interestingly, in mid 1990s, "mandatory" fuel reserves were scrubbed, in favour of better education for both pre-flight planning and in-flight monitoring ----- but "mandatory" fuel rules remained in Operations Manuals.
The results were instructive. In subsequent years up to the post-implementation review, amongst non-AOC operations, fuel exhaustion accidents had a major and statistically significant reduction, in AOC operations, the numbers did not change. So much for the power of "mandatory". But FOIs hated the idea, so much less to "pingya" on ramp checks.
The big message here ---- for real risk management (aka "air safety") it is using your brains that counts, not slavish and mindless conformity with "the rules".
Tootle pip!!
If I was "in CASA", it would not be "objective truths", but for every rule proposed it would be a risk analysis process, and cost/benefit justification, and many of the "rools" would never see the light of day.
The 1998 draft of CASA Part 91 was an example of that process, if you can find a copy, you will be very surprised as what a concise and clear document resulted. Its page and word count is significantly less than the FAA or NZ CAA equivalents -- it is amazing what a bit of ruthless pruning (without the double p) can do, without reducing the utility of the document for its the core purpose --- General Operating and Flight Rules. Of course, in total contrast to the current draft, about five times the page count, and often bordering on the indecipherable.
Indeed, at one point, when I did have some influence, CASA did a very instructive exercise, in part with two performance based rules consultants from the ATO, of all places.
The rules set chosen for the exercise was a slab of the maintenance rules. Using outcome based performance criteria, risk analysis based on probable "air safety outcomes" and benefit/cost analysis, something in the order of 70% of the maintenance rules would have been scrubbed, leaving what "common sense" said most people would probably do, anyway, but things like "ICAO" still required a minimum.
Interestingly, in mid 1990s, "mandatory" fuel reserves were scrubbed, in favour of better education for both pre-flight planning and in-flight monitoring ----- but "mandatory" fuel rules remained in Operations Manuals.
The results were instructive. In subsequent years up to the post-implementation review, amongst non-AOC operations, fuel exhaustion accidents had a major and statistically significant reduction, in AOC operations, the numbers did not change. So much for the power of "mandatory". But FOIs hated the idea, so much less to "pingya" on ramp checks.
The big message here ---- for real risk management (aka "air safety") it is using your brains that counts, not slavish and mindless conformity with "the rules".
Tootle pip!!
omg bus driver. Pmsl . If you were in casa we be in far more trouble than we are in now. You made a mess of aopa what more damage could you do. Your dig about certification agaist me shows your complete lack of knowledge on this subject. How many times now have i proven you wrong.
once again how many maintenance certifications do you hold and how many maintenance releases have you issued again. Tootie toot toot tootie pie
Can I ask what your legal Min fuel was when you operated these heroic flights landing with just minutes of fuel onboard? Perhaps this catching up to the rest of the world regulation was designed to protect persons such as yourself?
The rules dictate how much reserve fuel is required, if folks transgress it's no different to ignoring other rules, low flying for example. If forced by weather to engage in a bit of low flying should we declare a MAYDAY, because accident reports tell us it often doesn't end well with deaths aplenty. As said by LeadSled, it is using your brains (aka airmanship) that counts, not slavish and mindless conformity with "the rules". What's the saying, rules are for the guidance of wise men and the obedience of fools (quote is attributed to Harry Day, the Royal Flying Corps First World War fighter ace).
Nothing heroic you prat. Just a demonstration how one can be caught out by events which one has no control over, that being unforecast weather, and using a little nouse to ensure a safe outcome. One thing I never ever did is purposely burn into reserve, even in combat, this being the only time in 20K. Oh, by the way, reserve was 30 mins in the example. I
Your example of burning into reserve to be able to lift a load shows the commercial pressure where companies of aircraft not up to the task under bid those that are capable to get the job, but then need to bend the rules to make it work . But it was only a little bit of rule bending right? This is the reason why authorities need to publish these types of rules, as it seems they can't rely on pilots using CDF and sorting it out themselves .
Your example of burning into reserve to be able to lift a load shows the commercial pressure where companies of aircraft not up to the task under bid those that are capable to get the job, but then need to bend the rules to make it work
You mentioned Two examples of burning into your reserve in that one post old fella . Some of us have contingency fuel on board to help deal with the unexpected .
Not unlike the early trans pacific with the SP LAX - SY, you hoped to make it in one hop but the howgozit sometimes required a stop in Nadi.
Last edited by megan; 16th Jun 2018 at 03:56.
Not unlike the early trans pacific with the SP LAX - SY, you hoped to make it in one hop but the howgozit sometimes required a stop in Nadi.
You are the universal expert of all things aeronautical, you tell us, I am certain the aviation community will be eternally thankful for your wisdom.
Tootle pip!!
PS:
Nandi?? Don't know much about optimised routes, do you?? As I didn't work for PamAm/United, Nandi??
Sorry I thought WJRH might have been able to tell us of a time that he had been there and done that, but I was wrong. I also thought that you might also have been able to add to the discussion.
I don't see helos being a big part of the problem with fuel exhaustion, for the obvious reasons.
I don't see helos being a big part of the problem with fuel exhaustion, for the obvious reasons.
Last edited by Lookleft; 16th Jun 2018 at 10:29.
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Isnt the issue about the view that it may be preferable to outland with now mandated reserves intact than to press on and use them
Other key point is these reserves are now legally mandated meaning possible prosecution if you use them, mayday or not?
Its not about how large or defined the reserve is.
Other key point is these reserves are now legally mandated meaning possible prosecution if you use them, mayday or not?
Its not about how large or defined the reserve is.
Nandi?? Don't know much about optimised routes, do you?? As I didn't work for PamAm/United, Nandi??
Re Dispatch Release
I don't see helos being a big part of the problem with fuel exhaustion, for the obvious reasons
Other key point is these reserves are now legally mandated meaning possible prosecution if you use them, mayday or not?
https://assets.publishing.service.go...pdf_501030.pdf
An interesting paper and references on reserve fuel here,
https://www.sciencedirect.com/scienc...6304513#bbib32
Megan, thank you for that research paper! It is a model of how all rules should be justified.
To be clear, I am not in favor of playing fast and loose with fuel reserves. What worries me is that CASA are allegedly a vindictive mob as evidenced by what was done to Dominic James and the "fuel mayday" call is both an invitation to prosecution and an excuse for more intrusive checks by FOIs.
To be clear, I am not in favor of playing fast and loose with fuel reserves. What worries me is that CASA are allegedly a vindictive mob as evidenced by what was done to Dominic James and the "fuel mayday" call is both an invitation to prosecution and an excuse for more intrusive checks by FOIs.
Folks,
There's another admission from Lookleft, who'd a thunk it??
Megan,
Multiple were the times, in those days, we listened to Pam Am, later United,hear from their Operations Control the words: "No re-dispatch". United OPSCTL was, as I recall, in Chicago, not sure about PanAm.
The great operational advantage we had/have, unlike FAA Part 121 carriers, or Australian domestic airline operations at the time, our Operations Control was wearing four bars and sitting in the flightdeck, not in some office somewhere, with, all too often, weather way out of date.
Tootle pip!!
PS: As a matter of interest, the P&W engined B747SP always had better range than RR powered, it was the severe limitations of the imposition of their OPSCTL that was such a commercial advantage to us, nor did we always have to hold an alternate.
There's another admission from Lookleft, who'd a thunk it??
Megan,
Multiple were the times, in those days, we listened to Pam Am, later United,hear from their Operations Control the words: "No re-dispatch". United OPSCTL was, as I recall, in Chicago, not sure about PanAm.
The great operational advantage we had/have, unlike FAA Part 121 carriers, or Australian domestic airline operations at the time, our Operations Control was wearing four bars and sitting in the flightdeck, not in some office somewhere, with, all too often, weather way out of date.
Tootle pip!!
PS: As a matter of interest, the P&W engined B747SP always had better range than RR powered, it was the severe limitations of the imposition of their OPSCTL that was such a commercial advantage to us, nor did we always have to hold an alternate.
Megan,
The EASA paper feature that I find most interesting (and I haven't read all the references) is that it assumes that FFR is part of normal reserves, which is NOT the concept behind the FFR. Other posts have covered the concept ---- that it is to cover vagaries of Order of Accuracy and to ensure that there is something left, so that the engine(s) are running.
Indeed, initially, after a number of near exhaustion incidents, Boeing published a table of "minimum fuel for approach", which Boeing defined as "that amount of fuel, calculated or indicated, below which BCA Inc. will not guarantee the successful completion of the approach", and defined approach as "on final at 1500 and in the landing configuration".
It was not necessarily related to any non-normal operation.
A number of airlines operating Boeing aircraft, including BOAC and QF, took a different tack, as a result of the Boeing "recommendation", and fuel policies at the time were amended to what later became codified as FFR, and "minimum fuel at the end of the landing roll" made its appearance ----- many years before any ICAO action. Indeed, in at least two airlines, "minimum fuel at the end of the landing role" featured in Instructions to Captains, quite distinct to fuel policy, ie: wherever you finally wound up, have 30 minutes in tanks ---- so that the engined are still running.
As far as I have read, the EASA paper does not acknowledge this original history, but I must read further.
Sunfish,
CASA completely refuses to do the kind of statistical analysis in the EASA paper, let alone benefit/cost analysis depicted, likewise Airservices.
Tootle pip!!
PS: I did apologise for my original remarks about Nandi. What I was alluding was the fact that PanAm/United would buck the winter jetstreams on KLAX-YSSY routes much further south than we would fly on the same day.
When flying N- registered aeroplanes I always found the FAA mandated dispatch system and flight following a bleeding nuisance.
The EASA paper feature that I find most interesting (and I haven't read all the references) is that it assumes that FFR is part of normal reserves, which is NOT the concept behind the FFR. Other posts have covered the concept ---- that it is to cover vagaries of Order of Accuracy and to ensure that there is something left, so that the engine(s) are running.
Indeed, initially, after a number of near exhaustion incidents, Boeing published a table of "minimum fuel for approach", which Boeing defined as "that amount of fuel, calculated or indicated, below which BCA Inc. will not guarantee the successful completion of the approach", and defined approach as "on final at 1500 and in the landing configuration".
It was not necessarily related to any non-normal operation.
A number of airlines operating Boeing aircraft, including BOAC and QF, took a different tack, as a result of the Boeing "recommendation", and fuel policies at the time were amended to what later became codified as FFR, and "minimum fuel at the end of the landing roll" made its appearance ----- many years before any ICAO action. Indeed, in at least two airlines, "minimum fuel at the end of the landing role" featured in Instructions to Captains, quite distinct to fuel policy, ie: wherever you finally wound up, have 30 minutes in tanks ---- so that the engined are still running.
As far as I have read, the EASA paper does not acknowledge this original history, but I must read further.
Sunfish,
CASA completely refuses to do the kind of statistical analysis in the EASA paper, let alone benefit/cost analysis depicted, likewise Airservices.
Tootle pip!!
PS: I did apologise for my original remarks about Nandi. What I was alluding was the fact that PanAm/United would buck the winter jetstreams on KLAX-YSSY routes much further south than we would fly on the same day.
When flying N- registered aeroplanes I always found the FAA mandated dispatch system and flight following a bleeding nuisance.
Last edited by LeadSled; 17th Jun 2018 at 08:24.
Depends on their use, offshore oil, pilot transfers for example are just as constrained in their operations as any jet.
On another point there have been instances of QF aircraft autolanding at PH and SY because they had no fuel to go anywhere else. I don't recall the crew being "punished".
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Then there was the example of why some always choose to carry that bit extra. Back in the mid 71 there was a F28 Skipper that was renowned for always putting on an extra 1000lb for Mum and the kids. Well one night/early morning the F28 was northbound for Broome and the fog that was forecast indeed turned up forcing a diversion to Derby. Well would you believe that the (unforecast) fog rolled in at Derby not long after he diverted and it was unsuitable for a landing. His only option then was to Fitzroy Crossing so he headed off there at around 3am. The manual phone exchange there was night switched to the hospital and the FSO at Derby tried a number of times to get thru. It was answered by a staff member at last and the problem was passed on with the result that a small team headed out to the airport and gathered the flares and started to lay them. They laid one side of the runway and the F28 made its first approach only to find they were lined up on the wrong side of the single flare path which caused a go-round. The second approach was successful only to find as the story goes that one engine stopped due lack of fuel at the end of the landing run. Thank goodness for that extra bit of fuel.
There was a thread on this incident back in 2011 and can be found here: Forty years ago today ...
A Google search will also bring up some various reports.
I was in Derby for two years about that time and never saw fog once!!
There was a thread on this incident back in 2011 and can be found here: Forty years ago today ...
A Google search will also bring up some various reports.
I was in Derby for two years about that time and never saw fog once!!
So how does that work with off-shore fuel requirements? Do you always plan to carry the fuel to return to a land base or only if the platform requires an alternate? Are there times when the weather at the land base just makes it impossible to depart with the fuel requirements and payload?
It was a VFR operation ostensibly with limits of 350’, clear of cloud, vis 3k. Instrumentation in the single engine Hueys was per normal for IMC, but the only nav aid was a coffee grinder ADF. CASA deemed all the platforms to be within the 50nm arc of home, so weather reports were not required, nor obtained. Trouble was Bass Strait’s notoriously fickle weather, a lesson in micrometeorology, frontal systems that never appeared on a met chart for example. Intermittent fog patches, stratus patches down to the water, both too large to circumnavigate, heavy rain in the mini frontal systems that sent you IMC at 350. Going out you needed to stay low level in order to find the platform, a tap on the shoulder and point by a pax was at times a godsend. Going home if it was a dank day and hand flying IMC was too much of a grind, a climb to 3,000 more than often put you on top, and then a Henshaw approach at home – homing on the bulge in the cloud layer caused by the hot air from the gas plant.Finally twin engine helos took over, with full kit of coupled auto pilots, radar, GPS (had our own LORAN chain at one time prior to GPS) and flown single pilot, as were the Hueys. Before the link below was published the same information was contained in a CASA supplement at the front of the flight manual. With one exception. The supplement required OEI accountability, meaning availability of somewhere to put it down in the event of engine failure. Similarly, the ops manual required a land based alternate at all times if operating offshore. The S-76 required 880’ of runway from 50’ height to a stop in the worse case conditions (no wind, max gross), touchdown being at about 40 kt. 11,700 pounds with shopping trolley size wheels/brakes did take a bit to stop. The link now says private ops, which it was, now no longer require OEI accountability. So much for safety, and a reason the company wants it to remain a private op and not subject to an AOC as I believe CASA tried to make them subject.
Aircraft were frequently required to shut down offshore as home base had clagged. The only out if you found yourself OEI would have been to make a coupled ILS at the company installed ILS at East Sale. Aircraft would flare automatically at 50' and track the localiser maintaining the 50'. Up to you then to put it on the ground. Difficulty in making changes was the operator never had an accident and all failures that did occur all happened in benign circumstances.
https://www.casa.gov.au/file/103646/...token=2CPLdK5q
Commercial operators do it by the book I’m told. They have their own ops manual obviously, also the national requirements of the country in which they work, plus the standards applied by the charterer. The highest of the three is what they apply. Interestingly the Bass Strait operator hired in a commercial operator to do some work and the workers wanted to know why the company’s aircraft were flying but not the commercial operator. Safety has a price.
I believe there are now helos that are able to hover OEI and how they apply alternate requirement in that case I know not.
Lookleft,
Are you also Megan now?? I am certainly not apologising to you for anything, the likelihood of that is about the same as the ICAO Separation Assurance Standard probability collision happening.
I hope you enjoy your petty sniping, small things for small minds.
Tootle pip!!
Are you also Megan now?? I am certainly not apologising to you for anything, the likelihood of that is about the same as the ICAO Separation Assurance Standard probability collision happening.
I hope you enjoy your petty sniping, small things for small minds.
Tootle pip!!