DHC Beaver down in Hawkesbury
My condolences to the family and friends of the pilot and the passengers of this terrible tragedy.
Without pre-judging the outcome of the accident investigation, the following thoughts may have some relevance...
The de Havilland Beaver floatplane has a long history of fatal accidents caused by low altitude stalls (see TSB Canada Aviation Investigation Report A15Q0120 below).
Unfortunately in the floatplane configuration, the Beaver aircraft is necessarily operated at low altitude from rivers and lake valleys that are typically surrounded by high ground with gusty changing wind velocities.
Added to that challenging environment, is the Beaver's modest performance envelope, low power/weight ratio, high drag form, the aircraft's stall behaviour and its stall warning characteristics.
After a deadly Beaver stall/crash accident in which killed a pilot along with his 5 passengers in Ontario 23 Aug 2015, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada's investigation report recommended that commercially operated de Havilland Beaver aircraft should be fitted with a stall warning systems.
The installation of stall warning systems were recommended because of inadequate natural stall warning provided by the aircraft itself and rapid onset of an accelerated stall.
The extracts below are from the TSB Canada Aviation Investigation Report A15Q0120:
Aviation Investigation Report A15Q0120 - Transportation Safety Board of Canada
Appendix C – TSB aviation investigation reports on accidents involving aircraft that stalled and were not equipped with stall warning system
Without pre-judging the outcome of the accident investigation, the following thoughts may have some relevance...
The de Havilland Beaver floatplane has a long history of fatal accidents caused by low altitude stalls (see TSB Canada Aviation Investigation Report A15Q0120 below).
Unfortunately in the floatplane configuration, the Beaver aircraft is necessarily operated at low altitude from rivers and lake valleys that are typically surrounded by high ground with gusty changing wind velocities.
Added to that challenging environment, is the Beaver's modest performance envelope, low power/weight ratio, high drag form, the aircraft's stall behaviour and its stall warning characteristics.
After a deadly Beaver stall/crash accident in which killed a pilot along with his 5 passengers in Ontario 23 Aug 2015, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada's investigation report recommended that commercially operated de Havilland Beaver aircraft should be fitted with a stall warning systems.
The installation of stall warning systems were recommended because of inadequate natural stall warning provided by the aircraft itself and rapid onset of an accelerated stall.
The extracts below are from the TSB Canada Aviation Investigation Report A15Q0120:
Aviation Investigation Report A15Q0120 - Transportation Safety Board of Canada
In the controlled conditions of certification, the stalling of the DHC-2 was described as gentle. However, as is the case for many other aircraft, a stall in a steep turn under power triggers an Incipient spin with few or no signs of an impending stall, and the flight path changes from horizontal to vertical. In low-altitude flight, stalling followed by incipient spin, no matter how brief, prevents the pilot from regaining control of the aircraft before impact with the ground.
In 2014, Transport Canada and the manufacturer, Viking Air Limited, recommended that stall warning systems be installed, but only 4 have been installed on Canadian‑registered DHC-2s. There are currently 382 DHC-2s registered in Canada, 223 of which are used in commercial operations.
Level of risk is determined by the probability and severity of adverse consequences. Given the number of DHC-2s without a stall warning system in commercial operations, combined with the fact that low-altitude manoeuvres are an integral part of bush flying, it is reasonable to conclude that a stall at low altitude is likely to occur again. Because stalls at low altitude lead to catastrophic consequences, this type of accident carries a high level of risk.
Until, at a minimum, commercially operated DHC-2s registered in Canada are required to be equipped with a stall warning system, pilots and passengers who travel on these aircraft will remain exposed to an elevated risk of injury or death as a result of a stall at low altitude.
Therefore, the Board recommends that
the Department of Transport require all commercially operated DHC‑2 aircraft in Canada to be equipped with a stall warning system.
TSB Recommendation A17-01
Level of risk is determined by the probability and severity of adverse consequences. Given the number of DHC-2s without a stall warning system in commercial operations, combined with the fact that low-altitude manoeuvres are an integral part of bush flying, it is reasonable to conclude that a stall at low altitude is likely to occur again. Because stalls at low altitude lead to catastrophic consequences, this type of accident carries a high level of risk.
Until, at a minimum, commercially operated DHC-2s registered in Canada are required to be equipped with a stall warning system, pilots and passengers who travel on these aircraft will remain exposed to an elevated risk of injury or death as a result of a stall at low altitude.
Therefore, the Board recommends that
the Department of Transport require all commercially operated DHC‑2 aircraft in Canada to be equipped with a stall warning system.
TSB Recommendation A17-01
Appendix C – TSB aviation investigation reports on accidents involving aircraft that stalled and were not equipped with stall warning system
Accident Type Fatalities Summary
A14O0105 DHC-2 Beaver 0 The float-equipped DHC-2 Beaver aircraft (registration C‑FHVT, serial number 284) rolled to the left prior to the flare. The pilot attempted to regain control of the aircraft by applying full right rudder and right aileron. The attempt was unsuccessful, and the aircraft struck rising tree‑covered terrain above the shoreline. The aircraft came to a stop on its right side and on a slope. Two of the 3 people on board received minor injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system.
A12O0071 DHC-2 Beaver 2 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-FGBR, serial number 168) stalled and crashed during a go-around while attempting to land. Two of the 3 people on board drowned. The aircraft had no stall warning system.
A11C0100 DHC-2 Beaver 5 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-GUJX, serial number 1132) stalled and crashed during takeoff. All 5 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system.
A10Q0117 DHC-2 Beaver 2 The DHC-2 amphibious floatplane (registration C–FGYK, serial number 123) stalled and crashed during takeoff. Two of the 5 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system.
A09P0397 DHC-2 Beaver 6 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-GTMC, serial number 1171) stalled and crashed during takeoff. Six of the 8 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft was equipped with a stall warning system, but it was not functioning, and the TSB identified this as a cause or contributing factor.
A08A0095 DHC-2 Beaver 0 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-FPQC, serial number 873) stalled and crashed while the crew was attempting a forced landing. Five of the 7 people on board sustained serious injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system.
A05Q0157 DHC-2 Beaver 1 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-FODG, serial number 205) stalled and crashed during takeoff. The pilot, who was the sole person on board, received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system.
A04C0098 DHC-2 Beaver 4 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-GQHT, serial number 682) stalled and crashed on approach. The 4 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system.
A01Q0166 DHC-2 Beaver 3 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-GPUO, serial number 810) stalled and crashed on approach. Three of the 7 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system, and the TSB found this to be a risk factor.
A01P0194 DHC-2 Beaver 5 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-GVHT, serial number 257) stalled and crashed on approach. All 5 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system; the TSB noted this fact under "Other findings."
A00Q0006 DHC-2 Beaver 3 The DHC-2 (registration C-FIVA, serial number 515) stalled and crashed while climbing. Three of the 6 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system.
A98P0194 DHC-2 Beaver
(modified: maximum weight increased) 0 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-GCZA, serial number 1667) stalled and crashed following a missed approach. None of the people on board were injured, but the aircraft sustained substantial damage. The aircraft had no stall warning system, and the fact that the pilot had no warning of the impending stall was identified by the TSB as a cause or contributing factor in this occurrence.
A14O0105 DHC-2 Beaver 0 The float-equipped DHC-2 Beaver aircraft (registration C‑FHVT, serial number 284) rolled to the left prior to the flare. The pilot attempted to regain control of the aircraft by applying full right rudder and right aileron. The attempt was unsuccessful, and the aircraft struck rising tree‑covered terrain above the shoreline. The aircraft came to a stop on its right side and on a slope. Two of the 3 people on board received minor injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system.
A12O0071 DHC-2 Beaver 2 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-FGBR, serial number 168) stalled and crashed during a go-around while attempting to land. Two of the 3 people on board drowned. The aircraft had no stall warning system.
A11C0100 DHC-2 Beaver 5 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-GUJX, serial number 1132) stalled and crashed during takeoff. All 5 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system.
A10Q0117 DHC-2 Beaver 2 The DHC-2 amphibious floatplane (registration C–FGYK, serial number 123) stalled and crashed during takeoff. Two of the 5 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system.
A09P0397 DHC-2 Beaver 6 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-GTMC, serial number 1171) stalled and crashed during takeoff. Six of the 8 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft was equipped with a stall warning system, but it was not functioning, and the TSB identified this as a cause or contributing factor.
A08A0095 DHC-2 Beaver 0 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-FPQC, serial number 873) stalled and crashed while the crew was attempting a forced landing. Five of the 7 people on board sustained serious injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system.
A05Q0157 DHC-2 Beaver 1 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-FODG, serial number 205) stalled and crashed during takeoff. The pilot, who was the sole person on board, received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system.
A04C0098 DHC-2 Beaver 4 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-GQHT, serial number 682) stalled and crashed on approach. The 4 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system.
A01Q0166 DHC-2 Beaver 3 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-GPUO, serial number 810) stalled and crashed on approach. Three of the 7 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system, and the TSB found this to be a risk factor.
A01P0194 DHC-2 Beaver 5 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-GVHT, serial number 257) stalled and crashed on approach. All 5 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system; the TSB noted this fact under "Other findings."
A00Q0006 DHC-2 Beaver 3 The DHC-2 (registration C-FIVA, serial number 515) stalled and crashed while climbing. Three of the 6 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system.
A98P0194 DHC-2 Beaver
(modified: maximum weight increased) 0 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-GCZA, serial number 1667) stalled and crashed following a missed approach. None of the people on board were injured, but the aircraft sustained substantial damage. The aircraft had no stall warning system, and the fact that the pilot had no warning of the impending stall was identified by the TSB as a cause or contributing factor in this occurrence.
Last edited by FlexibleResponse; 1st Jan 2018 at 04:26. Reason: typo correction
Sniping
A reason I rarely bother with Pprune now is the constant sniping at contributors. If you think a post is wrong, say so in a professional way and move on. Reading slanging matches and 'one upmanship' posts is tedious and reflects poorly on aviators.
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Regarding the previous comment that turns below 400ft should be avoided in float operations - I have seen a caravan operated in the Brisbane Water channel enter a 70 degree bank angle turn immediately after liftoff (albeit having discharged passengers) to clear terrain,and on different days smaller aircraft including a Beaver weave down the channel after takeoff before climbing over Broken Bay. How feasible is it, operating in Cowan or channel areas to have a straight climb after takeoff? I would have thought that immediate turns would be required just about everywhere
As I said, this is something "I always TRY to adhere to when flying floats”. Of course with obstacle clearance, it’s simply not always possible. Obviously nobody is going to fly into a hillside on take-off from a river because it’s at 300ft directly in front of them and they don’t want to turn before 400ft...That’s just common sense.
I’ve seen numerous pilots on floats make needless steep turns immediately after take-off, or when coming into land - when there is simply no reason for it.
I’m not even saying the 400ft idea is applicable to all pilots and all aircraft. It’s simply an example of a self-imposed standard - and I do think having a personal set of such standards is good way to mitigate risk and remain disciplined.
Moderator
Wish we had a "Like" button for flyingfox's post.
Perhaps the arm chair experts may care to wander off for a coldie or should the Mods start culling posts?
Perhaps the arm chair experts may care to wander off for a coldie or should the Mods start culling posts?
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I’ve seen numerous pilots on floats make needless steep turns immediately after take-off, or when coming into land - when there is simply no reason for it.
I’m not even saying the 400ft idea is applicable to all pilots and all aircraft. It’s simply an example of a self-imposed standard - and I do think having a personal set of such standards is good way to mitigate risk and remain disciplined.
I’m not even saying the 400ft idea is applicable to all pilots and all aircraft. It’s simply an example of a self-imposed standard - and I do think having a personal set of such standards is good way to mitigate risk and remain disciplined.
I do not wish to impugn the airmanship of the pilots - just passing on a frequent observation that left me at times confounded at what to me appeared a bit gun-ho. Never flown a seaplane so I put it down to "what would I know"
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If the aircraft floats at a weight, the floats are supprting 100% of that weight, irrespective of what it is. The floats will have been designed to provide X kg/pounds max bouyancy each. Exceed that, and the aircraft will sink, irrespective of its BEW or MTOW.
If, however, you had said the floats are designed to support 180% of the aircraft's MTOW......
If, however, you had said the floats are designed to support 180% of the aircraft's MTOW......
- Yes floats are designed with a max buoyancy each.
- Yes the plane will sink if that is exceeded.
- Yes, the floats are designed to support 180% of your aircraft types MTOW.
FAR 23.751 requires that the 2 floats of a twin-float floatplane provide 180% fresh water buoyancy. To determine the maximum weight allowed for a seaplane equipped with two floats, divide the total displacement by 1.8.
Specific floats are designed for specific aircraft types. You could in theory put floats of reduced buoyancy capacity on your a/c, and reduce your MTOW accordingly - but that would be rather silly.
What you do, is select a set of floats with enough buoyancy so that the upper limit on your MTOW is not restricted by the buoyancy capacity of your floats.
So I as said, you will install floats that are designed to support 180% of your aircrafts MTOW.
I can’t really help you more on this. It’s really not that complicated, so I’ll leave it at that. Just google FAR 23.751 for more information on float requirements.
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From the Beeb:-
The chief executive of catering giant Compass Group has died in a New Year's Eve seaplane crash near Sydney alongside his two sons, fiancée and her daughter, his firm has said.
Richard Cousins died after the plane plunged into a river 30 miles (50km) north of Sydney. Mr Cousins, 58, died alongside Emma Bowden, 48, her 11-year-old daughter, and his sons, William, 25, and Edward, 23, police have said. The Australian pilot was also killed. Police in Australia have named the pilot as Gareth Morgan, 44.
The crash happened at about 15.10 local time (04.10 GMT) on Sunday, New South Wales Police said.
BBC correspondent Phil Mercer said the family were believed to be returning to Sydney from an exclusive waterfront restaurant in Jerusalem Bay on New Year's Eve when the plane crashed. Mr Cousins had been chief executive of the Surrey-based Compass Group - thought to be the largest food service company in the world - since 2006. He was due to leave his role in March and retire from the group in September.
'A tragic accident'
Paul Walsh, Compass chairman, said the firm was "deeply shocked and saddened" by his death.
"The thoughts of everyone at Compass are with Richard's family and friends, and we extend our deepest sympathies to them," he said. "It has been a great privilege to know Richard personally and to work with him for the last few years. Richard was known and respected for his great humanity and a no-nonsense style that transformed Compass into one of Britain's leading companies."
The crash involved a single-engine DHC-2 Beaver Seaplane Detective Superintendent Mark Hutchings, head of the New South Wales marine area command, said: "These people had come over on holiday to one of the most beautiful parts of the world and for this to happen at a place like this is just tragic," he told a press conference. "We would like to extend our sincere condolences to the family and friends of those people that perished." He added: "This can only be described as a tragic accident, and our hearts go out to them."
Plane 'sunk rapidly'
Eyewitnesses said the aircraft turned sharply to the right shortly after taking off, before crashing. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) said the plane "sunk rapidly" after crashing into the river. Police divers were flown to the scene, and all six bodies were recovered on Sunday evening.
"The sequence of events leading up to the accident are not yet understood," the ATSB said.
The single-engine aircraft belonged to sightseeing flight company Sydney Seaplanes, which offers scenic flights over local tourist attractions. Aaron Shaw, managing director of Sydney Seaplanes, said: "We do not yet know the cause of the accident." He said everyone at the firm was "deeply shocked by this incident", adding: "We have suspended all operations until further notice."
The UK Foreign Office has said consular officials are in contact with local authorities and staff are "ready to provide consular assistance".
The chief executive of catering giant Compass Group has died in a New Year's Eve seaplane crash near Sydney alongside his two sons, fiancée and her daughter, his firm has said.
Richard Cousins died after the plane plunged into a river 30 miles (50km) north of Sydney. Mr Cousins, 58, died alongside Emma Bowden, 48, her 11-year-old daughter, and his sons, William, 25, and Edward, 23, police have said. The Australian pilot was also killed. Police in Australia have named the pilot as Gareth Morgan, 44.
The crash happened at about 15.10 local time (04.10 GMT) on Sunday, New South Wales Police said.
BBC correspondent Phil Mercer said the family were believed to be returning to Sydney from an exclusive waterfront restaurant in Jerusalem Bay on New Year's Eve when the plane crashed. Mr Cousins had been chief executive of the Surrey-based Compass Group - thought to be the largest food service company in the world - since 2006. He was due to leave his role in March and retire from the group in September.
'A tragic accident'
Paul Walsh, Compass chairman, said the firm was "deeply shocked and saddened" by his death.
"The thoughts of everyone at Compass are with Richard's family and friends, and we extend our deepest sympathies to them," he said. "It has been a great privilege to know Richard personally and to work with him for the last few years. Richard was known and respected for his great humanity and a no-nonsense style that transformed Compass into one of Britain's leading companies."
The crash involved a single-engine DHC-2 Beaver Seaplane Detective Superintendent Mark Hutchings, head of the New South Wales marine area command, said: "These people had come over on holiday to one of the most beautiful parts of the world and for this to happen at a place like this is just tragic," he told a press conference. "We would like to extend our sincere condolences to the family and friends of those people that perished." He added: "This can only be described as a tragic accident, and our hearts go out to them."
Plane 'sunk rapidly'
Eyewitnesses said the aircraft turned sharply to the right shortly after taking off, before crashing. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) said the plane "sunk rapidly" after crashing into the river. Police divers were flown to the scene, and all six bodies were recovered on Sunday evening.
"The sequence of events leading up to the accident are not yet understood," the ATSB said.
The single-engine aircraft belonged to sightseeing flight company Sydney Seaplanes, which offers scenic flights over local tourist attractions. Aaron Shaw, managing director of Sydney Seaplanes, said: "We do not yet know the cause of the accident." He said everyone at the firm was "deeply shocked by this incident", adding: "We have suspended all operations until further notice."
The UK Foreign Office has said consular officials are in contact with local authorities and staff are "ready to provide consular assistance".
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Pilot Gareth Morgan, 44, and passengers have been identified.
CEO Richard Cousins and family cut down in seaplane crash before year of new beginnings
RIP.
CEO Richard Cousins and family cut down in seaplane crash before year of new beginnings
RIP.
This accident makes no sense to me.
Good weather and wind conditions, highly experienced pilot, video seems to show the aircraft safely airborne with reasonable terrain clearance over the ridge line.
Yet the crash scene seems to indicate some sort of uncontrolled flight into the water.
Why would the pilot choose to fly to Cowan Ck after, apparently, getting airborne in the safe, wide, waterway at Cottage Point for a southbound flight?
There simply has to be more to this - major mechanical failure, pilot incapacitation, bird strike, cabin fire, controls obstructed by right seat pax etc. And yes, I have enough Beaver float time to know the primary flight control arrangement.
Good weather and wind conditions, highly experienced pilot, video seems to show the aircraft safely airborne with reasonable terrain clearance over the ridge line.
Yet the crash scene seems to indicate some sort of uncontrolled flight into the water.
Why would the pilot choose to fly to Cowan Ck after, apparently, getting airborne in the safe, wide, waterway at Cottage Point for a southbound flight?
There simply has to be more to this - major mechanical failure, pilot incapacitation, bird strike, cabin fire, controls obstructed by right seat pax etc. And yes, I have enough Beaver float time to know the primary flight control arrangement.
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This accident makes no sense to me.
Good weather and wind conditions, highly experienced pilot, video seems to show the aircraft safely airborne with reasonable terrain clearance over the ridge line.
Yet the crash scene seems to indicate some sort of uncontrolled flight into the water.
Why would the pilot choose to fly to Cowan Ck after, apparently, getting airborne in the safe, wide, waterway at Cottage Point for a southbound flight?
There simply has to be more to this - major mechanical failure, pilot incapacitation, bird strike, cabin fire, controls obstructed by right seat pax etc. And yes, I have enough Beaver float time to know the primary flight control arrangement.
Good weather and wind conditions, highly experienced pilot, video seems to show the aircraft safely airborne with reasonable terrain clearance over the ridge line.
Yet the crash scene seems to indicate some sort of uncontrolled flight into the water.
Why would the pilot choose to fly to Cowan Ck after, apparently, getting airborne in the safe, wide, waterway at Cottage Point for a southbound flight?
There simply has to be more to this - major mechanical failure, pilot incapacitation, bird strike, cabin fire, controls obstructed by right seat pax etc. And yes, I have enough Beaver float time to know the primary flight control arrangement.
this year i am starting a degree in safety and accident investigations, so it will make an interesting subject of study for me, as i do know a lot of guys at Syd Seaplanes and Salt air pretty well.
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A great irritation of media reporting of events like this is: “Catering giant CEO Richard C.... killed...”
as if somehow one life was more important than the other five who died.
Incidentally, I had never before heard of him or his organisation.
Jack
as if somehow one life was more important than the other five who died.
Incidentally, I had never before heard of him or his organisation.
Jack
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I think the Beaver had and A.D come out Canada in the last few years pertaining corrosion in the elevator...anyhow, I guess they’ll figure the cause.
Last edited by Jerry Springer; 1st Jan 2018 at 09:30.
This accident makes no sense to me.
Good weather and wind conditions, highly experienced pilot, video seems to show the aircraft safely airborne with reasonable terrain clearance over the ridge line.
Yet the crash scene seems to indicate some sort of uncontrolled flight into the water.
Why would the pilot choose to fly to Cowan Ck after, apparently, getting airborne in the safe, wide, waterway at Cottage Point for a southbound flight?
Good weather and wind conditions, highly experienced pilot, video seems to show the aircraft safely airborne with reasonable terrain clearance over the ridge line.
Yet the crash scene seems to indicate some sort of uncontrolled flight into the water.
Why would the pilot choose to fly to Cowan Ck after, apparently, getting airborne in the safe, wide, waterway at Cottage Point for a southbound flight?
RIP Gareth Morgan, and your passengers. Something happened to you that none reading this would want to see themselves. There, but for the grace of God.....
PS: Be nice if someone could fix the spelling of ‘HawkEsbury’ in the title of this post,
Last edited by V-Jet; 1st Jan 2018 at 10:06. Reason: Suggestion for accuracy in the thread title.
.
A lengthy quote - sorry.
I recall from my RAAF Pilots Course in 1952 that these sort of so-called Safety Briefings briefings so beloved by CASA and incorporated in todays flying school Operations Manuals, were never considered necessary. in fact they were never even thought of. To this day I still consider them as superfluous. In any take off, the situation is dynamic. It is impossible to self brief all the possible permutations that could occur. So what's the point in gabbling away to yourself apart from making your passengers feel nervous as you mutter away to yourself a meaningless ritual.
In real life you simply have to wing it - literally.
See above..
A lengthy quote - sorry.
I recall from my RAAF Pilots Course in 1952 that these sort of so-called Safety Briefings briefings so beloved by CASA and incorporated in todays flying school Operations Manuals, were never considered necessary. in fact they were never even thought of. To this day I still consider them as superfluous. In any take off, the situation is dynamic. It is impossible to self brief all the possible permutations that could occur. So what's the point in gabbling away to yourself apart from making your passengers feel nervous as you mutter away to yourself a meaningless ritual.
In real life you simply have to wing it - literally.
See above..
Saved my skin on at least two occasions on heavy jets with engine failure just after take off.
Can't prepare for every eventuality, but you can at least prepare for many, costs nothing, might save the day.
Last edited by RetiredBA/BY; 1st Jan 2018 at 10:25.
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Jack - the media have to lead with something - you'd probably complain if they'd lead about the little girl
And Compass are a major player in food services all over the place - not a household name but a major company
Always bad a whole family is hit like this - there but for the grace of God.............
And Compass are a major player in food services all over the place - not a household name but a major company
Always bad a whole family is hit like this - there but for the grace of God.............
Keeping Danny in Sandwiches
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These pilot notes might be of interest
https://washingtonseaplanepilots.org...Beaver-POH.pdf
A quick read through does highlight that the ASI goes up to 250 MPH (?) VNO is 180mph normal max speed is 145 mph at sea level but the normal flight envelope is between getting airborne a 55 -65 mph with T/O flaps and climbing at 80 to 95mph with climb flaps. The area of normal operation on the ASI is only about a quarter of the indicator and very compressed at the T/O and climb section.
Referring to the stall (60 mph clean zero bank) the manual states "the stall is gentle at all normal conditions of load and flap and may be anticipated by a slight vibration that increases as flap is lowered. the aircraft will pitch if no yaw is present. If yaw is permitted there is a tendency to roll. Prompt corrective action must be initiated to prevent the roll from developing.
Instruments like the ASI might well have been updated since then.
https://washingtonseaplanepilots.org...Beaver-POH.pdf
A quick read through does highlight that the ASI goes up to 250 MPH (?) VNO is 180mph normal max speed is 145 mph at sea level but the normal flight envelope is between getting airborne a 55 -65 mph with T/O flaps and climbing at 80 to 95mph with climb flaps. The area of normal operation on the ASI is only about a quarter of the indicator and very compressed at the T/O and climb section.
Referring to the stall (60 mph clean zero bank) the manual states "the stall is gentle at all normal conditions of load and flap and may be anticipated by a slight vibration that increases as flap is lowered. the aircraft will pitch if no yaw is present. If yaw is permitted there is a tendency to roll. Prompt corrective action must be initiated to prevent the roll from developing.
Instruments like the ASI might well have been updated since then.
Last edited by sky9; 1st Jan 2018 at 18:22.