DHC Beaver down in Hawkesbury
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Unusual indeed! The floats support 180% of the aircraft, so for nothing to float up it it’s odd, though I recall a helicopter in a similar depth of water nose-diving in getting stuck intact in the mud at the bottom.
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Someone poignantly posted on the thread about the new year's eve disaster when six died in a seaplane on a branch of the Hawkesbury just north of Sydney, that the thought of wishing anyone a "Happy New Year" to some degree stuck in his throat. Which for me prompted the beginning of a line of thought to do with taking a look back to possibly find a way to reduce the number of careless accidents in the year ahead.
How to inculcate in the novice or in the more experienced who repeatedly "gets away with it again" a revitalised sense of an active awareness of the pitfalls of inattention or the cock-sure and dangerous belief that they have the game scunned?
Ossie Osgood of Arnhem Air Charter saw to it that all new recruits to his company ploughed through and read a list of prescribed books including 'Fate is the Hunter' and 'Sigh for a Merlin' so as to acquire an appreciation of the stand-point of those who had gone before and who had the gift to impart in their writings the various key factors that helped to ensure their repeated survival in the hostile environment in which the business of flying has always functioned. Not just their survival, but their newly discovered ability not to be stupid, but to be realistic in assessing every potential hazard.
Ossie was the mentor supreme. He wanted his pilots to think about those who had stuffed up. He wanted to talk with them about what they thought killed Smithy. Or killed Charles Ulm. And what it was saved men like PG (Bill) Taylor from disaster time and time again. But he could not teach them how to take the calculated risk. He knew, and they soon knew, that you cannot pick away at your quota of coal without doing it essentially on your own at the coalface. If on the other hand, Ossie found that he could not get anywhere with certain individuals (whom he soon realised he had initially misjudged and had acted on an erroneous gut feeling in employing them) he would then in a fatherly way take them aside and use his well tuned powers of persuasion to point the object of his disappointment in another direction to that of being the reincarnation of James Bigglesworth.
In John Gunn's book , 'The Defeat of Distance' , there are early passages that tell how the Queensland and Northern Territory AIr Service emerged out of a combination of business acumen (Fergus McMaster, Ainslie Templeton), operational nous and caution (Hudson Fysh) and sheer gung-ho balls for the adventure (Paul McGuiness).
Ossie lamented the passing of the days of pioneering flight but at the same time knew that the future was one that would be driven and held together by a new breed of men and women more attune to pressing buttons than discovering the roots of their craft. Shiny bums devoid of first hand experience of the real character of the business would be employed sitting at their desks devising new programs of risk management and occupational health and safety. Brave new (inevitable) world!
How to inculcate in the novice or in the more experienced who repeatedly "gets away with it again" a revitalised sense of an active awareness of the pitfalls of inattention or the cock-sure and dangerous belief that they have the game scunned?
Ossie Osgood of Arnhem Air Charter saw to it that all new recruits to his company ploughed through and read a list of prescribed books including 'Fate is the Hunter' and 'Sigh for a Merlin' so as to acquire an appreciation of the stand-point of those who had gone before and who had the gift to impart in their writings the various key factors that helped to ensure their repeated survival in the hostile environment in which the business of flying has always functioned. Not just their survival, but their newly discovered ability not to be stupid, but to be realistic in assessing every potential hazard.
Ossie was the mentor supreme. He wanted his pilots to think about those who had stuffed up. He wanted to talk with them about what they thought killed Smithy. Or killed Charles Ulm. And what it was saved men like PG (Bill) Taylor from disaster time and time again. But he could not teach them how to take the calculated risk. He knew, and they soon knew, that you cannot pick away at your quota of coal without doing it essentially on your own at the coalface. If on the other hand, Ossie found that he could not get anywhere with certain individuals (whom he soon realised he had initially misjudged and had acted on an erroneous gut feeling in employing them) he would then in a fatherly way take them aside and use his well tuned powers of persuasion to point the object of his disappointment in another direction to that of being the reincarnation of James Bigglesworth.
In John Gunn's book , 'The Defeat of Distance' , there are early passages that tell how the Queensland and Northern Territory AIr Service emerged out of a combination of business acumen (Fergus McMaster, Ainslie Templeton), operational nous and caution (Hudson Fysh) and sheer gung-ho balls for the adventure (Paul McGuiness).
Ossie lamented the passing of the days of pioneering flight but at the same time knew that the future was one that would be driven and held together by a new breed of men and women more attune to pressing buttons than discovering the roots of their craft. Shiny bums devoid of first hand experience of the real character of the business would be employed sitting at their desks devising new programs of risk management and occupational health and safety. Brave new (inevitable) world!
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It is. Each float needs enough buoyancy to support 90% of the aircrafts weight. There are 2 floats, hence combined they will support 180% of the aircraft weight.
Furthermore, they are designed so that the aircraft will still float if half of any of the compartments in one of the floats are flooded.
Furthermore, they are designed so that the aircraft will still float if half of any of the compartments in one of the floats are flooded.
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I think some basic aerobatics should be part of all pilot training. I don’t think pilots even need to do spins in most countries to get a CPL ? I’ve come across many pilots who appear to think the rudder pedals are really only for taxing.
It's too early to assume the pilot was at fault in this accident, but stalling at low level in a turn is one such ‘carless accident’ that simply does not have to happen in 2018. “Speed is life” has always stuck in my head from my Ag rating. It’s a moto I used in all flying activities.
I think we naturally get more cautions with time, and probably we can all admit to doing one or two silly things when flying. Especially when not restricted to Airways and Published Arrivals and Departures.
“No turns below 400 feet” was another rule we had in the Maldives, which I always try to adhere to when flying floats, even if there in nothing but open water all around.
Discipline can be very difficult to self-monitor for single-pilots. Two crew: a take-off briefing is standard, but as a single pilot it’s easy just to start a take off run without any self-brefing, especially if VFR. I think in training this should be addressed. Maybe today it is, but when I did my PPL/CPL training, I never had to say, "if the engine quits at 100 feet I’m going to land straight ahead. If it quits at 400 feet, I’m tuning 30 degrees left and heading for the golf course, however the wind is from the right so i’m going be extra cautious with the loss of airspeed ...and so on”
I’d be curious to know if instructors today make their students give a brief prior to each phase of flight?
This is something I get lazy with when flying alone - which obviously isn’t good. I need to work in that in 2018. So thanks for your post. It’s timely to ask how to "possibly find a way to reduce the number of careless accidents.” This is something well worth thinking about as individuals and collectively. It’s just a shame it sometimes takes a tragic accident before we reexamine our own flying habits.
Reporter on the nine news said the divers would be looking for the black box when they located the wreckage. Good luck with that! 
DF.
DF.
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Regarding the previous comment that turns below 400ft should be avoided in float operations - I have seen a caravan operated in the Brisbane Water channel enter a 70 degree bank angle turn immediately after liftoff (albeit having discharged passengers) to clear terrain,and on different days smaller aircraft including a Beaver weave down the channel after takeoff before climbing over Broken Bay. How feasible is it, operating in Cowan or channel areas to have a straight climb after takeoff? I would have thought that immediate turns would be required just about everywhere
Last edited by Alchemy101; 1st Jan 2018 at 01:36.
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zzuf - we were probably hoeing into one of Carmel's great hamburgers at the time. VH-HTS, the C185, used to be with Wilderness Air at Strahan in Tasmania. The principal there was one KP. I christened him Captain Sudden as he sometimes threw his seaplanes around like a dodgem car driver. When he was asked if HTS stood for anything in particular, he point to the battery and jumper leads in the luggage compartment and said -
"Gees yeah . . .. HARD TO START."
The wreckage of HTS at Berowra was notable in that the scatter was closely confined, pointing right off to a stall/ spin being the end result, but really not the prime cause at all. (There were many
other earlier factors that in hindsight pointed to a calamity in the making.)
"Gees yeah . . .. HARD TO START."
The wreckage of HTS at Berowra was notable in that the scatter was closely confined, pointing right off to a stall/ spin being the end result, but really not the prime cause at all. (There were many
other earlier factors that in hindsight pointed to a calamity in the making.)
It has to be said that it had no maintenance problems. The aircraft under went a extreme service piour to the accident. It was over heard by poeple recovering the aircraft that a basi person said it was the best maintained sea plane that they had seen.
The accident was purly pilot error.
They did find one commercial bolt in the accident. However this was proven to be installed by the operator post service.
The main difference between these two accidents at this stage is the weather.
Just two extremely sad endings to what should have been a happy occasion.
Thoughts to all thoose envoled.
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If the aircraft went in nose first as described, it would have torn the floats to shreds. There's no way they would have held together from the impact. Straight to the bottom she would go... as she did.
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Connedrod - not wanting to feed a troll - but here goes...
What absolute nonsense.
What absolute nonsense.
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24994/...802830_001.pdf
what he has said about the earlier prang does not warrant your insult.
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Ossie’s insights
Someone poignantly posted on the thread about the new year's eve disaster when six died in a seaplane on a branch of the Hawkesbury just north of Sydney, that the thought of wishing anyone a "Happy New Year" to some degree stuck in his throat. Which for me prompted the beginning of a line of thought to do with taking a look back to possibly find a way to reduce the number of careless accidents in the year ahead.
How to inculcate in the novice or in the more experienced who repeatedly "gets away with it again" a revitalised sense of an active awareness of the pitfalls of inattention or the cock-sure and dangerous belief that they have the game scunned?
Ossie Osgood of Arnhem Air Charter saw to it that all new recruits to his company ploughed through and read a list of prescribed books including 'Fate is the Hunter' and 'Sigh for a Merlin' so as to acquire an appreciation of the stand-point of those who had gone before and who had the gift to impart in their writings the various key factors that helped to ensure their repeated survival in the hostile environment in which the business of flying has always functioned. Not just their survival, but their newly discovered ability not to be stupid, but to be realistic in assessing every potential hazard.
Ossie was the mentor supreme. He wanted his pilots to think about those who had stuffed up. He wanted to talk with them about what they thought killed Smithy. Or killed Charles Ulm. And what it was saved men like PG (Bill) Taylor from disaster time and time again. But he could not teach them how to take the calculated risk. He knew, and they soon knew, that you cannot pick away at your quota of coal without doing it essentially on your own at the coalface. If on the other hand, Ossie found that he could not get anywhere with certain individuals (whom he soon realised he had initially misjudged and had acted on an erroneous gut feeling in employing them) he would then in a fatherly way take them aside and use his well tuned powers of persuasion to point the object of his disappointment in another direction to that of being the reincarnation of James Bigglesworth.
In John Gunn's book , 'The Defeat of Distance' , there are early passages that tell how the Queensland and Northern Territory AIr Service emerged out of a combination of business acumen (Fergus McMaster, Ainslie Templeton), operational nous and caution (Hudson Fysh) and sheer gung-ho balls for the adventure (Paul McGuiness).
Ossie lamented the passing of the days of pioneering flight but at the same time knew that the future was one that would be driven and held together by a new breed of men and women more attune to pressing buttons than discovering the roots of their craft. Shiny bums devoid of first hand experience of the real character of the business would be employed sitting at their desks devising new programs of risk management and occupational health and safety. Brave new (inevitable) world!
How to inculcate in the novice or in the more experienced who repeatedly "gets away with it again" a revitalised sense of an active awareness of the pitfalls of inattention or the cock-sure and dangerous belief that they have the game scunned?
Ossie Osgood of Arnhem Air Charter saw to it that all new recruits to his company ploughed through and read a list of prescribed books including 'Fate is the Hunter' and 'Sigh for a Merlin' so as to acquire an appreciation of the stand-point of those who had gone before and who had the gift to impart in their writings the various key factors that helped to ensure their repeated survival in the hostile environment in which the business of flying has always functioned. Not just their survival, but their newly discovered ability not to be stupid, but to be realistic in assessing every potential hazard.
Ossie was the mentor supreme. He wanted his pilots to think about those who had stuffed up. He wanted to talk with them about what they thought killed Smithy. Or killed Charles Ulm. And what it was saved men like PG (Bill) Taylor from disaster time and time again. But he could not teach them how to take the calculated risk. He knew, and they soon knew, that you cannot pick away at your quota of coal without doing it essentially on your own at the coalface. If on the other hand, Ossie found that he could not get anywhere with certain individuals (whom he soon realised he had initially misjudged and had acted on an erroneous gut feeling in employing them) he would then in a fatherly way take them aside and use his well tuned powers of persuasion to point the object of his disappointment in another direction to that of being the reincarnation of James Bigglesworth.
In John Gunn's book , 'The Defeat of Distance' , there are early passages that tell how the Queensland and Northern Territory AIr Service emerged out of a combination of business acumen (Fergus McMaster, Ainslie Templeton), operational nous and caution (Hudson Fysh) and sheer gung-ho balls for the adventure (Paul McGuiness).
Ossie lamented the passing of the days of pioneering flight but at the same time knew that the future was one that would be driven and held together by a new breed of men and women more attune to pressing buttons than discovering the roots of their craft. Shiny bums devoid of first hand experience of the real character of the business would be employed sitting at their desks devising new programs of risk management and occupational health and safety. Brave new (inevitable) world!
If the aircraft floats at a weight, the floats are supprting 100% of that weight, irrespective of what it is. The floats will have been designed to provide X kg/pounds max bouyancy each. Exceed that, and the aircraft will sink, irrespective of its BEW or MTOW.
If, however, you had said the floats are designed to support 180% of the aircraft's MTOW......
If, however, you had said the floats are designed to support 180% of the aircraft's MTOW......
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If the aircraft floats at a weight, the floats are supporting 100% of that weight, irrespective of what it is. The floats will have been designed to provide X kg/pounds max buoyancy each. Exceed that, and the aircraft will sink, irrespective of its BEW or MTOW.
If, however, you had said the floats are designed to support 180% of the aircraft's MTOW......
If, however, you had said the floats are designed to support 180% of the aircraft's MTOW......
but as a single pilot it’s easy just to start a take off run without any self-briefing, especially if VFR. I think in training this should be addressed. Maybe today it is, but when I did my PPL/CPL training, I never had to say, "if the engine quits at 100 feet I’m going to land straight ahead. If it quits at 400 feet, I’m tuning 30 degrees left and heading for the golf course, however the wind is from the right so i’m going be extra cautious with the loss of airspeed ...and so on”
A lengthy quote - sorry.
I recall from my RAAF Pilots Course in 1952 that these sort of so-called Safety Briefings briefings so beloved by CASA and incorporated in todays flying school Operations Manuals, were never considered necessary. in fact they were never even thought of. To this day I still consider them as superfluous. In any take off, the situation is dynamic. It is impossible to self brief all the possible permutations that could occur. So what's the point in gabbling away to yourself apart from making your passengers feel nervous as you mutter away to yourself a meaningless ritual.
For example, before you drive your car from the driveway, do you verbally or mentally go through all the varying events that could occur requiring your instant action?
"If I see a kangaroo hop from the side of the road, I shall immediately assess whether I should apply the brakes or swerve to avoid it. The Threat is the moving kangaroo and I will identify that threat and manage it. If someone is tail-gating me on the Freeway (very likely
), I shall move gently into another lane. if that lane is not free, I will stamp on my brakes and hopefully frighten the bugger to back off." Get the drift?
For every second after lift off the situation changes depending on rate of climb, current indicated altitude (corrected for OAT in cold climates
) energy in store, IAS, flap setting, temperature and wind direction. You name it.In real life you simply have to wing it - literally.
I’d be curious to know if instructors today make their students give a brief prior to each phase of flight?
This is something I get lazy with when flying alone - which obviously isn’t good.
This is something I get lazy with when flying alone - which obviously isn’t good.