B747 Flying Tiger Line crash CFIT Kuala Lumpur February 1989
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B747 Flying Tiger Line crash CFIT Kuala Lumpur February 1989
Flying Tiger 747 approaching Kuala Lumpur. ATC radioed to the flight, "Tiger 66, descend two four zero zero [2,400 ft]. Cleared for NDB approach runway three three." The captain of Tiger 66, who heard "descend to four zero zero" replied with, "Okay, four zero zero" (meaning 400 ft above sea level, which was 2,000 ft too low). The result was fatal.
The proper radio call from ATC, instead of "descend two four zero zero", should have been "descend and maintain two thousand four hundred feet". The captain read back "okay, four zero zero" where the proper read back should have been "Roger, descend and maintain four-hundred feet".
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flying...Line_Flight_66
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Reminds me when we were descending into Manila where the lady ATC was talking so fast (her accent didn't help) that the PM got really stressed trying to understand her - let alone read-back instructions. . It was his first time into Manila so his confusion was understandable. In the end it was easier for the PF to continue flying plus do the talking since the PM had lost the plot by then.
The proper radio call from ATC, instead of "descend two four zero zero", should have been "descend and maintain two thousand four hundred feet". The captain read back "okay, four zero zero" where the proper read back should have been "Roger, descend and maintain four-hundred feet".
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flying...Line_Flight_66
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Reminds me when we were descending into Manila where the lady ATC was talking so fast (her accent didn't help) that the PM got really stressed trying to understand her - let alone read-back instructions. . It was his first time into Manila so his confusion was understandable. In the end it was easier for the PF to continue flying plus do the talking since the PM had lost the plot by then.
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I could be wrong here but I seem to recall that the phraseology "two thousand...etc" only came into effect sometime after, and as a direct consequence of, this accident. Prior to that, I seem recall that the appropriate phraseology was typically "....descend TO two four zero zero"
Centaurus, thank you again for a useful and thought-provoking post. The wiki report mentions the importance of minimum altitude; note to self: these are important. I'll also remind myself that in some ways these unfortunate people died because of errors of judgement, and have I ever made any such errors -hell yes.
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Tiger 66
I was based in HKG at the time of this accident and I recall much was made of the attempt by the ATC involved to "fit in" with what some believed to be the less "formal" RT phraseology used by many US crews. That no one, including the ATC, picked up on the incorrect read back of the clearance by the Captain was certainly a contributing factor. Also, the First Officer who was the handling pilot did not have an approach plate to refer to. Had he had an approach plate he would certainly have been made aware of the MSA in the area and the MDA for the NDB approach.
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There are several videos online puporting to have the Tigers 66 CVR recording but I think most if not all actually have audio from a training tape done in the sim from the published CVR transcript.
I've operated that Changi to Subang leg a few times in years past with both round dials and glass. It's only a few minutes, looks like a piece of cake after the long flight into Singapore but is often full of weather, terrain and similar sounding fixes.
Of course, ignoring a GPWS on approach at night has repeatedly proven to be a fatal mistake.
I somehow associate this crash with the 'no significant loss of life' phrase used, often ironically, to explain the sometimes lower regulatory standards and higher accident rate found in cargo flying.
However, this cite references a cargo plane crash in 1997:
https://www.joc.com/cargo-planes-fal..._20000228.html
I've operated that Changi to Subang leg a few times in years past with both round dials and glass. It's only a few minutes, looks like a piece of cake after the long flight into Singapore but is often full of weather, terrain and similar sounding fixes.
Of course, ignoring a GPWS on approach at night has repeatedly proven to be a fatal mistake.
I somehow associate this crash with the 'no significant loss of life' phrase used, often ironically, to explain the sometimes lower regulatory standards and higher accident rate found in cargo flying.
However, this cite references a cargo plane crash in 1997:
He noted what some freighter pilots see as callousness toward them by federal regulators. That was evidenced for many pilots by a National Transportation Safety Board review of the crash of a freighter that killed eight crewmembers in December 1997. The official NTSB report included a line that the tragedy involved ''no significant loss of life.''
Not having cargo aircraft equipped with the same safety equipment as other jetliners is shortsighted at best, Whyte said.
Not having cargo aircraft equipped with the same safety equipment as other jetliners is shortsighted at best, Whyte said.
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Rescue Services
Airbubba, I noted the article you provided the link to was dated 2000. Is it still valid in terms of Rescue and Firefighting Services as they apply to freight ops?
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Talk about lack of situational awareness. Who accepts a clearance to 400' to commence an instrument approach? Where in the world is there an instrument approach commencing at 400'? They should have known immediately that something was terribly wrong when they thought they were being cleared to 400' & clarified the instruction.
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Clearance error
Not sure if the tape is actual or a reenactment... but they sound tired. Hard to believe that in the normal run of things that a person qualified to be a 747 Captain would make such a basic error to accept a clearance to 400 that far away. The FO is flying but sounds concerned. The Captain seems over assertive and makes the decision to press on. Perhaps heavy fatigue played a role.
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Rest rules in the U.S. are different for the freight dogs due to a 'cargo cutout' provision in FAR Part 117:
One Level Of Safety Needed In Flawed Flight Duty And Rest Regulations
By Jim Douglas
January 26, 2012 - More than a dozen pilots from a number of ALPA pilot groups have been in Washington, D.C., working with Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) Government Affairs staff aggressively lobbying members of Congress in support of “One Level of Safety” for cargo and passenger pilots.
In just two weeks, ALPA pilots met face-to-face with more than 50 congressional offices on this important issue, advocating for legislation to include cargo operations in the new FAR 117 pilot fatigue rule. Is it going to take a tragedy before we properly apply the new flight duty and rest rules?
ALPA pilots are also hand-delivering a letter from Capt. Moak urging Congress to complete work on the FAA reauthorization bill. ALPA’s work to include cargo operations on the new pilot fatigue rule will be ongoing, with pilots regularly visiting Capitol Hill to advocate for One Level of Safety.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) recently released the new flight duty and rest regulations required by the Airline Safety and Federal FAA Extension Act of 2010. These long awaited regulations were on the National Transportation Safety Board’s most wanted list for over twenty years and sought by airline labor groups for nearly as long.
By Jim Douglas
January 26, 2012 - More than a dozen pilots from a number of ALPA pilot groups have been in Washington, D.C., working with Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) Government Affairs staff aggressively lobbying members of Congress in support of “One Level of Safety” for cargo and passenger pilots.
In just two weeks, ALPA pilots met face-to-face with more than 50 congressional offices on this important issue, advocating for legislation to include cargo operations in the new FAR 117 pilot fatigue rule. Is it going to take a tragedy before we properly apply the new flight duty and rest rules?
ALPA pilots are also hand-delivering a letter from Capt. Moak urging Congress to complete work on the FAA reauthorization bill. ALPA’s work to include cargo operations on the new pilot fatigue rule will be ongoing, with pilots regularly visiting Capitol Hill to advocate for One Level of Safety.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) recently released the new flight duty and rest regulations required by the Airline Safety and Federal FAA Extension Act of 2010. These long awaited regulations were on the National Transportation Safety Board’s most wanted list for over twenty years and sought by airline labor groups for nearly as long.
Large cargo planes operated by U.S. carriers certainly seem to have a high hull loss rate compared passenger carriers in the last couple of decades as we have discussed on past threads here:
>>by now FED EX must have one of the worst hull loss records in the industry!
Sadly, FedEx seems to have a widebody hull loss every two or three years. If they were a pax carrier there would be enormous adverse publicity and probably many casualties as well.
I've got friends over at FedEx who tell me the FAA has been all over their training for years now. Instead of annual AQP sim checks like most U.S. carriers, they are under a closely monitored old style six month program.
The pilot flying in the December 2003 MD-10 hard landing and fire at MEM had a history of busted checkrides before she was hired. In April, 1994 the feds pulled her ATP after an FAA inspector observed her performance. She took more training and got the ATP back and was hired by FedEx in 1996. At FedEx she had more checkride failures, a couple of DUI's and an altitude bust that set up the fateful Mad Dog line check back into MEM. Is it possible that "diversity" was promoted over performance in this case? A possibly similar precedent at FedEx was the overlooked poor employment history of Auburn Calloway who brutally attempted to hijack a FedEx DC-10 in MEM in 1994.
Traditionally, FedEx has had very high employment standards for the freight world, i.e. almost all pilots have college degrees (well, there are some Naval Academy graduates <g>) and many are like the founder, Fred Smith, ex-military aviators [I was later corrected on this point, Fred was a Marine officer but not an Aviator - Airbubba]. The company is consistently profitable and maintenance is excellent by most accounts.
Still, the mishaps and hull losses continue at what everyone agrees is an unacceptable rate...
Sadly, FedEx seems to have a widebody hull loss every two or three years. If they were a pax carrier there would be enormous adverse publicity and probably many casualties as well.
I've got friends over at FedEx who tell me the FAA has been all over their training for years now. Instead of annual AQP sim checks like most U.S. carriers, they are under a closely monitored old style six month program.
The pilot flying in the December 2003 MD-10 hard landing and fire at MEM had a history of busted checkrides before she was hired. In April, 1994 the feds pulled her ATP after an FAA inspector observed her performance. She took more training and got the ATP back and was hired by FedEx in 1996. At FedEx she had more checkride failures, a couple of DUI's and an altitude bust that set up the fateful Mad Dog line check back into MEM. Is it possible that "diversity" was promoted over performance in this case? A possibly similar precedent at FedEx was the overlooked poor employment history of Auburn Calloway who brutally attempted to hijack a FedEx DC-10 in MEM in 1994.
Traditionally, FedEx has had very high employment standards for the freight world, i.e. almost all pilots have college degrees (well, there are some Naval Academy graduates <g>) and many are like the founder, Fred Smith, ex-military aviators [I was later corrected on this point, Fred was a Marine officer but not an Aviator - Airbubba]. The company is consistently profitable and maintenance is excellent by most accounts.
Still, the mishaps and hull losses continue at what everyone agrees is an unacceptable rate...
Whether lower safety standards are acceptable for cargo airlines continues to be a hotly debated question for the unions, the companies and the feds.
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Age of Crew - SO aged 70 and using magnifying glass to see
Just a couple of points to be made. The Flight Crew consisted of three. The fourth person on board was a company engineer. The SO was 70 years of age and the comment regarding him "using a magnifying glass to see" is shown as requiring citation in the source used. The aircraft being flown was a B747-200F and the SO was acting in the capacity of Flight Engineer. Whilst I do not know for sure (remember this is PPRuNe) the SO could well have been a former pilot whom was employed as a Systems Operator, a common practice and a title sometimes used by our friends from the USA to describe the person acting as F/E.
In the US airport certification falls under Part 139 which includes AFRR services. Buried in the reg is a sentence, "...any supplemental operation (except an all-cargo operation)..." In the FAA system, most of the all cargo operations, even if they fly a regular schedule, are considered supplemental ops.
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In the US airport certification falls under Part 139 which includes AFRR services. Buried in the reg is a sentence, "...any supplemental operation (except an all-cargo operation)..." In the FAA system, most of the all cargo operations, even if they fly a regular schedule, are considered supplemental ops.
Don't know about the other U.S. freight dogs.
