Report of plane missing near Renmark SA
More from the Adelaide Advertiser website:
Why only one?
DF.
THE bent propeller from the doomed Rossair plane that crashed near Renmark, killing all three people on board, has been transported to Adelaide for further examination.
The propeller, with remnants of dirt still on it, was partly covered by a blue tarp and loaded onto a truck on Saturday afternoon as the Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigation into the devastating crash continued.
More parts of the nine-seat Cessna Conquest aircraft will be taken to facilities in the city for more detailed examination over the coming days while a preliminary report into the crash is expected to be released within a month.
The propeller, with remnants of dirt still on it, was partly covered by a blue tarp and loaded onto a truck on Saturday afternoon as the Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigation into the devastating crash continued.
More parts of the nine-seat Cessna Conquest aircraft will be taken to facilities in the city for more detailed examination over the coming days while a preliminary report into the crash is expected to be released within a month.
DF.
Join Date: Feb 2004
Location: NZ
Posts: 835
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thanks, I've had a quick look but searching for Fairchild aircraft with Lake George as the location yields no results - do you have an investigation number?
Last edited by Cloud Cutter; 3rd Jun 2017 at 20:35.
The inference of two crash sites was not that it crashed at point A. versus point B... it was that the wreckage at first was believed to be in two separate locations with an inference of an in-flight breakup. Given what has been posted above, then that now sounds very unlikely.
Given recent events at DFO, it sounds like they have covered up the prop to stop the "experts" from making early judgements.
The propeller, with remnants of dirt still on it, was partly covered by a blue tarp and loaded onto a truck
I should have directed you to the common search engine but here is the summary. Report number 200404589
No doubt at all, but neither were the crew onboard the AirNZ A320 that crashed into the Mediterranean doing a pre-delivery test. Sometimes experience can work against you.
On 21 November 2004, the crew of a Fairchild Industries SA227-AC Metro III aircraft, registered VH-TAG, was conducting an endorsement training flight near Lake George, 33 km north-east of Canberra Airport. The flight included a planned in-flight engine shutdown and restart, conducted at an altitude below 4,500 ft (about 2,200 ft above ground level (AGL)). During the engine restart preparation, the instructor departed from the published procedure by moving the power lever for the left engine into the beta range and directing the pilot to select the unfeather test switch. These actions were appropriate to prepare an engine for start on the ground with a feathered propeller, but not during an airstart. As a result, the propeller on the left engine became fixed in the start-locks position. The crew lost control of the aircraft and it descended 1,000 ft, to about 450 ft AGL, before they regained control. The crew could not diagnose the source of the loss of control and proceeded to start the left engine while the propeller was fixed on the start-locks. As a result, the crew lost control of the aircraft for a second time and it descended 1,300 ft, to about 300 ft AGL, before they regained control. The SA226 / SA227 aircraft contain no lockout system to prevent pilots from intentionally moving the power lever into the beta range during flight. It was the first time the instructor had given a Metro endorsement and he was subject to time pressure to complete the endorsement. His ongoing difficulties in adapting to his employment tasks were not successfully dealt with by the operator. He had a limited understanding of the aircraft's engine and propeller systems, and had not practiced an airstart for 8 years as the CASA check and training approval did not include an assessment of all flight critical exercises.
The three pilots who died were not gung-ho amateurs playing at 'Top Gun'. They were mature, experienced and careful.
I always thought there was an interesting parallel between those suffering a few loose screws and the apparent fixation with a few missing fasteners.
Join Date: Feb 2004
Location: NZ
Posts: 835
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thanks for that - makes perfect sense in that context. There is no way for a propeller attached to a running Garrett to be placed on the start locks in flight - it's essentially water running uphill - goes against physics. This accident occurred shortly after takeoff, so I'd be very confident in excluding this as a possibility.
Don't forget the crew flying the Beech 1900 around Willy that almost came to grief by setting Flight Idle rather than Zero Thrust and sinking back to around 100'AGL after takeoff...
The ATSB report.
The ATSB report.
Join Date: Jan 2017
Location: The Couch
Posts: 117
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Join Date: Jun 2017
Location: Adelaide
Posts: 21
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thank you
Let's just leave the speculative dribble to Geoffrey Thomas. I can't believe channel 7 persist with this guy.
There are no guarantees at this stage it was a VMCA incident. Let the ATSB do their thing and give the families and friends some space before we all go pontificating on wild guesses.
There are no guarantees at this stage it was a VMCA incident. Let the ATSB do their thing and give the families and friends some space before we all go pontificating on wild guesses.
Join Date: Jun 2017
Location: Adelaide
Posts: 21
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Poor buggers.
I once had the pleasure of enjoying the company of one of these fellow aviators socially. A more humorous, informative, and engageable person would be hard to find.
It appears they perished enjoying their passion. Sad none the less.
Heartfelt condolences to family, acquaintances and friends.
I once had the pleasure of enjoying the company of one of these fellow aviators socially. A more humorous, informative, and engageable person would be hard to find.
It appears they perished enjoying their passion. Sad none the less.
Heartfelt condolences to family, acquaintances and friends.
My heartfelt condolences to you and your family, I feel your pain. Most of us crusty old buggers here have lost someone close over the years to our profession. It comes as a reminder of our unforgiving operating environment. If there's anything I can do for you.
Join Date: Jul 2006
Location: Australia
Posts: 325
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Certainly not a silly question though,
as some of the Apple gear supposedly features barometric sensors.
Thread Starter
Report out.
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications...r/ao-2017-057/
It was also identified that normal power on both engines was not restored when the expected single engine performance and target airspeed were not attained. That was probably because the degraded aircraft performance, or the associated risk, were not recognised by the pilots occupying the control seats. Consequently, about 40 seconds after initiation of the simulated engine failure, the aircraft experienced an asymmetric loss of control.
The single engine failure after take‑off exercise was conducted at a significantly lower height above the ground than the 5,000 ft recommended in the Cessna 441 pilot’s operating handbook. This meant that there was insufficient height to recover from the loss of control before the aircraft impacted the ground.
While not necessarily contributory to the accident, the ATSB also identified that:
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications...r/ao-2017-057/
What the ATSB found
The ATSB determined that, following a simulated failure of one of the aircraft’s engines at about 400 ft above the ground during the take‑off from Renmark, the aircraft did not achieve the expected single engine climb performance or target airspeed. As there were no technical defects identified, it is likely that the reduced aircraft performance was due to the method of simulating the engine failure, pilot control inputs or a combination of both.It was also identified that normal power on both engines was not restored when the expected single engine performance and target airspeed were not attained. That was probably because the degraded aircraft performance, or the associated risk, were not recognised by the pilots occupying the control seats. Consequently, about 40 seconds after initiation of the simulated engine failure, the aircraft experienced an asymmetric loss of control.
The single engine failure after take‑off exercise was conducted at a significantly lower height above the ground than the 5,000 ft recommended in the Cessna 441 pilot’s operating handbook. This meant that there was insufficient height to recover from the loss of control before the aircraft impacted the ground.
While not necessarily contributory to the accident, the ATSB also identified that:
- The operator’s training and checking manual procedure for simulating an engine failure in a turboprop aircraft was inappropriate and increased the risk of asymmetric control loss.
- The CASA flying operations inspector was not in a control seat and was unable to share the headset system used by the inductee and chief pilot. Therefore, despite having significant experience in Cessna 441 operations, he had reduced ability to actively monitor the flight and communicate any identified problem.
- The inductee and chief pilot, while compliant with recency requirements, had limited recent experience in the Cessna 441 and that probably led to a degradation in the skills required to safely perform and monitor the simulated engine failure exercise.
- The chief pilot and other key operational managers within Rossair were experiencing high levels of workload and pressure during the months leading up to the accident.
- The Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s method of oversighting Rossair in the several years prior to the accident increased the risk that organisational issues would not be identified and addressed.
I would like to see more of the evidence. The question as to whether or not the failure was initiated from V1 or at 400ft is important. If the latter is true then target speed would have been easily achieved and then some. There's little doubt that a Vmca event occurred. The question is why during a 40 second level segment did speed decay below Vmca. Flying directly into a setting sun would have been a significant factor, the rest is pure speculation.
1. What was the flap position
2. What was the blade angle of the propeller of the simulated failed engine.
1. What was the flap position
2. What was the blade angle of the propeller of the simulated failed engine.
Flying directly into a setting sun would have been a significant factor, the rest is pure speculation.
There's nothing speculative about where the sun was or it's effect. Yes both pilots would have been heads down, each pilot had different tasks and neither would be able to adequately monitor the others actions or performance in this condition. Neither pilot is likely to have been, lets say polished for this particular exercise. I'm not sure where you get the live engine wasn't developing full power, but it's fair to say if you knew you were going Vmca, pulling the live engine back would be the correct course of action on the part of the flying pilot
I wouldn't argue with a training exercise gone wrong or the benefits of a simulator. I'm not convinced that the exercise commenced at 400 feet, whats the point the takeoff is over, more likely to have been a V1 cut or once the gear is retracted. Nor am I convinced there wasn't an unexpected drag issue from the failed engine. 40 seconds in a level segment with speed decay is a very long time, even for the unpolished.
I wouldn't argue with a training exercise gone wrong or the benefits of a simulator. I'm not convinced that the exercise commenced at 400 feet, whats the point the takeoff is over, more likely to have been a V1 cut or once the gear is retracted. Nor am I convinced there wasn't an unexpected drag issue from the failed engine. 40 seconds in a level segment with speed decay is a very long time, even for the unpolished.
I'm not sure where you get the live engine wasn't developing full power, but it's fair to say if you knew you were going Vmca, pulling the live engine back would be the correct course of action on the part of the flying pilot
It was also identified that normal power on both engines was not restored when the expected single engine performance and target airspeed were not attained. That was probably because the degraded aircraft performance, or the associated risk, were not recognised by the pilots occupying the control seats. Consequently, about 40 seconds after initiation of the simulated engine failure, the aircraft experienced an asymmetric loss of control.
Agreed and we'll never know what really happened. We only know what the power output was at impact. I concede my statement wasn't well said. In the heat of the millisecond you have to act you know power will come off instantaneously, but not necessarily the other way around.
Extended: Where I was going with that is that I have had a propeller going in the wrong direction, it was a split O ring on the propeller control rod, it was really difficult to find because the rod had to be in exactly the right spot to allow oil to flow in the wrong direction, causing the blade to go beta instead of course.
Extended: Where I was going with that is that I have had a propeller going in the wrong direction, it was a split O ring on the propeller control rod, it was really difficult to find because the rod had to be in exactly the right spot to allow oil to flow in the wrong direction, causing the blade to go beta instead of course.
Last edited by Xeptu; 1st May 2020 at 00:18. Reason: extended
