King Air down at Essendon?
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JDzi-utoKtc&t=201s
Interesting C90 EFATO video at light weight.
B200 speeds:
Vmca 90
Vx 101
Vy 108
If autofeather is in use reducing power lever before the prop stops will cancel autofeather.
Anyone know if Vmca assumes engine inop is feathered or not?
Interesting C90 EFATO video at light weight.
B200 speeds:
Vmca 90
Vx 101
Vy 108
If autofeather is in use reducing power lever before the prop stops will cancel autofeather.
Anyone know if Vmca assumes engine inop is feathered or not?
Gazumped
For someone who has supposedly read the accident report from cover to cover, studied it, and used it as a training guide, you continue to make unconditionally declarative statements that are simply not supported by its contents and in a manner that is defamatory to a deceased pilot. I am refering to your contentions that the PIC "... did retract the gear, but late, he did not retract the flap till his IAS was approx 95k, putting him 26K below blue speed, (his blue speed flap out was 106k), he eventually feathered the propeller very late, in ground effect ..."
I draw your attention to Section 1.16.7 Aircraft Performance on p.18, specifically;
"Whilst the landing gear was retracted when the left engine failed and the left propeller probably feathered shortly afterwards, it was not known at what point the flaps were retracted."
and 1.16.8 Left Propeller Feathering on pp.19-20, specifically;
"... it was considered only valid to conclude that the pilot had most probably feathered the left propeller shortly after the left engine failed."
1.16.9 Flight Path Reconstruction re-iterates that the left engine failed after the landing gear had been retracted and that "... at about 1908:30 hours [11 seconds after the left engine failed], he manually selected the left propeller to feather."
Section 2 Analysis (p.25) also states "... When the left engine of VH-AAV failed it is known that the landing gear was up ..."
The report (p.26) also makes the observation that "The pilot might have contemplated ditching the aircraft, but the short time available would not have permitted this to be a carefully planned manoeuvre."
There is nothing at all in the report to support your contention that "... the failed engine pumped through the water in the fuel, and reignited, and was at stable idle at impact ...". In fact the report specifically states in Section 2 Analysis (p.24) that;
"The only finding of significance during the examination of the left engine was numerous droplets of water in the FCU and downstream components. The water was present in sufficient volume to conclude that it had probably caused a flame-out."
Further, Section 1.16.1 Engines and propellers (p.13) states that when the left fuel control unit and fuel pump were inspected water was found throughout the fuel nozzles, transfer tubes, flow divider, FCU outlet line and the fuel pump itself. The report (p.14) also concludes that "... the pilot had retarded the left power lever as part of his left engine shutdown procedure."
I'd be very interested to hear how you were able to ascertain the speed at which the flaps were retracted when the DoT couldn't.
In sum, the gear was not retracted late (it was up before the left engine failed), the timing of flap retraction is not known and the left propeller was not feathered very late, it was feathered promptly after the left engine failed.
Maybe you should properly reacquaint yourself with the report particularly if you are applying your grossly misconstrued mental model of the accident to training. In the meantime, please refrain from further slandering a pilot who can not respond.
Cheers,
Mick
I draw your attention to Section 1.16.7 Aircraft Performance on p.18, specifically;
"Whilst the landing gear was retracted when the left engine failed and the left propeller probably feathered shortly afterwards, it was not known at what point the flaps were retracted."
and 1.16.8 Left Propeller Feathering on pp.19-20, specifically;
"... it was considered only valid to conclude that the pilot had most probably feathered the left propeller shortly after the left engine failed."
1.16.9 Flight Path Reconstruction re-iterates that the left engine failed after the landing gear had been retracted and that "... at about 1908:30 hours [11 seconds after the left engine failed], he manually selected the left propeller to feather."
Section 2 Analysis (p.25) also states "... When the left engine of VH-AAV failed it is known that the landing gear was up ..."
The report (p.26) also makes the observation that "The pilot might have contemplated ditching the aircraft, but the short time available would not have permitted this to be a carefully planned manoeuvre."
There is nothing at all in the report to support your contention that "... the failed engine pumped through the water in the fuel, and reignited, and was at stable idle at impact ...". In fact the report specifically states in Section 2 Analysis (p.24) that;
"The only finding of significance during the examination of the left engine was numerous droplets of water in the FCU and downstream components. The water was present in sufficient volume to conclude that it had probably caused a flame-out."
Further, Section 1.16.1 Engines and propellers (p.13) states that when the left fuel control unit and fuel pump were inspected water was found throughout the fuel nozzles, transfer tubes, flow divider, FCU outlet line and the fuel pump itself. The report (p.14) also concludes that "... the pilot had retarded the left power lever as part of his left engine shutdown procedure."
I'd be very interested to hear how you were able to ascertain the speed at which the flaps were retracted when the DoT couldn't.
In sum, the gear was not retracted late (it was up before the left engine failed), the timing of flap retraction is not known and the left propeller was not feathered very late, it was feathered promptly after the left engine failed.
Maybe you should properly reacquaint yourself with the report particularly if you are applying your grossly misconstrued mental model of the accident to training. In the meantime, please refrain from further slandering a pilot who can not respond.
Cheers,
Mick
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Concur with Birdman on the final flight path.
Taking a look at the location of the gouge in the DFO roof and some visual cues - the diagonal roofing join and the dislodged airconditioning unit, I would opine the final flight path is something as depicted here. (hope this attachment works).
The angle to Bulla Rd appears to be no more than about 30 degrees or about 50 degrees from rwy heading.
Taking a look at the location of the gouge in the DFO roof and some visual cues - the diagonal roofing join and the dislodged airconditioning unit, I would opine the final flight path is something as depicted here. (hope this attachment works).
The angle to Bulla Rd appears to be no more than about 30 degrees or about 50 degrees from rwy heading.
Lots of info has just come to light in the news regarding feathering:
http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/pi...22-guitn9.html
http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/pi...22-guitn9.html
From the subsequent investigations and defenses we will learn a lot more than just "it was the pilot's fault"
The airfield may be closed in a misguided attempt to censure media helicopters, either by police who sometimes put too high a priority on subjudice or politicians who think media helicopters will broadcast pictures of victims.
How many ways can you look at the what ifs?
If DFO didn't exist, the king air would have hit a light pole or the telecom tower, then smacked into the freeway, where the traffic was dense due to road works. The downward slope encouraging a river of fire to form under the northbound carriageway.
What is the cost of an arrester net as used in U.K. Military bases?
Mickjoebill
Lots of info has just come to light in the news regarding feathering:
Pilots untrained to deal with 'feathering' failure that may have caused DFO crash: experts
Pilots untrained to deal with 'feathering' failure that may have caused DFO crash: experts
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Lots of info has just come to light in the news regarding feathering:
Pilots untrained to deal with 'feathering' failure that may have caused DFO crash: experts
Pilots untrained to deal with 'feathering' failure that may have caused DFO crash: experts
Standard Raisbeck figures would give a V1/Vr of 94kts with a takeoff safety speed of 103 kts. If the Autofeather failed then as per the manual Vmca could be as high as 108 kts. Your already 14kts behind the eight ball if you had the failure as you rotated. 5 seconds into a 10 second flight just to recognise what the hell is going on.
Maybe the Kobayashi Maru should be a standard sim check.
Thanks JT Funny, despite what was previously stated about major manufactures operational documents, my experiences with their flight test depts was always as per the regulatory certification docs.
Moderator
Yes, mate ... certification and operations (especially marketing in OEMs) rarely sleep peacefully together.
Trust life is treating you well. Not over to Avalon by any chance ?
Trust life is treating you well. Not over to Avalon by any chance ?
Looking at the footage, maybe the pilot was distracted by the engine out, had his head in the cockpit, and didn't realise that he was flying at such a low angle & high speed. I wonder if this has been considered? Just a thought.
How many times have you played at your car radio whilst driving, relaxed your hand pressure, and almost driven into a power pole or oncoming traffic?
How many times have you played at your car radio whilst driving, relaxed your hand pressure, and almost driven into a power pole or oncoming traffic?
JT
Wanted to go to AV with BR also ex ARDU TPS, unfortunately SWMBO has appointment with knee butcher! Let you know next ML trip.
Wanted to go to AV with BR also ex ARDU TPS, unfortunately SWMBO has appointment with knee butcher! Let you know next ML trip.
Last edited by zzuf; 22nd Feb 2017 at 09:42. Reason: typo
Kulwin,
If he was flying at high speed, the result would have been no doubt different.
Not ever! You need to get off the road!
If he was flying at high speed, the result would have been no doubt different.
How many times have you played at your car radio whilst driving, relaxed your hand pressure, and almost driven into a power pole or oncoming traffic?
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Failures in both the engine and 'feathering' system, that pilots are not trained to deal with, may be behind Tuesday's fatal plane crash, experts say.
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How many times have you played at your car radio whilst driving, relaxed your hand pressure, and almost driven into a power pole or oncoming traffic?
There really is no inconsistency. Firstly I'm not going into far25, so forget 25-7. (if you have a couple of years.... ) Vmc and Vmcg are as defined in far23. Vmca is as defined in the GAMMA spec for flight manuals which is referenced in 23-8 and has Clements and Gallagher's signature on it so it must be right. Somewhere along the line Vmcg has been added to the Gamma spec