King Air down at Essendon?
Is Moorabbin or Essendon worse for buildings near the runway??? Look at how close this new building is / looks!
Hearsay of course.
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A little late to this thread which is very long. But I read through every post and the entire accident report. This sort of accident happens every once in a while. As the report mentioned, there was King Air in California that crashed with the trims(including a lot of rudder trim improperly set), and another accident in Tennessee due to the rudder trim. I also remember a 737 crash in New York for the same reason.
The reality is that this will continue to happen, however, there is a way to prevent it. Check what I call your killer items just before takeoff after having finished finished the Before Takeoff Checklist. It has been a very long time since I flew a King Air but off the top of my head, I would suggest taking 10 seconds prior to entering the runway to check the flap position indicator, elevator and rudder position indicators, autofeather armed(if installed), position of fuel selectors/pumps and pitot heat. Perhaps there is more of less that can be checked and it can vary from aircraft to aircraft, but all of the accidents I just mentioned would not have happened if this had been done. And while some would say the same thing about if only the checklist had been done properly, the report gives us the reality of how the checklist is frequently not done properly for a variety of reasons. And that will continue to happen no matter how emphatic some are about doing the checklist properly.
The reality is that this will continue to happen, however, there is a way to prevent it. Check what I call your killer items just before takeoff after having finished finished the Before Takeoff Checklist. It has been a very long time since I flew a King Air but off the top of my head, I would suggest taking 10 seconds prior to entering the runway to check the flap position indicator, elevator and rudder position indicators, autofeather armed(if installed), position of fuel selectors/pumps and pitot heat. Perhaps there is more of less that can be checked and it can vary from aircraft to aircraft, but all of the accidents I just mentioned would not have happened if this had been done. And while some would say the same thing about if only the checklist had been done properly, the report gives us the reality of how the checklist is frequently not done properly for a variety of reasons. And that will continue to happen no matter how emphatic some are about doing the checklist properly.
What is your theory as to how the rudder trim got to the position it was in, in the first place, tcasblue?
(I’m not suggesting the meticulous following of good checklists is not a good idea.)
(I’m not suggesting the meticulous following of good checklists is not a good idea.)
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I don't have a theory on that. I just have an idea on how to be 100% sure to not takeoff with the rudder trim indicator improperly set, even if one mishandles the checklist.
Ah, but you’re presuming that the rudder trim was physically at FSD and the indication system said so as each of the aircraft lined up.
I have yet to be convinced that there is no possibility of a latent defect in the rudder trim system in these aircraft. In each case there has yet to be any first-hand evidence-based explanation as to how and when the rudder trim came to be at FSD before take-off. I have spent many thousands of hours over many years tracking down weird faults in complex flying machinery, which faults were almost invariably easily dismissed as pilot error but turned out not to be.
I have yet to be convinced that there is no possibility of a latent defect in the rudder trim system in these aircraft. In each case there has yet to be any first-hand evidence-based explanation as to how and when the rudder trim came to be at FSD before take-off. I have spent many thousands of hours over many years tracking down weird faults in complex flying machinery, which faults were almost invariably easily dismissed as pilot error but turned out not to be.
It’s been explained to you previously in this thread that the King Air requires a full trim check during preflight.
Distraction during this could foreseeably result in forgetting to reset a trim wheel to take off.
Distraction during this could foreseeably result in forgetting to reset a trim wheel to take off.
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Ah, but you’re presuming that the rudder trim was physically at FSD and the indication system said so as each of the aircraft lined up.
I have yet to be convinced that there is no possibility of a latent defect in the rudder trim system in these aircraft. In each case there has yet to be any first-hand evidence-based explanation as to how and when the rudder trim came to be at FSD before take-off. I have spent many thousands of hours over many years tracking down weird faults in complex flying machinery, which faults were almost invariably easily dismissed as pilot error but turned out not to be.
I have yet to be convinced that there is no possibility of a latent defect in the rudder trim system in these aircraft. In each case there has yet to be any first-hand evidence-based explanation as to how and when the rudder trim came to be at FSD before take-off. I have spent many thousands of hours over many years tracking down weird faults in complex flying machinery, which faults were almost invariably easily dismissed as pilot error but turned out not to be.
I suspect that most of the other crashes mentioned in the report would have been avoided if a final check had been performed but if there was one of those extremely rare malfunctions, it may not have help and could even make things worse.
Last edited by tcasblue; 13th Dec 2020 at 22:33.
Lots of things are foreseeable, but that doesn’t mean that’s what happens in fact, and lots things have very remote probabilities but still happen. For example, it is remotely probable that in each case the pilot was coincidentally distracted at the point in the trim check that the rudder happened to be at full left deflection. Strange that no one happened to be distracted at the point in the trim check that the rudder happened to be at full right deflection.
I’m confident I’ve spent more time than you, junior, up to my elbows in flying machinery, tracking down faults with ostensibly inexplicable symptoms that magically become explicable when you find the wiring defect that intermittently short circuits wires from separate systems when particular physical controls are in particular positions.
And I’ve said it before in this thread: As I recall, the Max 8 issue was initially attributed to pilot incompetence. Is my recollection inaccurate?
You’d think that if incorrectly positioned rudder trim on a serviceable aircraft of this type produced such a ‘foreseeable’ risk of disastrous consequences on take-off, there’d be an AD requiring a flashing rudder trim warning annunciator on the application of take-off power. The components would cost about $2.50, the systems engineering and FMECA about $250,000 and the regulatory process about $2,500,000, but given the number of fatalities I would have thought the cost/benefit analysis writes itself.
(PS: Junior, do you know if anyone from ATSB has actually physically looked at the rudder trim and rudder trim wiring in situ in the aircraft type, while the flight and engine controls are manipulated.)
I’m confident I’ve spent more time than you, junior, up to my elbows in flying machinery, tracking down faults with ostensibly inexplicable symptoms that magically become explicable when you find the wiring defect that intermittently short circuits wires from separate systems when particular physical controls are in particular positions.
And I’ve said it before in this thread: As I recall, the Max 8 issue was initially attributed to pilot incompetence. Is my recollection inaccurate?
You’d think that if incorrectly positioned rudder trim on a serviceable aircraft of this type produced such a ‘foreseeable’ risk of disastrous consequences on take-off, there’d be an AD requiring a flashing rudder trim warning annunciator on the application of take-off power. The components would cost about $2.50, the systems engineering and FMECA about $250,000 and the regulatory process about $2,500,000, but given the number of fatalities I would have thought the cost/benefit analysis writes itself.
(PS: Junior, do you know if anyone from ATSB has actually physically looked at the rudder trim and rudder trim wiring in situ in the aircraft type, while the flight and engine controls are manipulated.)
Check what I call your killer items just before takeoff after having finished finished the Before Takeoff Checklist.
* Note I’m referring to pilots in general and am not commenting on this accident specifically.
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It is not a checklist. It is a simple look around at key items after the checklist has been stowed(although one could argue that it is a mental checklist). Takes about ten seconds or so. It becomes a good habit after a while.
Lots of things are foreseeable, but that doesn’t mean that’s what happens in fact, and lots things have very remote probabilities but still happen. For example, it is remotely probable that in each case the pilot was coincidentally distracted at the point in the trim check that the rudder happened to be at full left deflection. Strange that no one happened to be distracted at the point in the trim check that the rudder happened to be at full right deflection.
I’m confident I’ve spent more time than you, junior, up to my elbows in flying machinery, tracking down faults with ostensibly inexplicable symptoms that magically become explicable when you find the wiring defect that intermittently short circuits wires from separate systems when particular physical controls are in particular positions.
And I’ve said it before in this thread: As I recall, the Max 8 issue was initially attributed to pilot incompetence. Is my recollection inaccurate?
You’d think that if incorrectly positioned rudder trim on a serviceable aircraft of this type produced such a ‘foreseeable’ risk of disastrous consequences on take-off, there’d be an AD requiring a flashing rudder trim warning annunciator on the application of take-off power. The components would cost about $2.50, the systems engineering and FMECA about $250,000 and the regulatory process about $2,500,000, but given the number of fatalities I would have thought the cost/benefit analysis writes itself.
(PS: Junior, do you know if anyone from ATSB has actually physically looked at the rudder trim and rudder trim wiring in situ in the aircraft type, while the flight and engine controls are manipulated.)
I’m confident I’ve spent more time than you, junior, up to my elbows in flying machinery, tracking down faults with ostensibly inexplicable symptoms that magically become explicable when you find the wiring defect that intermittently short circuits wires from separate systems when particular physical controls are in particular positions.
And I’ve said it before in this thread: As I recall, the Max 8 issue was initially attributed to pilot incompetence. Is my recollection inaccurate?
You’d think that if incorrectly positioned rudder trim on a serviceable aircraft of this type produced such a ‘foreseeable’ risk of disastrous consequences on take-off, there’d be an AD requiring a flashing rudder trim warning annunciator on the application of take-off power. The components would cost about $2.50, the systems engineering and FMECA about $250,000 and the regulatory process about $2,500,000, but given the number of fatalities I would have thought the cost/benefit analysis writes itself.
(PS: Junior, do you know if anyone from ATSB has actually physically looked at the rudder trim and rudder trim wiring in situ in the aircraft type, while the flight and engine controls are manipulated.)
I don't know how to investigate crashes, so I have to trust the ATSB does know how. You might know better and that's great.
As for the annunciator? Sounds great, can they make one for the friction locks too? Those things are a pain in the ass.
I'm not assuming anything. I am just recommending something. Something that would likely have prevented many crashes, including all of the ones mentioned in the report that involved serviceable aircraft.
It is not a checklist. It is a simple look around at key items after the checklist has been stowed(although one could argue that it is a mental checklist). Takes about ten seconds or so. It becomes a good habit after a while.
It is not a checklist. It is a simple look around at key items after the checklist has been stowed(although one could argue that it is a mental checklist). Takes about ten seconds or so. It becomes a good habit after a while.
The following NTSB report is similar to the accident to the Essendon King Air in that the takeoff run was started with the rudder trim full scale to one side. Why the rudder trim was like that was never determined. However reading the NTSB full report on the 737 accident it seems the captain had trouble keeping straight while taxiing for take off so he used the nosewheel steering wheel to help him. That was the first clue that there was someting unusual going on during taxiing. The rudder pedals were offset while the aircraft taxied and during the initial part of the takeoff run flown by the copilot. It was the copilot that alerted the captain that he was having directional control problems during the early part of the takeoff run. The captain took control and aborted the takeoff but due to a combination of pilot error factors the aircraft overran the end of the runway and slid into a river.
In the case of the 737, the rudder pedals can turn the nosewheel a limited amount in either direction but for more turning capability the steering wheel must be used. On the ground a full scale offset rudder trim will cause the rudder pedals to move in the same direction as the trim so in theory it should be obvious from the beginning of taxiing that a directional control problem has occurred. In the case of the 737 an electrical fault most probably caused the rudder trim to move uncommanded. A a matter of interest I experienced this fault during simulator training in UK in 1989. On that occasion I gave the rudder trim a tweak during a one engine inoperative exercise only to find the rudder trim went to full scale without further pilot input.
See more detail below. Keep in mind while the discussion is on the Kingair accident involving rudder trim operation a similar accident to the Kingair occurred in a 737-400 during the takeoff roll.
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On September 20, 1989, USAir, Inc. flight 5050 was departing New York City's LaGuardia Airport, Flushing, New York, for Charlotte Douglas International Airport, Charlotte, North Carolina. As the first officer began the take off on runway 31, he felt the airplane drift left. The captain noticed the left drift also and used the nosewheel tiller to help steer.
As the takeoff run progressed, the aircrew heard a "bang" and a continual rumbling noise. The captain then took over and rejected the takeoff but did not stop the airplane before running off the end of the runway into Bowery Bay. Instrument flight conditions prevailed at the time and the runway was wet. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the captain's failure to exercise his command authority in a timely manner to reject the takeoff or take sufficient control to continue the takeoff, which was initiated with a mis-trimmed rudder.
Also causal was the captain's failure to detect the mis-trimmed rudder before the takeoff was attempted. The safety issues discussed in this report were the design and location of the rudder trim control on the Boeing 737-400, air crew coordination and communication during takeoffs, crew pairing, and crash survivability.
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
NTSB Investigation
The Safety Board collected about 90 reports of rudder trim anomalies for the Boeing -737 300/400 aircraft. The majority of these reports were received after the accident and were from pilots who had heard of or read about the accident in various publications. Boeing knew only of six anomalies and the FAA Maintenance Discrepancy Reports showed none. Many reports described the inadvertent setting of rudder trim by the foot of the jump seat occupant behind the captain’s seat. Their shoe sole pushed the trim knob counter clockwise and set left trim. Pages 28 and 29 of the NTSB Accident Report covers this in more detail. The NTSB report is well worth reading in its entirety especially as the Boeing 737-300/400 series aircraft is still used by Australian and New Zealand registered operators.
See: http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online...s/AAR90-03.pdf
Interesting but not surprising reading. This, too, from that report, Centaurus:
Several reports show that even when the trim operates properly, the trim indicator can either remain centred or show an erroneous indication.
Fortunately in most cases the out of trim situation could have been and was controlled by rudder.
Also demonstrates why defects should be recorded and properly investigated. It seems that the normalised deviation of accepting rudder trim system defects was exposed by the incident.
Many pilots reported rudder trim knobs sticking out of neutral after intentional activation. A knob with debris underneath or mechanical anomaly found later on some airplanes can keep driving trim after release, despite it being spring loaded to release.
Several reports show that even when the trim operates properly, the trim indicator can either remain centred or show an erroneous indication.
Also demonstrates why defects should be recorded and properly investigated. It seems that the normalised deviation of accepting rudder trim system defects was exposed by the incident.
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I'm of the opinion an off centre rudder trim tab was not the sole cause. Christ if it was that dangerous then the A/C would not have got certified without additional warnings!
a properly adjusted seat, a healthy strong pilot should be able to overcome an out of trim rudder or at least a good proportion of its effect.
we'll never truly know what happened!
a properly adjusted seat, a healthy strong pilot should be able to overcome an out of trim rudder or at least a good proportion of its effect.
we'll never truly know what happened!
Last edited by machtuk; 14th Dec 2020 at 06:20.
B200 AFM/POH doesn't ask for a full trim check during preflight. Many King Air operators do however, but not mandated by any manufacturer documentation.
I'm of the opinion an off centre rudder trim tab was not thecste cause. Christ if it was that dangerous tyen the A/C would not have got certified without additional warnings!
a properly adjusted seat, a healthy strong pilot should be able to overcome an out of trim rudder or at least a good proportion of its effect.
we'll never truly know what happened!
a properly adjusted seat, a healthy strong pilot should be able to overcome an out of trim rudder or at least a good proportion of its effect.
we'll never truly know what happened!
The trim was visually checked by both pilots, the square white indicator at the end of travel looks - at a glance - very much like the square white indicator at the centre of travel.
Through about 50kt, the aircraft was drifting left and could not be managed with the full strength of the pilots leg input which is considerable. This is well before takeoff speed and I believe it highly unlikely that the incident pilot was in the same situation and still allowed the aircraft to accelerate to takeoff speed. In fact I doubt whether he could have physically held it on the runway strip long enough to even get to takeoff speed.
The situation was only examined in a SIM. It was not trialed in a real aircraft. I have also tried it in the same SIM and found it relatively easy to hold direction, very much different to the aircraft.
My opinion only.
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It should be obvious to any King Air pilot doing the final check of their killer items just before takeoff that the rudder trim is out of place. One simply has to look. Check out this picture from the crashed King Air in California that took off with full rudder trim. If only he had checked.
Click on item 23 of this docket.
https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=74745
Click on item 23 of this docket.
https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=74745
Your underlying assumption continues to be that the trim was in that position at the start of the take-off roll. Whilst a reasonable assumption, it does not necessarily follow that it was in that position at that time. As always, there’s no explanation as to how the trim got into that position.
