King Air down at Essendon?
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For Groggy, I note the ATSB report says this about flight carried out in a Level D simulator for a similar model aircraft:The unambiguous implication of that outcome (assuming it substantially replicated the performance of ZCR) is that it is not physically possible for the aircraft to fly away ‘like a homesick angel’, if the rudder trim is set to full deflection (or at least full nose left deflection), unless the pilot is an “exceptional human”.
Have you any first-hand experience, either in the simulator or the aircraft, of flight with the rudder trim set to full nose left deflection and both engines delivering maximum thrust?
Have you any first-hand experience, either in the simulator or the aircraft, of flight with the rudder trim set to full nose left deflection and both engines delivering maximum thrust?
Lead,
It takes a long time, relatively, for a King Air to reach 140 KIAS after lift off if flown properly regards speeds. I train my guys to climb at max rate, about 125 kts, until through lowest safe however in visual conditions the subject pilot may have done it differently. I would expect you would be approaching 400 ft before reaching 140 kts in a normal situation. Getting back to gear retraction I want to reiterate the power lever snaps back very quickly and the pilot may never get to actually place his hand on the gear lever before grabbing the yoke with both hands in an effort to control a wildly yawing aircraft.
Groggy
Centaurus, you misunderstood my point and that was that B200 sim caught a lot of people out with assymetric handling.
A lot of the aces found out the B200 sim like the real aeroplane, was a handfull to fly in assymetric configuration, nothing like a Seminole or Seneca.
A lot of the aces found out the B200 sim like the real aeroplane, was a handfull to fly in assymetric configuration, nothing like a Seminole or Seneca.
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Wichita B200 Accident report
I was thinking this report about a B200 accident in Wichita back in 2014 read very similarly to the Essendon accident. While there is no probable cause, attached to this report, a simple Google search seems to point towards Power Lever Migration.
Groggy
Groggy
Concorde pilot John Hutchinson tells the story that an Air France 747 carrying President Chirac was holding off the side of the runway, the 747 Captain told the story that the Concorde sailed over the top of them with an estimated twenty feet of clearance, had they attempted to stop perhaps we would have seen a Tenerife rerun. The above photo was taken from the 747.
The other great difference between the two accidents, is that in the case of Tenerife, the KLM Captain did everything wrong, while the Air France Concorde Captain did everything right. A translation from the French says that the words "too late" were heard, suggesting a reference perhaps in response to the Engineer's call of "stop" at some 35 knots above V1; but maybe it came later and meant they knew their fate was sealed.
From the multiple 'Maydays' heard by ATC, the King Air pilot obviously knew his fate was sealed almost the moment the wheels left the ground, probably before any attempt to retract the gear was made. Whether he did right or wrong is open to conjecture and no doubt will play out in lawsuits for some time to come.
Last edited by Mach E Avelli; 13th Jan 2021 at 20:27.
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the B200 sim like the real aeroplane, was a handfull to fly in assymetric configuration, nothing like a Seminole or Seneca.
Pinky, I think that the old B200 simulator is probably worse than the real aeroplane in that it is very sensitive to pitch control. More than two degrees either way and a positive climb speed can't be achieved if the failure is simulated at Vr. Later King Airs with Raisebeck mods seem to be more tolerant in pitch, but still require precise lateral control, though no more than most twins which have so much power to weight.
However, despite being only level B that sim remains a useful training tool and could well be used for any light twin training to teach the fundamentals in a safe environment.
However, despite being only level B that sim remains a useful training tool and could well be used for any light twin training to teach the fundamentals in a safe environment.
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That old Sim wasn't the easiest contraption to drive but it did/does the job. You simply had to be a good driver to handle it within the testing parameters. We used to even experiment after a Sim check. Full flap, one engine, off Syd 34L from a standing start, could get it airborne, just -) Sometimes we used to swap roles, the examiner would jump in the drivers seat and we/I would fail things at the control panel revenge is sweet-)
Sorry for my propensity for persistence, but I’m not sure my question was answered. I’ll ask it again, but generally:
I note the ATSB report says this about flight carried out in a Level D simulator for a similar model aircraft: .... The unambiguous implication of that outcome (assuming it substantially replicated the performance of ZCR) is that it is not physically possible for the aircraft to fly away ‘like a homesick angel’, if the rudder trim is set to full deflection (or at least full nose left deflection), unless the pilot is an “exceptional human”.
[Has anyone had] any first-hand experience, either in the simulator or the aircraft, of flight with the rudder trim set to full nose left deflection and both engines delivering maximum thrust [and accelerating through 140kts]?
[Has anyone had] any first-hand experience, either in the simulator or the aircraft, of flight with the rudder trim set to full nose left deflection and both engines delivering maximum thrust [and accelerating through 140kts]?
Mach, the Tenerife comment was purely in reference to a collision between the aircraft, no more. The Concorde pilot telling the near miss story was asked by John, "Surely you mean 20 metres?", No he replied "20 feet", 16:50 on the video.
With reference to a possible abort the official report says,
Between a rock and a hard place it would seem, the first sign of trouble was 6.4 seconds after V1 at 188 kt CAS.
V1: 150 kt
VR: 199 kt
V2: 220 kt
The left wheel truck took out a runway light and burn marks on the grass show deviation well to the left.
A closer shot from the 747, photo is full frame and not cropped.
With reference to a possible abort the official report says,
it appears that the residual speed of the aircraft at the end of the runway would have been 74 kt for a takeoff aborted at 183 kt and 115 kt for a takeoff aborted at 196 kt.
These figures show that an aborted takeoff would have led to a runway excursion at such a speed that, taking into account the fire, the result would probably have been catastrophic for the aircraft and its occupants.
These figures show that an aborted takeoff would have led to a runway excursion at such a speed that, taking into account the fire, the result would probably have been catastrophic for the aircraft and its occupants.
V1: 150 kt
VR: 199 kt
V2: 220 kt
The left wheel truck took out a runway light and burn marks on the grass show deviation well to the left.
A closer shot from the 747, photo is full frame and not cropped.
I tend to get more persistent when I can't get straight answers to fairly simple questions. The ATSB, having produced various works of fiction for various reasons for a substantial period, means I am presumptively dubious about the content.
In the case of ZCR, the mystery of why the rudder trim was where it was post-impact may be a mystery forever. But the question whether an aircraft of this kind is 'handleable' by an ordinary pilot, with full nose left rudder trim and the engines delivering full power after accelerating through 140kts, is binary.
If the ATSB probably got it right, I should concede that.
In the case of ZCR, the mystery of why the rudder trim was where it was post-impact may be a mystery forever. But the question whether an aircraft of this kind is 'handleable' by an ordinary pilot, with full nose left rudder trim and the engines delivering full power after accelerating through 140kts, is binary.
If the ATSB probably got it right, I should concede that.
Citing the cockpit voice recorder findings, the board also criticized the crew for failing to complete pre-takeoff checklists.
concludes that the pilot likely depressed the wrong rudder pedal in his attempt to maintain control after loss of thrust in one engine.
For example, as to what caused the power to drop off on the left engine, “the NTSB noted that there was a known risk of an unintentional movement of an engine power lever if its friction lock was adjusted incorrectly. Friction lock settings are one of the items in a pre-takeoff checklist the pilot failed to use,” according to a statement from the board.
Both pilots and all eight passengers died in the fiery crash into the side of a hangar.
The outcome of the US one makes the Essendon ATSB thesis sound even more likely. Sounds like their roll rate was way more uncontrollable than Essendon one and much more sudden, whereas Essendon appears to have gotten more uncontrolled as speed built up.
No finding of mis-set rudder trim in the NTSB report is construed by you guys as being support for the ATSB finding of mis-set rudder trim?
You guys should join the ATSB. Heavens knows they need necromancers.
You guys should join the ATSB. Heavens knows they need necromancers.
You are of course correct LB. Other than the similarity of 2 KingAirs being flown by pilots not following checklists and then mishandling the controls that resulted in a fatal crash into a building within minutes of the thrust levers being advanced, the two accidents are as similar as the Challenger and the Hindenburg.
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Here is a hypothetical.
KADS crash: diverging left very shortly after liftoff.
YMEN crash: very similar.
KADS crash: report states the pilot likely pressed the wrong rudder pedal initially (left one) exacerbating the roll/yaw.
YMEN crash: report states the rudder trim was found to be deflected full left (but couldn’t determine when that was done).
Could the incorrect left rudder application like at KADS and the left rudder trim at YMEN be “similar”?
Stick with me here.
A reduction (by a certain amount) of power on the left engine, for whatever reason be it failure or migration of the power lever, will result in the rudder boost activation. The pilot will feel this in the pedals- application of right rudder to counter the yaw: left pedal moves aft and right pedal moves forward.
There might be the possibility that in the KADS crash the pilot applied left pedal because they felt the pedals move in such a way and it was an attempt to get them back to central and feel “normal”- the report does say that the input was apparently corrected.
Could it have been possible that in the YMEN crash that there was a reduction in left power for some reason, activation of the rudder boost, the pilot felt similar movement in the pedal and incorrectly wound in left rudder instead?
I fully understand that this is hypothetical. And we will never know the full reason as to “why” in the YMEN crash. I also accept that the rudder trim could have been full left right from the beginning, but we don’t have the conclusive proof.
But without that conclusive proof I think we need to consider these sorts possibilities and have these discussions to try and avoid these sorts of things in the future. I’ve lost count of how many King Airs have speared in to the left shortly after liftoff....
One of the biggest take-aways from both of these accidents is the importance of the proper use of checklists though.
KADS crash: diverging left very shortly after liftoff.
YMEN crash: very similar.
KADS crash: report states the pilot likely pressed the wrong rudder pedal initially (left one) exacerbating the roll/yaw.
YMEN crash: report states the rudder trim was found to be deflected full left (but couldn’t determine when that was done).
Could the incorrect left rudder application like at KADS and the left rudder trim at YMEN be “similar”?
Stick with me here.
A reduction (by a certain amount) of power on the left engine, for whatever reason be it failure or migration of the power lever, will result in the rudder boost activation. The pilot will feel this in the pedals- application of right rudder to counter the yaw: left pedal moves aft and right pedal moves forward.
There might be the possibility that in the KADS crash the pilot applied left pedal because they felt the pedals move in such a way and it was an attempt to get them back to central and feel “normal”- the report does say that the input was apparently corrected.
Could it have been possible that in the YMEN crash that there was a reduction in left power for some reason, activation of the rudder boost, the pilot felt similar movement in the pedal and incorrectly wound in left rudder instead?
I fully understand that this is hypothetical. And we will never know the full reason as to “why” in the YMEN crash. I also accept that the rudder trim could have been full left right from the beginning, but we don’t have the conclusive proof.
But without that conclusive proof I think we need to consider these sorts possibilities and have these discussions to try and avoid these sorts of things in the future. I’ve lost count of how many King Airs have speared in to the left shortly after liftoff....
One of the biggest take-aways from both of these accidents is the importance of the proper use of checklists though.
