Amazing Spin by Airservices re. Lack of Radar in Tasmania
So the USA , Canada and many other countries can provide this safer system but not Australia. At the present time we get an ATC service where the risks are minimal but when the risks go up- in the terminal area- pilots have to become their own " ATCs" . Pathetic system at busy non tower airports most would reckon.
How come the work load on controllers is clearly so much lower than in other leading aviation countries.?
I have spoken to Aussie controllors of low level en route airspace and some claim they could also do approach work as long as we had the FAA enlightened procedural separation standards.
This was supposed to happen in 1992. Why not trial just one airport before we claim it would be too expensive?
And a number of controllors have told me that giving traffic information in our old 1950s way is more labor intensive than actually separating the aircraft in some circumstances .
But we would not know because we have never used en route controllors to provide a terminal service at non tower airports.
How come the work load on controllers is clearly so much lower than in other leading aviation countries.?
I have spoken to Aussie controllors of low level en route airspace and some claim they could also do approach work as long as we had the FAA enlightened procedural separation standards.
This was supposed to happen in 1992. Why not trial just one airport before we claim it would be too expensive?
And a number of controllors have told me that giving traffic information in our old 1950s way is more labor intensive than actually separating the aircraft in some circumstances .
But we would not know because we have never used en route controllors to provide a terminal service at non tower airports.
As to your ludicrous workload claim - you clearly have no idea.
Show us the money! Show us the resource!
Last edited by le Pingouin; 13th Jul 2015 at 05:27.
Come on, let Dick place his argument.
I for one have faith in what he does say as since 1997, when the last big change was to foisted on us, we did stop this attempt to protect the rice-bowls of ASA employees at the time.
Again, No Safety Case was advanced and I note watching the October 2014 and May 2015 Senate estimates, that #ASA still protects it's rice-bowl.
Need I remind you that the ASA Board made a decision on moving the Adelaide facility to Melbourne without the benefit of a safety case - Attitude advanced to the Senator's was that "...we can do it later and it really is OK anyway..."
Comments?? Le P, Grow, P lovett [I can supply you a rice-bowl if you wish!!]
I for one have faith in what he does say as since 1997, when the last big change was to foisted on us, we did stop this attempt to protect the rice-bowls of ASA employees at the time.
Again, No Safety Case was advanced and I note watching the October 2014 and May 2015 Senate estimates, that #ASA still protects it's rice-bowl.
Need I remind you that the ASA Board made a decision on moving the Adelaide facility to Melbourne without the benefit of a safety case - Attitude advanced to the Senator's was that "...we can do it later and it really is OK anyway..."
Comments?? Le P, Grow, P lovett [I can supply you a rice-bowl if you wish!!]
Dick has been having his say for a very long time - he makes all manner of ridiculous claims that should not go unchallenged.
Where's the safety case for Dick's proposed changes? Things have moved on since the last time so it needs a new one. Hang on a sec, was there ever one in the first place?
Thread Starter
Le Ping. I have never said or implied that the FAA system could be introduced at all time and all places. Quite the opposite.
I reckon we could test one or two locations. We may be pleasantly surprised how well our Aussie en route controllers can perform approach work even without radar like their US counterparts .
I reckon we could test one or two locations. We may be pleasantly surprised how well our Aussie en route controllers can perform approach work even without radar like their US counterparts .
Folks,
The latest in The Australian.
Tootle pip!!
Airservices Australia fails to follow own safety plan
Airservices Australia’s failure to provide reliable radar coverage to runway level at Hobart airport is an apparent breach of its own target. The airspace safety body has repeatedly dismissed concerns about the lack of reliable radar below 7000 feet at the Hobart and Launceston airports as unjustified.
This is despite warnings from experts that a tragedy is inevitable unless the situation is rectified — and the revelation that Airservices itself intended to provide radar coverage to ground-level at Hobart airport in a 2010 project developed in *response to a wave of earlier safety concerns.
Outlining the goals of a $6 million TASWAM (Tasmania Wide Area Multilateration) radar system in its 2009-10 annual report, Airservices said the project intended to provide radar surveillance “down to the surface at Hobart”.
But the system it actually *delivered cannot be relied upon below 7000 feet — despite the presence in Hobart of mountains and hills — because its coverage at lower levels is deemed inadequate by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.
CASA yesterday confirmed that it had refused to approve the system’s use below 7000 feet because the “surveillance coverage below this altitude does not meet the coverage requirements”.
Asked if this was due to Airservices’ failure to provide a sufficient number of ground stations to support full coverage, CASA communications manager Peter Gibson declined to comment and said: “This is a question for Airservices.”
Airservices did not directly answer the question when contacted by The Australian but *insisted the system did work to ground level, despite not being accepted by CASA as sufficiently reliable in Hobart.
According to one air-traffic insider, who posted on the industry chat site pprune.org, Air*services reneged on its promise of reliable radar “down to the surface” to cut costs on the project. “(They) decided to try and save some money on the installation by using fewer ground stations than recommended by the suppliers,” he posted. “You get what you pay for.”
Airservices denied it had failed to deliver its own plans. “Below 7000 feet, aircraft are separated using ‘procedural’ standards (pilots reporting their location), however (they) remain displayed (on the radar system) and can be seen by air traffic controllers in Hobart, Launceston and our Melbourne air traffic control centre,” an Airservices spokesman said.
“The TASWAM was a successful project that delivered on its key objectives in a cost efficient and timely manner.”
But businessman and pilot Dick Smith, a former CASA chairman, told The Australian he believed Airservices had bungled the project by failing to install sufficient ground stations.
It was now trying to “cover-up” its failure, instead of installing more ground stations to satisfy CASA and deliver the long-promised radar coverage to the runway level. “It’s outrageous that $6m would be spent and Tasmanians are still getting a 1930s system — and it’s not safe,” Mr Smith said. “If they’ve got 90 per cent towards putting in a radar system, why not do the other 10 per cent? No one can say that having mountains and bad weather and not using radar is safe. It’s not safe. Luckily, we’ve got away without an accident. It (collision with hills and mountains) is the most common form of serious accident, and the cause of our last serious accident (in 2005) at Lockhart River (Queensland) that killed 15 people.”
Instead of radar to the runway, pilots inform air traffic control of their location below 7000 feet.
Mr Smith said he believed the system would inevitably lead to a disaster in Hobart similar to Lockhart River.
Airservices insists air traffic operations in Tasmania are “safe”. It says the system of pilots reporting their location to air-traffic control below 7000 feet is used at large regional airports, including Broome, Rockhampton, Alice Springs, Karratha, Coffs Harbour and Tamworth.
Mr Smith said few if any of these locations had the combination of mountainous topography and weather conditions of Tasmania. “They put this WAM radar system (in Tasmania) because we had some scares — two near-misses where planes were flying around in cloud — that were quite serious near-accidents,” he said.
The latest in The Australian.
Tootle pip!!
Airservices Australia fails to follow own safety plan
Airservices Australia’s failure to provide reliable radar coverage to runway level at Hobart airport is an apparent breach of its own target. The airspace safety body has repeatedly dismissed concerns about the lack of reliable radar below 7000 feet at the Hobart and Launceston airports as unjustified.
This is despite warnings from experts that a tragedy is inevitable unless the situation is rectified — and the revelation that Airservices itself intended to provide radar coverage to ground-level at Hobart airport in a 2010 project developed in *response to a wave of earlier safety concerns.
Outlining the goals of a $6 million TASWAM (Tasmania Wide Area Multilateration) radar system in its 2009-10 annual report, Airservices said the project intended to provide radar surveillance “down to the surface at Hobart”.
But the system it actually *delivered cannot be relied upon below 7000 feet — despite the presence in Hobart of mountains and hills — because its coverage at lower levels is deemed inadequate by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.
CASA yesterday confirmed that it had refused to approve the system’s use below 7000 feet because the “surveillance coverage below this altitude does not meet the coverage requirements”.
Asked if this was due to Airservices’ failure to provide a sufficient number of ground stations to support full coverage, CASA communications manager Peter Gibson declined to comment and said: “This is a question for Airservices.”
Airservices did not directly answer the question when contacted by The Australian but *insisted the system did work to ground level, despite not being accepted by CASA as sufficiently reliable in Hobart.
According to one air-traffic insider, who posted on the industry chat site pprune.org, Air*services reneged on its promise of reliable radar “down to the surface” to cut costs on the project. “(They) decided to try and save some money on the installation by using fewer ground stations than recommended by the suppliers,” he posted. “You get what you pay for.”
Airservices denied it had failed to deliver its own plans. “Below 7000 feet, aircraft are separated using ‘procedural’ standards (pilots reporting their location), however (they) remain displayed (on the radar system) and can be seen by air traffic controllers in Hobart, Launceston and our Melbourne air traffic control centre,” an Airservices spokesman said.
“The TASWAM was a successful project that delivered on its key objectives in a cost efficient and timely manner.”
But businessman and pilot Dick Smith, a former CASA chairman, told The Australian he believed Airservices had bungled the project by failing to install sufficient ground stations.
It was now trying to “cover-up” its failure, instead of installing more ground stations to satisfy CASA and deliver the long-promised radar coverage to the runway level. “It’s outrageous that $6m would be spent and Tasmanians are still getting a 1930s system — and it’s not safe,” Mr Smith said. “If they’ve got 90 per cent towards putting in a radar system, why not do the other 10 per cent? No one can say that having mountains and bad weather and not using radar is safe. It’s not safe. Luckily, we’ve got away without an accident. It (collision with hills and mountains) is the most common form of serious accident, and the cause of our last serious accident (in 2005) at Lockhart River (Queensland) that killed 15 people.”
Instead of radar to the runway, pilots inform air traffic control of their location below 7000 feet.
Mr Smith said he believed the system would inevitably lead to a disaster in Hobart similar to Lockhart River.
Airservices insists air traffic operations in Tasmania are “safe”. It says the system of pilots reporting their location to air-traffic control below 7000 feet is used at large regional airports, including Broome, Rockhampton, Alice Springs, Karratha, Coffs Harbour and Tamworth.
Mr Smith said few if any of these locations had the combination of mountainous topography and weather conditions of Tasmania. “They put this WAM radar system (in Tasmania) because we had some scares — two near-misses where planes were flying around in cloud — that were quite serious near-accidents,” he said.
Bloggsie,
Quite deliberate, actually, there seems to be distinct differences in the readers of both threads.
Come to think of it, tell me you are not having conniptions at the statement of the President of AFAP re. supporting Class E
Tootle pip!!
Quite deliberate, actually, there seems to be distinct differences in the readers of both threads.
Come to think of it, tell me you are not having conniptions at the statement of the President of AFAP re. supporting Class E
Tootle pip!!
This is despite warnings from experts that a tragedy is inevitable
Mr Smith said he believed the system would inevitably lead to a disaster
Also, hills and mountains have been around a lot longer than aeroplanes, and procedures have been developed to avoid them, but pilots f#cking up the approach and running into said hills (eg Lockhart River) isn't the fault of the system.
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I for one have faith in what he does say as since 1997, when the last big change was to foisted on us, we did stop this attempt to protect the rice-bowls of ASA employees at the time.
ASA is as busy as a one legged man in an arse kicking competition. They don't need work practices protected, they are a monopoly provider with steady increases of traffic year on year plus major projects. They provide separation in mandated airspace, any more of it and you are creating more work for them. 
Charged back to you of course. 
Apart from the fact that as much as you'll hate to hear it, Australian controllers are probably the most productive considering the size of their sectors and the traffic numbers. again
Thread Starter
Traffic. I don't believe I have ever blamed common pilot errors on " the system".
I simply believe that if we can put procedures in place to help reduce the chance of pilot errors that it's a good idea.
Radar control used properly can make operations safer in the terminal area.
I simply believe that if we can put procedures in place to help reduce the chance of pilot errors that it's a good idea.
Radar control used properly can make operations safer in the terminal area.
Last edited by Dick Smith; 14th Jul 2015 at 23:50.
Radar control used properly can make operations safer in the terminal area.
Originally Posted by Sled
tell me you are not having conniptions at the statement of the President of AFAP re. supporting Class E
What I am laughing at is your about-face on the AFAP; a few days you intimated they were the worst, most ratbag bunch of rednecks on earth, now you are singing their praises. A Visa moment...priceless!
Really .....??
"radar control used properly can make operations safer in the terminal area"
'Terminal' is right.
Wasnt publicised much and only Lockhart and Benalla seem to get a mention but in the recent decades out of Cairns in radar/transponder controlled airspace 2 aircraft flew into hillsides. Que?? Anybody say anything?
Aero Comander into Thorntons Peak. Aztec into Bellenden Kerr.
WTF. !!
'Terminal' is right.
Wasnt publicised much and only Lockhart and Benalla seem to get a mention but in the recent decades out of Cairns in radar/transponder controlled airspace 2 aircraft flew into hillsides. Que?? Anybody say anything?
Aero Comander into Thorntons Peak. Aztec into Bellenden Kerr.
WTF. !!
out of Cairns in radar/transponder controlled airspace 2 aircraft flew into hillsides
the point
is...were these two aircraft on the radar screen, never mind the airspace type or altitude ?
And if they were giving a tsp blip with alt. and seen to be off track, too low etc.
why didnt anybody make comment.
And if it had been an ADS B blip...would it have made any difference.?
Just asking.
And if they were giving a tsp blip with alt. and seen to be off track, too low etc.
why didnt anybody make comment.
And if it had been an ADS B blip...would it have made any difference.?
Just asking.
I am not a radar controller but if they were visually operating below the LSALT what would you want a controller to say? Remind you every 2 minutes you are below LSALT? The radar screens don't typically have all the terrain marked on them so if the pilot is flying visually what exactly would you like ATC to do in that situation?
They were on radar.
The VFR aircraft was slightly right of cleared route, but at about 15NM South deviated further to the right. The radar paint disappeared a short time later. Terrain shielding around Cairns is a regular occurrence, especially in this area.
Also, VFR aircraft in Cairns area are often maneuvering due terrain and weather, you can't constantly be checking all is OK.
As for IFR cleared at visual level at pilot request, what are we supposed to do?
Our system does not give terrain alerts for VFR aircraft or for IFR aircraft cleared visually.
The VFR aircraft was slightly right of cleared route, but at about 15NM South deviated further to the right. The radar paint disappeared a short time later. Terrain shielding around Cairns is a regular occurrence, especially in this area.
Also, VFR aircraft in Cairns area are often maneuvering due terrain and weather, you can't constantly be checking all is OK.
As for IFR cleared at visual level at pilot request, what are we supposed to do?
Our system does not give terrain alerts for VFR aircraft or for IFR aircraft cleared visually.
What I am laughing at is your about-face on the AFAP; a few days you intimated they were the worst, most ratbag bunch of rednecks on earth, now you are singing their praises. A Visa moment...priceless!
Merely acknowledging a major reversal of policy by AFAP, credit where credit is due. Probably something, with which you have some difficulty. It does represent somewhat of a seachange from the days AFAP members on the east coast refused to fly in E at all, and threatened industrial action against E.
As John Maynard Keynes said: " When the facts change, I change my mind, what, Sir, do you do?"
Tootle pip!!
Thread Starter
Do the multilateration stations in Tassie also receive ADSB? If not. Are there any ADSB stations in Tasmanian?
What level does ADSB operate down to at Devonport? Or is there no ADSB coverage at low level in Tasmania ? Surely someone must have this info.
What level does ADSB operate down to at Devonport? Or is there no ADSB coverage at low level in Tasmania ? Surely someone must have this info.
Fifteen seconds on ASA website:
ADS-B services are being implemented in stages during which time surveillance coverage will progressively increase. Currently, the system is supported by more than 60 duplicated ADS-B ground stations nationwide plus 14 ADS-B capable multilateration sites in Tasmania and 16 sites in the Sydney basin. These are now delivering continuous surveillance of aircraft operations high level airspace across western, central and northern Australia where radar coverage does not currently exsist. A further 14 ground stations are being considered to support the needs of airlines, regional and general aviation.
ADS-B services are being implemented in stages during which time surveillance coverage will progressively increase. Currently, the system is supported by more than 60 duplicated ADS-B ground stations nationwide plus 14 ADS-B capable multilateration sites in Tasmania and 16 sites in the Sydney basin. These are now delivering continuous surveillance of aircraft operations high level airspace across western, central and northern Australia where radar coverage does not currently exsist. A further 14 ground stations are being considered to support the needs of airlines, regional and general aviation.
