A new paint job and this Piper Navajo is up for hire and reward
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A new paint job and this Piper Navajo is up for hire and reward
On this Forum and in another thread a contributor requested advice on instructing as a career. The replies were well considered and sensible and I am sure the contributor appreciated them. One reply suggested that flying schools with clean maintenance release documents on their aircraft might indicate new aeroplanes and therefore a good mob to work for.
We all know the adage don't judge a book by its cover. The following report to the then BASIS is a instructive example. The aircraft owner at the time of the report was a captain with a reputable Australian domestic airline
From an old CAIR report: Circa 1994
The aircraft was a Piper Navajo engaged on a charter flight. The aircraft was based in Victoria. The maintenance release was squeaky clean of all endorsements and the aircraft had a shiny new paint job on the outside.
It took only 15 minutes to find the following defects seen from a pilot’s point of view but almost one hour to write them down. Starting with:
1. A placard on the pilot’s side-consul states that the aircraft is limited to a maximum landing flap setting of 25 degrees. The Flight Manual has a similar notice with a requirement that 2 knots be added to the flight manual Vref speed for 40 flap when landing with 25 flap. The flap indicator shows a white sector band from up to 15 flap –and nothing else on the gauge to indicate exactly what flap setting in degrees is available beyond 15. When selecting the flap to down, the needle goes beyond 15 by ¾ inch into the unmarked areas and there is no indication if the flap micro-switch stops the flaps (via a limit switch) at 25 or 40. There is no external mark on the wings to indicate current flap position. This is common to many Navajos. In short, the flap indicator is misleading and impossible to comply with the flight manual restriction because there are no markings beyond 15 flap.
2. The rear baggage compartment aft of the rear door has no tie down net. However, the operator has thoughtfully supplied a brightly coloured carpet to throw over any cargo or bags. This rug has eyelets and tape attached to the retaining hooks in the floor. In other words there is no effective restraint.
3. The nose baggage compartment is not equipped with tie down devices or floor restraints. In this compartment are three metal wheel chocks, several empty soft drink bottles, a small metal ladder and various debris. The metal ladder is firmly wedged against thin electrical wiring emanating from behind the instrument panel and disappearing into the nose cone via the sidewall of the front baggage compartment. Everything in the baggage compartment is unrestrained and would float freely in turbulence.
4. Numerous oil leaks are visible through the front of the left engine cowl area with oil running from under the engine nacelle and through to the top surface of the flap area inboard of the engine. The operator is aware of the oil leak but says it is due to over-filling of the oil tank. He directs that that the contents should be 9 quarts maximum to minimize perceived oil loss. Both wheel wells also show signs of excess engine oil leaks.
5. Strong smell of fuel in the fuselage area when the aircraft is stationary. In the immediate vicinity of both cross-feed drains there is wet fuel stains on the fuselage belly with flow patterns extending several inches. The operator was previously advised but no action was taken. The problem of fuel leaks in this area are long-standing. Two wing fuel tank water drains drip fuel at one drop per 30 seconds on to the tarmac.
6. Autopilot when engaged causes very sudden in-flight manoeuvres and has to be hurriedly disengaged. There is no placard indicating an unserviceable autopilot and nothing in the MR The Century 111 autopilot control panel has a missing knob for roll mode – it is just a bare metal rod on which the knob is supposed to be attached. The calibration wheel on the autopilot box has unreadable graduations thus it is not possible to note a specific setting in daytime – worse at night, of course. There is a knob called “Auto Pilot Nav Selector” which can be selected to Nav1, Nav 2 or Off. There is no documentation on the specific use of this section of the autopilot.
The operator’s policy is not to make the system serviceable because he deems it too expensive to rectify. The aircraft flies single pilot IFR with no autopilot. This is apparently legal on passenger charter operations but not on RPT flights. Passengers should be entitled to the same degree of safety regardless of the category of flight. The operator crews RPT flights with two pilots, with the second pilot paying for the right seat under the guise of in command under supervision – but logging the total flight as “in command”. The autopilot has been unserviceable for 9 months and no action taken to rectify the problem. Single pilot IFR/IMC with no auto pilot is not conducive to a safe operation, regardless of the legalities.
7. Normally a green light appears when there is electrical power to the turn-coordinator. The light is inoperative. Next to the u/s light is an empty un-labelled lamp socket.
8. The two position voltage regulator switch is labeled only Main. There is apparently a second position hopefully for the Aux regulator if indeed one is installed. There is no Aux label on the switch assembly.
9. The circuit breaker panel has many obliterated decals or words with one or more letters missing. At night it is difficult to read the decals due grime and dirt or simply non-existent labels. The autopilot circuit breaker was out and easily reset because there is a piece of plastic or broken collar surrounding the circuit breaker shank. Nothing about this in the m/r. If the circuit breaker is inoperative or permanently collared out, then as a protection against circuit breaker resetting it is useless and potentially dangerous fire risk.
10. The green glide slope engaged light is inoperative on press-to-test.
11. There is a decal on the circuit breaker panel which on close scrutiny (impossible at night) says “Turn and Bank Left/Right”. There is however only one turn coordinator – not a Turn and Bank Indicator which is situated on the left instrument panel in front of the left seat pilot. There is no similar instrument in front of the RH seat pilot – only a couple of plugged holes where instruments were once installed.
The circuit breaker marked “Left Turn and Bank”, appears to be a false circuit breaker as it does not pull out and on closer inspection it is merely a black painted knob which looks exactly like a circuit breaker in shape and size. The circuit breaker labeled “RH Turn and Bank” is a real circuit breaker but there is no RH instrument for it to supply power to. One can imagine the confusion in event of electrical smoke or fire when the pseudo circuit breaker is found to be jammed.
11. There is a Stormscope installed. It is well advertised by a decal situated on the fuselage near the entrance door which says “Stormscope equipped.” An identical decal advertising the presence of the Stormscope is situated on the left fuselage sidewall adjacent to the circuit breaker panel. Maybe this is to give an added sense of security to the pilot. However, above the actual instrument is a decal marked Radar. There is also a circuit breaker marked Radar. Only problem is that the aircraft is not equipped with weather radar.
12. There is a set of normal looking rudder pedals for the copilot position. They are identical in size and shape to the pilot’s rudder pedals. However, there are no brakes on the copilot’s pedals. There is no decal warning of this, nothing in the Flight Manual or the Operations Manual and no mention in the maintenance release. Simply, one would not know if the brakes were either not working from the RH side, or if they were not installed.
One endorsement was carried out on this particular aircraft where the instructor was not aware that brakes were not installed on the right hand seat pedals, until after the flight with a student undergoing conversion training. The pilot under training had commented on the heavy nosewheel steering problems, so the instructor took control to “free up” the nosewheel steering by applying alternate foot pressure to each pedal on his side. The brake “pressure” appeared to lock solid on his pedals and the aircraft started to veer off the tarmac towards a nearby obstruction. The instructor quickly told the student to take over control. Later it was discovered that the copilot’s pedals indeed had no braking capability. The aircraft had flown for hundreds of hours and previous pilots had been unaware of the lack of RH seat brakes.
13. There are two engine gauges. Each gauge has an integral oil pressure, oil temperature and CHT sub gauge. In this aircraft the colour coding of the various instruments within the main gauge display do not agree with each other. For example, one oil pressure gauge shows 10 PSI red line limit for the left engine while the right oil pressure gauge shows 25 PSI red line limit. The green normal oil pressure operating range is quite different between the two oil pressure gauges.
The CHT left engine gauge indicates 200F as the lower limit on the needle while the right engine CHT lower limit shows 100F. The varying size of temperature in degrees F scales on the two CHT gauges means that the needle positions are not generally parallel, thus requiring careful scrutiny of the actual readings – rather than a normal scan which looks for similar parallel readings within average temperature parameters. The left oil temperature gauge has no numbers – just a green arc and one red temperature limit mark. The right oil temperature gauge has graduations from 50F to 250F plus – with three colour codes of green, yellow, and red. This means that a normal scan of engine temperatures and pressures in flight is not possible in terms of normal or abnormal needle positions. Instead a close scrutiny of each needle is needed which becomes a problem at night where cockpit directional lighting is poor by even automobile standards.
14. It is impossible to read the Directional Gyro at night because the internal lighting is inoperative. One needs to shine a torch on the instrument or have cat’s eye vision to read compass headings.
15. The upper switch panel over the pilot’s head houses the magneto switches. On the panel is a sign which says “Alternators Press-to-Test”. This refers to alternator test buttons that were presumably once installed. Instead there are two empty holes drilled into the vinyl roof and no buttons to press.
16. Both mixture controls are misaligned. The rear limit (idle cut-off position) actually coincides with a decal marked “Lean” that itself is supposed to indicate typical cruise position of the mixture control when leaned correctly. In other words, if the pilot leaned the mixture levers to the position marked “Lean” both engines would stop. Similarly the full forward rich mixture limit stops one and a half inches from the forward stop. The available movement of the two mixture controls is only slightly more than half of the total quadrant distance between ICO and full rich lever position.
17. There is intolerable noise in the No 1 VHF set and it sounds like a parrot squawking. The No 2 ADF volume control (Bendix) has no decal indicating volume direction. The HF volume control knob is un-marked and the decal obliterated. Similarly the circuit breaker panel has various switches such as landing and taxi light controls. There is no decal showing on/off positions which is confusing, particularly as the alternator field switches lay fore and aft.
18. The metal vertical cover which protects the left engine fire fuel shut-off handles (behind the pilot’s seat) from inadvertent actuation, does a good job indeed. It is tightly jammed and no amount of effort could move it in event of an engine fire - apart from using a set of pliars or a screw driver. The right engine fire fuel handle cover plate is not jammed. It is so loose that it is normally left laying on the cockpit floor.
19. On top of the right engine cowl a crack is evident adjacent to the hinge line of the oil cap cover. The crack is proceeding nicely but there is no stop drilling present.
20. Exposed and unprotected electrical wiring is readily visible coming from behind the left fuselage vinyl wall covering, and running behind the copilot’s seat and leading to the fuel system panel. The wiring is partially secured by masking tape which has peeled away. As the gap between the copilot’s seat and the passenger compartment wooden separation panel is used for maps, brief cases etc, it is easy to snag the wiring.
21. There is an electrically operated passenger seat belt sign attached to a portable wooden bulkhead. The box in which the sign is installed has a thick dark brown plastic cover. The seat belt signs are not visible in daylight, but with much peering one can just see the sign at night. It is quite useless for its task in daylight and only marginally better at night. There is no sign to indicate to passengers that the box displayed to their view is indeed a seat belts fastened device. It is just looks like a dark coloured box with no function.
22. Now here is a real beauty. Above the front right passenger window there is some light coloured masking tape. A closer inspection reveals the faded word EXIT in red but under the masking tape. It would be impossible to read at night in a dim passenger cabin. It is difficult to see in bright daylight. The emergency exit handle is covered by very tough plastic that requires a heavy pull to break in order to get at the handle. Lacerated fingers would occur. The handle assembly is situated in a position between two windows. There is no positive indication which of the two passenger windows is the emergency exit – especially as the small red EXIT sign is covered over with masking tape.
There is a decal which displays the following instruction: Emergency Exit – Lift Latch – Pull pin-Push window out. Which window? So there are two contradictory directions; one says Pull Pin, Lift Latch and the other says Pull handle Down. Very confusing even for the pilot, let alone a passenger at night. There is no doubt that the emergency exit window should be clearly outlined and the decal confusion sorted out.
23. The rear door can be used as an emergency exit. There is no decal indication that it can be used for this purpose. A passenger briefing card is available but the Navajo door opening procedure for the rear exit is complicated. In this aircraft the vital “Press-to-Release” knob which allows the main hatch to be operated that unlocks the exit door, is painted in faded white with what appears to be a faded red touch to it. There is no indication of the importance of that button to release the latch mechanism.
24. There is also a chain and bolt attached to the door area which is supposed to be attached after the door is locked closed, in order to prevent inadvertent door opening in flight. With the chain in place the door can only open an inch or so. There is no mention on the passenger briefing cards of the function of this bolt and chain and no decals or instructions adjacent to the door of the vital need to undo the chain and bolt before attempting to operate the exit mechanism. In other words the whole emergency exit policy in this Navajo is shambles. But all is not yet lost because to balance things up there is a very clearly displayed sign opposite the rear exit which says “Thank you for not smoking”.
25. In front of the copilot position are situated the cockpit heat controls. Next to the levers is a decal marked “Fuel On”. But there is no switch to associate with the decal –just another empty hole where presumably there was once a switch.
26. The fuel tank caps have a red decal stating that 100 octane fuel should be used. However the decal stating fuel tank capacity is missing on all caps.
27. The passenger emergency exit windows are not marked on the outside of the fuselage for ingress into the cabin. There is also no instruction on the outside of the rear door on how to open the door from the outside in event of an emergency.
28. In cruise the No 2 fuel pressure needle shows 3 PSI in excess of the red line limit.
28. The taxi light gives only five metres forward illumination – about the same as the parking lights on a car. In other words useless for obstacle illumination.
29. The right windscreen has numerous small nicks, cracks and crazed areas. Landing at night, runway lights show very diffused patterns through the windscreen and would be impossible to have adequate vision towards the sun.
30. The left oil pressure gauge shows a green band 30 to 60 PSI. The right oil pressure gauge shows a yellow caution band 30-60 PSI – then a green sector. Very confusing.
31. DME inoperative on last leg. Common defect on this aircraft.
32. Both pilot’s sun-visors flop down during take off, and in flight they dangle loosely and apparently have been like this for months.
But all is not lost. On the plus side, the maintenance release for this aircraft is squeaky clean....
We all know the adage don't judge a book by its cover. The following report to the then BASIS is a instructive example. The aircraft owner at the time of the report was a captain with a reputable Australian domestic airline
From an old CAIR report: Circa 1994
The aircraft was a Piper Navajo engaged on a charter flight. The aircraft was based in Victoria. The maintenance release was squeaky clean of all endorsements and the aircraft had a shiny new paint job on the outside.
It took only 15 minutes to find the following defects seen from a pilot’s point of view but almost one hour to write them down. Starting with:
1. A placard on the pilot’s side-consul states that the aircraft is limited to a maximum landing flap setting of 25 degrees. The Flight Manual has a similar notice with a requirement that 2 knots be added to the flight manual Vref speed for 40 flap when landing with 25 flap. The flap indicator shows a white sector band from up to 15 flap –and nothing else on the gauge to indicate exactly what flap setting in degrees is available beyond 15. When selecting the flap to down, the needle goes beyond 15 by ¾ inch into the unmarked areas and there is no indication if the flap micro-switch stops the flaps (via a limit switch) at 25 or 40. There is no external mark on the wings to indicate current flap position. This is common to many Navajos. In short, the flap indicator is misleading and impossible to comply with the flight manual restriction because there are no markings beyond 15 flap.
2. The rear baggage compartment aft of the rear door has no tie down net. However, the operator has thoughtfully supplied a brightly coloured carpet to throw over any cargo or bags. This rug has eyelets and tape attached to the retaining hooks in the floor. In other words there is no effective restraint.
3. The nose baggage compartment is not equipped with tie down devices or floor restraints. In this compartment are three metal wheel chocks, several empty soft drink bottles, a small metal ladder and various debris. The metal ladder is firmly wedged against thin electrical wiring emanating from behind the instrument panel and disappearing into the nose cone via the sidewall of the front baggage compartment. Everything in the baggage compartment is unrestrained and would float freely in turbulence.
4. Numerous oil leaks are visible through the front of the left engine cowl area with oil running from under the engine nacelle and through to the top surface of the flap area inboard of the engine. The operator is aware of the oil leak but says it is due to over-filling of the oil tank. He directs that that the contents should be 9 quarts maximum to minimize perceived oil loss. Both wheel wells also show signs of excess engine oil leaks.
5. Strong smell of fuel in the fuselage area when the aircraft is stationary. In the immediate vicinity of both cross-feed drains there is wet fuel stains on the fuselage belly with flow patterns extending several inches. The operator was previously advised but no action was taken. The problem of fuel leaks in this area are long-standing. Two wing fuel tank water drains drip fuel at one drop per 30 seconds on to the tarmac.
6. Autopilot when engaged causes very sudden in-flight manoeuvres and has to be hurriedly disengaged. There is no placard indicating an unserviceable autopilot and nothing in the MR The Century 111 autopilot control panel has a missing knob for roll mode – it is just a bare metal rod on which the knob is supposed to be attached. The calibration wheel on the autopilot box has unreadable graduations thus it is not possible to note a specific setting in daytime – worse at night, of course. There is a knob called “Auto Pilot Nav Selector” which can be selected to Nav1, Nav 2 or Off. There is no documentation on the specific use of this section of the autopilot.
The operator’s policy is not to make the system serviceable because he deems it too expensive to rectify. The aircraft flies single pilot IFR with no autopilot. This is apparently legal on passenger charter operations but not on RPT flights. Passengers should be entitled to the same degree of safety regardless of the category of flight. The operator crews RPT flights with two pilots, with the second pilot paying for the right seat under the guise of in command under supervision – but logging the total flight as “in command”. The autopilot has been unserviceable for 9 months and no action taken to rectify the problem. Single pilot IFR/IMC with no auto pilot is not conducive to a safe operation, regardless of the legalities.
7. Normally a green light appears when there is electrical power to the turn-coordinator. The light is inoperative. Next to the u/s light is an empty un-labelled lamp socket.
8. The two position voltage regulator switch is labeled only Main. There is apparently a second position hopefully for the Aux regulator if indeed one is installed. There is no Aux label on the switch assembly.
9. The circuit breaker panel has many obliterated decals or words with one or more letters missing. At night it is difficult to read the decals due grime and dirt or simply non-existent labels. The autopilot circuit breaker was out and easily reset because there is a piece of plastic or broken collar surrounding the circuit breaker shank. Nothing about this in the m/r. If the circuit breaker is inoperative or permanently collared out, then as a protection against circuit breaker resetting it is useless and potentially dangerous fire risk.
10. The green glide slope engaged light is inoperative on press-to-test.
11. There is a decal on the circuit breaker panel which on close scrutiny (impossible at night) says “Turn and Bank Left/Right”. There is however only one turn coordinator – not a Turn and Bank Indicator which is situated on the left instrument panel in front of the left seat pilot. There is no similar instrument in front of the RH seat pilot – only a couple of plugged holes where instruments were once installed.
The circuit breaker marked “Left Turn and Bank”, appears to be a false circuit breaker as it does not pull out and on closer inspection it is merely a black painted knob which looks exactly like a circuit breaker in shape and size. The circuit breaker labeled “RH Turn and Bank” is a real circuit breaker but there is no RH instrument for it to supply power to. One can imagine the confusion in event of electrical smoke or fire when the pseudo circuit breaker is found to be jammed.
11. There is a Stormscope installed. It is well advertised by a decal situated on the fuselage near the entrance door which says “Stormscope equipped.” An identical decal advertising the presence of the Stormscope is situated on the left fuselage sidewall adjacent to the circuit breaker panel. Maybe this is to give an added sense of security to the pilot. However, above the actual instrument is a decal marked Radar. There is also a circuit breaker marked Radar. Only problem is that the aircraft is not equipped with weather radar.
12. There is a set of normal looking rudder pedals for the copilot position. They are identical in size and shape to the pilot’s rudder pedals. However, there are no brakes on the copilot’s pedals. There is no decal warning of this, nothing in the Flight Manual or the Operations Manual and no mention in the maintenance release. Simply, one would not know if the brakes were either not working from the RH side, or if they were not installed.
One endorsement was carried out on this particular aircraft where the instructor was not aware that brakes were not installed on the right hand seat pedals, until after the flight with a student undergoing conversion training. The pilot under training had commented on the heavy nosewheel steering problems, so the instructor took control to “free up” the nosewheel steering by applying alternate foot pressure to each pedal on his side. The brake “pressure” appeared to lock solid on his pedals and the aircraft started to veer off the tarmac towards a nearby obstruction. The instructor quickly told the student to take over control. Later it was discovered that the copilot’s pedals indeed had no braking capability. The aircraft had flown for hundreds of hours and previous pilots had been unaware of the lack of RH seat brakes.
13. There are two engine gauges. Each gauge has an integral oil pressure, oil temperature and CHT sub gauge. In this aircraft the colour coding of the various instruments within the main gauge display do not agree with each other. For example, one oil pressure gauge shows 10 PSI red line limit for the left engine while the right oil pressure gauge shows 25 PSI red line limit. The green normal oil pressure operating range is quite different between the two oil pressure gauges.
The CHT left engine gauge indicates 200F as the lower limit on the needle while the right engine CHT lower limit shows 100F. The varying size of temperature in degrees F scales on the two CHT gauges means that the needle positions are not generally parallel, thus requiring careful scrutiny of the actual readings – rather than a normal scan which looks for similar parallel readings within average temperature parameters. The left oil temperature gauge has no numbers – just a green arc and one red temperature limit mark. The right oil temperature gauge has graduations from 50F to 250F plus – with three colour codes of green, yellow, and red. This means that a normal scan of engine temperatures and pressures in flight is not possible in terms of normal or abnormal needle positions. Instead a close scrutiny of each needle is needed which becomes a problem at night where cockpit directional lighting is poor by even automobile standards.
14. It is impossible to read the Directional Gyro at night because the internal lighting is inoperative. One needs to shine a torch on the instrument or have cat’s eye vision to read compass headings.
15. The upper switch panel over the pilot’s head houses the magneto switches. On the panel is a sign which says “Alternators Press-to-Test”. This refers to alternator test buttons that were presumably once installed. Instead there are two empty holes drilled into the vinyl roof and no buttons to press.
16. Both mixture controls are misaligned. The rear limit (idle cut-off position) actually coincides with a decal marked “Lean” that itself is supposed to indicate typical cruise position of the mixture control when leaned correctly. In other words, if the pilot leaned the mixture levers to the position marked “Lean” both engines would stop. Similarly the full forward rich mixture limit stops one and a half inches from the forward stop. The available movement of the two mixture controls is only slightly more than half of the total quadrant distance between ICO and full rich lever position.
17. There is intolerable noise in the No 1 VHF set and it sounds like a parrot squawking. The No 2 ADF volume control (Bendix) has no decal indicating volume direction. The HF volume control knob is un-marked and the decal obliterated. Similarly the circuit breaker panel has various switches such as landing and taxi light controls. There is no decal showing on/off positions which is confusing, particularly as the alternator field switches lay fore and aft.
18. The metal vertical cover which protects the left engine fire fuel shut-off handles (behind the pilot’s seat) from inadvertent actuation, does a good job indeed. It is tightly jammed and no amount of effort could move it in event of an engine fire - apart from using a set of pliars or a screw driver. The right engine fire fuel handle cover plate is not jammed. It is so loose that it is normally left laying on the cockpit floor.
19. On top of the right engine cowl a crack is evident adjacent to the hinge line of the oil cap cover. The crack is proceeding nicely but there is no stop drilling present.
20. Exposed and unprotected electrical wiring is readily visible coming from behind the left fuselage vinyl wall covering, and running behind the copilot’s seat and leading to the fuel system panel. The wiring is partially secured by masking tape which has peeled away. As the gap between the copilot’s seat and the passenger compartment wooden separation panel is used for maps, brief cases etc, it is easy to snag the wiring.
21. There is an electrically operated passenger seat belt sign attached to a portable wooden bulkhead. The box in which the sign is installed has a thick dark brown plastic cover. The seat belt signs are not visible in daylight, but with much peering one can just see the sign at night. It is quite useless for its task in daylight and only marginally better at night. There is no sign to indicate to passengers that the box displayed to their view is indeed a seat belts fastened device. It is just looks like a dark coloured box with no function.
22. Now here is a real beauty. Above the front right passenger window there is some light coloured masking tape. A closer inspection reveals the faded word EXIT in red but under the masking tape. It would be impossible to read at night in a dim passenger cabin. It is difficult to see in bright daylight. The emergency exit handle is covered by very tough plastic that requires a heavy pull to break in order to get at the handle. Lacerated fingers would occur. The handle assembly is situated in a position between two windows. There is no positive indication which of the two passenger windows is the emergency exit – especially as the small red EXIT sign is covered over with masking tape.
There is a decal which displays the following instruction: Emergency Exit – Lift Latch – Pull pin-Push window out. Which window? So there are two contradictory directions; one says Pull Pin, Lift Latch and the other says Pull handle Down. Very confusing even for the pilot, let alone a passenger at night. There is no doubt that the emergency exit window should be clearly outlined and the decal confusion sorted out.
23. The rear door can be used as an emergency exit. There is no decal indication that it can be used for this purpose. A passenger briefing card is available but the Navajo door opening procedure for the rear exit is complicated. In this aircraft the vital “Press-to-Release” knob which allows the main hatch to be operated that unlocks the exit door, is painted in faded white with what appears to be a faded red touch to it. There is no indication of the importance of that button to release the latch mechanism.
24. There is also a chain and bolt attached to the door area which is supposed to be attached after the door is locked closed, in order to prevent inadvertent door opening in flight. With the chain in place the door can only open an inch or so. There is no mention on the passenger briefing cards of the function of this bolt and chain and no decals or instructions adjacent to the door of the vital need to undo the chain and bolt before attempting to operate the exit mechanism. In other words the whole emergency exit policy in this Navajo is shambles. But all is not yet lost because to balance things up there is a very clearly displayed sign opposite the rear exit which says “Thank you for not smoking”.
25. In front of the copilot position are situated the cockpit heat controls. Next to the levers is a decal marked “Fuel On”. But there is no switch to associate with the decal –just another empty hole where presumably there was once a switch.
26. The fuel tank caps have a red decal stating that 100 octane fuel should be used. However the decal stating fuel tank capacity is missing on all caps.
27. The passenger emergency exit windows are not marked on the outside of the fuselage for ingress into the cabin. There is also no instruction on the outside of the rear door on how to open the door from the outside in event of an emergency.
28. In cruise the No 2 fuel pressure needle shows 3 PSI in excess of the red line limit.
28. The taxi light gives only five metres forward illumination – about the same as the parking lights on a car. In other words useless for obstacle illumination.
29. The right windscreen has numerous small nicks, cracks and crazed areas. Landing at night, runway lights show very diffused patterns through the windscreen and would be impossible to have adequate vision towards the sun.
30. The left oil pressure gauge shows a green band 30 to 60 PSI. The right oil pressure gauge shows a yellow caution band 30-60 PSI – then a green sector. Very confusing.
31. DME inoperative on last leg. Common defect on this aircraft.
32. Both pilot’s sun-visors flop down during take off, and in flight they dangle loosely and apparently have been like this for months.
But all is not lost. On the plus side, the maintenance release for this aircraft is squeaky clean....
Last edited by Centaurus; 24th Jun 2015 at 14:29.
Man Bilong Balus long PNG
Join Date: Apr 2002
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Centaurus; If it wasn`t so serious (and unfortunately quite believable
) I`d be roaring with laughter!
Not even the worst, beat up, high time, used, abused and misused Bongo vans, or A model 402`s I poled around the PNG landscape all those years ago were as bad as the Navajo described.
May one enquire as to the eventual outcome? A box of matches judicially applied perhaps?
) I`d be roaring with laughter!Not even the worst, beat up, high time, used, abused and misused Bongo vans, or A model 402`s I poled around the PNG landscape all those years ago were as bad as the Navajo described.
May one enquire as to the eventual outcome? A box of matches judicially applied perhaps?
Last edited by Pinky the pilot; 24th Jun 2015 at 10:43. Reason: Typo
And I bet I know the owner..... If it's who I'm thinking, I could have written a list just as long about two of his other Chieftains!
And the owner was a Captain with a reputable airline?
Un...king believable.
Could well be the same guy once had an Aztec. A colleague hired it so that I could renew his CIR. When we climbed into it there was a very strong smell of fuel. So we climbed out for a closer look. Upon giving the wing a bit of a shake, fuel started pouring out of the centre section belly area.
Of course we cancelled and wrote up the defect. The owner went ballistic, accusing us of trying to send him broke. Seems that a couple of the fuel tank cells had to be replaced to clear the defect from the Maintenance Release. Shame....pr!cks with that attitude deserve to be bankrupted.
Un...king believable.
Could well be the same guy once had an Aztec. A colleague hired it so that I could renew his CIR. When we climbed into it there was a very strong smell of fuel. So we climbed out for a closer look. Upon giving the wing a bit of a shake, fuel started pouring out of the centre section belly area.
Of course we cancelled and wrote up the defect. The owner went ballistic, accusing us of trying to send him broke. Seems that a couple of the fuel tank cells had to be replaced to clear the defect from the Maintenance Release. Shame....pr!cks with that attitude deserve to be bankrupted.
Thread Starter
Another CAIR report. This time an Aztec
CAIR Report – Aztec: Around 1995 era
The purpose of the flight was to endorse a pilot on type. The author arrived at the airport to find that the pilot under instruction had been verbally briefed by the company chief pilot that there were problems with the cockpit door which was hard to close and which had previously opened in flight. He said that if the door came open on final, the pilot should increase the approach speed by five knots.
This statement indicated that the door defect was a known event on this particular aircraft. The chief pilot further advised of a faulty autopilot pitch control channel and that it should be only used in two axis. He also indicated that the EGT gauge for both engines was inoperative.
The maintenance release showed that some 65 hours had been flown since the last 100 hourly inspection. There were no recorded defects endorsed in the maintenance release at the time of our flight. However, a company designed flight record sheet that was attached to the maintenance release had an annotation that that the cockpit door had opened twice during one flight. The last three flights shown in the flight record sheet had not been recorded in the maintenance release.
On attending the aircraft the door was found to be ill-fitting and it took several attempts to secure it from inside the cockpit. Abnormal force was needed to push its handle over-centre. As with other types of aircraft, once locked from inside it is not designed to be opened from the outside, thus making it impossible for rescue purposes from the outside.
This Aztec was fitted with only one hydraulic pump with which to operate the landing gear and flaps. This pump was on the left engine. In event of a failure of the left engine, the pilot would operate an emergency hydraulic hand-pump to operate the landing gear and flaps. Thus, besides securing the dead engine, the pilot would be forced to fly with one hand, while withdrawing the hand-pump from its socket with the other hand, before pumping the gear into the wheel wheels. A vision of the proverbial one arm paper-hanger springs to mind.
In this case the single engine rate of climb would be negative and a crash landing ahead inevitable, unless the gear was up at the time of engine failure. Despite this problem, at the time of this report the Aztec was still considered “safe” for charter flights. Some Aztecs have a second engine driven pump installed on the right engine at owner’s option.
After the instructional flight the following defects were recorded in the clean maintenance release:
1. The stall warning system failed to operate during stall recovery demonstrations.
2. The landing gear warning horn failed to operate and the red gear warning light in the gear lever failed to illuminate with gear up and throttles retarded.
3. Control column movement fore and aft caused squealing noises due lack of lubrication. This could be clearly heard during the landing hold off and when checking freedom of movement.
4. The Turn Coordinator was abnormally noisy during gyro run up.
5. Both CHT gauges appeared either unserviceable or unusually under-reading. Neither needle left the bottom (cold) stop although the right CHT needle did flicker higher a couple of times. As I had not flown this particular aircraft before and the OAT was only 10C, I accepted these low readings during run-up, but once airborne there was no discernible increase above the low stop.
6. Both EGT gauges inoperative
.7. The mandatory second artificial horizon (AH) was installed in the bottom far right hand corner of the copilot’s instrument panel and well outside the normal scan from the LH seat. The gross parallax error when viewed from the LH seat would negate the purpose of the second AH and in any case may lead to vertigo as the LH seat pilot leaned way over to his right to see the second AH. This is a well known problem with installation of some second AH’s to satisfy an airworthiness requirement.
It would be dangerous at night if the pilot was faced with a failed AH and was forced to rely on the second instrument well outside his scan. With a passenger in the RH seat, the second AH was not visible to the occupant of the LH seat.
8. The left engine manifold pressure needle (dual needles in a single gauge) frequently failed to respond to power changes until a differential of at least 6 inches of manifold pressure occurred. The needle would then move sluggishly to take up an appropriate reading. This fault showed throughout the flight whenever the throttles were repositioned.
9. The radio switch panel displayed a switch marked No 2 VHF.Nav receiver and another marked as No 2 VHF transmitter. In fact there was only one VHF and one VHF-Nav. These switches should be labelled as inoperative.
10. The feedback on VHF transmissions was scratchy and practically unreadable.
11. On two ILS approaches, while at 3 miles from the runway, the localiser needle showed one dot off centre with the aircraft visually aligned on the runway centre line. On one approach there was a rapid oscillation of the localiser needle on 3 miles final. Oscillation was less on the second ILS approach.
12. The autopilot over-controlled in roll and a severe pitch/bunt occurred when the pitch channel was engaged. No further attempts were made to experiment with the auto-pilot.
13. Attached to the pilot’s control wheel were two unidentified switches. One had the word ‘Winchester Electronics Incorporated” etched on the assembly. This was a press-to-transmit type switch and had it’s button missing, leaving a very nasty sharp threaded point for the pilot to push. The other switch was concealed under the wheel and not readily noticeable until inadvertently felt. It was a black toggle switch, spring loaded to centre, and operable in either direction. There was no labeling to indicate the purpose of either switch and no Flight Manual annotation.
14. With both mixture controls full forward, their position was at least two inches from the top edge of the quadrant, and looked as though they were actually in a mid-lean position. This may be an Aztec characteristic?
15. During run-up, the right pitch control was abnormally stiff to operate throughout the full range from Fine to Feather.
16. The parking brake was useless. As soon as moderate power was applied to any engine for run-up, the aircraft would move forward and veer left.
17. The right brake was weak during landing. Equal foot pressure on both pedals produced a marked turn to the left.
18. The altimeter on the copilot’s side showed 120 ft less than the pilot’s altimeter for same QNH. This was on the ground. There was an 80 ft difference when airborne. The right altimeter was outside IFR limits.
19. On two ILS approaches, the marker beacon lights and audio for the OM and MM failed to operate. The light globes also failed to operate on press to test.
20. The emergency exit window (passenger) is not labelled in any form. There is a single red handle beneath the window. This handle faces forward, but is unmarked. It would be easy for a passenger to inadvertently knock the handle with an elbow.
21. At 1100 rpm, the right engine manifold gauge needle oscillates rapidly over a 150 rpm range.
22. The pilot’s overhead vent control has an exposed metal shaft. The plastic round button is missing.
23. The internal dim/bright lights on the ADF digital control panel appear to be stuck in the dim position.
24. There is a radio rheostat switch labelled “Radio Light”. The switch may be disconnected or inoperative, as it does not appear to illuminate anything. If so, it should be labelled Inoperative.
25. The flap indicator needle indicates slight flap extended, although the flaps are confirmed visually up.
26. Most circuit breakers are underneath the left instrument panel out of sight of the pilot in the normal seated position. A portion of the decal serving these circuit breakers has been obliterated due wear and it takes time to read exactly what services are covered. Impossible at night.
27. A fire extinguisher is installed under the copilot’s seat. A label reveals that the last inspection was in 1986.
28. There is no POH in the aircraft. The Flight Manual did not have a copy of the C of R inside.
29. The ASI has no markings for Vmca, or blue line speed.
……………………………………………………………………………………………
Comments. In view of the inoperative stall warning and gear unsafe warning, the author endorsed the maintenance release as aircraft un-airworthy. This Aztec is used for charter flying by the operator. Signatures on the maintenance release indicate that at least 8 pilots have flown this aircraft since the maintenance release was issued.
It is difficult to believe that there were no defects apparently discovered during the 60 hours of flying until I flew it. The chief pilot was clearly aware of some of the defects because he cautioned the pilot under conversion prior to our flight.
Many of the defects must have been current during the last 100 hourly inspection, but the maintenance organization have appeared to missed them – or more likely deliberately ignored their presence. I understand that the operator has recently undergone routine surveillance by CASA inspectors. Presumably this would have included an inspection of airworthiness aspects of this aircraft. If so, the inspectors concerned perhaps lacked their usual vigour?
A short flight test would have revealed the in-flight defects such as those listed in this report. After all, cars are subject to a short road test to renew some roadworthy issues, so perhaps old aircraft should be required to undergo the same appropriate airworthiness flight tests as part of charter approval for the type.
If nothing else, there should be an airworthiness investigation on the positioning of the second AH which is required for IFR charter. I have seen this problem on many GA types, although this particular Aztec was the worst example. There is little point in having flight instrument redundancy if the pilot faces serious aircraft handling problems when forced to fall back on the spare AH which may be outside his normal scan. The Monarch Airlines Chieftain accident inquiry revealed a similar problem in instrumentation.
Airworthiness authorities are rightly concerned with correctness of paper work during routine operator surveillance. From my experience there is a clear need for inspectors to crawl around a few cockpits. Many of the defects that I have listed on this Aztec should have been readily apparent to a diligent flying operations or airworthiness inspector who took time to open the door – that being the very first defect.
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
The purpose of the flight was to endorse a pilot on type. The author arrived at the airport to find that the pilot under instruction had been verbally briefed by the company chief pilot that there were problems with the cockpit door which was hard to close and which had previously opened in flight. He said that if the door came open on final, the pilot should increase the approach speed by five knots.
This statement indicated that the door defect was a known event on this particular aircraft. The chief pilot further advised of a faulty autopilot pitch control channel and that it should be only used in two axis. He also indicated that the EGT gauge for both engines was inoperative.
The maintenance release showed that some 65 hours had been flown since the last 100 hourly inspection. There were no recorded defects endorsed in the maintenance release at the time of our flight. However, a company designed flight record sheet that was attached to the maintenance release had an annotation that that the cockpit door had opened twice during one flight. The last three flights shown in the flight record sheet had not been recorded in the maintenance release.
On attending the aircraft the door was found to be ill-fitting and it took several attempts to secure it from inside the cockpit. Abnormal force was needed to push its handle over-centre. As with other types of aircraft, once locked from inside it is not designed to be opened from the outside, thus making it impossible for rescue purposes from the outside.
This Aztec was fitted with only one hydraulic pump with which to operate the landing gear and flaps. This pump was on the left engine. In event of a failure of the left engine, the pilot would operate an emergency hydraulic hand-pump to operate the landing gear and flaps. Thus, besides securing the dead engine, the pilot would be forced to fly with one hand, while withdrawing the hand-pump from its socket with the other hand, before pumping the gear into the wheel wheels. A vision of the proverbial one arm paper-hanger springs to mind.
In this case the single engine rate of climb would be negative and a crash landing ahead inevitable, unless the gear was up at the time of engine failure. Despite this problem, at the time of this report the Aztec was still considered “safe” for charter flights. Some Aztecs have a second engine driven pump installed on the right engine at owner’s option.
After the instructional flight the following defects were recorded in the clean maintenance release:
1. The stall warning system failed to operate during stall recovery demonstrations.
2. The landing gear warning horn failed to operate and the red gear warning light in the gear lever failed to illuminate with gear up and throttles retarded.
3. Control column movement fore and aft caused squealing noises due lack of lubrication. This could be clearly heard during the landing hold off and when checking freedom of movement.
4. The Turn Coordinator was abnormally noisy during gyro run up.
5. Both CHT gauges appeared either unserviceable or unusually under-reading. Neither needle left the bottom (cold) stop although the right CHT needle did flicker higher a couple of times. As I had not flown this particular aircraft before and the OAT was only 10C, I accepted these low readings during run-up, but once airborne there was no discernible increase above the low stop.
6. Both EGT gauges inoperative
.7. The mandatory second artificial horizon (AH) was installed in the bottom far right hand corner of the copilot’s instrument panel and well outside the normal scan from the LH seat. The gross parallax error when viewed from the LH seat would negate the purpose of the second AH and in any case may lead to vertigo as the LH seat pilot leaned way over to his right to see the second AH. This is a well known problem with installation of some second AH’s to satisfy an airworthiness requirement.
It would be dangerous at night if the pilot was faced with a failed AH and was forced to rely on the second instrument well outside his scan. With a passenger in the RH seat, the second AH was not visible to the occupant of the LH seat.
8. The left engine manifold pressure needle (dual needles in a single gauge) frequently failed to respond to power changes until a differential of at least 6 inches of manifold pressure occurred. The needle would then move sluggishly to take up an appropriate reading. This fault showed throughout the flight whenever the throttles were repositioned.
9. The radio switch panel displayed a switch marked No 2 VHF.Nav receiver and another marked as No 2 VHF transmitter. In fact there was only one VHF and one VHF-Nav. These switches should be labelled as inoperative.
10. The feedback on VHF transmissions was scratchy and practically unreadable.
11. On two ILS approaches, while at 3 miles from the runway, the localiser needle showed one dot off centre with the aircraft visually aligned on the runway centre line. On one approach there was a rapid oscillation of the localiser needle on 3 miles final. Oscillation was less on the second ILS approach.
12. The autopilot over-controlled in roll and a severe pitch/bunt occurred when the pitch channel was engaged. No further attempts were made to experiment with the auto-pilot.
13. Attached to the pilot’s control wheel were two unidentified switches. One had the word ‘Winchester Electronics Incorporated” etched on the assembly. This was a press-to-transmit type switch and had it’s button missing, leaving a very nasty sharp threaded point for the pilot to push. The other switch was concealed under the wheel and not readily noticeable until inadvertently felt. It was a black toggle switch, spring loaded to centre, and operable in either direction. There was no labeling to indicate the purpose of either switch and no Flight Manual annotation.
14. With both mixture controls full forward, their position was at least two inches from the top edge of the quadrant, and looked as though they were actually in a mid-lean position. This may be an Aztec characteristic?
15. During run-up, the right pitch control was abnormally stiff to operate throughout the full range from Fine to Feather.
16. The parking brake was useless. As soon as moderate power was applied to any engine for run-up, the aircraft would move forward and veer left.
17. The right brake was weak during landing. Equal foot pressure on both pedals produced a marked turn to the left.
18. The altimeter on the copilot’s side showed 120 ft less than the pilot’s altimeter for same QNH. This was on the ground. There was an 80 ft difference when airborne. The right altimeter was outside IFR limits.
19. On two ILS approaches, the marker beacon lights and audio for the OM and MM failed to operate. The light globes also failed to operate on press to test.
20. The emergency exit window (passenger) is not labelled in any form. There is a single red handle beneath the window. This handle faces forward, but is unmarked. It would be easy for a passenger to inadvertently knock the handle with an elbow.
21. At 1100 rpm, the right engine manifold gauge needle oscillates rapidly over a 150 rpm range.
22. The pilot’s overhead vent control has an exposed metal shaft. The plastic round button is missing.
23. The internal dim/bright lights on the ADF digital control panel appear to be stuck in the dim position.
24. There is a radio rheostat switch labelled “Radio Light”. The switch may be disconnected or inoperative, as it does not appear to illuminate anything. If so, it should be labelled Inoperative.
25. The flap indicator needle indicates slight flap extended, although the flaps are confirmed visually up.
26. Most circuit breakers are underneath the left instrument panel out of sight of the pilot in the normal seated position. A portion of the decal serving these circuit breakers has been obliterated due wear and it takes time to read exactly what services are covered. Impossible at night.
27. A fire extinguisher is installed under the copilot’s seat. A label reveals that the last inspection was in 1986.
28. There is no POH in the aircraft. The Flight Manual did not have a copy of the C of R inside.
29. The ASI has no markings for Vmca, or blue line speed.
……………………………………………………………………………………………
Comments. In view of the inoperative stall warning and gear unsafe warning, the author endorsed the maintenance release as aircraft un-airworthy. This Aztec is used for charter flying by the operator. Signatures on the maintenance release indicate that at least 8 pilots have flown this aircraft since the maintenance release was issued.
It is difficult to believe that there were no defects apparently discovered during the 60 hours of flying until I flew it. The chief pilot was clearly aware of some of the defects because he cautioned the pilot under conversion prior to our flight.
Many of the defects must have been current during the last 100 hourly inspection, but the maintenance organization have appeared to missed them – or more likely deliberately ignored their presence. I understand that the operator has recently undergone routine surveillance by CASA inspectors. Presumably this would have included an inspection of airworthiness aspects of this aircraft. If so, the inspectors concerned perhaps lacked their usual vigour?
A short flight test would have revealed the in-flight defects such as those listed in this report. After all, cars are subject to a short road test to renew some roadworthy issues, so perhaps old aircraft should be required to undergo the same appropriate airworthiness flight tests as part of charter approval for the type.
If nothing else, there should be an airworthiness investigation on the positioning of the second AH which is required for IFR charter. I have seen this problem on many GA types, although this particular Aztec was the worst example. There is little point in having flight instrument redundancy if the pilot faces serious aircraft handling problems when forced to fall back on the spare AH which may be outside his normal scan. The Monarch Airlines Chieftain accident inquiry revealed a similar problem in instrumentation.
Airworthiness authorities are rightly concerned with correctness of paper work during routine operator surveillance. From my experience there is a clear need for inspectors to crawl around a few cockpits. Many of the defects that I have listed on this Aztec should have been readily apparent to a diligent flying operations or airworthiness inspector who took time to open the door – that being the very first defect.
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
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Sounds like most of the aircraft that I spent years on during my my career before I went to airlines, except for the paint job.
Is Centaurus a person who went to Aviation Nirvana with a bare Instructors Rating , 4-500 hours and, is now the Captain of a A380 who wants to go back to his aviation roots?
This guy is sharp because I normally only had time to look after I had been airborne for an hour or so and I used the first couple of hours flying the thing and a few landings to get that sort of information.
Did it really just take 15 minutes to find all those errors?
Did you ever get around to actually flying it?
In an ideal world this would not happen but, General Aviation is not in that world and never was.
I'm not saying that the operator shouldn't be looked at and maybe shut down but, he will only be replaced by another.
I have seen this for forty years and counting.
Centaurus, if you would like to hire my Navajo, it will be available to you providing you can meet my minimum requirements:
Type experiece : 300 hrs on type ,100 hours in 365 days, 3 T/O & Ldgs in 30 days.
Appropriate Licences:
Recurrent training: Evidence of recent type refresher from a recognized organization ( Flight Safety International is Ok).
Cost to you will be something like :
$1500 per flight hour ( min of 3 hours).
7 days notice before flight, payment in advance, no refunds.
Too much?
Go see the guy with the new paint job and,..... most people do.
Is Centaurus a person who went to Aviation Nirvana with a bare Instructors Rating , 4-500 hours and, is now the Captain of a A380 who wants to go back to his aviation roots?
This guy is sharp because I normally only had time to look after I had been airborne for an hour or so and I used the first couple of hours flying the thing and a few landings to get that sort of information.
Did it really just take 15 minutes to find all those errors?
Did you ever get around to actually flying it?
In an ideal world this would not happen but, General Aviation is not in that world and never was.
I'm not saying that the operator shouldn't be looked at and maybe shut down but, he will only be replaced by another.
I have seen this for forty years and counting.
Centaurus, if you would like to hire my Navajo, it will be available to you providing you can meet my minimum requirements:
Type experiece : 300 hrs on type ,100 hours in 365 days, 3 T/O & Ldgs in 30 days.
Appropriate Licences:
Recurrent training: Evidence of recent type refresher from a recognized organization ( Flight Safety International is Ok).
Cost to you will be something like :
$1500 per flight hour ( min of 3 hours).
7 days notice before flight, payment in advance, no refunds.
Too much?
Go see the guy with the new paint job and,..... most people do.
Last edited by International Trader; 25th Jun 2015 at 02:19. Reason: typo
Moderator
Having counted Centaurus a close friend for 45 or more years, I really have to rise to his defence, here ... you are free, of course, to hold whatever view you may choose but to suggest that Centaurus is wet behind the ears is a bit rich ...
Is Centaurus a person who went to Aviation Nirvana with a bare Instructors Rating , 4-500 hours
He passed that sort of milestone somewhat in excess of 60-odd years ago ..
This guy is sharp ..
Oh, that he definitely is ... and very thorough in what he does and says.
I used the first couple of hours flying the thing and a few landings to get that sort of information.
A risky way to do the flying business ?
Did it really just take 15 minutes to find all those errors?
Did is say he was sharp, thorough, and very competent ?
In an ideal world this would not happen but, General Aviation is not in that world and never was.
... and will remain ever thus unless folks speak up.
I have seen this for forty years and counting.
... but not raised your hand in protest ?
Is Centaurus a person who went to Aviation Nirvana with a bare Instructors Rating , 4-500 hours
He passed that sort of milestone somewhat in excess of 60-odd years ago ..
This guy is sharp ..
Oh, that he definitely is ... and very thorough in what he does and says.
I used the first couple of hours flying the thing and a few landings to get that sort of information.
A risky way to do the flying business ?
Did it really just take 15 minutes to find all those errors?
Did is say he was sharp, thorough, and very competent ?
In an ideal world this would not happen but, General Aviation is not in that world and never was.
... and will remain ever thus unless folks speak up.
I have seen this for forty years and counting.
... but not raised your hand in protest ?
When I started my career, the a/c I operated had already been ridden hard and put away wet for a minimum of 25 years.
There is an entire generation of us out there that had the good luck to operate just the sort of machinery you describe.
If you think a squawk sheet like that is bad (which it is) then you wouldn't believe some of the things that "Joe Lighty" had to do out there to survive in decades past.
I should add that I very much enjoy your anecdotes, they are the type of stories that motivated many of us to get into what has obviously turned out to be a very different aviation universe.
There is an entire generation of us out there that had the good luck to operate just the sort of machinery you describe.
If you think a squawk sheet like that is bad (which it is) then you wouldn't believe some of the things that "Joe Lighty" had to do out there to survive in decades past.
I should add that I very much enjoy your anecdotes, they are the type of stories that motivated many of us to get into what has obviously turned out to be a very different aviation universe.
thanks centaurus , that really takes me back . my alcoholic chief lame had a long , colourful string of names for people like you . navajos also had auto jamming tank selectors but i suspect you didn't get that far .
Funny isn't it.
People get on here to moan about the decline in professional standards, and when someone, Centaurus in this instance, puts his hands up and raises an issue that is clearly an issue and people shoot him down on the basis that they had to put up with the crap he was describing and therefore why whinge about it!
Aviation is a business with razor thing margins and clearly this tempts people to cut corners, but I would rather fly a well maintained aeroplane with a ****ty paint job rather than a shiny looking turd.
Medicine is another business where bastardisation and bullying exists and because it has always been thus it is therefore ok to continue. Different issues but unacceptable nonetheless!
If we don't listen to the lessons of the past we are condemned to repeat them.
As for the regulator allowing this sort of stuff to occur, they are too busy pole vaulting over mouse **** to worry about the real issues.
People get on here to moan about the decline in professional standards, and when someone, Centaurus in this instance, puts his hands up and raises an issue that is clearly an issue and people shoot him down on the basis that they had to put up with the crap he was describing and therefore why whinge about it!
Aviation is a business with razor thing margins and clearly this tempts people to cut corners, but I would rather fly a well maintained aeroplane with a ****ty paint job rather than a shiny looking turd.
Medicine is another business where bastardisation and bullying exists and because it has always been thus it is therefore ok to continue. Different issues but unacceptable nonetheless!
If we don't listen to the lessons of the past we are condemned to repeat them.
As for the regulator allowing this sort of stuff to occur, they are too busy pole vaulting over mouse **** to worry about the real issues.
That sort of ****box machine is pretty much evidence of the way the industry works, and is believed to be the normal thing.
Why are so many aircraft like the ones described? I think basically because people don't charge appropriate rates for their aircraft. In an effort to get work, they have rates that don't support the REAL cost of operation. Undercut the mob next door just to get more work, don't pay good wages, don't put money into the right maintenance. The old mob next door gets cheaper again and gets the work back but are spending even less now on the aircraft. Cycle repeats.
The attitude gets to me sometimes. Owners, operators, maintainers etc should have a hell of a lot more pride in their service and equipment, and if everyone charges appropriately for such a service the quality of aircraft etc can only increase. Being a tightarse is easy; doing it properly is hard, and those that do it properly should be supported.
Some of the **** that goes on out there is beyond a joke.
Why are so many aircraft like the ones described? I think basically because people don't charge appropriate rates for their aircraft. In an effort to get work, they have rates that don't support the REAL cost of operation. Undercut the mob next door just to get more work, don't pay good wages, don't put money into the right maintenance. The old mob next door gets cheaper again and gets the work back but are spending even less now on the aircraft. Cycle repeats.
The attitude gets to me sometimes. Owners, operators, maintainers etc should have a hell of a lot more pride in their service and equipment, and if everyone charges appropriately for such a service the quality of aircraft etc can only increase. Being a tightarse is easy; doing it properly is hard, and those that do it properly should be supported.
Some of the **** that goes on out there is beyond a joke.
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Cost to you will be something like :
$1500 per flight hour ( min of 3 hours).
7 days notice before flight, payment in advance, no refunds.
Too much?
Go see the guy with the new paint job and,..... most people do.
$1500 per flight hour ( min of 3 hours).
7 days notice before flight, payment in advance, no refunds.
Too much?
Go see the guy with the new paint job and,..... most people do.
For a Navajo?
I can hire a King air B200 for $1500 per flight hour
I can hire a King air B200 for $1500 per flight hour
Man Bilong Balus long PNG
Join Date: Apr 2002
Location: Looking forward to returning to Japan soon but in the meantime continuing the never ending search for a bad bottle of Red!
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That sort of ****box machine is pretty much evidence of the way the industry works, and is believed to be the normal thing.
And I state here for the record that if I ever do, not only will I refuse to fly it, I will write into the MR each and every defect I find! Oh, and I`ll make a photographic copy of the list with my phone which will be `used in evidence` if required!
I`m too old to put up with **** like that!
And I have this dream of living a real long life!
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you may well stand to the defence of your good friend centaurus, john but all international trader has done is ask some questions.
it is not for him to know that centaurus' back ground is ex military as i understand it, and if i'm right is perhaps less experienced than some others as to the maintenance realities of some of the ga fleet
not that it is wrong of centaurus to write the posts the he does
who's to know if, when or how international trader has raised his hand in protest?
its all very well for each of us to say "i'm not flying that". but as 400hr ga pilots most would. if, as elder statesmen of the industry, we have a problem, can we put hands on heart and say putting up multiple paragraph posts on anonymous bulletin boards and say "job done"?
it is not for him to know that centaurus' back ground is ex military as i understand it, and if i'm right is perhaps less experienced than some others as to the maintenance realities of some of the ga fleet
not that it is wrong of centaurus to write the posts the he does
who's to know if, when or how international trader has raised his hand in protest?
its all very well for each of us to say "i'm not flying that". but as 400hr ga pilots most would. if, as elder statesmen of the industry, we have a problem, can we put hands on heart and say putting up multiple paragraph posts on anonymous bulletin boards and say "job done"?
Last edited by waren9; 25th Jun 2015 at 10:03.