Channel 7 Sunday Night Program About VH-MDX
On arrival at Coolangatta the aircraft was refuelled and the pilot attended the Briefing Office, where he was provided with copies of the relevant weather forecasts for the remaining part of the flight. These forecasts indicated a strong westsouthwesterly airflow over northern New South Wales, with considerable low level cloud to the west of the mountains but only scattered stratocumulus or cumulus up to 6000 feet to the east and over the coast. The freezing level was expected to be between 4000 and 7000 feet above mean sea level, and moderate icing was forecast in cloud above that level. A SIGMET (forecast of significant weather which may affect aircraft safety) was current, indicating occasional severe turbulence existed below 12,000 feet to the east of the mountains.
HOW do you wait NVFR, away from a navaid and without a proper holding procedure, then resume track within the required tolerances?
Dr
Thread Starter
I don't accept that there is acceptable evidence that the refuelers claim is accurate . It's easy to make a comment like that after everyone in the aircraft are dead.
It's clear that the pilot made numerous errors that contributed to the accident. None of these were the fault of the passengers.
I believe if the RAAF flight planning restriction is removed from ERSA there will be less chance of this type of accident repeating itself.
Why didn't anyone tell the pilot when he turned and flew west from CRAVEN that he was heading in the wrong direction? I know - he wasn't the responsibility of either the RAAF ATC or Sydney ATC so it wasn't their jobs to tell anyone !
That's no doubt why BASI made no recommendation that the radar be used in future to prevent this type of accident.
Concrete minded investigators I would say. I will ask again - did BASI make any safety recommendations at all?
It's clear that the pilot made numerous errors that contributed to the accident. None of these were the fault of the passengers.
I believe if the RAAF flight planning restriction is removed from ERSA there will be less chance of this type of accident repeating itself.
Why didn't anyone tell the pilot when he turned and flew west from CRAVEN that he was heading in the wrong direction? I know - he wasn't the responsibility of either the RAAF ATC or Sydney ATC so it wasn't their jobs to tell anyone !
That's no doubt why BASI made no recommendation that the radar be used in future to prevent this type of accident.
Concrete minded investigators I would say. I will ask again - did BASI make any safety recommendations at all?
Andrewr,
Regarding your question about holding, you do not have to "just orbit", you can opt to conduct your own holding pattern taking into account known or estimated wind which will give you a much better method of maintaining your position over the ground.
For example, if the wind is estimated to be a 30kt tailwind outbound and thus a 30kt headwind inbound and your TAS is 160kt, an outbound leg will of 1 minute would be about 3.17nm, therefore the inbound leg to get you back to your starting point would take about 1 minute and 28 seconds. For the inbound leg of your holding pattern you would re-establish yourself on the bearing/radial of your tracking aid.
Yes, without DME or GNSS as was the case with VH-MDX you would not be assured of your exact position but the above method would in my opinion provide enough accuracy to keep your position within a good tolerance. As for the question regarding LSALT for the hold, you could utilise Grid LSALT.
Dick,
Can I please request that you answer my question regarding the accident of N25BR mentioned in post 354. Please don't make me resort to utilising excessively large fonts to gain a response from you as others have had to do.
Regarding your question about holding, you do not have to "just orbit", you can opt to conduct your own holding pattern taking into account known or estimated wind which will give you a much better method of maintaining your position over the ground.
For example, if the wind is estimated to be a 30kt tailwind outbound and thus a 30kt headwind inbound and your TAS is 160kt, an outbound leg will of 1 minute would be about 3.17nm, therefore the inbound leg to get you back to your starting point would take about 1 minute and 28 seconds. For the inbound leg of your holding pattern you would re-establish yourself on the bearing/radial of your tracking aid.
Yes, without DME or GNSS as was the case with VH-MDX you would not be assured of your exact position but the above method would in my opinion provide enough accuracy to keep your position within a good tolerance. As for the question regarding LSALT for the hold, you could utilise Grid LSALT.
Dick,
Can I please request that you answer my question regarding the accident of N25BR mentioned in post 354. Please don't make me resort to utilising excessively large fonts to gain a response from you as others have had to do.
Last edited by Check_Thrust; 9th Jun 2014 at 04:30. Reason: Wording error
Andrewr, re your post #524, I'm not sure where you are going with this line of reasoning, however I'll note that under Night VFR the pilot must either navigate with continual reference to the ground or use Navaids. If he could no longer navigate visually and his navaids were not working, he had an obligation to report to ATC that he was unable to maintain standard track keeping tolerances, declaring an emergency if necessary and requesting radar vectors if available.
Dick, re your post #496 where your comment "No need for the gyro as it was CAVOK that would allow visual reference to ground all the way to Bankstown that night". Flying under NVFR it is mandatory to have a serviceable attitude indicator (artificial horizon) and heading indicator (directional gyro). See CAO20.18 Appendix IV Instruments required for aeroplanes engaged in: (i) aerial work and private operations under the Instrument Flight Rules (including night V.M.C.).
Also, remember that CAVOK means no cloud below 5000'. If you're flying at 8000' you could be flying over a cloud layer that prevents visual reference with the ground.
We know from the radio transmissions that the pilot was having trouble with his flight instruments but we don't know when these problems first became evident. Given that the pilot remarked to the refueller in Coolangatta that there was some problem with the gyros or electrics, therefore regardless of whether the pilot was planning to fly over the mountains or down the coast, one would have to question the pilot's decision to get airborne at night with suspect instruments. If the instruments failed airborne, the pilot should have declared an emergency right away which would have given him the ability to fly wherever he wanted even through active restricted airspace.
So if you're in the camp that states it was the fault of the RAAF airspace that caused the pilot to crash, you would have to agree that if the pilot had declared an emergency and flown down the coast, he would have reached his destination. And I could elaborate to identify other contributory factors as in all accidents removing any of the links or holes in cheese would have prevented the accident. My point is that the sweeping simplistic statement "I blame the situation on the military airspace at Williamtown" at the exclusion of all other factors is disingenuous.
Dick, re your post #496 where your comment "No need for the gyro as it was CAVOK that would allow visual reference to ground all the way to Bankstown that night". Flying under NVFR it is mandatory to have a serviceable attitude indicator (artificial horizon) and heading indicator (directional gyro). See CAO20.18 Appendix IV Instruments required for aeroplanes engaged in: (i) aerial work and private operations under the Instrument Flight Rules (including night V.M.C.).
Also, remember that CAVOK means no cloud below 5000'. If you're flying at 8000' you could be flying over a cloud layer that prevents visual reference with the ground.
We know from the radio transmissions that the pilot was having trouble with his flight instruments but we don't know when these problems first became evident. Given that the pilot remarked to the refueller in Coolangatta that there was some problem with the gyros or electrics, therefore regardless of whether the pilot was planning to fly over the mountains or down the coast, one would have to question the pilot's decision to get airborne at night with suspect instruments. If the instruments failed airborne, the pilot should have declared an emergency right away which would have given him the ability to fly wherever he wanted even through active restricted airspace.
So if you're in the camp that states it was the fault of the RAAF airspace that caused the pilot to crash, you would have to agree that if the pilot had declared an emergency and flown down the coast, he would have reached his destination. And I could elaborate to identify other contributory factors as in all accidents removing any of the links or holes in cheese would have prevented the accident. My point is that the sweeping simplistic statement "I blame the situation on the military airspace at Williamtown" at the exclusion of all other factors is disingenuous.
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When all is said and done I would say that 99% of people seeing those shots of the weather in which they were flying and the terrain over which they were flying will ask why the flight wasn't permitted to flight plan coastal.
It will be interesting to watch whatever unfolds
It will be interesting to watch whatever unfolds
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More likely they will be asking why he was flying at all with faulty instruments/equipment, and why he didn't wait for clearance, if it is such an important requirement.
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From post #528
Dick, what evidence do you have to back up your assertion? In the past 30 years since MDX crashed there would have thousands, maybe hundreds of thousands, of light aircraft flying over the Barrington tops. How many of these aircraft have crashed or how many have come close to crashing? If it's as dangerous as you suggest, surely there must have been some reported near misses which would be an argument in support of changing the procedures.
In that same time, how many aircraft have crashed due to pilots pressing NVFR into IMC, not declaring an emergency to ATC in time, poor decision making etc which you acknowledged were contributory factors in the accident
On the basis of probability and consequence if you are serious about wanting to prevent this type of accident from repeating itself, I suggest your time would be better spent advocating for improved pilot training and checking, better decision-making, encouraging pilots to declare emergencies sooner rather than later - i.e. education and training in airmanship.
I understand that you have been trying for years to reduce the amount of military restricted airspace however to use this accident as a vehicle to push your agenda without factual evidence is seen by many as just that.
I believe if the RAAF flight planning restriction is removed from ERSA there will be less chance of this type of accident repeating itself.
In that same time, how many aircraft have crashed due to pilots pressing NVFR into IMC, not declaring an emergency to ATC in time, poor decision making etc which you acknowledged were contributory factors in the accident
It's clear that the pilot made numerous errors that contributed to the accident.
I understand that you have been trying for years to reduce the amount of military restricted airspace however to use this accident as a vehicle to push your agenda without factual evidence is seen by many as just that.
Thread Starter
Frab I have said it before. The risk generated by the flight planning ban may cause one accident every 50 years - that means we could have another 19 years before extra fatalities. But why take the risk when the problem is do easily fixed?
Your view may be that my time could be better spent elsewhere - my view is different.
Many posters on this site seem to be obsessed with keeping the status quo.
What wrong with changing rules from time it time if safety can be improved .
Check. Re post 354. Sounds like a classic controlled flight into terrain - which is the most common cause of fatalities by professional pilots in this world.
Contributing facts are the lack of radar coverage resulting in pressure on the pilots to depart into E airspace without a clearance - that is VFR
This clearly shows the USA has areas without radar coverage . In fact over 50% of US IFR approaches commence below radar coverage.
By the look of it BASI made no recommendations at all after the MDX crash. Why could that be? Yes. Offend people who resist any change.
Your view may be that my time could be better spent elsewhere - my view is different.
Many posters on this site seem to be obsessed with keeping the status quo.
What wrong with changing rules from time it time if safety can be improved .
Check. Re post 354. Sounds like a classic controlled flight into terrain - which is the most common cause of fatalities by professional pilots in this world.
Contributing facts are the lack of radar coverage resulting in pressure on the pilots to depart into E airspace without a clearance - that is VFR
This clearly shows the USA has areas without radar coverage . In fact over 50% of US IFR approaches commence below radar coverage.
By the look of it BASI made no recommendations at all after the MDX crash. Why could that be? Yes. Offend people who resist any change.
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Only the "human factor" needed to realise getting home for dinner, wasn't as important as getting home alive.
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DO TELL US ALL AGAIN ABOUT 'AFFORDABLE SAFETY'!
You've been around too long mate, we've seen it all before.
Thread Starter
So pjm. If they recommended that in radar coverage pilots would be on the same frequency as the person who had the radar screen( as introduced by my team over a decade later) that safety would not be improved and there would not be a reduced chance of that type of accident happening again?
Could it be they made no such recommendation because their culture of change resistance said. "FSO's are not trained to use radar so they never can"
Could it be they made no such recommendation because their culture of change resistance said. "FSO's are not trained to use radar so they never can"
Thread Starter
Hempy. Money would be saved by removing the restriction - less paper needs to be printed for a start. If Williamtown ATC has the flight details the Chief of the Airforce in his press release says there is likely to be less holding- and that will save even more money.
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Dont start that 'resistant to change' bull**** all over again. If you'd spent 5 minutes learning what goes on you'd realise that it's only ever 'change'...no one is 'resistant to change', we are just 'resistant to change for no good reason other than to keep the idiot who came up with it in a job'.
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p.s if an ATC can't process a 'no details' flight, cobble up a strip and pick a safe level (if there is one available) inside a minute, then he/she doesn't deserve a licence...
Thread Starter
Hempy what you will not address is
" What would be the problem in removing the flight planning restriction if the RAAF let 90% fly direct anyway"
Dare you to consider the proposal!
" What would be the problem in removing the flight planning restriction if the RAAF let 90% fly direct anyway"
Dare you to consider the proposal!
Thread Starter
And Hempy how could you criticize "affordable safety"
It's just a fact if life. - the money spent on safety is limited by what can be afforded by those who pay.
Or don't you like the truth being quoted?
It's just a fact if life. - the money spent on safety is limited by what can be afforded by those who pay.
Or don't you like the truth being quoted?
Thank you for answering my question Dick.
Now I do agree with you that N25BR was a "classic CFIT accident" whereas MDX was uncontrolled when it went down. But here is in my opinion the similarities between the two incidents.
The crew of N25BR elected to depart VFR in marginal VMC conditions instead of requesting an IFR clearance on the ground, this was probrably done to try and avoid delaying their depart. After they got airborne they requested to change to IFR but were essentially told that an IFR clearance was not available at that time, which to me is essentially saying "remain OCTA" (yes, I do understand that they were inside CTA for IFR aircraft but did not require clearance to be there as a VFR flight). Whilst manoeuvering to maintain VMC they impacted terrain. Now was this accident the fault of ATC? No. Was it the fault of the system of airspace? No. Was it the fault of the aircrews decision to depart in marginal VMC conditions in an attempt to elicit a faster clearence? Probably. If they requested an IFR clearance on the ground and had been issued one regards of whether or not a delay was incurred would have the accident occurred? Probably not. Therefore this accident could be most easily summarised as pilot error.
Now, the pilot of MDX elected not to wait for a clearance through Williamtown airspace. He chose to take his planned inland track. The controller at WLM was prepared to let him in through his airspace (granted MDX was not aware of this because there were issues with getting a clearance for his flight post WLM airspace, not due to the RAAF or their airspace). It may seem rough for me to say this, but an option was provided to MDX, he turned it down, he elected to go inland. Yes, if he transited WLM the outcome of his flight may have been different. Yes, to have been given the clearance to transit the airspace he would of needed to hold, if he was worried about the holding time he could of requested an estimate of how long it was going to take. Therefore, in my opinion, the major factor in this accident was pilot error. The RAAF did not make him take that route, yes they made him plan that route, but they did not make him take it.
If the same situation was to occur tonight, a NVFR aircraft planning the same flight with the exact same equipment and the same weather conditions of the night MDX went missing I dare say the outcome would perhaps be different. The reason for this is the fact that the hypothetical pilot in this scenario would be requesting a clearance directly from the WLM controller rather than having to deal with FIS who in turn had to deal with WLM and SY on behalf of MDX, in which case he would of been granted a clearance through WLM airspace more expeditiously, however issues perhaps would have still arisen when he reached the boundary of the next airspace sector due to the weather, not the RAAF, not civilian ATC, and the final outcome would depend on the decisions made by the PIC.
Just to be clear Dick, I am not against your desire to lift the flight planning restriction in regards to Williamtown, in fact I am for it. However I have my doubts as to whether or not it would of had any bearing in regards to the outcome of the flight of MDX if the clearance was denied by SY due to the weather.
I do find it disgusting though your statement that you hold the RAAF responsible for the deaths of those onboard MDX. Do you hold anyone else responsible for the deaths of the people onboard N25BR other than the pilots, I don't think you do as you stated it looked like a classic CFIT. So why is anyone else responsible for the outcome of the flight of MDX?
Yes, argue for a better system for traffic wanting to operate around Williamtown, but do not utilise a tragic accident that really does not have anything to do with it for the purpose. Do not unfairly tarnish people and an organisation that did not force the accident to occur. I do not work, nor have I ever worked for the RAAF or any branch of the armed forces for that matter, but I still find your public comments regarding the RAAF insulting and I would appreciate for an apology to be forthcoming from you to the RAAF.
Now I do agree with you that N25BR was a "classic CFIT accident" whereas MDX was uncontrolled when it went down. But here is in my opinion the similarities between the two incidents.
The crew of N25BR elected to depart VFR in marginal VMC conditions instead of requesting an IFR clearance on the ground, this was probrably done to try and avoid delaying their depart. After they got airborne they requested to change to IFR but were essentially told that an IFR clearance was not available at that time, which to me is essentially saying "remain OCTA" (yes, I do understand that they were inside CTA for IFR aircraft but did not require clearance to be there as a VFR flight). Whilst manoeuvering to maintain VMC they impacted terrain. Now was this accident the fault of ATC? No. Was it the fault of the system of airspace? No. Was it the fault of the aircrews decision to depart in marginal VMC conditions in an attempt to elicit a faster clearence? Probably. If they requested an IFR clearance on the ground and had been issued one regards of whether or not a delay was incurred would have the accident occurred? Probably not. Therefore this accident could be most easily summarised as pilot error.
Now, the pilot of MDX elected not to wait for a clearance through Williamtown airspace. He chose to take his planned inland track. The controller at WLM was prepared to let him in through his airspace (granted MDX was not aware of this because there were issues with getting a clearance for his flight post WLM airspace, not due to the RAAF or their airspace). It may seem rough for me to say this, but an option was provided to MDX, he turned it down, he elected to go inland. Yes, if he transited WLM the outcome of his flight may have been different. Yes, to have been given the clearance to transit the airspace he would of needed to hold, if he was worried about the holding time he could of requested an estimate of how long it was going to take. Therefore, in my opinion, the major factor in this accident was pilot error. The RAAF did not make him take that route, yes they made him plan that route, but they did not make him take it.
If the same situation was to occur tonight, a NVFR aircraft planning the same flight with the exact same equipment and the same weather conditions of the night MDX went missing I dare say the outcome would perhaps be different. The reason for this is the fact that the hypothetical pilot in this scenario would be requesting a clearance directly from the WLM controller rather than having to deal with FIS who in turn had to deal with WLM and SY on behalf of MDX, in which case he would of been granted a clearance through WLM airspace more expeditiously, however issues perhaps would have still arisen when he reached the boundary of the next airspace sector due to the weather, not the RAAF, not civilian ATC, and the final outcome would depend on the decisions made by the PIC.
Just to be clear Dick, I am not against your desire to lift the flight planning restriction in regards to Williamtown, in fact I am for it. However I have my doubts as to whether or not it would of had any bearing in regards to the outcome of the flight of MDX if the clearance was denied by SY due to the weather.
I do find it disgusting though your statement that you hold the RAAF responsible for the deaths of those onboard MDX. Do you hold anyone else responsible for the deaths of the people onboard N25BR other than the pilots, I don't think you do as you stated it looked like a classic CFIT. So why is anyone else responsible for the outcome of the flight of MDX?
Yes, argue for a better system for traffic wanting to operate around Williamtown, but do not utilise a tragic accident that really does not have anything to do with it for the purpose. Do not unfairly tarnish people and an organisation that did not force the accident to occur. I do not work, nor have I ever worked for the RAAF or any branch of the armed forces for that matter, but I still find your public comments regarding the RAAF insulting and I would appreciate for an apology to be forthcoming from you to the RAAF.
Dick Smith
Dick, no the majority of posters on this site would agree with Check_Thrust
Many posters on this site seem to be obsessed with keeping the status quo.
I do find it disgusting though your statement that you hold the RAAF responsible for the deaths of those onboard MDX.
You're asking the wrong people Dick. RAAF airspace, their requirements, their procedures, so ask them.
Being able to plan something does not guarantee you'll get it or without delay. Assuming he'd planned overhead WLM, MDX would still have been delayed because the SY sector would have knocked him back for exactly the same reason. The delay was not caused by no plan. Why would the pilot have waited any longer before tracking the way he did as that would have been plan "B" in case of clearance refusal? The outcome would have been no different.
And seriously, the only constant in our job is change.
Being able to plan something does not guarantee you'll get it or without delay. Assuming he'd planned overhead WLM, MDX would still have been delayed because the SY sector would have knocked him back for exactly the same reason. The delay was not caused by no plan. Why would the pilot have waited any longer before tracking the way he did as that would have been plan "B" in case of clearance refusal? The outcome would have been no different.
And seriously, the only constant in our job is change.
Thread Starter
Check thrust. You say that the outcome may be different today ( ie safer) because the pilot can call the military controller directly.
Do you realize i was directly involved in this change and it was greatly resisted at the time? I was abused on this site in the same way as I am now.
The pilot most likely did not wait for the clearance because he did not know how long the wait might be. Also as covered on other posts actually remaining OCTA would have been quite difficult
But the overriding issue is that the pilot new the RAAF had prohibited planning over the safest route. Why would they do that other than give the message "you won't be welcome if you come this way - and you are likely to be refused entry"
So which organisation is solely responsible for forcing this aircraft from the safest route along the coast in good visibility to a very much less safe route inland?
And which organisation still gives this message today - over 30 years later?
Yes you have it. The RAAF Bureaucracy .
Do you realize i was directly involved in this change and it was greatly resisted at the time? I was abused on this site in the same way as I am now.
The pilot most likely did not wait for the clearance because he did not know how long the wait might be. Also as covered on other posts actually remaining OCTA would have been quite difficult
But the overriding issue is that the pilot new the RAAF had prohibited planning over the safest route. Why would they do that other than give the message "you won't be welcome if you come this way - and you are likely to be refused entry"
So which organisation is solely responsible for forcing this aircraft from the safest route along the coast in good visibility to a very much less safe route inland?
And which organisation still gives this message today - over 30 years later?
Yes you have it. The RAAF Bureaucracy .