The Empire Strikes Back! on Colour Defective Pilots
Join Date: Jul 2010
Location: sydney
Posts: 1,469
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Errr, pardon if I misunderstood CAsA's reason for destroying the careers, livelihoods and wellbeing of some 400 Australian "Citizens", but didn't they say they had "Recent" research??. They never mentioned the volume!!!... about every bit of paper written with CVD in it back to 1885!!
Oh Good grief!!...Excuse me.
Hoi!!!...Mr. Attorney General, you have an inquiry going on about the rule of law...
Want a really good example of bureaucratic buggery??
Have we got a deal for you!!..... and mate CVD is just the start!!
While their at it, perhaps your investigators could find the persons responsible for hacking a serious CAsA critic's computer and hampering his ability to contribute to the debate.
In Case your wondering the vast majority of the population of this country is under the impression that we live in a democracy, do we or don't we?? Your college in government, minister Wuss, seems reluctant to confront corruption, are you of the same Ilk?
The question that troubles me is Why???
What possible motive? what perverted reason? is compelling CAsA to deliberately and maliciously destroy an Australian industry?
I've heard said, someone overheard a member of the iron ring state if he had his way the only aircraft operating in Australian sky's would be "RPT or Military".
Is it his warped military Philosophy that drives CAsA to wipe out a whole industry?
I just don't accept they are not intelligent enough to realize what they are doing.
So it must be intentional, malicious and carefully planned, the big question is why?
Oh Good grief!!...Excuse me.
Hoi!!!...Mr. Attorney General, you have an inquiry going on about the rule of law...
Want a really good example of bureaucratic buggery??
Have we got a deal for you!!..... and mate CVD is just the start!!
While their at it, perhaps your investigators could find the persons responsible for hacking a serious CAsA critic's computer and hampering his ability to contribute to the debate.
In Case your wondering the vast majority of the population of this country is under the impression that we live in a democracy, do we or don't we?? Your college in government, minister Wuss, seems reluctant to confront corruption, are you of the same Ilk?
The question that troubles me is Why???
What possible motive? what perverted reason? is compelling CAsA to deliberately and maliciously destroy an Australian industry?
I've heard said, someone overheard a member of the iron ring state if he had his way the only aircraft operating in Australian sky's would be "RPT or Military".
Is it his warped military Philosophy that drives CAsA to wipe out a whole industry?
I just don't accept they are not intelligent enough to realize what they are doing.
So it must be intentional, malicious and carefully planned, the big question is why?
Last edited by thorn bird; 12th Jul 2014 at 01:24.
From wikipedia:
The High Court ultimately overturned the decision (on the basis that Scottish Gaelic was not a European language...)
So Australia has 'progressed' to the point at which the control mechanism for pilots, who are demonstrably competent in all respects, is a vision test selected by a bureacrat.
I find it exquisitely ironic that a person whose skin colour would, in the past, have resulted in him being subjected to a test that conveniently justified, on appallingly irrelevant racial grounds, the person's exclusion as a citizen of Australia - Can't write in Scottish Gaelic, don't you know old boy? Not the kind of chap we can have around here old boy! - is now determining the tests that will discriminate on the basis of colour perception abilities that have no relevance to the fitness of a person to be pilot.
As to the letter, the paraphrasing provides an insight into the thinking of the author.
A tip contained in the first textbook I was told to read at law school: Don't use the word "clearly". If something is clear, it will be clear.
That's not what regulation 67.150(6)(c) says.
That regulation says (in fact? clearly?) that a person who does not satisfy (a) or (b) must instead demonstrate that he or she meets the applicable standard by:
Note that, contrary to Mr F's letter, the word "relevant" in the CASRs to which he refers does not apply to the "test". Rather, and very importantly, the word "relevant" applies to the word "lights".
The person has to "correctly identify all relevant coloured lights in a test ... that simulates an operational situation." That sentence would continue to make sense if it said the person has to correctly identify all "relevant lights" in a test, but wouldn't continue to make sense if it said the person has to correctly identify all "relevant coloured" in a test.
The requirement is not that the person has to identify the colour of relevant lights. Rather, the test is that the person has to identify all relevant coloured lights.
So, for example, the person has to be able to identify the fact that the coloured light 'over there' indicates the undercarriage is not down and locked, and that the coloured light 'over there' indicates the cabin pressure is decreasing at a high rate. There is no requirement for the person to know what the colours of each of those lights happen to be or that they happen to be different (if they are).
That interpretation is consistent with the safety intent of the legislation.
If CASA 'determines' a test whose aim is to find out whether a person can identify and distinguish between the colours of lights, CASA is no different to the administrators of tests requiring someone to write in Scottish Gaelic.
With the Federation of the Australian colonies into a single nation, one of the first acts of the new Commonwealth Government was the Immigration Restriction Act 1901, otherwise known as the White Australia policy, which was a strengthening and unification of disparate colonial policies designed to restrict non-White settlement. Because of opposition from the British government, an explicit racial policy was avoided in the legislation, with the control mechanism being a dictation test in a European language selected by the immigration officer. This was selected to be one the immigrant did not know; the last time an immigrant passed a test was in 1909.
Perhaps the most celebrated case was Egon Erwin Kisch, a left-wing Czechoslovakian journalist, who could speak five languages, who was failed in a test in Scottish Gaelic, and deported as illiterate.
Perhaps the most celebrated case was Egon Erwin Kisch, a left-wing Czechoslovakian journalist, who could speak five languages, who was failed in a test in Scottish Gaelic, and deported as illiterate.
So Australia has 'progressed' to the point at which the control mechanism for pilots, who are demonstrably competent in all respects, is a vision test selected by a bureacrat.
I find it exquisitely ironic that a person whose skin colour would, in the past, have resulted in him being subjected to a test that conveniently justified, on appallingly irrelevant racial grounds, the person's exclusion as a citizen of Australia - Can't write in Scottish Gaelic, don't you know old boy? Not the kind of chap we can have around here old boy! - is now determining the tests that will discriminate on the basis of colour perception abilities that have no relevance to the fitness of a person to be pilot.
As to the letter, the paraphrasing provides an insight into the thinking of the author.
CASR Part 67 clearly identifies the process that is required to be carried out ...
... a relevant test determined by CASA that simulates an operational situation.
That regulation says (in fact? clearly?) that a person who does not satisfy (a) or (b) must instead demonstrate that he or she meets the applicable standard by:
... correctly identifying all relevant coloured lights in a test, determined by CASA, that simulates an operational situation.
The person has to "correctly identify all relevant coloured lights in a test ... that simulates an operational situation." That sentence would continue to make sense if it said the person has to correctly identify all "relevant lights" in a test, but wouldn't continue to make sense if it said the person has to correctly identify all "relevant coloured" in a test.
The requirement is not that the person has to identify the colour of relevant lights. Rather, the test is that the person has to identify all relevant coloured lights.
So, for example, the person has to be able to identify the fact that the coloured light 'over there' indicates the undercarriage is not down and locked, and that the coloured light 'over there' indicates the cabin pressure is decreasing at a high rate. There is no requirement for the person to know what the colours of each of those lights happen to be or that they happen to be different (if they are).
That interpretation is consistent with the safety intent of the legislation.
If CASA 'determines' a test whose aim is to find out whether a person can identify and distinguish between the colours of lights, CASA is no different to the administrators of tests requiring someone to write in Scottish Gaelic.
Last edited by Creampuff; 14th Jul 2014 at 11:25. Reason: Changed "67.145" back to "67.150" to see who was paying attention
Join Date: Oct 2010
Location: Styx Houseboat Park.
Posts: 2,055
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Creamy – I do declare you an honest man. A worthy. It is an very undervalued accolade in the modern world. So, perhaps Sirrah, should the opportunity present, I could buy you a beer; whilst we argue, amicable like...
If the CVD issue were being managed on the basis of evidence and safety risk, the test determined by CASA for the purposes of CASR 67.150(6)(c) should be based on reality: Can the person pass the flight test for an instrument rating? Can the person pass the flight test for a multi-engine rating? Can the person meet the required level of competence in a sim ride? (Of course, we know the results of those tests, because CVD pilots have been passing them for decades.)
It's obvious that CASA is going to try to tough this one out.
It seems to me that the argument to leverage off the mystique of aviation and the fear of the 30,000' death plunge will be based on "the complex, and often relatively subtle use of colour in modern cockpits". The "problem" - so it will be alleged - is that "when a light changes colour depending on the state of a system, or when the colours of digits change on an EFIS display", our CVD colleagues take longer than non-CVD pilots to notice the change. This and the consequent risks are a recent development the implications of which were not considered by the Tribunal in the previous matters.
I can see it now: CASA flashes up those airliner cockpit photos with all the dazzling and confusing arrays of coloured lights and dials and screens and numbers and words. "The colours in that cockpit are different for a reason, your Honour. How could a person who has a defect in the ability quickly to distinguish between those colours possibly be as competent, and therefore be as safe, as a person without that defect?" [Pause, to let the Tribunal contemplate the horror of the 30,000' death plunge...] (It won't work on the Tribunal, but CASA doesn't have too much else to argue.)
Time to do some very important homework, people.
Is anyone aware of any safety-critical system in any "modern cockpit" that annuniciates through, and only through, the change in colour of one light or text? E.g. A system that has a green light that itself changes to red to signify a safety-critical failure/circumstance requiring immediate attention?
Is anyone aware of any display that annunciates important information through, and only through, the change in colour of text/numbers?
Is anyone aware of any warning system in any "modern cockpit" that does not use multiple methods to annunicate a safety-critical failure/circumstance requiring immediate attention? e.g. buzzer/tone sound plus flashing light in front of the pilot plus a physical intervention to cancel the annunciation.
(I would have thought that if the answer to any of those questions is 'yes', it's a badly-designed system, irrespective of the CVD issue.)
Is anyone aware of any circumstances in which a CVD pilot takes more time than a non-CVD pilot to notice a change in important information or an annuciation of a safety-critical failure/circumstance requiring immediate attention?
It's obvious that CASA is going to try to tough this one out.
It seems to me that the argument to leverage off the mystique of aviation and the fear of the 30,000' death plunge will be based on "the complex, and often relatively subtle use of colour in modern cockpits". The "problem" - so it will be alleged - is that "when a light changes colour depending on the state of a system, or when the colours of digits change on an EFIS display", our CVD colleagues take longer than non-CVD pilots to notice the change. This and the consequent risks are a recent development the implications of which were not considered by the Tribunal in the previous matters.
I can see it now: CASA flashes up those airliner cockpit photos with all the dazzling and confusing arrays of coloured lights and dials and screens and numbers and words. "The colours in that cockpit are different for a reason, your Honour. How could a person who has a defect in the ability quickly to distinguish between those colours possibly be as competent, and therefore be as safe, as a person without that defect?" [Pause, to let the Tribunal contemplate the horror of the 30,000' death plunge...] (It won't work on the Tribunal, but CASA doesn't have too much else to argue.)
Time to do some very important homework, people.
Is anyone aware of any safety-critical system in any "modern cockpit" that annuniciates through, and only through, the change in colour of one light or text? E.g. A system that has a green light that itself changes to red to signify a safety-critical failure/circumstance requiring immediate attention?
Is anyone aware of any display that annunciates important information through, and only through, the change in colour of text/numbers?
Is anyone aware of any warning system in any "modern cockpit" that does not use multiple methods to annunicate a safety-critical failure/circumstance requiring immediate attention? e.g. buzzer/tone sound plus flashing light in front of the pilot plus a physical intervention to cancel the annunciation.
(I would have thought that if the answer to any of those questions is 'yes', it's a badly-designed system, irrespective of the CVD issue.)
Is anyone aware of any circumstances in which a CVD pilot takes more time than a non-CVD pilot to notice a change in important information or an annuciation of a safety-critical failure/circumstance requiring immediate attention?
Last edited by Creampuff; 12th Jul 2014 at 00:09.
Choccy frog for the first person to identify the paper from which this comes:
So there you go: The most important, safety-critical, colour-related tasks for pilots is, apparently, PAPI, and simply fitting a ten buck filter to the PAPI apparently results in "significant, overall improvements in PAPI performance".
Why not just:
- fit the ten buck filter to the PAPI (given that it results in significant, overall improvement in PAPI performance), and
- test CVD pilots using real PAPIs in the real world (given that PAPI has been identified as the most important, safety-critical task that relies largely on colour vision)?
...
• Identification of the most important, safety-critical, colour-related tasks for pilots and faithful reproduction of such tasks in the laboratory made it possible to establish experimentally the safe limits of colour vision loss. The visual task analysis carried out as part of this study identified the Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) as the most important, safety-critical task that relies largely on colour vision.
...
• Analysis of PAPI results shows that the use of a modified “white” light results in significant, overall improvements in PAPI performance, particularly within normal trichromats and deuteranomalous observers. The modified (or colour corrected white) is achieved simply by adding a colour correction filter to the standard white lights produced by the source. The filter employed in this study decreased the colour temperature of the standard white (used in PAPI systems) by 200 MIREDS (micro reciprocal degrees).
• Identification of the most important, safety-critical, colour-related tasks for pilots and faithful reproduction of such tasks in the laboratory made it possible to establish experimentally the safe limits of colour vision loss. The visual task analysis carried out as part of this study identified the Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) as the most important, safety-critical task that relies largely on colour vision.
...
• Analysis of PAPI results shows that the use of a modified “white” light results in significant, overall improvements in PAPI performance, particularly within normal trichromats and deuteranomalous observers. The modified (or colour corrected white) is achieved simply by adding a colour correction filter to the standard white lights produced by the source. The filter employed in this study decreased the colour temperature of the standard white (used in PAPI systems) by 200 MIREDS (micro reciprocal degrees).
Why not just:
- fit the ten buck filter to the PAPI (given that it results in significant, overall improvement in PAPI performance), and
- test CVD pilots using real PAPIs in the real world (given that PAPI has been identified as the most important, safety-critical task that relies largely on colour vision)?
Join Date: Apr 2010
Location: Morobe
Posts: 84
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
CAA Paper 2009/04 is your reference.
Must add that the only interest I have in this discussion is that I carry the red green defect as recessive gene, my son is red green deficient
Must add that the only interest I have in this discussion is that I carry the red green defect as recessive gene, my son is red green deficient
Join Date: Apr 2004
Location: ˙ǝqɐq ǝɯ ʇ,uıɐ ʇɐɥʇ 'sɔıʇɐqoɹǝɐ ɹoɟ uʍop ǝpısdn ǝɯɐu ɹıǝɥʇ ʇnd ǝɯos
Posts: 272
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Why am I not surprised its a UK CAA paper that is quoted?
It is the British ICAO medical officer and his CAA chronies we are fighting here. They are spurring CASA to comply with the way it has always been in UK/Europe where Cvd pilots have never been allowed to fly past sunset with no hope of a decent career.
When we clear up the final stinking remains of the ACPS in Australia they will be the next target!
CVDPA
It is the British ICAO medical officer and his CAA chronies we are fighting here. They are spurring CASA to comply with the way it has always been in UK/Europe where Cvd pilots have never been allowed to fly past sunset with no hope of a decent career.
When we clear up the final stinking remains of the ACPS in Australia they will be the next target!
CVDPA
Last edited by outofwhack; 12th Jul 2014 at 02:53.
Join Date: Apr 2010
Location: Morobe
Posts: 84
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
From the CAA paper
Creampuff, have you read the source documents bolded above? As to your question, no but he is in a profession that also uses the Ishiraha plate test as entrance hurdle, and was able to identify the correct image or non image by another method.
There is also some evidence to suggest that the likelihood of accidents is increased in pilots that are colour deficient (Vingrys & Cole, 1986). Other studies have shown that subjects with colour vision deficiencies make more errors and are slower in recognising aviation signals and colour coded instrument displays (Vingrys & Cole, 1986; Cole & Maddocks, 1995; Squire et al, 2005). There are also a small number of tasks in which colour information is not used redundantly and therefore the correct interpretation of colour signals becomes very important.
Last edited by tolakuma manki; 12th Jul 2014 at 08:11. Reason: Syntax
There is also some evidence to suggest that the likelihood of accidents is increased in pilots that are colour deficient (Vingrys & Cole, 1986).
There is also some evidence to suggest that the likelihood of accidents is not increased in pilots that are colour deficient (see: decades and tens and thousands of hours of real life operations).
Other studies have shown that subjects with colour vision deficiencies make more errors and are slower in recognising aviation signals and colour coded instrument displays (Vingrys & Cole, 1986; Cole & Maddocks, 1995; Squire et al, 2005).
There are also a small number of tasks in which colour information is not used redundantly and therefore the correct interpretation of colour signals becomes very important.
My favourite paper is David H. Freedman's Wrong: Why Experts Keep Failing Us—And How to Know When Not to Trust Them. My favourite quotes from that paper:
“Researchers headed into their studies wanting certain results—and, lo and behold, they were getting them.”
“At every step in the process, there is room to distort results, a way to make a stronger claim or to select what is going to be concluded,”
“Not surprisingly, the studies that tend to make the grade are those with eye-catching findings. But while coming up with eye-catching theories is relatively easy, getting reality to bear them out is another matter. The great majority collapse under the weight of contradictory data when studied rigorously.”
“[R]esearchers were frequently manipulating data analyses, chasing career-advancing findings rather than good science ...”
“[A]ssuming modest levels of researcher bias, typically imperfect research techniques, and the well-known tendency to focus on exciting rather than highly plausible theories, researchers will come up with wrong findings most of the time.”
“Simply put, if you’re attracted to ideas that have a good chance of being wrong, and if you’re motivated to prove them right, and if you have a little wiggle room in how you assemble the evidence, you’ll probably succeed in proving wrong theories right.”
Last edited by Creampuff; 12th Jul 2014 at 08:49.
Join Date: Apr 2010
Location: Morobe
Posts: 84
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Creampuff, you have no argument from me on your astute synopsis of the issue.
I have at times found that source documents do not support a given position, hence my question about the documents. I will continue to search for them
I have at times found that source documents do not support a given position, hence my question about the documents. I will continue to search for them
Thread Starter
Creampuff (bless his socks) wrote:
The Pape and Denison hearings of the ‘80’s devoted a lot of energy to examining the “scientific” evidence of the day, the bulk of which came from the Vic College of Optometry. It is amazing how the same names just keep on popping up 25 years later. In those AAT hearings we mounted a sustained critique of the works written by Cole, Vingrys, MacDonald, and Bowman, to name just a few. The six paragraphs in the above quote were applicable to these works. None of the works presented by the then DOT were able to withstand the critiques offered, and the cases were lost on the basis of the bad evidence that the regulator presented through their proxies, the optometrists. There are more modern additions to the list, and the problem their works suffer from come from the same five points in the above quote.
It should be noted that these authors, both the old and the new, come from an industry sector that earns a great deal of income from the promotion of, and implementation of industrial colour perception standards. There is a multi-million dollar industry at stake. It didn’t shock me when I attended my first ASMA (Aerospace Medical Association Meeting) in Chicago last year and found a multitude of new colour vision tests on display, all vying for a piece of the action in the resurgence of aggressive promotion of the aviation colour perception standard. The marketing of the CAD test has been brilliant, as far as marketing goes. I wonder who started the CAD project off, the CAA UK or the City University, London, Applied Vision Research Department. Irrespective of the answer, the marketing claim that the CAD test is “aviation specific” is demonstratively untrue and not supported by the documentation provided. Make no mistake, the CAD alone represents a very large investment in the expectation of equally large profits. But, in the debate that is now raging in good old Oz, the CAD and its underlying philosophy, will be given the critical scrutiny it deserves.
I am so glad to see that so many who have contributed to this thread “get it” that the only tests that have validity in assessing the safe performance of pilots are those tests that measure the safe performance of pilots, i.e. the flight tests, simulator sessions, check and training tests, instrument renewals and so forth. They “get it” that in the entire history of aviation there has been only one accident in which the colour vision deficient status of a pilot was attributed a causal role, and that there are more plausible explanations for that crash, which if accepted, leave the tally of accidents due to CVD at NIL. Not bad for a century old industry.
My favourite paper is David H. Freedman's Wrong: Why Experts Keep Failing Us—And How to Know When Not to Trust Them. My favourite quotes from that paper:
“Researchers headed into their studies wanting certain results—and, lo and behold, they were getting them.”
“At every step in the process, there is room to distort results, a way to make a stronger claim or to select what is going to be concluded,”
“Not surprisingly, the studies that tend to make the grade are those with eye-catching findings. But while coming up with eye-catching theories is relatively easy, getting reality to bear them out is another matter. The great majority collapse under the weight of contradictory data when studied rigorously.”
“[R]esearchers were frequently manipulating data analyses, chasing career-advancing findings rather than good science ...”
“[A]ssuming modest levels of researcher bias, typically imperfect research techniques, and the well-known tendency to focus on exciting rather than highly plausible theories, researchers will come up with wrong findings most of the time.”
“Simply put, if you’re attracted to ideas that have a good chance of being wrong, and if you’re motivated to prove them right, and if you have a little wiggle room in how you assemble the evidence, you’ll probably succeed in proving wrong theories right.”
“Researchers headed into their studies wanting certain results—and, lo and behold, they were getting them.”
“At every step in the process, there is room to distort results, a way to make a stronger claim or to select what is going to be concluded,”
“Not surprisingly, the studies that tend to make the grade are those with eye-catching findings. But while coming up with eye-catching theories is relatively easy, getting reality to bear them out is another matter. The great majority collapse under the weight of contradictory data when studied rigorously.”
“[R]esearchers were frequently manipulating data analyses, chasing career-advancing findings rather than good science ...”
“[A]ssuming modest levels of researcher bias, typically imperfect research techniques, and the well-known tendency to focus on exciting rather than highly plausible theories, researchers will come up with wrong findings most of the time.”
“Simply put, if you’re attracted to ideas that have a good chance of being wrong, and if you’re motivated to prove them right, and if you have a little wiggle room in how you assemble the evidence, you’ll probably succeed in proving wrong theories right.”
It should be noted that these authors, both the old and the new, come from an industry sector that earns a great deal of income from the promotion of, and implementation of industrial colour perception standards. There is a multi-million dollar industry at stake. It didn’t shock me when I attended my first ASMA (Aerospace Medical Association Meeting) in Chicago last year and found a multitude of new colour vision tests on display, all vying for a piece of the action in the resurgence of aggressive promotion of the aviation colour perception standard. The marketing of the CAD test has been brilliant, as far as marketing goes. I wonder who started the CAD project off, the CAA UK or the City University, London, Applied Vision Research Department. Irrespective of the answer, the marketing claim that the CAD test is “aviation specific” is demonstratively untrue and not supported by the documentation provided. Make no mistake, the CAD alone represents a very large investment in the expectation of equally large profits. But, in the debate that is now raging in good old Oz, the CAD and its underlying philosophy, will be given the critical scrutiny it deserves.
I am so glad to see that so many who have contributed to this thread “get it” that the only tests that have validity in assessing the safe performance of pilots are those tests that measure the safe performance of pilots, i.e. the flight tests, simulator sessions, check and training tests, instrument renewals and so forth. They “get it” that in the entire history of aviation there has been only one accident in which the colour vision deficient status of a pilot was attributed a causal role, and that there are more plausible explanations for that crash, which if accepted, leave the tally of accidents due to CVD at NIL. Not bad for a century old industry.
So while some people are saying complimentary things about Creampuff..
Creampuff achieved his 1000hrs GA PPL "in command" today.
And it was just so much fun to go flying with him, yet again, in his rather beautiful V35 Bonanza.
Sorry for the thread drift. Now back to topic!
Creampuff achieved his 1000hrs GA PPL "in command" today.
And it was just so much fun to go flying with him, yet again, in his rather beautiful V35 Bonanza.
Sorry for the thread drift. Now back to topic!
Creamie at #387
Join Date: Jun 1999
Location: Australasia
Posts: 362
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
interesting...
So Arthur,
It seems that you are saying:
However, I am very open to the thought that the biggest failure of the research by Barry's group was that it failed to challenge the eleventh commandment - that there is no place in aviation for CVD. I wholeheartedly agree with Creampuff that neither the evidence nor the ICAO SARPs support such a view and we should again challenge it as the starting point for all the current CASA nonsense. I am also open to the thought that much of the research of those times is flawed in terms of modern experimental designs and verification methods and, on that basis, the conclusions should also be challenged.
However, I would be disappointed if we stray from the pinnacle of the moral high ground by implying or directly impugning the motives of those who long preceded the present debate and whose role in your and Denison's case has not been examined with any hint of procedural fairness.
Stay Alive,
It seems that you are saying:
Barry Cole was corrupted by commercial interests and cooked the books...
Optometrists are the enemy, even though in the eighties they were totally suppressed by the ophthalmologists...
My recollections of the man and the motivation for the research in the mid-80s is a bit different from yours, it would seem. At the time, such vision research was not widespread among scientists as it was not seen as offering the path to academic glory that other research areas seemed to do. My memory is that it was quite highly regarded within that part of the Australian scientific community that concerned itself with matters of aviation.Optometrists are the enemy, even though in the eighties they were totally suppressed by the ophthalmologists...
However, I am very open to the thought that the biggest failure of the research by Barry's group was that it failed to challenge the eleventh commandment - that there is no place in aviation for CVD. I wholeheartedly agree with Creampuff that neither the evidence nor the ICAO SARPs support such a view and we should again challenge it as the starting point for all the current CASA nonsense. I am also open to the thought that much of the research of those times is flawed in terms of modern experimental designs and verification methods and, on that basis, the conclusions should also be challenged.
However, I would be disappointed if we stray from the pinnacle of the moral high ground by implying or directly impugning the motives of those who long preceded the present debate and whose role in your and Denison's case has not been examined with any hint of procedural fairness.
Stay Alive,
Dr Pape can speak for himself, but I don't read his comments, or the findings of David H Freedman, as suggesting corruption.
Everyone has natural biases. (To a hammer, every issue is a nail...) That doesn't make them corrupt.
As you note, there is bias built into the whole CVD paradigm. It is manifested in capital "D": The word "defect" or "deficiency" has negative connotations.
As I keep saying, pilots with alopecia have a "D". They should therefore have restrictions imposed on their medical certificates until a causal link between alopecia and increased risk of accidents has been disproved.
Everyone has natural biases. (To a hammer, every issue is a nail...) That doesn't make them corrupt.
As you note, there is bias built into the whole CVD paradigm. It is manifested in capital "D": The word "defect" or "deficiency" has negative connotations.
As I keep saying, pilots with alopecia have a "D". They should therefore have restrictions imposed on their medical certificates until a causal link between alopecia and increased risk of accidents has been disproved.
Thread Starter
I apologize, 4Dogs, for giving the impression that I was accusing anyone of corruption; such is far from the truth.
From 1977 onwards I was a close observer of the research work originating almost exclusively from the Vic College of Optometry. I was able to obtain via a FOI request a great deal of the correspondence between the regulator and the VCO, and the terminology was often along the lines of "defending the standard". Bias can arise from the terms of the contract between sponsors and researchers.
Contrary to your assertion regarding the suppression of the optometry school by the ophthalmologists, I found the exact opposite. I challenge any observer to find a published paper by any individual or collection of ophthalmologists on the topic of the aviation colour perception standard. In fact, in my dealings with them, I found most ophthalmologists were quick to acknowledge how little they knew about colour vision defects. I find the same today.
In 2002 there was a heated debate that played out in the pages of "Clinical and Experimental Optometry" between Dr Richard Wolfe, the Chairman, Visual Standards Committee, Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Ophthalmologists, and a number of optometrists representing the College of Optometry. The debate topic was "Protans and Driving Safety" and the problem Dr Wolfe saw was the selective and inappropriate interpretation by the optometrists of published road accident data. Reading the same papers, Dr Wolfe came to the opposite view in regard to accident rates for colour defective drivers. The view of the ophthalmologists ultimately prevailed and the colour vision standard for road transport was subsequently abandoned Australia wide. I refer the reader to Clin Exp Optom 2002; 85: 6: 399-402. The same Dr Wolfe admits freely how little he knows about colour vision defects, but that was not the issue. The issue was, with close parallels to the current aviation colour vision debate, how a certain group mindset can predispose to a bias that is unlikely to be detected or exposed from within that group.
Optometry is but one of many disciplines within the broad field of the visual sciences . Until I got seriously into my own reading, I had never heard of the field of perception psychology. I too believed the eye was a camera and the brain something akin to a computer. I now know that human perception is far more amazing than what any such simple analogy can describe.
The common theme in much of the research presented to the AAT 25 years ago was the reduction of complex psychomotor tasks to the level of de-facto colour vision tests. People with colour vision defects are distinguished by their inability to pass colour vision tests, and experiments that reduce the task to a colour vision test will inevitably produce predictable results. The best illustration of this phenomenon is embodied in the two papers: MacDonald and Cole, in Ergonomics 1988, and Cole and MacDonald, in Opthal. Physiol. Opt.,1988 Vol 8. The first papers sought to determine the value of colour coding in the new technology of the day, the EFIS displays of the B767. The second measured the performance of colour defective observers against the performance of colour normal. The bias built into this paper was palpable, once it was realised that the colour normal subjects were sourced from the student ranks of the College of Optometry. Their mean age was of the order of 23 years. The colour defective subjects (from memory, four different groups) were sourced from the public patient lists of the College, with significantly greater mean ages and lower levels of academic backgrounds. None were pilots and all had brief indoctrination in the meaning of the various colour coded symbols that they would be expected to identify in a multiple choice task. What they were administered amounted to quasi colour vision tests. The results were a foregone conclusion. The design of the experiments was flawed at several levels, yet both papers passed through the peer review processes and were judged suitable for publication. Not a word of critique was subsequently ever sighted in the journals concerned. The critique of these papers in particular in the AAT was a lesson in basic experimental design and how not to do it.
I am alive!
From 1977 onwards I was a close observer of the research work originating almost exclusively from the Vic College of Optometry. I was able to obtain via a FOI request a great deal of the correspondence between the regulator and the VCO, and the terminology was often along the lines of "defending the standard". Bias can arise from the terms of the contract between sponsors and researchers.
Contrary to your assertion regarding the suppression of the optometry school by the ophthalmologists, I found the exact opposite. I challenge any observer to find a published paper by any individual or collection of ophthalmologists on the topic of the aviation colour perception standard. In fact, in my dealings with them, I found most ophthalmologists were quick to acknowledge how little they knew about colour vision defects. I find the same today.
In 2002 there was a heated debate that played out in the pages of "Clinical and Experimental Optometry" between Dr Richard Wolfe, the Chairman, Visual Standards Committee, Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Ophthalmologists, and a number of optometrists representing the College of Optometry. The debate topic was "Protans and Driving Safety" and the problem Dr Wolfe saw was the selective and inappropriate interpretation by the optometrists of published road accident data. Reading the same papers, Dr Wolfe came to the opposite view in regard to accident rates for colour defective drivers. The view of the ophthalmologists ultimately prevailed and the colour vision standard for road transport was subsequently abandoned Australia wide. I refer the reader to Clin Exp Optom 2002; 85: 6: 399-402. The same Dr Wolfe admits freely how little he knows about colour vision defects, but that was not the issue. The issue was, with close parallels to the current aviation colour vision debate, how a certain group mindset can predispose to a bias that is unlikely to be detected or exposed from within that group.
Optometry is but one of many disciplines within the broad field of the visual sciences . Until I got seriously into my own reading, I had never heard of the field of perception psychology. I too believed the eye was a camera and the brain something akin to a computer. I now know that human perception is far more amazing than what any such simple analogy can describe.
The common theme in much of the research presented to the AAT 25 years ago was the reduction of complex psychomotor tasks to the level of de-facto colour vision tests. People with colour vision defects are distinguished by their inability to pass colour vision tests, and experiments that reduce the task to a colour vision test will inevitably produce predictable results. The best illustration of this phenomenon is embodied in the two papers: MacDonald and Cole, in Ergonomics 1988, and Cole and MacDonald, in Opthal. Physiol. Opt.,1988 Vol 8. The first papers sought to determine the value of colour coding in the new technology of the day, the EFIS displays of the B767. The second measured the performance of colour defective observers against the performance of colour normal. The bias built into this paper was palpable, once it was realised that the colour normal subjects were sourced from the student ranks of the College of Optometry. Their mean age was of the order of 23 years. The colour defective subjects (from memory, four different groups) were sourced from the public patient lists of the College, with significantly greater mean ages and lower levels of academic backgrounds. None were pilots and all had brief indoctrination in the meaning of the various colour coded symbols that they would be expected to identify in a multiple choice task. What they were administered amounted to quasi colour vision tests. The results were a foregone conclusion. The design of the experiments was flawed at several levels, yet both papers passed through the peer review processes and were judged suitable for publication. Not a word of critique was subsequently ever sighted in the journals concerned. The critique of these papers in particular in the AAT was a lesson in basic experimental design and how not to do it.
I am alive!