Operational Control at Bankstown
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So have any lives been lost since 1991 when my board removed the operational controllers from CAA?
What would be good, is for the ATSB database to be searchable by accident type, and then we could quickly get a grip on weather related, fuel exhaustion, planning related etc. and you would see.
Folks,
As many probably never knew, DCA Operational Control (control of the commencement, continuation or diversion of the aircraft) only applied to domestic operators, substantially Ansett and TAA, and the smaller airlines.
It never applied to Qantas operations, the only "Ops Control" sat in the left front window seat.
We always found it a little amusing and just a trifle insulting, given Qantas tradition and practice (and the law), that some bloke on the ground would be making operational decisions that were, as far as we were concerned, the exclusive preserve of the bloke called Captain.
US operators have always had Ops. Control, run by each company, it is huge cost and not very efficient. For, say, United, is the flight follower in Chicago going to have a better idea of the Sydney weather than an aircraft several hours from Sydney.
There never was any "operational control" of VFR flights, but the way some FSOs carried on, an impressionable young bloke could be forgiven for thinking otherwise.
Undoubtedly, there were many great people amongst the people who worked in the system, but it cost large dollops of money for little demonstrable benefit, ie; it could not be cost/benefit justified. I'm all for nostalgia, as long as I don't have to pay for it!!
Tootle pip!!
As many probably never knew, DCA Operational Control (control of the commencement, continuation or diversion of the aircraft) only applied to domestic operators, substantially Ansett and TAA, and the smaller airlines.
It never applied to Qantas operations, the only "Ops Control" sat in the left front window seat.
We always found it a little amusing and just a trifle insulting, given Qantas tradition and practice (and the law), that some bloke on the ground would be making operational decisions that were, as far as we were concerned, the exclusive preserve of the bloke called Captain.
US operators have always had Ops. Control, run by each company, it is huge cost and not very efficient. For, say, United, is the flight follower in Chicago going to have a better idea of the Sydney weather than an aircraft several hours from Sydney.
There never was any "operational control" of VFR flights, but the way some FSOs carried on, an impressionable young bloke could be forgiven for thinking otherwise.
Undoubtedly, there were many great people amongst the people who worked in the system, but it cost large dollops of money for little demonstrable benefit, ie; it could not be cost/benefit justified. I'm all for nostalgia, as long as I don't have to pay for it!!
Tootle pip!!
Last edited by LeadSled; 19th Oct 2013 at 16:48.
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Peter Hugh Pigott
hi Dick I remember filling in plans back in 1962 and in those days we had full reporting for all VFR flights at huge cost to the taxpayer. We were all told the myth that if we crashed rescue aircraft would take off within minutes to search for us.How gullible was that. Yes they checked every detail,we were all I fear of being wrong. Cheers Pete
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And while some pilots were indeed silly to depart, some FS officers were overly cautious and not accepting your flight plan was more to do with protecting their backside ( in case you did go missing) than basing their decision on factual weather rather than a forecast
Another experience with operational control was after I had an engine failure on a charter flight one night and called a pan. When I arrived in the circuit area:
ATC: "....Operational Control have instructed you to hold until they can figure it out"
And after a short pause
ATC: "..confirm POB and intentions"
Me: "...POB 3 and land"
ATC: "...clear to land and check wheels on final"
And after landing.
ATC: "...don't worry about calling up, I'll sort out Operations Control. Have a good night."
I remember speaking to the controller later and he'd had a neck full of them as well.
Dick you were right to get rid of it, Operational Control was a total waste of money.
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we had full reporting for all VFR flights
WE did advise "souls on board" on taxi at Bankstown as opposed to POB. But that's another story.
I did my Nav's using full reporting as was the custom, but thenceforth I remember BO50 OCTA with a SARTIME was usual for most flights.
Reporting within 2 minutes either side of ETA was a pain that required constant attention and accurate MET, so most of us flying low performance private flights took the easy way out. I'm still alive so I must be doing something right.
When later flying C210's and Bonanzas that had gadgets like DME (A)! and ADF/ VOR, we flew higher and got there faster but I don't recall full reporting.
I do recall old blokes telling me not to use those electric gadgets because all aeroplanes would converge on the NDB you were homing into and there would be scrap aluminum galore where they all smashed into each other.
Didn't happen of course and I've heard similar things about GPS and people flying one mile each side of track.
Yes, things change, but it is important to recall the old days with accuracy.
I think that's right, but sometimes one has doubts about memories.
Last edited by Frank Arouet; 20th Oct 2013 at 06:38. Reason: Oldtimers moment.
We were all told the myth that if we crashed rescue aircraft would take off within minutes to search for us.How gullible was that.
Nearly every other country in the world ATC monitors 121.5. It must be possible. But my argument is not that we don't monitor 121.5. Its that its hard to justify some of the other things (the case in point was full reporting) when AsA has a blind spot about the obvious things like someone monitoring the emergency frequency.
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You were correct in abolishing ATC Ops at Capital city aerodromes and placing ops control into the hands of the major airlines, Dick, but it was very short sighted and foolish to abolish briefing office services at the Secondary Zones such as BK and MB. They provided a great service to the GA industry and especially to inexperienced or newly licensed pilots.
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I recall "service stations" giving service. Check oil, water, tyres and wash the windscreen. They don't do that any more. Did "service stations" plan your trip for you or were they liable in any way for you crashing en route.
FS were great and everyone I dealt with were helpful even to the point of making a cuppa or arranging a lift to town, but flight into terrain was as an epidemic then, as now.
Most pilots have access to a computer and watch the weather on TV these days and I guess as technology advances service dwindles. I hope nobody ever thought FS were a fallback if they, as PIC, failed or FS were in any way "flight planners" or carried liability.
I'm guessing if you didn't have Dick to blame, you would be blaming someone else.
I long for the good old days, but I don't live there any more.
FS were great and everyone I dealt with were helpful even to the point of making a cuppa or arranging a lift to town, but flight into terrain was as an epidemic then, as now.
Most pilots have access to a computer and watch the weather on TV these days and I guess as technology advances service dwindles. I hope nobody ever thought FS were a fallback if they, as PIC, failed or FS were in any way "flight planners" or carried liability.
I'm guessing if you didn't have Dick to blame, you would be blaming someone else.
I long for the good old days, but I don't live there any more.
They provided a great service to the GA industry and especially to inexperienced or newly licensed pilots.
Instructors are supposed to give inexperienced or newly licensed pilots support. If its not happening there, then we need to look at that at the quality of schools, not apply a band-aid. Sooner or later you have to take responsibility for your own actions.
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I recall service stations giving service.
The service offered was more than "checking oil etc", it was also about safety and the BO's provided an operational information centre. The amount of private calls to GA towers seems to indicate there is an information void out there. Not all instructors have the necessary experience to impart such knowledge.
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Flight Planning and Operational Control
I must admit to being somewhat bemused by comments appearing on this thread that implies ATS briefing officers arbitrarily "tore up flight plans" or did not accept flight plans in order to protect "their backsides".
I would like to balance this debate by highlighting some facts based on someone who was in the ATS system for many years (up to senior management level) and who also had significant operational experience in the pilot briefing role:
1. No briefing officer (ATC or FS) had the authority to arbitrarily not accept a flight plan from a pilot. They had a responsibility to give the pilot all the critical information for the flight (both forecast and actual) and to provide advice based on their ATS/flying experience where it was considered appropriate. However, provided the flight plan met regulatory requirements, if the pilot still wanted to have the flight plan lodged with the ATS system, then the briefing officer was bound to accept it;
2. The only time a briefing officer was justified in not accepting a flight plan from a pilot was if the flight did not meet regulatory requirements. Typically, these situations included flights intending to operate into remote areas or over water without the proper equipment, flights planning to enter an active restricted area or IFR flights intending to operate contrary to designated one-way air routes or IFR flight plans with altitudes below the published LSALTs. Based on my experience when a flight plan was being rejected by a briefing officer, it was always done in a professional manner, usually followed up with a bit of empathetic education if the pilot was either a student, inexperienced or new to the area;
3. If a briefing officer felt that a pilot (particularly a VFR pilot) was intending to proceed into weather conditions or into an area (remote or over water) that would present a potential safety risk to the aircraft's occupants, the briefing officer had the option of referring the matter to the Senior Operations Controller responsible for the relevant Flight Information Region. I had to exercise this option on a number of occasions in the past. The SOC had the power to either exercise operational control directly over the subject aircraft (even if it was VFR OCTA) or issue a direction to the pilot for the flight not to proceed;
4. Briefing officers were required to retain all flight plans lodged with the relevant briefing office, regardless of whether the flight plans were eventually activated or not; and
5. In all my years of experience, I have never heard of a briefing officer arbitrarily tearing up or rejecting a flight plan.
With respect to other comments as to whether the abolition of operational control has resulted in the loss of life, I would have to say, yes, and point to the PA31 accident at Mt Hotham as a good example. If Operational Control had still been in place at Melbourne, I am sure the SOC would have directed that flight remain on the ground at Essendon. Although no loss of life occurred in the recent VA B737 incident at Mildura or the Pelair accident at Norfolk Island, the lack of effective operational control in my view was a factor in both of these situations.
However, I also agree with comments on this thread that the proper place for operational control should rest with the pilot in command but, in order for safe operational control to be exercised, the pilot in command needs to supported by an effective ground based dissemination system within the pilot's organisation. Unfortunately, I don't consider this to be the case for many of Australia's airlines or larger charter operators, particularly for the smaller regional airlines.
I would like to balance this debate by highlighting some facts based on someone who was in the ATS system for many years (up to senior management level) and who also had significant operational experience in the pilot briefing role:
1. No briefing officer (ATC or FS) had the authority to arbitrarily not accept a flight plan from a pilot. They had a responsibility to give the pilot all the critical information for the flight (both forecast and actual) and to provide advice based on their ATS/flying experience where it was considered appropriate. However, provided the flight plan met regulatory requirements, if the pilot still wanted to have the flight plan lodged with the ATS system, then the briefing officer was bound to accept it;
2. The only time a briefing officer was justified in not accepting a flight plan from a pilot was if the flight did not meet regulatory requirements. Typically, these situations included flights intending to operate into remote areas or over water without the proper equipment, flights planning to enter an active restricted area or IFR flights intending to operate contrary to designated one-way air routes or IFR flight plans with altitudes below the published LSALTs. Based on my experience when a flight plan was being rejected by a briefing officer, it was always done in a professional manner, usually followed up with a bit of empathetic education if the pilot was either a student, inexperienced or new to the area;
3. If a briefing officer felt that a pilot (particularly a VFR pilot) was intending to proceed into weather conditions or into an area (remote or over water) that would present a potential safety risk to the aircraft's occupants, the briefing officer had the option of referring the matter to the Senior Operations Controller responsible for the relevant Flight Information Region. I had to exercise this option on a number of occasions in the past. The SOC had the power to either exercise operational control directly over the subject aircraft (even if it was VFR OCTA) or issue a direction to the pilot for the flight not to proceed;
4. Briefing officers were required to retain all flight plans lodged with the relevant briefing office, regardless of whether the flight plans were eventually activated or not; and
5. In all my years of experience, I have never heard of a briefing officer arbitrarily tearing up or rejecting a flight plan.
With respect to other comments as to whether the abolition of operational control has resulted in the loss of life, I would have to say, yes, and point to the PA31 accident at Mt Hotham as a good example. If Operational Control had still been in place at Melbourne, I am sure the SOC would have directed that flight remain on the ground at Essendon. Although no loss of life occurred in the recent VA B737 incident at Mildura or the Pelair accident at Norfolk Island, the lack of effective operational control in my view was a factor in both of these situations.
However, I also agree with comments on this thread that the proper place for operational control should rest with the pilot in command but, in order for safe operational control to be exercised, the pilot in command needs to supported by an effective ground based dissemination system within the pilot's organisation. Unfortunately, I don't consider this to be the case for many of Australia's airlines or larger charter operators, particularly for the smaller regional airlines.
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Not all instructors have the necessary experience to impart such knowledge
Last edited by Frank Arouet; 22nd Oct 2013 at 01:14. Reason: Removed reference to Labor Party for niceness.
I agree with Mr 'QSK'.
In my experience working at several / various FSC's & FSU's, we were all acutely aware of our responsibilities, particularly what we 'could say/do' and what we could NOT.
And 'tearing up' a FPL was NOT on the agenda.
If submitted, the FPL would be put into the system, as the pilot may decide to go and 'have a look' - later, or seek other advice - instructor etc.
A little green smiley face often was an acknowledgement of a well prepared and legible FPL, and all available assistance was the attitude of the stations I worked at. No flashing blue lights here mate.....
As has been stated, any particularly 'stroppy' situations would be referred to the Senior Ops Controller (SOC) in those days, who DID have the authority to direct the pilot accordingly.
I do not recall ever having to do this as most advice given was in a professional manner, stuck to the facts / requirements of the situation, and was accepted accordingly. What the pilot did later was up to him /her.
No Cheers
In my experience working at several / various FSC's & FSU's, we were all acutely aware of our responsibilities, particularly what we 'could say/do' and what we could NOT.
And 'tearing up' a FPL was NOT on the agenda.
If submitted, the FPL would be put into the system, as the pilot may decide to go and 'have a look' - later, or seek other advice - instructor etc.
A little green smiley face often was an acknowledgement of a well prepared and legible FPL, and all available assistance was the attitude of the stations I worked at. No flashing blue lights here mate.....
As has been stated, any particularly 'stroppy' situations would be referred to the Senior Ops Controller (SOC) in those days, who DID have the authority to direct the pilot accordingly.
I do not recall ever having to do this as most advice given was in a professional manner, stuck to the facts / requirements of the situation, and was accepted accordingly. What the pilot did later was up to him /her.
No Cheers
