No balls cause helicopter prang.
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No balls cause helicopter prang.
Permission from the author granted.
Helicopterpilot not negligent in wire strike.
On 29 January 2009 a Eurocopter EC 120B wasflying to Sydney from Scone. Theaircraft collided with a power line which was about 10 metres above the ground whichhad no visual aids (balls) installed. The power company had repaired the very same wire after it was struck byanother helicopter in 1994. The power company, some might say unbelievably,failed to install balls when they repaired this wire. Fortunately unlike most helicopter wirestrikes, no one was injured in this accident though there were a few cuts when thePerspex broke on taking the force of the wire. The helicopter made a normal powered landing.
The weather was not good. The cloud basewas getting lower and was coming from behind and from the west. It was around8.00am. There were some fog patches. The pilot believed he should turn eastwhere it was clearer but as the Court found, he was low due to the cloud andhis need to remain visual. It was a VFRflight. By turning left he flew into a military Restricted Area.
The case involved the owners of thehelicopter suing in the NSW District Court the company which had operated thehelicopter on that day. The insurer paidup on the repairs. However, the owners sued the operator for the insurance excesspayment of $70,000, lost profit and reduced value.
The plaintiff company relied on a couple ofalleged breaches of the Regulations. They were flying through a restricted area(Reg 140) and low flying (Reg 157). (Theplaintiff did not sue the power company or Airservices Australia at the sametime).
The Court said “However, in a civil claimbased on non-compliance with such statutory provisions, without more, any suchnon-compliance with statutory regulation provisions does not constitute absoluteor strict proof of negligence, nor does it establish an entitlement to damagesso as to confer a private right of action upon an aggrieved party.”
We see in the judgment what is in myopinion a welcome view of not accepting hindsight expert evidence which failsto appreciate the situation pilots find themselves in at the time.
There was expert evidence to the conclusionthat the pilot should not have entered military restricted airspace, shouldhave turned around, landed or obtained a clearance to enter the restrictedarea. In dealing with this expert evidence, the Court said “In my view, for thereasons which follow, those criticisms go well beyond the response of whatwould be expected of a reasonable person faced with the dilemma with which (thepilot) was confronted at that time. In my view, those criticisms involve acounsel of perfection and rely for their support, on an inappropriate hindsightanalysis which paid insufficient regard to the reasonable prospective judgement(the pilot) was required to make at the time he was confronted with theproblematic circumstances.” Further in thejudgment the Court said in relation to the expert opinions that they “…haveonly become available through the more leisurely considerations revealedthrough the opportunity of hindsight analysis, rather than through aprospective analysis of the kind that confronted (the pilot) at the time.”“…(the pilot) was in a better position than the experts for the purpose ofmaking judgments concerning the significance of weather observations, includingperceptions of depth, and including the perception that the weather was closingin as (the pilot) described.”
The Court reminded us of the fact thatsection 30 of the Civil Aviation Act 1988provides a defence if it is established, and on the balance of probabilities,that the offence was due to weather conditions (the section actually speaks ofextreme weather conditions) or other unavoidable cause. The Court held thecircumstances of the alleged breach of Reg 140 fell within the terms of section30. The same defence was held to be made out for the alleged breach of Reg 157.
The Court held that the pilot was notnegligent in relation to striking the power line.
In the event the defendant had been heldliable the defendant pleaded Part 4 of the CivilLiability Act 2002 (Proportionality). For the sake of completeness theCourt held that had the pilot been found negligent there would have beenproportionality to the extent that the defendant’s liability would have beenreduced to 20%. Interestingly, the Courtheld that Airservices Australia would have carried 40% of the blame (for notshowing the wire on their map) along with 40% to the power company. With great respect to the Court, I havedifficulty with this percentage of liability.
Some might say (of which I am respectfully one)surely it was the power company’s negligence which was the primary negligence whenit failed to install balls on the wire and therefore should carry moreresponsibility than a shared responsibility with Airservices. One has to ask, what would it have taken toget the power company to open its corporate eyes and put balls on the wireafter the 1994 accident?
The Court held that the fact the wire wasin a restricted area did not reduce the power company’s duty to put balls onthe wire. This makes good sense. It might be assumed that no one willintentionally penetrate a restricted area. So when they do, they surely don’tneed to be faced with a hidden danger.
The case was heard in Sydney in 2012.Judgment was delivered 7 December 2012 – see AV8 Air Charter Pty Ltd v Sydney Helicopters Pty Ltd 2012 NSWDC220.
The plaintiff has appealed to the NSW Courtof Appeal. We wait with interest. Ishall report again when the Court of Appeal delivers its judgement.
C. McKeown
21 May 2013.
Helicopterpilot not negligent in wire strike.
On 29 January 2009 a Eurocopter EC 120B wasflying to Sydney from Scone. Theaircraft collided with a power line which was about 10 metres above the ground whichhad no visual aids (balls) installed. The power company had repaired the very same wire after it was struck byanother helicopter in 1994. The power company, some might say unbelievably,failed to install balls when they repaired this wire. Fortunately unlike most helicopter wirestrikes, no one was injured in this accident though there were a few cuts when thePerspex broke on taking the force of the wire. The helicopter made a normal powered landing.
The weather was not good. The cloud basewas getting lower and was coming from behind and from the west. It was around8.00am. There were some fog patches. The pilot believed he should turn eastwhere it was clearer but as the Court found, he was low due to the cloud andhis need to remain visual. It was a VFRflight. By turning left he flew into a military Restricted Area.
The case involved the owners of thehelicopter suing in the NSW District Court the company which had operated thehelicopter on that day. The insurer paidup on the repairs. However, the owners sued the operator for the insurance excesspayment of $70,000, lost profit and reduced value.
The plaintiff company relied on a couple ofalleged breaches of the Regulations. They were flying through a restricted area(Reg 140) and low flying (Reg 157). (Theplaintiff did not sue the power company or Airservices Australia at the sametime).
The Court said “However, in a civil claimbased on non-compliance with such statutory provisions, without more, any suchnon-compliance with statutory regulation provisions does not constitute absoluteor strict proof of negligence, nor does it establish an entitlement to damagesso as to confer a private right of action upon an aggrieved party.”
We see in the judgment what is in myopinion a welcome view of not accepting hindsight expert evidence which failsto appreciate the situation pilots find themselves in at the time.
There was expert evidence to the conclusionthat the pilot should not have entered military restricted airspace, shouldhave turned around, landed or obtained a clearance to enter the restrictedarea. In dealing with this expert evidence, the Court said “In my view, for thereasons which follow, those criticisms go well beyond the response of whatwould be expected of a reasonable person faced with the dilemma with which (thepilot) was confronted at that time. In my view, those criticisms involve acounsel of perfection and rely for their support, on an inappropriate hindsightanalysis which paid insufficient regard to the reasonable prospective judgement(the pilot) was required to make at the time he was confronted with theproblematic circumstances.” Further in thejudgment the Court said in relation to the expert opinions that they “…haveonly become available through the more leisurely considerations revealedthrough the opportunity of hindsight analysis, rather than through aprospective analysis of the kind that confronted (the pilot) at the time.”“…(the pilot) was in a better position than the experts for the purpose ofmaking judgments concerning the significance of weather observations, includingperceptions of depth, and including the perception that the weather was closingin as (the pilot) described.”
The Court reminded us of the fact thatsection 30 of the Civil Aviation Act 1988provides a defence if it is established, and on the balance of probabilities,that the offence was due to weather conditions (the section actually speaks ofextreme weather conditions) or other unavoidable cause. The Court held thecircumstances of the alleged breach of Reg 140 fell within the terms of section30. The same defence was held to be made out for the alleged breach of Reg 157.
The Court held that the pilot was notnegligent in relation to striking the power line.
In the event the defendant had been heldliable the defendant pleaded Part 4 of the CivilLiability Act 2002 (Proportionality). For the sake of completeness theCourt held that had the pilot been found negligent there would have beenproportionality to the extent that the defendant’s liability would have beenreduced to 20%. Interestingly, the Courtheld that Airservices Australia would have carried 40% of the blame (for notshowing the wire on their map) along with 40% to the power company. With great respect to the Court, I havedifficulty with this percentage of liability.
Some might say (of which I am respectfully one)surely it was the power company’s negligence which was the primary negligence whenit failed to install balls on the wire and therefore should carry moreresponsibility than a shared responsibility with Airservices. One has to ask, what would it have taken toget the power company to open its corporate eyes and put balls on the wireafter the 1994 accident?
The Court held that the fact the wire wasin a restricted area did not reduce the power company’s duty to put balls onthe wire. This makes good sense. It might be assumed that no one willintentionally penetrate a restricted area. So when they do, they surely don’tneed to be faced with a hidden danger.
The case was heard in Sydney in 2012.Judgment was delivered 7 December 2012 – see AV8 Air Charter Pty Ltd v Sydney Helicopters Pty Ltd 2012 NSWDC220.
The plaintiff has appealed to the NSW Courtof Appeal. We wait with interest. Ishall report again when the Court of Appeal delivers its judgement.
C. McKeown
21 May 2013.
Last edited by Frank Arouet; 22nd May 2013 at 09:03. Reason: apologies for font not fitting, but you get the story OK.
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av8 District Court Case
The full details are at:
http://vocasupport.com/?page_id=1475
In general:
or: AV8 Air Charter Pty Ltd v Sydney Helicopters Pty Ltd [2012] NSWDC 220 - District Court - NSW Caselaw
http://vocasupport.com/?page_id=1475
In general:
Nature of case
1. These proceedings involve an economic loss claim founded upon allegations of negligence and breach of contract concerning the flying of a civilian helicopter that was damaged when it struck a suspended overhead powerline.
2. On 29 January 2009, in conditions of deteriorating weather, whilst on flight from Scone to Sydney, following a descent below cloud level near Broke and then flying on for several minutes after that descent, the helicopter struck an 11kV powerline from Rothbury that was suspended over a valley located in restricted military airspace, variously described as map reference R564(A) or R532(A) on Mt Broken Back, near Singleton Army Base, in NSW. The presence of that powerline was not indicated on the map comprising the current visual navigation chart ["VNC"] that was then available to the defendant's pilot: Exhibit "F".
3. The cost of repairs to the helicopter amounted to $631,104.82. Those repair costs are not the subject of these proceedings. Following completion of those repairs, the plaintiff seeks damages in respect of the cost of the excess payment it made pursuant to its policy of insurance, the claimed diminution in the resale value of the helicopter, and the loss of profits during the period it could not be used or hired whilst it was under repair. That claim was initially quantified by the plaintiff in the amount of $1,172,293.62, but later reduced to a claim for $708,440.10: Exhibit "B". The Civil Liability Act 2002 ["CL Act"] applies to these proceedings.
Parties
4. AV8 Air Charter Pty Limited ["the plaintiff"], owned the helicopter. Sydney Helicopters Pty Limited ["the defendant"], was the bailee or hirer of that helicopter, and the defendant's pilot was in control of the helicopter at the time of the wire strike.
1. These proceedings involve an economic loss claim founded upon allegations of negligence and breach of contract concerning the flying of a civilian helicopter that was damaged when it struck a suspended overhead powerline.
2. On 29 January 2009, in conditions of deteriorating weather, whilst on flight from Scone to Sydney, following a descent below cloud level near Broke and then flying on for several minutes after that descent, the helicopter struck an 11kV powerline from Rothbury that was suspended over a valley located in restricted military airspace, variously described as map reference R564(A) or R532(A) on Mt Broken Back, near Singleton Army Base, in NSW. The presence of that powerline was not indicated on the map comprising the current visual navigation chart ["VNC"] that was then available to the defendant's pilot: Exhibit "F".
3. The cost of repairs to the helicopter amounted to $631,104.82. Those repair costs are not the subject of these proceedings. Following completion of those repairs, the plaintiff seeks damages in respect of the cost of the excess payment it made pursuant to its policy of insurance, the claimed diminution in the resale value of the helicopter, and the loss of profits during the period it could not be used or hired whilst it was under repair. That claim was initially quantified by the plaintiff in the amount of $1,172,293.62, but later reduced to a claim for $708,440.10: Exhibit "B". The Civil Liability Act 2002 ["CL Act"] applies to these proceedings.
Parties
4. AV8 Air Charter Pty Limited ["the plaintiff"], owned the helicopter. Sydney Helicopters Pty Limited ["the defendant"], was the bailee or hirer of that helicopter, and the defendant's pilot was in control of the helicopter at the time of the wire strike.
Last edited by Up-into-the-air; 22nd May 2013 at 10:51. Reason: More info
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What a joke.
What's the world coming to when the responsibility for a safe flight comes down to a power company?
If you find yourself at 30 ft (or even 100ft) AGL, in a restricted area (or any kind of VCA) and don't take responsibility for what happens next, you clearly don't understand the term Pilot in Command.
I know the courts interpret everything differently, just look at The Stella Awards, but surely commonsense must dictate some accountability to the pilot.
Although I usually agree with what you say, I don't like the agenda you're pushing here Frank (from the thread title). If pilots are taught to expect balls instead of knowing where wires and obstacles may be, tell me how that will make for safer aviation?
If you find yourself at 30 ft (or even 100ft) AGL, in a restricted area (or any kind of VCA) and don't take responsibility for what happens next, you clearly don't understand the term Pilot in Command.
I know the courts interpret everything differently, just look at The Stella Awards, but surely commonsense must dictate some accountability to the pilot.
Although I usually agree with what you say, I don't like the agenda you're pushing here Frank (from the thread title). If pilots are taught to expect balls instead of knowing where wires and obstacles may be, tell me how that will make for safer aviation?
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The leather chair view
4 W's, the following from the judgement at section may in fact give some background of the comparison of what the pilot was doing at the time, the decision process vs. the leather chair view at a later time.
The highlights are what I believe is important here.
Read in full:
Wire Strike | Assistance to the Aviation Industry
The highlights are what I believe is important here.
Ultimate focus of expert evidence
137 As a preface to the evaluation of the evidence given by the expert aviators, it must be observed that flying a helicopter involves considerable skill. It also involves many known risks, for example, the pilot not seeing an obstruction such as an unmarked suspended powerline until it is too late to avoid colliding with it. This is clear from the unchallenged evidence of Mr Dunscombe.
138 The duty of a pilot under civil law, in the circumstances in which Mr Harrold found himself, is not akin to that of an insurer of an aircraft he is flying. The strict duties and sanctions on a pilot that arise under the CA Act and related regulations, are not absolute in the sense that discretionary departures from some identified standards are permitted in unavoidable circumstances, including what is known in the industry as conditions involving stress of weather. These are matters that ultimately involve the determination of questions of fact.
139 Pilots have to make aviation and navigation decisions that involve potential risk and threats to safety in at times quickly evolving circumstances, including changing weather conditions. The duties involved are onerous. The decisions made in accordance with those duties can have catastrophic results if things go wrong.
140 Judgments expressed by experts when giving their opinions about such matters must be evaluated carefully to ensure that they have not been dictated by, or contaminated with, considerations that only arise on an inappropriate hindsight analysis concerning whether or not there have been relevant departures from the expected standard of care in the circumstances.
141 A pilot in the position of Mr Harrold is required to make reasonable aviation and navigational decisions, commensurate with the prevailing circumstances, in accordance with learned theory, applicable regulations, and practical training.
142 The expectation is not that pilots must necessarily always make the correct decision. However, pilots are expected to exercise reasonable skill, care and judgment in all the circumstances to avoid making wrong decisions. The process is a dynamic one.
143 Where the actions of the pilot are subjected to scrutiny by experts, and where, as is the case here, the pilot has provided cogent reasons for the decisions under critical scrutiny, those reasons must be given due weight and not discounted lightly.
144 It is in that context, that after the event analysis by experts must be viewed.
145 In this case, the experts provided a statement of criticism in answer to the essential question stated at paragraph [8] above, concerning whether there was evidence of a departure from the standard of care expected of a helicopter pilot in the circumstances. That joint statement contained the following 5 elements:
147 In expressing their views in connection with these two actions, a key question emerged as to the analytical process applied by the experts. The question was to this effect: How in the first place did Mr Harrold find himself in the situation of being in the restricted area immediately before the wire strike?
148 The two identified actions provide the convenient reference point for the required analysis, in conjunction with the factual circumstances that evolved at the time, and with which Mr Harrold had to contend.
149 I now turn to consider the issue of whether, in the circumstances, Mr Harrold's actions in the described events justify the claim that he had breached his duty of care, and that if so, whether, according to the requirements of s 5B of the CL Act, this requires a finding that he had been negligent.
137 As a preface to the evaluation of the evidence given by the expert aviators, it must be observed that flying a helicopter involves considerable skill. It also involves many known risks, for example, the pilot not seeing an obstruction such as an unmarked suspended powerline until it is too late to avoid colliding with it. This is clear from the unchallenged evidence of Mr Dunscombe.
138 The duty of a pilot under civil law, in the circumstances in which Mr Harrold found himself, is not akin to that of an insurer of an aircraft he is flying. The strict duties and sanctions on a pilot that arise under the CA Act and related regulations, are not absolute in the sense that discretionary departures from some identified standards are permitted in unavoidable circumstances, including what is known in the industry as conditions involving stress of weather. These are matters that ultimately involve the determination of questions of fact.
139 Pilots have to make aviation and navigation decisions that involve potential risk and threats to safety in at times quickly evolving circumstances, including changing weather conditions. The duties involved are onerous. The decisions made in accordance with those duties can have catastrophic results if things go wrong.
140 Judgments expressed by experts when giving their opinions about such matters must be evaluated carefully to ensure that they have not been dictated by, or contaminated with, considerations that only arise on an inappropriate hindsight analysis concerning whether or not there have been relevant departures from the expected standard of care in the circumstances.
141 A pilot in the position of Mr Harrold is required to make reasonable aviation and navigational decisions, commensurate with the prevailing circumstances, in accordance with learned theory, applicable regulations, and practical training.
142 The expectation is not that pilots must necessarily always make the correct decision. However, pilots are expected to exercise reasonable skill, care and judgment in all the circumstances to avoid making wrong decisions. The process is a dynamic one.
143 Where the actions of the pilot are subjected to scrutiny by experts, and where, as is the case here, the pilot has provided cogent reasons for the decisions under critical scrutiny, those reasons must be given due weight and not discounted lightly.
144 It is in that context, that after the event analysis by experts must be viewed.
145 In this case, the experts provided a statement of criticism in answer to the essential question stated at paragraph [8] above, concerning whether there was evidence of a departure from the standard of care expected of a helicopter pilot in the circumstances. That joint statement contained the following 5 elements:
"- Appreciation of position in respect of the restricted area was not to that expected of a pilot of ordinary skill and competence.
- The navigation techniques used were not that expected of ordinary skill and competence. This has resulted in entry into R532.
- Under the favourable weather conditions in evidence, the pilot's actions were appropriate until the point of choosing to low fly somewhere prior to the wire-strike. This ignores the aspect of entry into R532.
- Under the unfavourable weather conditions in evidence, the pilot's actions were appropriate until the bottom of the descent. The ground level cloud/fog/mist in evidence, and the visibility reported are indicative of conditions below that which were suitable for the safe conduct of flight.
- There are other aspects beyond the points in time discussed above, where appropriateness of actions are subject to some disagreement."
146 When those 5 elements are considered, in reality, they essentially criticise two actions by Mr Harrold, first, the fact that he flew into the restricted area at all, and secondly, that he flew into that area in circumstances where the prevailing conditions were considered to be unsuitable for safe flying. 147 In expressing their views in connection with these two actions, a key question emerged as to the analytical process applied by the experts. The question was to this effect: How in the first place did Mr Harrold find himself in the situation of being in the restricted area immediately before the wire strike?
148 The two identified actions provide the convenient reference point for the required analysis, in conjunction with the factual circumstances that evolved at the time, and with which Mr Harrold had to contend.
149 I now turn to consider the issue of whether, in the circumstances, Mr Harrold's actions in the described events justify the claim that he had breached his duty of care, and that if so, whether, according to the requirements of s 5B of the CL Act, this requires a finding that he had been negligent.
Wire Strike | Assistance to the Aviation Industry
Wow. Since that company changed hands about 10 years ago, there have been 3 weather-related crashes. (There were none in the 25 years or so of its previous ownership.)
This EC 120 at Scone, an AS 350 enroute to the Bathurst races going into cloud and bumping into trees, and a B206L double fatal going into cloud in the SAN hospital area.
Very sad.
This EC 120 at Scone, an AS 350 enroute to the Bathurst races going into cloud and bumping into trees, and a B206L double fatal going into cloud in the SAN hospital area.
Very sad.
A friend of mine was part of the legal team on this, and when it was all over I was allowed to have a look over all the information.
I don't think I would have continued the flight in the same situation, but the fact that the powerlines were not marked on the map had a profound improved the pilot's defence case.
Also, the fact that the powerlines had been struck before and the power company had not fitted balls (or any other markings) to them since rendered them liable.
I am just glad that no-one was killed and the powerlines are now clearly marked.
I don't think I would have continued the flight in the same situation, but the fact that the powerlines were not marked on the map had a profound improved the pilot's defence case.
Also, the fact that the powerlines had been struck before and the power company had not fitted balls (or any other markings) to them since rendered them liable.
I am just glad that no-one was killed and the powerlines are now clearly marked.
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Am I missing something?
Surely we don't expect (or do we) power company's to install balls/flags on all power lines. We all know the dangers of flying LL. Markers on wires on approach / departure to air strips, yes no question (although I have none on wires in relation to my private strip).
How many have seen the wires not marked crossing the gap on the NE Highway at Murrurundi? If you hit them you are really exceeding your LL limits, but I hear of pilots that skimp over them at times.
How many have seen the wires not marked crossing the gap on the NE Highway at Murrurundi? If you hit them you are really exceeding your LL limits, but I hear of pilots that skimp over them at times.
the Courtheld that Airservices Australia would have carried 40% of the blame (for notshowing the wire on their map)
Does this mean by publishing it, Airservices becomes responsible for the accuracy and completeness of the data?
Am I missing something?
The answer is yes.
We now have quite a history of NSW Courts making sensible decisions in these and legally similar circumstances, and taking what I consider to be a "real world" view of what faces a pilot in command from time to time.
It is a great pity that CASA cannot take such a sensible view, but invariably operate from the position of 20:20 hindsight and the counsel of perfection. The NSW Supreme Court and the NSW Court of Appeal have produced some very interesting judgements ---- supporting a very common sense view of the interpretation of the legal rights and responsibilities of the pilot in command.
Mr.McKeown has been a very effective advocate in this field, being a highly experienced pilot himself.
Tootle pip!!
are these power lines 10m above the ground
Where does CAR 157 stand in all of this.
How does the story about a "Superior Pilot" go:
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I have trees higher than that in my back yard. Do I now have to put balls on them
Last edited by rutan around; 25th May 2013 at 20:48.
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The magic word in AIRMANSHIP is accountability! This pilot crashed into a wire 10 metres off the ground in airspace that he was not aware he was in (hence the VCA).....at the very least he should have coughed up for the excess for the machine!
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Interesting to see this matter is back before the Supreme Court today on appeal. I cannot understand how this pilot continued into deteorating weather, so much so that he found himself very very low; was totally unaware of his position (VCA of Restricted Airspace) and then picked up a wire low level. At what point was this pilot prepared to put his hand up and take responsibility for his actions including a significant amount of damage to an aircraft and risk of death or injury to his passenger? I also note the 3 weather related accidents for this company in a very short space of time with the total loss of 2 aircraft and the death of 2 people? The pilot subject to the court action was the pilot in question of the aircraft involved in the wire strike and, I believe, is now the Chief Pilot of the business. I certainly hope he's changed his attitude towards his duties and responsibilities in this regard?
Just to correct the poster above, Airmanship is about PROFESSIONALISM, FLIGHT DISCIPLINE AND ACCOUNTABILITY. Seems none of these criteria were evoked in the Scone flight.
Just to correct the poster above, Airmanship is about PROFESSIONALISM, FLIGHT DISCIPLINE AND ACCOUNTABILITY. Seems none of these criteria were evoked in the Scone flight.
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Airmanship only seems to come to light when there's an accident being discussed.
I doubt very much any pilot goes out to have this sort of thing happen (collide with an object in this case wires).
It's about Airmanship for sure no issue there (bit like seamanship no ship Capt is gunna deliberately run his ship aground) but it's really about all the tiny little things that make up a particular flight. From the health of the pilot all the way thru to the currency of his equip, Eg charts etc. Obviously Wx plays a big part in any of these situations especially in this case but one has to wonder why humans tend to continue on in the face of a scenario that if looked at in the comfort of a warm room would not have certainly turned out like this.
We've all done it (well come close) gotten ourselves in a situation that we feel less comfy with than if we had have had hindsight but that's no excuse & no one's immune here.
Commercial pressure, that's probably the most driving factor here & has been the root cause of many an accident the PelAir Westy ditching comes to mind as an Eg.
All we can do is learn from other pilots mistakes, take something home from this event, store it the back of yr mind so that it might trigger yr mind into thinking I'm not gunna end up as headline news here!
Airmanship, yep it's not taught it's gained thru experience & the biggest single word in my mind that fits is "judgment", something that's lacking all too often
Fight or flight, two human traits where the first one seems to override the second where prudence would dictate otherwise.
Stay safe:-)
Wmk2
I doubt very much any pilot goes out to have this sort of thing happen (collide with an object in this case wires).
It's about Airmanship for sure no issue there (bit like seamanship no ship Capt is gunna deliberately run his ship aground) but it's really about all the tiny little things that make up a particular flight. From the health of the pilot all the way thru to the currency of his equip, Eg charts etc. Obviously Wx plays a big part in any of these situations especially in this case but one has to wonder why humans tend to continue on in the face of a scenario that if looked at in the comfort of a warm room would not have certainly turned out like this.
We've all done it (well come close) gotten ourselves in a situation that we feel less comfy with than if we had have had hindsight but that's no excuse & no one's immune here.
Commercial pressure, that's probably the most driving factor here & has been the root cause of many an accident the PelAir Westy ditching comes to mind as an Eg.
All we can do is learn from other pilots mistakes, take something home from this event, store it the back of yr mind so that it might trigger yr mind into thinking I'm not gunna end up as headline news here!
Airmanship, yep it's not taught it's gained thru experience & the biggest single word in my mind that fits is "judgment", something that's lacking all too often
Fight or flight, two human traits where the first one seems to override the second where prudence would dictate otherwise.
Stay safe:-)
Wmk2
Last edited by Wally Mk2; 30th May 2013 at 00:26. Reason: the usual culprit, poor speeling:-)
All we can do is learn from other pilots mistakes,
How many time do we have to have "pilot mistakes" before it sinks in?
Flying under a low cloud base in the clear at 500 feet agl knowing exactly where you are is a hell of a lot different than being "position uncertain" at 30 feet in sh***y weather.
Last edited by 601; 30th May 2013 at 00:30.
Commercial pressure, that's probably the most driving factor here
I have flown the passenger/owner a lot and he is fairly "risk averse".
...more so after the accident in question!
He would not have been applying pressure to press on. Quite the opposite I would think, but who knows? none of us were in the aircraft.
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I'm with 601 here! It's all well and good to claim that we learn from our mistakes but how many do you have to make before you learn from them? I doubt that any professional pilot worth his salt would not have been in this situation in the first place......lost in restricted airspace without a clearance and very low level in what was quite obvious sh*t weather - especially considering a turn back was available.
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I'm gonna get flamed here but not having much to do with helicopters, is there a good reason why they couldn't have just landed on a flat bit of paddock somewhere?
Well, no, that is always an option.
There are consequences, but in the end it's simply a PSL for the sake of safety and you always maintain the right to land if you feel it's necessary. People seem more tempted to push helicopters into deteriorating wx because they can fly lower, slower and into tighter spots, as anyone who went over the spine of Timor from Dili to Suai can attest. Problem is, most helicopter pilots are even more reliant on visual reference than fixed-wing because most helicopters are not dynamically stable.
There are consequences, but in the end it's simply a PSL for the sake of safety and you always maintain the right to land if you feel it's necessary. People seem more tempted to push helicopters into deteriorating wx because they can fly lower, slower and into tighter spots, as anyone who went over the spine of Timor from Dili to Suai can attest. Problem is, most helicopter pilots are even more reliant on visual reference than fixed-wing because most helicopters are not dynamically stable.
Last edited by Trojan1981; 30th May 2013 at 04:22.
