Ansett F27 Crash @ LST in 1965
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Ansett F27 Crash @ LST in 1965
Saw some old footage on tv of the Fokker that crashed at Launy in 1965. Does anyone have any info on that or some photos?
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VH-FNH, 17 march 1965. In bound from Flinders Is with 19 pax. Approached on one engine, then attempted a go around from low level, which didn't work. Aircraft impacted the runway in front of what is today the RFDS hangar, and slew around 180 to face back into the south. All escaped with only minor injuries, but aircraft a writeoff. I believe the aircraft was eventualy dumped on the Evandale tip
I was not previously aware of this accident, but did a little googling and discovered this http://www.baaa-acro.com/Photos-64/VH-FNH-1.jpg
http://www.baaa-acro.com/Photos-64/VH-FNH-2.jpg
http://www.baaa-acro.com/Photos-64/VH-FNH-2.jpg
Having shut down/feathered the engine, the approach was flown with full flap (40 degrees). The aircraft subsequently got behind the drag curve, I'm unsure as to whether they were actually attempting a go-around, but the aircraft departed controlled flight (i.e. below Vmca) when very close to the ground. Following the wingtip contact, the aircraft spun around came to rest - intact - facing back the way it had come; if nothing else a tribute as to just how strong the Friendship was.
They were lucky not to have killed people.
Certainly by the time I got on the F.27 in 1969 single-engine approaches were flown with approach flap only (26.5 degrees), but I'm unsure if this was in place before or after the Launceston accident.
They were lucky not to have killed people.
Certainly by the time I got on the F.27 in 1969 single-engine approaches were flown with approach flap only (26.5 degrees), but I'm unsure if this was in place before or after the Launceston accident.
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The performance capability difference between approach (OEI) and landing (AEO) climb cases wasn't well understood at the time and Joe - nice guy, I thought, although I never flew with him - was the unlucky fellow whom it caught out.
Indeed, the ICAO PAMC on performance was in the process of being adopted in the mid-60s and, up until then, performance certification was a bit hit and miss, being based on older piston designs.
Had Joe experienced his situation a few years later he would have not been caught out due to the added protection mandated by the newer procedural protocols. As I recall John Walshe - a charming gentleman's gentleman - was the performance boss at AN around that time and he was nobody's fool when it came to performance engineering work.
Since the performance rules moved to the PAMC requirements the certification basis for all heavies has the approach climb WAT for OEI gear up and the landing climb WAT for AEO gear down.
It is for this reason that the standard missed approach sequence from the normal landing case is thrust/flaps/gear to cover the OEI possibility. Also, if one fails in the landing configuration and the aircraft is not on very short final it probably makes a smart move to reconfigure to suit the OEI situation.
Likewise one should run with approach flap for an OEI landing or else accept that a low level miss is not on the gameplan if land flap is selected late in the approach.
In Joe's case, the higher drag put the aircraft in a parlous situation to start with after the engine was secured. The trap was that the situation is masked during descent due to the lower thrust requirement but becomes all to clear too quickly when one endeavours to level off.
Indeed, the ICAO PAMC on performance was in the process of being adopted in the mid-60s and, up until then, performance certification was a bit hit and miss, being based on older piston designs.
Had Joe experienced his situation a few years later he would have not been caught out due to the added protection mandated by the newer procedural protocols. As I recall John Walshe - a charming gentleman's gentleman - was the performance boss at AN around that time and he was nobody's fool when it came to performance engineering work.
Since the performance rules moved to the PAMC requirements the certification basis for all heavies has the approach climb WAT for OEI gear up and the landing climb WAT for AEO gear down.
It is for this reason that the standard missed approach sequence from the normal landing case is thrust/flaps/gear to cover the OEI possibility. Also, if one fails in the landing configuration and the aircraft is not on very short final it probably makes a smart move to reconfigure to suit the OEI situation.
Likewise one should run with approach flap for an OEI landing or else accept that a low level miss is not on the gameplan if land flap is selected late in the approach.
In Joe's case, the higher drag put the aircraft in a parlous situation to start with after the engine was secured. The trap was that the situation is masked during descent due to the lower thrust requirement but becomes all to clear too quickly when one endeavours to level off.
f27 crash 1965
i was a 4 year old passenger with my parents on ansett f27 crash at launceston airport. remember very little mainly what my father told me. i can remember on return flight to flinders dad had to carry me onto the plane,balling my eyes out i vividly remember biting him rather hard on the neck.no way i wanted to get on that plane. have photos and newspaper clippings.
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Was told by an Ansett Captain many years ago that an F27 crashed due, in part to getting into a high drag situation engine out and as the power lever was advanced it triggered the Water Methanol injection. Sudden increase in power contributed to loss of control. Engine out approaches there after were made at flaps approach.
As I recall all the above is correct. What also did not help the situation was that up till the introduction of Jets, crews were dual endorsed.
At the time Joe was the DC3 Flight Capt and probably only flew the F27 enough to keep himself valid.
Crews were DC3/DC4, DC3/Bristol, DC3/F27, DC4/DC6, DC6/L188, Visc 700/800. Apparently DCA would not allow this on jets fortunately.
Emeritus
At the time Joe was the DC3 Flight Capt and probably only flew the F27 enough to keep himself valid.
Crews were DC3/DC4, DC3/Bristol, DC3/F27, DC4/DC6, DC6/L188, Visc 700/800. Apparently DCA would not allow this on jets fortunately.
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Was told by an Ansett Captain many years ago that an F27 crashed due, in part to getting into a high drag situation engine out and as the power lever was advanced it triggered the Water Methanol injection. Sudden increase in power contributed to loss of control. Engine out approaches there after were made at flaps approach.
emeritus.
If I remember correctly Henry T was dual endorsed on F27/Dc9.
I know Mal W was dual endorsed on the Dc9/B727.
John D did a F27 (FNO) delivery flight to the UK in 1992 while endorsed on the B727.
If I remember correctly Henry T was dual endorsed on F27/Dc9.
I know Mal W was dual endorsed on the Dc9/B727.
John D did a F27 (FNO) delivery flight to the UK in 1992 while endorsed on the B727.
B772
I was referring to line operations. Cannot recall whether MW n HT were flying the line on both types or were current on both types simultaneously for checking purposes.
JD's ferry flt would not have been RPT and he probably got revalidated for it.
Nice little Jolly, especially if someone else is the nominated pooh bear and has to look after the paperwork.
emeritus.
I was referring to line operations. Cannot recall whether MW n HT were flying the line on both types or were current on both types simultaneously for checking purposes.
JD's ferry flt would not have been RPT and he probably got revalidated for it.
Nice little Jolly, especially if someone else is the nominated pooh bear and has to look after the paperwork.
emeritus.
I was referring to line operations. Cannot recall whether MW n HT were flying the line on both types or were current on both types simultaneously for checking purposes.
Anyone have a copy of the accident report?
Dual endorsement's must have been hard work, F27 today, DC-3 next week.
How did check training cover that, Instrument renewal in the Fokker and a proficiency check in the DC-3?
Dual endorsement's must have been hard work, F27 today, DC-3 next week.
How did check training cover that, Instrument renewal in the Fokker and a proficiency check in the DC-3?
Stationair8.
Some A/NSW pilots were dual endorsed on the F27 and the S25 Flying Boat.
See here for a FNH report.:
ASN Aircraft accident Fokker F-27 Friendship 200 VH-FNH Launceston, TAS
Some A/NSW pilots were dual endorsed on the F27 and the S25 Flying Boat.
See here for a FNH report.:
ASN Aircraft accident Fokker F-27 Friendship 200 VH-FNH Launceston, TAS
I read this book many years ago.
I flew for MMA : an airline pilot's life / R.C. Adkins.
The author says in the book he flew both the DC3 and F27 during the introduction of the F27 into MMA.
I flew for MMA : an airline pilot's life / R.C. Adkins.
The author says in the book he flew both the DC3 and F27 during the introduction of the F27 into MMA.
