Norfolk Island Ditching ATSB Report - ?
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Jinglie # 569 - I just read the submissions and it troubles me as to why two guys could get it right, but the government with unlimited resources couldn't sort it! The Hearings later this month will be interesting, to say the least!!!
Dear Sirs, we recently had a ditching event involving a West wind jet. We noted the following issues. The poor CRM of the flight crew, the life vests, the lights, the whistles the evacuation procedures, the lost life raft, the problems locating the passengers, the problems with weather forecasting, the problems with Radio communications.
There you go, 20 pages of helpful information. We should be getting bouquets not the brickbats of international public humiliation. What have we got, peurile personal attacks to discredit people who tried to point out the failings. We might get conned, but there other folk who are not so easily led about blindfold.
Argh! 'Steam off' - "Confirmed".
Last edited by Kharon; 9th Nov 2012 at 19:32.
The ATSB has lost the plot!
It’s official the ATSB are in total denial and firmly sticking to their befuddled and totally flawed script. The bigger question is why?
Kharon the ATSB standard line of defence for the points that you make (from ATSB Answers to QON):
Is it just me or did the ATSB totally miss the premise of the question asked?? Reading that answer you’d have to ask… “have you (the ATSB) totally lost the plot?”
Oh but (god forbid) there’s more much more, take a look at the following quote from the Answers to QON PDF in regards to the decimation of the ‘safety recommendation’
in Oz:
This philosophy is neat and doesn’t upset the relevant parties to an accident/incident allowing organisations to address safety issues highlighted by the final report without fear or prejudice (natural justice). However what it effectively means is that if you don’t read the report and take note of the proactive safety actions carried out by interested parties those actions and the subsequent lessons learnt become invisible to the worldwide aviation industry.
The NTSB had come to the conclusion, some 40 odd years ago, that the obligatory ‘safety recommendation’ signified the cornerstone of their existence, that is why they have devoted a whole electronic database to SRs so that the valuable lessons learnt can be disseminated worldwide. The NTSB isn’t alone in their recognition of the importance of issuing the obligatory safety recommendation..NZ, UK, EASA all deploy SRs and maintain a database.
If this adopted mentality (above) and the standard displayed in this report by the ATSB is allowed to continue then one would have to ask why have the ATSB??
Kharon said: If, and it's a big if the enquiry can join the dots between Lockhart and Pel Air, the wheels will come off. Not just the present bunch will be for the ministerial high jump. The ICAO and every other responsible NAA will simply refuse to allow Australian aircraft anywhere near their airspace. Just the fact that they failed to issue a caution on the survivability, life vest and life raft debacle is enough. It would have been very nice to send a neatly worded report out.
11. HANSARD, PG 64
Senator NASH: So at no stage did you ask them, 'Did the prescribed safety procedures work?' You are the Australian Transport Safety Bureau and at no stage did you ask the prescribed safety requirements work?
Mr Sangston: I do not know precisely what was asked in the interview.
CHAIR: Could we have a record of the interviews?
Mr Dolan: We can draw it to your attention. It should be amongst the material we have already supplied. We will find it for you.
ATSB response:
The survival aspects of the accident were reported on pp 20 to 24 of the investigation report.
In light of other issues raised during the course of the inquiry, the following is additional information that the ATSB obtained in the course of the investigation but did not include in the report on the basis that it did not indicate broader safety issues:
Senator NASH: So at no stage did you ask them, 'Did the prescribed safety procedures work?' You are the Australian Transport Safety Bureau and at no stage did you ask the prescribed safety requirements work?
Mr Sangston: I do not know precisely what was asked in the interview.
CHAIR: Could we have a record of the interviews?
Mr Dolan: We can draw it to your attention. It should be amongst the material we have already supplied. We will find it for you.
ATSB response:
The survival aspects of the accident were reported on pp 20 to 24 of the investigation report.
In light of other issues raised during the course of the inquiry, the following is additional information that the ATSB obtained in the course of the investigation but did not include in the report on the basis that it did not indicate broader safety issues:
- As indicated on p 21 of the investigation report, the liferafts were reported removed from their normal storage position and placed in the aircraft's central aisle ready for deployment after the ditching. There are advantages and disadvantages associated with this action. Access to the liferafts may be more readily available from a position in the central aisle; however, in anything but a low energy impact with the water, it could be expected a life raft might move/dislodge from that position.
- As indicated on pp 19 and 21 of the investigation report, the reported two or three large impacts with the water were sufficient in this case to fracture the fuselage immediately forward of the main wing spar. The fractured fuselage was reported to have remained aligned for a few seconds before the aircraft's nose and tail partially sank with the passenger cabin/cockpit section adopting a nose-down attitude.
- The copilot indicated that a quantity of equipment and baggage descended or rolled down the fuselage as it filled with water - this could be expected to have included the life rafts (p 22 of the investigation report refers).
- Given the insecure equipment and baggage in the darkened cabin/cockpit area, the difficulty experienced with the aircraft's main door, the requirement to assist the patient from the stretcher and then the aircraft and the increasing ingress of water, the priority given by the remaining aircraft occupants to exiting the aircraft over recovering and deploying the liferafts is understandable. Whether in that context their recovery and deployment would have been more likely from their stowed position is debatable.
- In interview with the ATSB, the PIC indicated that he was not wearing a life jacket and reported that the light on the nurse's life jacket was not working (although it is possible that the light was obscured by the patient she was supporting – see the nurse’s interview notes below). The PIC also recalled that he may have inadvertently slightly deflated one of the survivors' life jackets in the water at some time but it was too dark to tell, and that the whistle lanyard on one of the three jackets was too short and could not be used. It was not possible to determine whether or not this was due to tangling or snagging of the lanyard.
- The passenger indicated at interview on 24 November 2009 that his life jacket rode up on him and he found that this pushed his head forward. In addition, the passenger reported that the whistles were not available on two of the jackets and that he only activated one inflation 'toggle'. Another of the survivors activated the second toggle on the passenger's life jacket.
- The copilot was interviewed on 2 December 2009. In this interview the copilot indicated that she did not wear a life jacket and that she initially attempted to open the aircraft's main door before the fuselage tipped down. This compelled the copilot to seek an emergency exit. The copilot reported that, once on the surface, the doctor helped her to remain afloat.
- The doctor was interviewed on 4 December 2009. The doctor confirmed that only three of the aircraft occupants had life jackets but that all three jackets worked satisfactorily. He reported that one life jacket light failed and that only one whistle was located. He indicated that, once near rescue, he wasn't sure that a whistle would have helped. He reported that at evacuation, the priority was assisting the patient from the aircraft, rather than deploying the life rafts.
- An interview with the patient on 10 December 2009 determined that the patient was not wearing a life jacket. This is consistent with the report from the doctor that he did not put a life jacket on the patient due to concerns about a jacket hindering the already difficult task of releasing the patient's restraints after the ditching (pp 20 and 21 of the investigation report refer).
- The flight nurse was interviewed on 10 December 2009. The nurse recalled that only half of her life jacket had inflated but that was all right. The nurse reported assisting the patient to stay afloat and that after one hour it was difficult to maintain the patient afloat. The flight nurse stated that two life jacket lights were working, but that hers was generally underneath the patient, who was being held afloat.
Oh but (god forbid) there’s more much more, take a look at the following quote from the Answers to QON PDF in regards to the decimation of the ‘safety recommendation’
in Oz:
Further, with respect to the inclusion of ‘Recommendations’, it is important to note the difference filed by Australia in relation to Annex 13 Para 6.8 noted above.
The focus of an ATSB investigation is on achieving safety outcomes; that is through the identification of the factors that increased risk, particularly those associated with ongoing/future risk (safety issues), such that action can be taken by relevant organisations to address the identified ‘safety issue’. This does not in itself require the issuing of safety recommendations, although that is an option. Noting that safety recommendations are not enforceable, the issuing of a safety recommendation in itself may not achieve any tangible safety benefit, if the target organisation elects not to accept and react to the recommendation.
In this regard, the ATSB prefers to encourage proactive safety actions that address the ‘safety issues’ identified in its reports. Other benefits of this approach are that the stakeholders are generally best placed to determine the most effective way to address any ‘safety issues’ and the publication of the safety actions that address an issue proactively should be viewed as a positive step that provides for timely safety action prior to the release of the report and a level of completeness when the final report is published. This approach is reflected in the difference that Australia has filed with respect to Annex 13 para 6.8.
The response to a safety recommendation is most often unlikely to be any different to the safety action reported by an organisation in response to an identified safety issue, but the latter is likely to be more proactive and timely.
That is specifically the case with respect to the Norfolk Island investigation, where the responses to any formal safety recommendations to CASA and Pel-Air related to the two identified safety issues, are likely to be as per the safety action detailed in the report.
The focus of an ATSB investigation is on achieving safety outcomes; that is through the identification of the factors that increased risk, particularly those associated with ongoing/future risk (safety issues), such that action can be taken by relevant organisations to address the identified ‘safety issue’. This does not in itself require the issuing of safety recommendations, although that is an option. Noting that safety recommendations are not enforceable, the issuing of a safety recommendation in itself may not achieve any tangible safety benefit, if the target organisation elects not to accept and react to the recommendation.
In this regard, the ATSB prefers to encourage proactive safety actions that address the ‘safety issues’ identified in its reports. Other benefits of this approach are that the stakeholders are generally best placed to determine the most effective way to address any ‘safety issues’ and the publication of the safety actions that address an issue proactively should be viewed as a positive step that provides for timely safety action prior to the release of the report and a level of completeness when the final report is published. This approach is reflected in the difference that Australia has filed with respect to Annex 13 para 6.8.
The response to a safety recommendation is most often unlikely to be any different to the safety action reported by an organisation in response to an identified safety issue, but the latter is likely to be more proactive and timely.
That is specifically the case with respect to the Norfolk Island investigation, where the responses to any formal safety recommendations to CASA and Pel-Air related to the two identified safety issues, are likely to be as per the safety action detailed in the report.
The NTSB had come to the conclusion, some 40 odd years ago, that the obligatory ‘safety recommendation’ signified the cornerstone of their existence, that is why they have devoted a whole electronic database to SRs so that the valuable lessons learnt can be disseminated worldwide. The NTSB isn’t alone in their recognition of the importance of issuing the obligatory safety recommendation..NZ, UK, EASA all deploy SRs and maintain a database.
If this adopted mentality (above) and the standard displayed in this report by the ATSB is allowed to continue then one would have to ask why have the ATSB??
AQON 3 of the ATSB PDF is an interesting one and perhaps should be read in conjunction with both AQON 4 of the CASA PDF and indeed
recommendation R2000040, here’s Q4 and the ATSB answer:
Here is R20000040:
Recommendation R20000040
As can be seen R20000040 dealt with pretty much the same issues except over a dozen years before. However the most revealing bit is the final response text and the fact that the SR was “Closed – Accepted”
:
Given the open ended response from the BOM how is it possible that the ATSB effectively closed the loop on this significant safety issue by closing and accepting a very open ended response to the SR?
Then virtually the same safety issue rears its ugly head over a decade later…I think Sunny the virtual layman could understand the absurdity of this scenario!!
If the ATSB had of kept the original SR open then instead of arguing the toss with the regulator all they would have had to have done is reissue the original SR and add CASA as another party to the ‘issue owner’ column. Even ‘Blind Freddy’ can tell that the 2000 safety issue had not been properly addressed…not by a long shot!
recommendation R2000040, here’s Q4 and the ATSB answer:
12. HANSARD, PG 66
Mr Sangston: There was a second meeting whereby we met with a gentleman, John Grima, in CASA and we discussed the proposal again. If you peruse the letter that initially went to CASA, you will see that from our standpoint there was no proposal or intent to mandate any resolution. Indeed, the way we identify our safety issues is to identify the safety issue and then the owner, if you like—which in this case was CASA— would develop the response to the safety issue.
CHAIR: But you had a meeting with them to discuss their difference of position between yours and theirs.
Mr Sangston: We had an initial meeting to discuss the safety issue as I have just described and then there was a second meeting to discuss what CASA understood was the—
CHAIR: The tidying up meeting so that they did not have a public scrap with you: 'Hang on! We'd better'—that is what they are saying here.
Mr Sangston: I was not at that meeting, Senator, but I have got the letter back from CASA in which they outlined a lot of the in-place regulatory and other guidance in terms of the safety issue, but there was no—
CHAIR: They identified to you that they had a clear division of opinion within CASA?
Mr Sangston: No.
CHAIR: Because, obviously, speak no evil, hear no evil: we didn't talk. So to the best of your knowledge, they did not talk.
Mr Sangston: That did not come up in that meeting, no.
CHAIR: Or the other one that you were not at.
Mr Sangston: Not from what I understand.
CHAIR: So can you take that on notice and refer to us any email trail around that issue?
ATSB response:
The ATSB held an initial meeting by videoconference with CASA staff on 3 February 2010 to discuss a developing safety issue in respect of the lack of guidance for pilots when exposed to previously unforecast meteorological conditions on long flights to destinations with no nearby alternates. Based on the evidence to hand at the time, this issue was represented and discussed from the ATSB standpoint as a critical safety issue.
Subsequently, CASA wrote to the ATSB (CASA letter AT10/23 of 26 March 2010 refers) and provided formal comment on the developing safety issue. CASA offered for the ATSB to contact , (FOI deletion) Manager, Flight Operations should there be any questions or the ATSB wish to meet and discuss this matter. The ATSB agreed to arrange a face-to-face meeting with the subject matter experts at CASA.
This follow-up meeting was held in CASA’s Woden, ACT offices at 1430 on 22 April 2010. (FOI deletion) and a number of other CASA staff met with ATSB investigators (FOI deletion) and discussed the safety issue further. The CASA staff advised the ATSB that they believed the current Regulations and guidance material covered the issue satisfactorily, which was consistent with the content of CASA’s letter of 26 March 2012. At no stage during the meeting did the CASA staff advise the ATSB investigators that there may have been a difference of opinion within CASA.
Mr Sangston: There was a second meeting whereby we met with a gentleman, John Grima, in CASA and we discussed the proposal again. If you peruse the letter that initially went to CASA, you will see that from our standpoint there was no proposal or intent to mandate any resolution. Indeed, the way we identify our safety issues is to identify the safety issue and then the owner, if you like—which in this case was CASA— would develop the response to the safety issue.
CHAIR: But you had a meeting with them to discuss their difference of position between yours and theirs.
Mr Sangston: We had an initial meeting to discuss the safety issue as I have just described and then there was a second meeting to discuss what CASA understood was the—
CHAIR: The tidying up meeting so that they did not have a public scrap with you: 'Hang on! We'd better'—that is what they are saying here.
Mr Sangston: I was not at that meeting, Senator, but I have got the letter back from CASA in which they outlined a lot of the in-place regulatory and other guidance in terms of the safety issue, but there was no—
CHAIR: They identified to you that they had a clear division of opinion within CASA?
Mr Sangston: No.
CHAIR: Because, obviously, speak no evil, hear no evil: we didn't talk. So to the best of your knowledge, they did not talk.
Mr Sangston: That did not come up in that meeting, no.
CHAIR: Or the other one that you were not at.
Mr Sangston: Not from what I understand.
CHAIR: So can you take that on notice and refer to us any email trail around that issue?
ATSB response:
The ATSB held an initial meeting by videoconference with CASA staff on 3 February 2010 to discuss a developing safety issue in respect of the lack of guidance for pilots when exposed to previously unforecast meteorological conditions on long flights to destinations with no nearby alternates. Based on the evidence to hand at the time, this issue was represented and discussed from the ATSB standpoint as a critical safety issue.
Subsequently, CASA wrote to the ATSB (CASA letter AT10/23 of 26 March 2010 refers) and provided formal comment on the developing safety issue. CASA offered for the ATSB to contact , (FOI deletion) Manager, Flight Operations should there be any questions or the ATSB wish to meet and discuss this matter. The ATSB agreed to arrange a face-to-face meeting with the subject matter experts at CASA.
This follow-up meeting was held in CASA’s Woden, ACT offices at 1430 on 22 April 2010. (FOI deletion) and a number of other CASA staff met with ATSB investigators (FOI deletion) and discussed the safety issue further. The CASA staff advised the ATSB that they believed the current Regulations and guidance material covered the issue satisfactorily, which was consistent with the content of CASA’s letter of 26 March 2012. At no stage during the meeting did the CASA staff advise the ATSB investigators that there may have been a difference of opinion within CASA.
Recommendation R20000040
As can be seen R20000040 dealt with pretty much the same issues except over a dozen years before. However the most revealing bit is the final response text and the fact that the SR was “Closed – Accepted”
:
Initial Response
Date Issued: 27 April 2000
Response from: Bureau Of Meteorology
Response Status: Closed - Accepted
Response Text:
In response to your letter of 25 February 2000 relating to Air Safety Recommendation 20000040 and the reliability of meteorological forecasts for Norfolk Island, the Bureau of Meteorology has explored a number of possible ways to increase the reliability of forecasts for flights to the Island.
There are several factors which determine the accuracy and reliability of the forecasts. The first is the quality and timeliness of the baseline observational data from Norfolk Island itself. The second is the information base (including both conventional surface observational data and information from meteorological satellites and other sources) in the larger Eastern Australia-Southwest Pacific region. The third is the overall scientific capability of the Bureau's forecast models and systems and, in particular, their skill in forecasting the behaviour of the highly localised influences which can impact on conditions on Norfolk Island. And the fourth relates to the speed and responsiveness with which critical information on changing weather conditions (forecast or observed) can be conveyed to those who need it for immediate decision making.
As you are aware, the Bureau commits significant resources to maintaining its observing program at Norfolk Island. While the primary purpose of those observations is to support the overall large-scale monitoring and modelling of meteorological conditions in the Western Pacific, and the operation of the observing station is funded by the Bureau on that basis, it is staffed by highly trained observers with long experience in support of aviation. As far as is possible with available staff numbers, the observers are rostered to cover arrivals of regular flights and rosters are adjusted to cover the arrival of notified delayed flights.
The Norfolk Island Terminal Aerodrome Forecast (TAF) is produced by experienced professional meteorologists located in the Bureau's New South Wales Regional Forecasting Centre in Sydney. The terminal forecast provides predictions of wind, visibility, cloud amount and base height and weather routinely every six hours. Weather conditions are continuously monitored and the terminal forecast is amended as necessary in line with air safety requirements. The forecasters have full access to all the Bureau's synoptic meteorological data for the region and guidance material from both Australian and overseas prediction models. As part of the forecasting process, they continuously monitor all available information from the region including the observational data from Norfolk Island itself. When consideration of the latest observational data in the context of the overall meteorological situations suggests the need to modify the terminal forecast, amendments are issued as quickly as possible.
Despite the best efforts of the Bureau's observing and forecasting staff, it is clear that it is not always possible to get vital information to the right place as quickly as it is needed and the inherent scientific complexity of weather forecasting means that occasional serious forecast errors will continue to be unavoidable. That said, the Bureau has carefully reviewed the Norfolk Island situation in order to find ways of improving the accuracy and reliability of its forecasts for aviation through a range of short and longer-term means.
As part of its strategic research effort in forecast improvement, the Bureau of Meteorology Research Centre is undertaking a number of projects aimed at increasing scientific knowledge specifically applied to the provision of aviation weather services. Research projects are focussed on the detection and prediction of fog and low cloud and are based on extensive research into the science of numerical weather prediction. However, with the current level of scientific knowledge, the terminal forecasts for Norfolk Island cannot be expected to be reliable 100 percent of the time. Based on figures available for the period January 1998 to March 2000 (some 12 000 forecast hours), the Bureau's TAF verification system shows that for category A and B aircraft when conditions were forecast to be above the minima, the probability of encountering adverse weather conditions at Norfolk Island airport was 0.6%.
As part of its investigations, the Bureau has considered the installation of a weather watch radar facility at Norfolk Island with remote access in the NSW Regional Forecast Centre. Although routine radar coverage would enable the early detection of precipitation in the vicinity of the Island, investigations suggest that the impact of the radar images in improving forecast accuracy would be on the time-scale of one to two hours. This time frame is outside the point of no return for current aircraft servicing the route. It was concluded that the installation of a weather watch radar would be relatively expensive and would only partially address the forecast deficiencies identified in Air Safety Recommendation R20000040. The Bureau will however keep this option under review.
To increase the responsiveness of the terminal forecasts to changes in conditions at Norfolk Island, the Bureau has issued instructions to observing staff to ensure forecasters at the Sydney RFC are notified directly by telephone of any discrepancies between the current forecast and actual conditions. This arrangement will increase the responsiveness of the system particularly during periods of fluctuating conditions. In addition the Bureau has provided the aerodrome manager with access to a display of the latest observations to ensure the most up to date information is relayed to aircraft.
The Bureau is actively participating in the review of fuel requirements for flights to remote islands being undertaken by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.
I regret the delay in replying to your letter but the Bureau has felt it important to look carefully at all aspects of the Norfolk Island forecast situation and consider the full range of possibilities for forecast improvement within the resources available to us. We will continue to work on forecast improvement for Norfolk Island as resources permit.
Date Issued: 27 April 2000
Response from: Bureau Of Meteorology
Response Status: Closed - Accepted
Response Text:
In response to your letter of 25 February 2000 relating to Air Safety Recommendation 20000040 and the reliability of meteorological forecasts for Norfolk Island, the Bureau of Meteorology has explored a number of possible ways to increase the reliability of forecasts for flights to the Island.
There are several factors which determine the accuracy and reliability of the forecasts. The first is the quality and timeliness of the baseline observational data from Norfolk Island itself. The second is the information base (including both conventional surface observational data and information from meteorological satellites and other sources) in the larger Eastern Australia-Southwest Pacific region. The third is the overall scientific capability of the Bureau's forecast models and systems and, in particular, their skill in forecasting the behaviour of the highly localised influences which can impact on conditions on Norfolk Island. And the fourth relates to the speed and responsiveness with which critical information on changing weather conditions (forecast or observed) can be conveyed to those who need it for immediate decision making.
As you are aware, the Bureau commits significant resources to maintaining its observing program at Norfolk Island. While the primary purpose of those observations is to support the overall large-scale monitoring and modelling of meteorological conditions in the Western Pacific, and the operation of the observing station is funded by the Bureau on that basis, it is staffed by highly trained observers with long experience in support of aviation. As far as is possible with available staff numbers, the observers are rostered to cover arrivals of regular flights and rosters are adjusted to cover the arrival of notified delayed flights.
The Norfolk Island Terminal Aerodrome Forecast (TAF) is produced by experienced professional meteorologists located in the Bureau's New South Wales Regional Forecasting Centre in Sydney. The terminal forecast provides predictions of wind, visibility, cloud amount and base height and weather routinely every six hours. Weather conditions are continuously monitored and the terminal forecast is amended as necessary in line with air safety requirements. The forecasters have full access to all the Bureau's synoptic meteorological data for the region and guidance material from both Australian and overseas prediction models. As part of the forecasting process, they continuously monitor all available information from the region including the observational data from Norfolk Island itself. When consideration of the latest observational data in the context of the overall meteorological situations suggests the need to modify the terminal forecast, amendments are issued as quickly as possible.
Despite the best efforts of the Bureau's observing and forecasting staff, it is clear that it is not always possible to get vital information to the right place as quickly as it is needed and the inherent scientific complexity of weather forecasting means that occasional serious forecast errors will continue to be unavoidable. That said, the Bureau has carefully reviewed the Norfolk Island situation in order to find ways of improving the accuracy and reliability of its forecasts for aviation through a range of short and longer-term means.
As part of its strategic research effort in forecast improvement, the Bureau of Meteorology Research Centre is undertaking a number of projects aimed at increasing scientific knowledge specifically applied to the provision of aviation weather services. Research projects are focussed on the detection and prediction of fog and low cloud and are based on extensive research into the science of numerical weather prediction. However, with the current level of scientific knowledge, the terminal forecasts for Norfolk Island cannot be expected to be reliable 100 percent of the time. Based on figures available for the period January 1998 to March 2000 (some 12 000 forecast hours), the Bureau's TAF verification system shows that for category A and B aircraft when conditions were forecast to be above the minima, the probability of encountering adverse weather conditions at Norfolk Island airport was 0.6%.
As part of its investigations, the Bureau has considered the installation of a weather watch radar facility at Norfolk Island with remote access in the NSW Regional Forecast Centre. Although routine radar coverage would enable the early detection of precipitation in the vicinity of the Island, investigations suggest that the impact of the radar images in improving forecast accuracy would be on the time-scale of one to two hours. This time frame is outside the point of no return for current aircraft servicing the route. It was concluded that the installation of a weather watch radar would be relatively expensive and would only partially address the forecast deficiencies identified in Air Safety Recommendation R20000040. The Bureau will however keep this option under review.
To increase the responsiveness of the terminal forecasts to changes in conditions at Norfolk Island, the Bureau has issued instructions to observing staff to ensure forecasters at the Sydney RFC are notified directly by telephone of any discrepancies between the current forecast and actual conditions. This arrangement will increase the responsiveness of the system particularly during periods of fluctuating conditions. In addition the Bureau has provided the aerodrome manager with access to a display of the latest observations to ensure the most up to date information is relayed to aircraft.
The Bureau is actively participating in the review of fuel requirements for flights to remote islands being undertaken by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.
I regret the delay in replying to your letter but the Bureau has felt it important to look carefully at all aspects of the Norfolk Island forecast situation and consider the full range of possibilities for forecast improvement within the resources available to us. We will continue to work on forecast improvement for Norfolk Island as resources permit.
Then virtually the same safety issue rears its ugly head over a decade later…I think Sunny the virtual layman could understand the absurdity of this scenario!!
If the ATSB had of kept the original SR open then instead of arguing the toss with the regulator all they would have had to have done is reissue the original SR and add CASA as another party to the ‘issue owner’ column. Even ‘Blind Freddy’ can tell that the 2000 safety issue had not been properly addressed…not by a long shot!
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King of cheese Albanese supports the current pooh
Anthony Albaswisscheese certainly has confidence in the current system......
ATSB and CASA board members reappointed
Item by australianaviation.com.au at 5:26 pm, Tuesday June 5 2012
Transport Minister Anthony Albanese has announced a series of reappointments at CASA and the ATSB.
Dr Allan Hawke AC has been reappointed as chair of CASA, while fellow board members David Gray, Trevor Danos and Helen Gillies have also agreed to serve further terms. In addition, Noel Hart has been reappointed as a Commissioner of the ATSB.
“The re-appointments provide ongoing certainty for both CASA and the ATSB enabling both bodies to continue to perform their vital roles as the independent aviation safety regulator and national transport safety investigator respectively to the highest standard,” said Minister Albanese.
Item by australianaviation.com.au at 5:26 pm, Tuesday June 5 2012
Transport Minister Anthony Albanese has announced a series of reappointments at CASA and the ATSB.
Dr Allan Hawke AC has been reappointed as chair of CASA, while fellow board members David Gray, Trevor Danos and Helen Gillies have also agreed to serve further terms. In addition, Noel Hart has been reappointed as a Commissioner of the ATSB.
“The re-appointments provide ongoing certainty for both CASA and the ATSB enabling both bodies to continue to perform their vital roles as the independent aviation safety regulator and national transport safety investigator respectively to the highest standard,” said Minister Albanese.
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Expert advice - free.
The Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) produce some free useful guides to prevent CFIT and avoid ALAR incidents.
It takes, the first time about five minutes to evaluate the potential CFIT risk to a proposed operation and identify the threats. For those interested, completing the CFIT analysis for the Norfolk island ditching may, perhaps provides some insight. It may just surprise you. The FSF link:-
FSF – CFIT analysis.
Should you have the spare moments, the FSF ALAR exercise ran against the Norfolk incident will again, provide some very interesting data. The FSF link:-
FSF-ALAR analysis.
It takes, the first time about five minutes to evaluate the potential CFIT risk to a proposed operation and identify the threats. For those interested, completing the CFIT analysis for the Norfolk island ditching may, perhaps provides some insight. It may just surprise you. The FSF link:-
FSF – CFIT analysis.
Should you have the spare moments, the FSF ALAR exercise ran against the Norfolk incident will again, provide some very interesting data. The FSF link:-
FSF-ALAR analysis.
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For those interested, completing the CFIT analysis for the Norfolk island ditching may, perhaps provides some insight.
New category!
This morning's exposé of Senator rants and awkward moments is perhaps best summed up by Ben Sandilands:
A very big learning curve for the new ASA CEO. Still she'd better get used to dealing with hostile Senators, after all that is definitely part of Ms Staib's remit!!
The BOM part of this morning's event was very civilized in comparison...
Pel-Air hearing stunned by ATSB safety cop-out | Plane Talking
Oh and here's the Hansard from this morning:http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/...pplication/pdf
And here's the Hansard segment that Ben's blog piece refers to:
I think we can safely say there are several hangman's trapdoors lining up for the bureau it's just a case of how many and when!
Meanwhile over at Fort Fumble we hear that the DAS has made himself unavailable for further angry assaults from hostile Senators and he is presently on a jaunt to Montreal....hmm interesting!
:
Pel-Air hearing stunned by ATSB decision not to make safety recommendations
Ben Sandilands | Nov 19, 2012 1:48PM | EMAIL | PRINT
There are some extraordinary and serious implications for air safety administration in this country contained in this morning’s testimony by AirServices Australia to the Senate committee inquiring into Aviation Accident Investigations.
At its heart, the evidence says that the ATSB, in which ‘S’ stands for safety, has decided to limit issuing safety recommendations in its final reports, unless they become devalued!
The ATSB even says so in its supplementary submissions to the inquiry which can be accessed here.
But did the ATSB tell the Minister? If it did, did the Minister understand what it was doing? Why wasn’t there a ministerial statement to the parliament, and even to the media and the aviation industry in general?
What exactly is the role of the ATSB going to be, going forward (cough), if it is now just the ATB, and doesn’t make the safety recommendation that are the internationally accepted basis for alerting aircraft operators and other sovereign regulators of issues, as described in big print and simple words in ICAO’s Annex 13?
Could it be that this latest policy initiative by the ATSB is just an incredibly disingenuous attempt to shield CASA, the safety regulator, and the operator, Pel-Air, from being expose as incompetent, if not in their own right threats to the safety of flight in this country, by framing the final report into the ditching of a Careflight charter using a Westwind corporate jet into the sea near Norfolk Island on the night of 18 November 2009, three years and one day ago, to lay the entire blame on the pilot?
But let’s take this morning’s evidence from the top.
The executive general manager ATC at AirServices Australia, Jason Harfield, told the Senate committee inquiry into Aviation Accident Investigations that without any safety recommendations in the ATSB final report into the Pel-Air ditching near Norfolk Island in 2009 which was published on 30 August, there was no way he could raise a serious factor in the crash with the air services providers in Fiji and Auckland.
That factor was a serious deterioration in the terminal area forecast of TAF for Norfolk Island for the projected arrival of a Pel-Air ambulance charter flight for Careflight carrying a total of six people from Apia to their ultimate destination in Melbourne. However that information, supposed to be passed on by Auckland traffic control, which was responsible for the air space across most of the charter’s flight path, never reached the jet.
The flight has passed its point of no return in terms of diverting to an alternative airfield when it made four missed approaches in bad weather at Norfolk Island and was ditched in the sea immediately before the remaining fuel in its tanks was exhausted.
All six persons on board the flight survived the impact and were rescued by boat.
The point of the Senate inquiry is how the final and much delayed report into the incident by the ATSB was written in a manner which excluded such major issues as the serious safety failings in pilot training, and oversight, as required of both the operator and CASA the regulator, as well as the suppression of a CASA audit which found Pel-Air in breach of more than 30 fundamentally important safety requirements.
The report not only abandoned the issuing of safety recommendations by the ATSB, but failed to recognize the legal responsibility of air operators for the competency and recurrent training of their pilots.
Instead it described the events of the night as being exclusively the failure of the pilot to properly fuel the jet, something which has been established by other evidence before the committee as significantly influenced by the abysmal if not non-existent standards of Pel-Air in relation to such matters as fuel planning, which in turn was a situation tolerated by incompetent regulation and oversight by CASA.
This is a very nasty, yet very important insight into the performance of CASA and the lengths to which it will go to risk offending operators, or exposing itself to public scrutiny.
During this morning’s hearing, the committee’s members grilled two longer serving AirServices Australia executives, Harfield and Peter Hobson, the acting general manager of Network Management Services, over the apparent bureaucratic indifference to the safety issues involved in the Pel-Air ditching in that the air services in Fiji and ultimately Auckland had not proactively warned the pilot that the weather conditions at Norfolk Island had deteriorated well below those originally forecast.
Harfield took most of the flack, explaining why AirServices had not been proactive in leaning across the boundaries between itself and the Fiji and NZ air traffic control systems to address the non-forwarding of the information of the deteriorating weather conditions at Norfolk Island.
Under questioning, Harfield, at times assisted by Hobson, said that his hands were tied until the ATSB finally reported on 30 August, when he would have acted on its safety recommendations, but under even further questioning he admitted that he didn’t even know that the ATSB was no longer in the business of making safety recommendations.
It was an awkward performance on Harfield’s part, who seemed challenged by the notion that he might have exercised any initiative in dealing with the issue of non-forwarded weather changes to flights that were going to an Australian airfield in which the air space was controlled by another state.
The committee acknowledged that while the withholding of that information was not the actual cause of the crash, its availability to the captain of the flight on a timely basis would have alerted him to the need to divert to an alternative airport in Noumea or Fiji at a time when the jet was sufficiently fueled to reach either.
In other words, it was a safety failing that could have prevented the jet flying onwards into serious and unanticipated danger.
The new CEO of Airservices Australia, Margaret Staib, assured the committee that such issues would be more proactively addressed in the future.
Those who enjoyed reading rapid fire and at times heated and sarcastic exchanges in Hansard may find this morning’s transcript entertaining when it is published. However not all of the words used in the live videocast from the committee room are likely to make it from the ‘pink’ or draft Hansard into the ‘white’ and epithet deleted final version of Hansard.
There is a further public hearing scheduled for Wednesday afternoon, featuring among others the ATSB.
Ben Sandilands | Nov 19, 2012 1:48PM | EMAIL | PRINT
There are some extraordinary and serious implications for air safety administration in this country contained in this morning’s testimony by AirServices Australia to the Senate committee inquiring into Aviation Accident Investigations.
At its heart, the evidence says that the ATSB, in which ‘S’ stands for safety, has decided to limit issuing safety recommendations in its final reports, unless they become devalued!
The ATSB even says so in its supplementary submissions to the inquiry which can be accessed here.
But did the ATSB tell the Minister? If it did, did the Minister understand what it was doing? Why wasn’t there a ministerial statement to the parliament, and even to the media and the aviation industry in general?
What exactly is the role of the ATSB going to be, going forward (cough), if it is now just the ATB, and doesn’t make the safety recommendation that are the internationally accepted basis for alerting aircraft operators and other sovereign regulators of issues, as described in big print and simple words in ICAO’s Annex 13?
Could it be that this latest policy initiative by the ATSB is just an incredibly disingenuous attempt to shield CASA, the safety regulator, and the operator, Pel-Air, from being expose as incompetent, if not in their own right threats to the safety of flight in this country, by framing the final report into the ditching of a Careflight charter using a Westwind corporate jet into the sea near Norfolk Island on the night of 18 November 2009, three years and one day ago, to lay the entire blame on the pilot?
But let’s take this morning’s evidence from the top.
The executive general manager ATC at AirServices Australia, Jason Harfield, told the Senate committee inquiry into Aviation Accident Investigations that without any safety recommendations in the ATSB final report into the Pel-Air ditching near Norfolk Island in 2009 which was published on 30 August, there was no way he could raise a serious factor in the crash with the air services providers in Fiji and Auckland.
That factor was a serious deterioration in the terminal area forecast of TAF for Norfolk Island for the projected arrival of a Pel-Air ambulance charter flight for Careflight carrying a total of six people from Apia to their ultimate destination in Melbourne. However that information, supposed to be passed on by Auckland traffic control, which was responsible for the air space across most of the charter’s flight path, never reached the jet.
The flight has passed its point of no return in terms of diverting to an alternative airfield when it made four missed approaches in bad weather at Norfolk Island and was ditched in the sea immediately before the remaining fuel in its tanks was exhausted.
All six persons on board the flight survived the impact and were rescued by boat.
The point of the Senate inquiry is how the final and much delayed report into the incident by the ATSB was written in a manner which excluded such major issues as the serious safety failings in pilot training, and oversight, as required of both the operator and CASA the regulator, as well as the suppression of a CASA audit which found Pel-Air in breach of more than 30 fundamentally important safety requirements.
The report not only abandoned the issuing of safety recommendations by the ATSB, but failed to recognize the legal responsibility of air operators for the competency and recurrent training of their pilots.
Instead it described the events of the night as being exclusively the failure of the pilot to properly fuel the jet, something which has been established by other evidence before the committee as significantly influenced by the abysmal if not non-existent standards of Pel-Air in relation to such matters as fuel planning, which in turn was a situation tolerated by incompetent regulation and oversight by CASA.
This is a very nasty, yet very important insight into the performance of CASA and the lengths to which it will go to risk offending operators, or exposing itself to public scrutiny.
During this morning’s hearing, the committee’s members grilled two longer serving AirServices Australia executives, Harfield and Peter Hobson, the acting general manager of Network Management Services, over the apparent bureaucratic indifference to the safety issues involved in the Pel-Air ditching in that the air services in Fiji and ultimately Auckland had not proactively warned the pilot that the weather conditions at Norfolk Island had deteriorated well below those originally forecast.
Harfield took most of the flack, explaining why AirServices had not been proactive in leaning across the boundaries between itself and the Fiji and NZ air traffic control systems to address the non-forwarding of the information of the deteriorating weather conditions at Norfolk Island.
Under questioning, Harfield, at times assisted by Hobson, said that his hands were tied until the ATSB finally reported on 30 August, when he would have acted on its safety recommendations, but under even further questioning he admitted that he didn’t even know that the ATSB was no longer in the business of making safety recommendations.
It was an awkward performance on Harfield’s part, who seemed challenged by the notion that he might have exercised any initiative in dealing with the issue of non-forwarded weather changes to flights that were going to an Australian airfield in which the air space was controlled by another state.
The committee acknowledged that while the withholding of that information was not the actual cause of the crash, its availability to the captain of the flight on a timely basis would have alerted him to the need to divert to an alternative airport in Noumea or Fiji at a time when the jet was sufficiently fueled to reach either.
In other words, it was a safety failing that could have prevented the jet flying onwards into serious and unanticipated danger.
The new CEO of Airservices Australia, Margaret Staib, assured the committee that such issues would be more proactively addressed in the future.
Those who enjoyed reading rapid fire and at times heated and sarcastic exchanges in Hansard may find this morning’s transcript entertaining when it is published. However not all of the words used in the live videocast from the committee room are likely to make it from the ‘pink’ or draft Hansard into the ‘white’ and epithet deleted final version of Hansard.
There is a further public hearing scheduled for Wednesday afternoon, featuring among others the ATSB.
The BOM part of this morning's event was very civilized in comparison...
Pel-Air hearing stunned by ATSB safety cop-out | Plane Talking
Oh and here's the Hansard from this morning:http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/...pplication/pdf
And here's the Hansard segment that Ben's blog piece refers to:
Senator FAWCETT: Okay. Mr Harfield, your opening comment was that, if there were recommendations by the ATSB, you would look to take action. Does it surprise you that ATSB reports no longer appear to have recommendations about things that might trigger situations like the incident we have been talking about for the last five minutes? It is a simple concept. You would have a report that said: 'Here's an issue. We recommend that the Australian government contact its counterparts to see what can be done.' Does it surprise you that there is not a recommendation in there?
Mr Harfield: Maybe it is because of the way we review reports, but I was unaware that they are no longer making recommendations as such in ATSB reports. When any ATSB report comes in, we look at the relevant safety factors that have come out of that particular report and then we crosscheck whether we have already done something about it from an air traffic perspective or whether there may be a gap in our investigative process. We track everything that comes out of an ATSB report on safety factors or where there were previously recommendations and track them through to resolve them. I am not sure why I did not pick it up, but I was not aware that they were no longer making recommendations in reports.
Mr Harfield: Maybe it is because of the way we review reports, but I was unaware that they are no longer making recommendations as such in ATSB reports. When any ATSB report comes in, we look at the relevant safety factors that have come out of that particular report and then we crosscheck whether we have already done something about it from an air traffic perspective or whether there may be a gap in our investigative process. We track everything that comes out of an ATSB report on safety factors or where there were previously recommendations and track them through to resolve them. I am not sure why I did not pick it up, but I was not aware that they were no longer making recommendations in reports.
Meanwhile over at Fort Fumble we hear that the DAS has made himself unavailable for further angry assaults from hostile Senators and he is presently on a jaunt to Montreal....hmm interesting!
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Sarcs, this morning's "inquisition" appears to show that DOM should have had the appropriate weather forecast two hours before top of descent.
That's you whitefella legends, we have different stories
You are the one with the pennies for the ferryman.
Phelan provides update!
Paul Phelan from AA provides an update to the inquiry:Pel-Air enquiry update – aviationadvertiser.com.au
Big Mack with a big thank you:
Big Mack with a big thank you:
John McCormick thanks staff.
Meanwhile, CASA Director John McCormick has thanked his staff for their input into the Senate process while also firing a vigorous shot across the bows at his organisation’s critics. We publish an extract because we’d hate to be labelled part of the “uninformed minority.”
We recently appeared at a sitting of the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Reference’s Committee Inquiry into the ‘PEL-AIR’ ditching report and ‘other matters’. I wish to pass on my personal thanks for the outstanding effort everyone made to meet the requests of the Senate Committee inquiring into the PEL-AIR ditching report. I fully appreciate the time and effort that was required and on behalf of everyone else at CASA, thank you and well done! That sort of spirit is very humbling to me.
As for these Inquiries themselves, they are an important part of Westminster Democracy in this country and, as such, are not events to be feared or avoided. I personally welcome the opportunity to present CASA’s positions at any venue.
However, do not be dismayed by our vocal but largely uninformed minority of critics; they are symptomatic of other ills in society. I prefer ‘facts’ when engaged in discussions; not hearsay and tautological rubbish that some others seem to regard as promising material.
I look forward to assisting the Committee conclude its investigations. At the completion of this Inquiry there is a report produced. That report becomes a ‘Report of Parliament’ and will be forwarded, by established process, to the Minister for his consideration.
Meanwhile, CASA Director John McCormick has thanked his staff for their input into the Senate process while also firing a vigorous shot across the bows at his organisation’s critics. We publish an extract because we’d hate to be labelled part of the “uninformed minority.”
We recently appeared at a sitting of the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Reference’s Committee Inquiry into the ‘PEL-AIR’ ditching report and ‘other matters’. I wish to pass on my personal thanks for the outstanding effort everyone made to meet the requests of the Senate Committee inquiring into the PEL-AIR ditching report. I fully appreciate the time and effort that was required and on behalf of everyone else at CASA, thank you and well done! That sort of spirit is very humbling to me.
As for these Inquiries themselves, they are an important part of Westminster Democracy in this country and, as such, are not events to be feared or avoided. I personally welcome the opportunity to present CASA’s positions at any venue.
However, do not be dismayed by our vocal but largely uninformed minority of critics; they are symptomatic of other ills in society. I prefer ‘facts’ when engaged in discussions; not hearsay and tautological rubbish that some others seem to regard as promising material.
I look forward to assisting the Committee conclude its investigations. At the completion of this Inquiry there is a report produced. That report becomes a ‘Report of Parliament’ and will be forwarded, by established process, to the Minister for his consideration.
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Tautological, farcicle, pony poohicle......
Mr Skull,
Bollocks and grow a spine. No doubt the veins in your neck are pulsating like the heartbeat of a Pollie delving nose first into a trough! If you can't handle criticism then sod off out of the job. Or try this on for size - Pull your people into line, get them to stop bullying industry, act fairly and honestly with integrity (or at least comply with the CASA charter which you currently don't, and that is worth a NCN) and you most likely wouldn't receive half the criticism you receive old friend.
Speaking of troughs,
Hopefully he will be undertaking a 'please explain' by the robust epicenter of safety sermons - ICAO.
However most likely he will be dining on caviar and fine wines while pondering and musing over aviation's robsustness down under?
ATSB - The pony pooh surrounding the ATSB is laughable and embarrassing. It also proves that Beaker does not understand Annex 13, the Chicago convention or anything relevant to what an ATSB is meant to be. The situation is well beyond repair and the Green Mile can be the only option left for him.
However, do not be dismayed by our vocal but largely uninformed minority of critics; they are symptomatic of other ills in society. I prefer ‘facts’ when engaged in discussions; not hearsay and tautological rubbish that some others seem to regard as promising material.
Speaking of troughs,
Meanwhile over at Fort Fumble we hear that the DAS has made himself unavailable for further angry assaults from hostile Senators and he is presently on a jaunt to Montreal....hmm interesting!
However most likely he will be dining on caviar and fine wines while pondering and musing over aviation's robsustness down under?
ATSB - The pony pooh surrounding the ATSB is laughable and embarrassing. It also proves that Beaker does not understand Annex 13, the Chicago convention or anything relevant to what an ATSB is meant to be. The situation is well beyond repair and the Green Mile can be the only option left for him.
Last edited by gobbledock; 19th Nov 2012 at 10:03. Reason: Tripping over the Skulls popping neck vein
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Senators scope
P.S
Dear Senators,
Although this request may seem somewhat outrageous or even tautological, perhaps you could ask Fort Fumble for a matrix describing reasons and providing evidence for the following:
- A full list of Management and Inspectors to have resigned in the past 3 years.
- Outline the exact reasons and/or circumstances of each resignation. (Evidence could be provided by statements from those employees or by Fort Fumble providing copies of those individuals 'exit meeting' documentation on each count).
- Convene an extended inquiry time frame to interview each individual under oath and parliamentary privilege.
- Ask each individual whether they underwent internal bullying, harassment, intimidation or were victims of recklessness, deception and dishonesty. (You may just get enough information to help you understand what Industry is suffering).
- Ask CASA to provide documentation on how many staff are union members, how many have sought union intervention, assistance or had to lodge grievances.
- Ask those ex-employees if they were ever subjected to unfair treatment or acts by CASA senior management or HR/IR management within the organisation.
Time for the Senators to get out the BIG shovel and dig deeper.
Dear Senators,
Although this request may seem somewhat outrageous or even tautological, perhaps you could ask Fort Fumble for a matrix describing reasons and providing evidence for the following:
- A full list of Management and Inspectors to have resigned in the past 3 years.
- Outline the exact reasons and/or circumstances of each resignation. (Evidence could be provided by statements from those employees or by Fort Fumble providing copies of those individuals 'exit meeting' documentation on each count).
- Convene an extended inquiry time frame to interview each individual under oath and parliamentary privilege.
- Ask each individual whether they underwent internal bullying, harassment, intimidation or were victims of recklessness, deception and dishonesty. (You may just get enough information to help you understand what Industry is suffering).
- Ask CASA to provide documentation on how many staff are union members, how many have sought union intervention, assistance or had to lodge grievances.
- Ask those ex-employees if they were ever subjected to unfair treatment or acts by CASA senior management or HR/IR management within the organisation.
Time for the Senators to get out the BIG shovel and dig deeper.
McCormick sounds like the perfect replacement for Alan Jones! What are the ills of society he is referring to? Are the uninformed majority boat people or are they left-wing gay feminists, or is it those dreadful Muslims questioning CASA's commitment to safety? Many others have commented on the man's arrogance so there is no point in retreading that path but like Mary Antoinette his last words could possibly be "Whats that noise?".
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Jmac taunts industry
What are the ills of society he is referring to?
Secondly, anybody who dare 'rise against the machine', make passing comment against 'he who shall not be named', or dare expose an infinite measure of fact and truth about the S.S CASA is deemed 'an ill of society'. Interestingly the Senators are questioning Mr Skull's little outfit and commenting in a robust manner, mostly not in favor of Fort Fumble, so are Mr Skull's comments aimed also at the good Senators?
ILL adj. worse (wûrs), worst (wûrst)
1. Not healthy; sick: I began to feel ill last week.
2. Not normal; unsound: an ill condition of body and mind.
3. Resulting in suffering; harmful or distressing: the ill effects of a misconceived policy.
4.
a. Resulting from or suggestive of evil intentions: ill deeds committed out of spite.
b. Ascribing an objectionable quality: holds an ill view of that political group.
c. Hostile or unfriendly: ill feeling between rivals.
d. Harmful; pernicious: the ill effects of a misconceived policy.
5. Not favorable; unpropitious: ill predictions.
6. Not measuring up to recognized standards of excellence, as of behavior or conduct.
adv. worse, worst
1. In a sickly or unsound manner; not well.
2. Scarcely or with difficulty.
n.
1. Evil; sin.
2. Disaster, distress, or harm.
3. Something that causes suffering; trouble: the social ills of urban life.
4. Something that reflects in an unfavorable way on one: Please don't speak ill of me when I'm gone.
1. Not healthy; sick: I began to feel ill last week.
2. Not normal; unsound: an ill condition of body and mind.
3. Resulting in suffering; harmful or distressing: the ill effects of a misconceived policy.
4.
a. Resulting from or suggestive of evil intentions: ill deeds committed out of spite.
b. Ascribing an objectionable quality: holds an ill view of that political group.
c. Hostile or unfriendly: ill feeling between rivals.
d. Harmful; pernicious: the ill effects of a misconceived policy.
5. Not favorable; unpropitious: ill predictions.
6. Not measuring up to recognized standards of excellence, as of behavior or conduct.
adv. worse, worst
1. In a sickly or unsound manner; not well.
2. Scarcely or with difficulty.
n.
1. Evil; sin.
2. Disaster, distress, or harm.
3. Something that causes suffering; trouble: the social ills of urban life.
4. Something that reflects in an unfavorable way on one: Please don't speak ill of me when I'm gone.
.Perhaps we will all be hung, drawn and quartered before a Star Chamber??
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Hyenas and jackals would be ashamed of the company
Disgusted.
I speak not to the voices of reason around here.
While I compose myself for the moment, why don't the others and you know who you are, give over behaving like a bunch of rabid jackals and hyenas for the moment.
Saints they may not be, but neither are they the devil. You may think you have a reason but you do not have the right to behave here as you do.
I guess it's an attitude thing but I never had an issue that wasn't professionally resolved to the satisfaction of both sides.
They as you gratuitously refer to them, like you, put their trousers on one leg at a time.
They have to answer to their masters in the Senate, they may not be perfect as youselves but neither are they are entitled to be bullied and hectored in that forum. Neither do their masters in the Senate have the right to do so. No doubt the Senators have been primed, as they should, but it seems to me the priming may have been unreasonably zealous
We do not have the right to anonymously demonise those in the PUBLIC SERVICE including the politicians hiding behind noms de plume in forums such as these.
If you had any guts on matters of this great importance you would reveal who you actually are and take personal responsibility for you utterings, there is a chance you may feel you need to be a little more civilized. You may also find that you will get actually get your point of view noticed instead of written off as one of the usual malcontents.
I will now retire and wait for the venue for my stoning to be advised or banning whichever comes first. I've had enough watching all of this it actually achieves nothing. Personally I no longer care to be associated with D & G.
I speak not to the voices of reason around here.
While I compose myself for the moment, why don't the others and you know who you are, give over behaving like a bunch of rabid jackals and hyenas for the moment.
Saints they may not be, but neither are they the devil. You may think you have a reason but you do not have the right to behave here as you do.
I guess it's an attitude thing but I never had an issue that wasn't professionally resolved to the satisfaction of both sides.
They as you gratuitously refer to them, like you, put their trousers on one leg at a time.
They have to answer to their masters in the Senate, they may not be perfect as youselves but neither are they are entitled to be bullied and hectored in that forum. Neither do their masters in the Senate have the right to do so. No doubt the Senators have been primed, as they should, but it seems to me the priming may have been unreasonably zealous
We do not have the right to anonymously demonise those in the PUBLIC SERVICE including the politicians hiding behind noms de plume in forums such as these.
If you had any guts on matters of this great importance you would reveal who you actually are and take personal responsibility for you utterings, there is a chance you may feel you need to be a little more civilized. You may also find that you will get actually get your point of view noticed instead of written off as one of the usual malcontents.
I will now retire and wait for the venue for my stoning to be advised or banning whichever comes first. I've had enough watching all of this it actually achieves nothing. Personally I no longer care to be associated with D & G.
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Gaunty - I guess it's an attitude thing but I never had an issue that wasn't professionally resolved to the satisfaction of both sides.
The display put on by the Chair and senators in the inquiry is nothing short of embarrassing -childish comments and questions, complete lack of understanding of the regulations and the law.
The display put on by the Chair and senators in the inquiry is nothing short
of embarrassing -childish comments and questions, complete lack of understanding of the regulations and the law.
What they are unearthing is that the various agencies are only interested in protecting their brand and saving face and not learning anything from this accident.
For ASA to state that they only respond to ATSB recommendations and then for the ATSB to state that they don't issue recommendations except as a last resort is going to be a red flag to a bull for someone like Senator H.
For McCormick to call this Committee (by inference) an uninformed minority shows how childish he is and how little he understands the role of Parliament in its oversight of Government agencies.
Look Left: For McCormick to call this Committee (by inference) an uninformed minority shows how childish he is and how little he understands the role of Parliament in its oversight of Government agencies.
creamy:
[D]o not be dismayed by our vocal but largely uninformed minority of critics; they are symptomatic of other ills in society. I prefer ‘facts’ when engaged in discussions; not hearsay and tautological rubbish that some others seem to regard as promising material.
Presumably, then, the members of the Senate Committee who have already gone on record as being critical of CASA in this matter are among the “largely uninformed minority”.
And BTW: Most of CASA’s evidence to the Committee is merely opinion and hearsay. Nothing wrong with that, mind you. But CASA might remind itself about that Pot/Kettle metaphor.
[D]o not be dismayed by our vocal but largely uninformed minority of critics; they are symptomatic of other ills in society. I prefer ‘facts’ when engaged in discussions; not hearsay and tautological rubbish that some others seem to regard as promising material.
Presumably, then, the members of the Senate Committee who have already gone on record as being critical of CASA in this matter are among the “largely uninformed minority”.
And BTW: Most of CASA’s evidence to the Committee is merely opinion and hearsay. Nothing wrong with that, mind you. But CASA might remind itself about that Pot/Kettle metaphor.
Yourself and creamy have both voiced what the vast majority of rational individuals on here now know from all the available evidence presented in this inquiry thus far and the Senators also now 'get it!' Those who choose to ignore the cold hard facts and keep defending the indefenceable, for what can only be their own self-interest, by default become part of the problem and not the solution.
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Ben Sandilands 19 November Article
That factor was a serious deterioration in the terminal area forecast of TAF for Norfolk Island for the projected arrival of a Pel-Air ambulance charter flight for Careflight carrying a total of six people from Apia to their ultimate destination in Melbourne. However that information, supposed to be passed on by Auckland traffic control, which was responsible for the air space across most of the charter’s flight path, never reached the jet.
If Airservices' staff Jason Harfield and Peter Hobson believes it was, then this is an issue that should have been further investigated and commented on by the ATSB.