Low altitude mixture cuts in twin training still occuring despite CASA warnings

[Josh Cox]

Captain Sled

We kill more people asymmetric training than as a result of actual engine failures

Whilst that is sound logic, if we provided no asymmetric training what so ever, I think real engine failures would kill many more pilots than it presently does, probably with passengers onboard.

[Sarcs]

JC I think your cherry picking what Leadie said, he definitely wasn't implying no assys, more how and where you do those assys versus the risk involved!

You might be the 'gun' instructor with META but there are individuals out there who let their 'perceived' abilities affect sound judgement and risk assessment to the point of the accident!

LeadSled: but it is clear that the message is lost on "the survivors".

If you read back over the posts in this thread I think you will see that Leadie's concerns are well founded.

[Josh Cox]

SARCs,

I am a "gun" nothing, least of all a "gun" META instructor, any knowledge or skills I have, were taught to me by mentors and instructors.

It was not my intent to cherry pick Captain Sleds post or disagree with what he/she has said, just trying to provoke intelligent discussion on the point raised.

I also believe we do kill more people in EFATO training than from actual engine failures whilst flying the line.

So that might lead one to question why we do EFATO training at all.

Imagine for a moment the state of our industry if there were pilots out there without any initial or recurrent EFATO training and with passengers onboard.

Would it be fair to say, we would kill a lot more people with no initial and recurrent training on EFATOs.

SARCs, you've worked under a CAR217 organisation many times, how many dozens of time have you been beaten with V1 cuts and EFATOs on take off ?.

My opinion as posted in any of my posts above is in no way an alternate or contrary opinion to that of Captain Sleds statements, infact he/she questioned the accuracy of one of my statements, and rightly so.

Noting that my pseudonym is not a pseudonym and all reference to leadie has been that of the utmost respect.

[Oktas8]

The particular asymmetric training I conducted was in accordance with UK CAA expectations. It was not asymmetric circuits for example. The UK CAA has quite a good reputation for safe practice. But given Australia's recent accident history, sure, discouraging or forbidding may be appropriate at this time.

I don't have any accidents to relate. But perhaps these TEM practises would have helped the accidents above?

Has the examiner placed feet to physically prevent wrong rudder input? Will the examiner take control immediately the safe outcome is no longer assured? Will the examiner discontinue the exercise if performance isn't immediately satisfactory for any reason at all? Has the examiner quietly reviewed the intended flightpath to prevent loss of SA if distracted? Is there any terrain ahead or abeam the aircraft? If not day VMC are there two independent attitude indicators in plain sight, and is the aircraft at relatively high speed and low power, to mitigate yaw & roll, and are the height buffers even bigger than normal?

Apologies to Leadsled & other experienced pilots - this kind of thing is already done by many experienced pilots and I don't mean to imply otherwise. But obviously not all pilots.

[Sarcs]

SARCs, you've worked under a CAR217 organisation many times, how many dozens of time have you been beaten with V1 cuts and EFATOs on take off ?.

Josh I know you've been through the ringer a round or two with some pretty dubious Checkies. Checkies that probably shouldn't have a licence let alone a check pilot approval. You know the type that slam the power lever back to the flight idle stop just as you rotate and then call "auto feather failed"!

However these cowboy types somehow keep managing to escape all the checks and balances put in place and continue to put the fear of life into even experienced drivers...so if there is a better way with less risk..then we should be promoting that.

And Josh I wasn't alluding to your posts mate!

[Josh Cox]

However these cowboy types somehow keep managing to escape all the checks and balances put in place and continue to put the fear of life into even experienced drivers...so if there is a better way with less risk..then we should be promoting that.

Agreed in it's entirety.

Cheers,

Josh

Are you still in FNQ ?, Red Beret Friday night ?.

[Hugh Jarse]

If you want to see the result of poorly conducted (and arguably illegal) V1 cuts at night - google VH-NEJ crash at Tamworth. This resulted in the unnecessary and negligent deaths of two young, up-and-coming pilots.

I witnessed (and attended) that occurrence post-crash, and am astounded that criminal charges weren't forthcoming.

Take a read of the CVR transcript. The RHS trainee was spot-on questioning the legality of V1 cuts at night. The rest is history.

Rest in peace Messrs. Chomley and Smith. Piss on you Tamair!

[LeadSled]

Folks,
As an example of how not to do it, read the ATSB report on the last one at Camden, a Twin Comanche, and study the photographs carefully. Read the whole report carefully, it is one short.

Credible eyewitness reports said the aircraft never got above 100-200ft.

Does the prop. on one engine look feathered to you!!

Consider the widely differing reports from the student and the instructor as to what actually happened, and what the aeroplane did, and figure out for yourself what "most probably" really happened.

In your considerations, take account of the AFM note about the fact that recovery from a spin is unlikely with full tip tanks.

Is it probable, given the verifiable facts, and the witness statements, that the CAAP was followed?
What action has CASA taken in this matter??
What pro-active action has ATSB taken, to find out why these accidents keep happening???
What action has ATSB taken to prevent, to the greatest extent possible, further similar fatal crashes --- I will not call them accidents????

Please, anybody, don't suggest I am saying "no asymmetric training", but let's drop the (I was almost going to say macho, but then I realised I know at least two female instructors who also indulge in the seriously risky practice of pulling the mixture "just off the ground") unnecessarily dangerous practices, to almost eliminate the chances of recovery, on the day it all turns to custard.

I was on the aerodrome at YSBK the day of the last fatal. That is not the only similar one at Bankstown when I have been on the aerodrome. Not long after I stated flying, I actually witnessed an Apache crash on an asymmetric missed approach, the PIC was the Piper agent Chief Pilot, fortunately, both lived. Not long after, a Heron crashed on the same airfield, same deal, attempting a physically impossible missed approach, all died, then a best mate died in yet another twin training accident.

I had a blazing row with the pilot responsible for the last fatal at Camden, about two weeks before that accident. The subject of the row was a very close go, virtually a rehearsal for the final fatal crash. We all know the PIC was a high time instructor, but he was an accident looking for somewhere to happen. Finally, it did.

Several people on previous posts have said that the accidents we have had have been inexperienced instructors ---- in every accident, of which I have all too direct knowledge, that was not the case, but all high time and "highly respected" "professionals". There was no shortage of experience on the flightdeck of the Braz at Darwin.The laws of physics and aerodynamics, underlined by real world "human factors" have no respect for hours in log books or popular reputations.

I never cease to be amazed at the ignorance of some very high time instructors of close acquaintance , all Grade 1s, three are ATOs, who, quite frankly, simply do not understand just how un-safe their "SOPs" actually are.

Just because you are still alive doesn't prove your practices are "safe".

The FAA recommendation on the subject make worthwhile reading, but in certain quarters in this country, FAA recommendation are treated with disdain ---- we know better ---- an attitude thoroughly discredited by our actual record.

A quote:

Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect.

Tootle pip!!

[Josh Cox]

Here: http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/3460925...77.pdf#page=39

[Oktas8]

Well, we all think "we know better" Leadsled. It's human nature. I think it, and quite obviously you think it too. Tricky bit is to get the regulator to state publically and enforce-ably what "better" is, so it's no longer a matter of opinion.

- No mixture cuts below 3000', and then only for demonstrating the feathering procedure;
- Never fail an engine "creatively" - e.g. fuel selectors;
- No feathered operations below 3000' or it's an emergency;
- No surprise failures ever, everything briefed beforehand even for tests, and failures done methodically;
- No multi-engine training at non-towered airfields;
- Touch-and-goes off a simulated asymmetric approach are undesirable but not forbidden (special risk management applies);
- Training for META is expensive and difficult and requires substantial ME experience;
- Training for examiner approvals also expensive and difficult;
(edit)

None of these are my ideas. They are all the UK way of doing things in the single-pilot multi-engine part of the training industry. I think it's uncontroversial to say that they are safer than Australia in this segment.

Some more:
- Creative use of a flight simulator is positively encouraged;
- Almost any "professional" simulator is acceptable for training credit in a flying school, approval relatively easy to get, to encourage their use;
- Mixture cuts in the circuit are discouraged although not forbidden;
- Feathered propellers at low level are forbidden, unless it's an emergency.

That's the NZCAA.

The FAA publishes those commonly circulated documents already mentioned by others. Whilst I don't have a strong opinion on mixture vs. throttle personally, the bulk of the respectable world says "no" to mixture at low level, so I don't do it any more.

There's quite a bit of stuff out there but it's not always easy to access, unfortunately.

[Horatio Leafblower]

The laws of physics and aerodynamics, underlined by real world "human factors" have no respect for hours in log books or popular reputations.

I never cease to be amazed at the ignorance of some very high time instructors of close acquaintance , all Grade 1s, three are ATOs, who, quite frankly, simply do not understand just how un-safe their "SOPs" actually are.

Just because you are still alive doesn't prove your practices are "safe".

Lots to think about there, and every word of it true.

[LeadSled]

Oktas8,
Like the FAA, the UK CAA put out some excellent material, we ignore such wisdom at our peril. Which is exactly what we all too often do in Australia, ignore, because "we" know better.

The one thing I would take issue about, in your last post, that to "know better" is human nature. In my experience it is commonly a mixture of lack of maturity (unrelated to chronological age) and lack of training at an early stage.

One of the great problems of changing entrenched attitudes is what could loosely called the "you can't teach and old dog new tricks" problem --- but even that is possible to overcome, and the organisation that should take the lead is CASA ---- but, is that going to happen --- where do the FOIs come from???

Some of the worst example of absolutely un-safe practices come from the "informal" demands of some FOIs.

As far as I can see, the only potential circuit breaker is ATSB, they now have the power to investigate systemic safety problems.

If this problem is to be solved, it is going to be political pressure on ATSB to exercise its power --- and without political pressure ATSB will not move, that is already clear.

So, folks, create the political pressure --- it's all in the power of the pen.

Tootle pip!!

[Centaurus]

Quote:
Surviving pilot told ATSB investigators the mixture was cut
How could you possibly be certain of this ?, is there proof ?.

Just to clarify the above comment. It's a long time ago now but I interviewed the survivor by phone to Canada after he had been following earlier Pprune discussions that followed some time after the accident. He contacted me by Pprune PM service; hence follow up phone discussion. Yes! Pprune OZ is read in Canada, too.

I had a blazing row with the pilot responsible for the last fatal at Camden, about two weeks before that accident. The subject of the row was a very close go, virtually a rehearsal for the final fatal crash. We all know the PIC was a high time instructor, but he was an accident looking for somewhere to happen. Finally, it did.

The very close go? Was that in a Cessna 310 where the navigation light on the wing tip was shattered with contact with a tree or bushes during a very low level mixture cut also at Camden? There was no incident report filed as far as I know but it was a mighty close call.

Another incident I recall was written up by Mac Job in the former Aviation Safety Digest. Chieftain departing out of Port Lincoln at night with PF under training. The check pilot cut a mixture after take off but never got around to opening the mixture again in order to set the throttle at zero thrust to simulate a feathered prop. The aircraft was unable to maintain a positive rate of climb because of the excessive drag from the windmilling prop and the crew never saw the gently rising terrain they flew into.

Looking now on the bright side of this discussion of mixture cuts versus throttle closure to simulate engine failure after take off in a twin. I note that to date, 6863 Ppruners have viewed the posts since September 2011- as well as the usual suspects who have contributed their views. If nothing else, it means a lot of pilots have now seen both sides of the argument, which is a good thing.

[LeadSled]

The very close go? Was that in a Cessna 310 where the navigation light on the wing tip was shattered with contact with a tree or bushes during a very low level mixture cut also at Camden?

Nope, not that one, but it probably proves there are some very slow learners, aren't there??

Of the 6000+ lookers, I hope somebody has been persuaded to change their ways ---- think of it as the 90:90 rule, if you stick with the FAA/UK CAA guidelines ( they manage quite well without having to "mandate" everything) ----

You can get 90% of the training value but eliminate 90% of the risk associated with the (very dubious) remaining 10%.

Tootle pip!!

[Up-into-the-air]

EFATO - training

A lot of the discussions here have to do with words and definitions in the training environment. One that has come up regularly is "recommended" and I show this below.

Most people rely on part 2 "........as a course of action" for the definition, but I believe that in the flying arena, part 1 is the most applicable.

recommended - past participle, past tense of rec·om·mend (Verb)

Verb:

1. Put forward (someone or something) with approval as being suitable for a particular purpose or role;
2. Advise or suggest (something) as a course of action.

More info »Merriam-Webster - The Free Dictionary