Journos had enough of dodgy charter aircraft
Sprucegoose
Join Date: Sep 2000
Location: Hughes Point, where life is great! Was also resident on page 13, but now I'm lost in Cyberspace....
Age: 59
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It is the inescapable fact that pilots are reluctant to record defects in the maintenance release
I don't for one minute buy the premise that if you write something up you will lose your job, you won't! In fact if you stick with your principles you may even find you get some respect from owners/employers.
I have to disagree HH. I have seen Pilots chastised CPs for reporting maintenance issues. It eventually leads to a situation where the CP will start looking for excuses to sack that pilot. A colleague was recently in a situation where he reported a serious problem in flight and had photographic proof of the problem occurring. When he reported it the CP didn't believe him. When he produced the photo he was told that his flying was at fault because the problem had not been reported in the previous ten years that the operator had operated aircraft type.
It's like nineteeneightyfour.
If it wasn't reported it didn't happen, great safety culture
The only thing that can stop this is public complaint and actions. If Journos don't want to travel in dodgy Chieftains then they will have to front up the extra cash to fly in something newer and safer-vote with their feet.
It's like nineteeneightyfour.
If it wasn't reported it didn't happen, great safety culture
The only thing that can stop this is public complaint and actions. If Journos don't want to travel in dodgy Chieftains then they will have to front up the extra cash to fly in something newer and safer-vote with their feet.
Anyone remember the name of that movie about the dodgy South American operator?
Zulu Whiskey Foxtrot?
Aside:
The problem;
"If you don't want to do it I'll find someone who will"
The priciple;
People are paying money to get to their destination in one piece.
This means they, often unknowingly, are relying on the experience and judgement of the pilot to keep them from harm, be it by for example knowing the limitations if weather is an issue or, as this thread is leading, the aircraft is unserviceable.
The short term result;
When something goes south, the employer WILL NOT stand up and say, "I made the pilot fly."
You WILL be blamed as PIC.
The long term result;
It's a small industry. If you choose to operate outside the rules long term with this operator, don't think people don't know. The operator's reputation tends to follow the pilot, good AND bad.
Zulu Whiskey Foxtrot?
Aside:
The problem;
"If you don't want to do it I'll find someone who will"
The priciple;
People are paying money to get to their destination in one piece.
This means they, often unknowingly, are relying on the experience and judgement of the pilot to keep them from harm, be it by for example knowing the limitations if weather is an issue or, as this thread is leading, the aircraft is unserviceable.
The short term result;
When something goes south, the employer WILL NOT stand up and say, "I made the pilot fly."
You WILL be blamed as PIC.
The long term result;
It's a small industry. If you choose to operate outside the rules long term with this operator, don't think people don't know. The operator's reputation tends to follow the pilot, good AND bad.
Join Date: Jun 2005
Location: Mariner Trench
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Our boss gets very upset if something is written in the MR, the trouble is, as soon as a job gets canned due to a U/S aircraft he goes nuts and says..."How am I supposed to know what's going on with these aircraft if nobody writes it up?"
[
25 YEARS AGO and Things Don't Change much
Back then I sat in the right hand seat of a Navajo engaged on a charter flight EN-Swan Hill-EN. The aircraft was based at Essendon. With several spare hours on the ground, and working on the adage The Devil finds work for idle hands I listed all the things wrong with that aircraft that could cause Human Factors problems particularly to an inexperienced IFR pilot, or a pilot not current on this particular aircraft. The maintenance release was squeaky clean of all endorsements and the aircraft had a shiny new paint job on the outside, but a diligent airworthiness inspector would surely have picked up the following on a ramp check or maybe however, he would think it all too minor to worry about?
It took me only 15 minutes to find the following defects seen from a pilots point of view but almost one hour to write them down. Starting with:
1. A placard on the pilots side-consul states that the aircraft is limited to a maximum landing flap setting of 25 degrees. The Flight Manual has a similar notice with a requirement that 2 knots be added to the flight manual Vref speed for 40 flap when landing with 25 flap. The flap indicator shows a white sector band from up to 15 flap and nothing else on the gauge to indicate exactly what flap setting in degrees is available beyond 15. When selecting the flap to down, the needle goes beyond 15 by Ύ inch into the unmarked areas and there is no indication if the flap micro-switch stops the flaps (via a limit switch) at 25 or 40. There is no external mark on the wings to indicate current flap position. This is common to many Navajos I have seen. In short, the flap indicator is misleading and impossible to comply with the flight manual restriction because there are no markings beyond 15 flap.
2. The rear baggage compartment aft of the rear door has no tie down net. However, the operator has thoughtfully supplied a brightly coloured carpet to throw over any cargo or bags. This rug has eyelets and tape attached to the retaining hooks in the floor. In other words there is no effective restraint.
3. The nose baggage compartment is not equipped with tie down devices or floor restraints. In this compartment are three metal wheel chocks, several empty soft drink bottles, a small metal ladder and various debris. The metal ladder is firmly wedged against thin electrical wiring emanating from behind the instrument panel and disappearing into the nose cone via the sidewall of the front baggage compartment. Everything in the baggage compartment is unrestrained and would float freely in turbulence.
4. Numerous oil leaks are visible through the front of the left engine cowl area with oil running from under the engine nacelle and through to the top surface of the flap area inboard of the engine. The operator is aware of the oil leak but says it is due to over-filling of the oil tank. He directs that that the contents should be 9 quarts maximum to minimize perceived oil loss. Both wheel wells also show signs of excess engine oil leaks.
5. Strong smell of fuel in the fuselage area when the aircraft is stationary. In the immediate vicinity of both cross-feed drains there is wet fuel stains on the fuselage belly with flow patterns extending several inches. The operator was previously advised but no action was taken. The problem of fuel leaks in this area are long-standing. Two wing fuel tank water drains drip fuel at one drop per 30 seconds on to the tarmac.
6. Autopilot when engaged causes very sudden in-flight manoeuvres and has to be hurriedly disengaged. There is no placard indicating an unserviceable autopilot and nothing in the m/r. The Century 111 autopilot control panel has a missing knob for roll mode it is just a bare metal rod on which the knob is supposed to be attached. The calibration wheel on the autopilot box has unreadable graduations thus it is not possible to note a specific setting in daytime worse at night, of course. There is a knob called Auto Pilot Nav Selector which can be selected to Nav1, Nav 2 or Off. There is no documentation on the specific use of this section of the autopilot. The operators policy is not to make the system serviceable because he deems it too expensive to rectify. The aircraft flies single pilot IFR with no autopilot. This is apparently legal on passenger charter operations but not on RPT flights. Passengers should be entitled to the same degree of safety regardless of the category of flight. The operator crews RPT flights with two pilots, with the second pilot paying for the right seat under the guise of in command under supervision but logging the total flight as in command. The autopilot has been unserviceable for 9 months and no action taken to rectify the problem. Single pilot IFR/IMC with no auto pilot is not conducive to a safe operation, regardless of the legalities.
7. Normally a green light appears when there is electrical power to the turn-coordinator. The light is inoperative. Next to the u/s light is an empty un-labelled lamp socket.
8. The two position voltage regulator switch is labeled only Main. There is apparently a second position hopefully for the Aux regulator if indeed one is installed. There is no Aux label on the switch assembly.
9. The circuit breaker panel has many obliterated decals or words with one or more letters missing. At night it is difficult to read the decals due grime and dirt or simply non-existent labels. The autopilot circuit breaker was out and easily reset because there is a piece of plastic or broken collar surrounding the circuit breaker shank. Nothing about this in the m/r. If the circuit breaker is inoperative or permanently collared out, then as a protection against circuit breaker resetting it is useless and potentially dangerous fire risk.
10. The green glide slope engaged light is inoperative on press-to-test.
11. There is a decal on the circuit breaker panel which on close scrutiny (impossible at night) says Turn and Bank Left/Right. There is however only one turn coordinator not a Turn and Bank Indicator which is situated on the left instrument panel in front of the left seat pilot. There is no similar instrument in front of the RH seat pilot only a couple of plugged holes where instruments were once installed. The circuit breaker marked Left Turn and Bank, appears to be a false circuit breaker as it does not pull out and on closer inspection it is merely a black painted knob which looks exactly like a circuit breaker in shape and size. The circuit breaker labeled RH Turn and Bank is a real circuit breaker but there is no RH instrument for it to supply power to. One can imagine the confusion in event of electrical smoke or fire when the pseudo circuit breaker is found to be jammed.
11. There is a Stormscope installed. It is well advertised by a decal situated on the fuselage near the entrance door which says Stormscope equipped. An identical decal advertising the presence of the Stormscope is situated on the left fuselage sidewall adjacent to the circuit breaker panel. Maybe this is to give an added sense of security to the pilot. However, above the actual instrument is a decal marked Radar. There is also a circuit breaker marked Radar. Only problem is that the aircraft is not equipped with weather radar.
12. There is a set of normal looking rudder pedals for the copilot position. They are identical in size and shape to the pilots rudder pedals. However, there are no brakes on the copilots pedals. There is no decal warning of this, nothing in the Flight Manual or the Operations Manual and no mention in the maintenance release. Simply, one would not know if the brakes were either not working from the RH side, or if they were not installed. I know of one endorsement carried out on this particular aircraft where the instructor was not aware that brakes were not installed on the right hand seat pedals, until after the flight with a student undergoing conversion training. The pilot under training had commented on the heavy nosewheel steering problems, so the instructor took control to free up the nosewheel steering by applying alternate foot pressure to each pedal on his side. The brake pressure appeared to lock solid on his pedals and the aircraft started to veer off the tarmac towards a nearby obstruction. The instructor quickly told the student to take over control. Later it was discovered that the copilots pedals indeed had no braking capability. The aircraft had flown for hundreds of hours and previous pilots had been unaware of the lack of RH seat brakes.
13. There are two engine gauges. Each gauge has an integral oil pressure, oil temperature and CHT sub gauge. In this aircraft the colour coding of the various instruments within the main gauge display do not agree with each other. For example, one oil pressure gauge shows 10 PSI red line limit for the left engine while the right oil pressure gauge shows 25 PSI red line limit. The green normal oil pressure operating range is quite different between the two oil pressure gauges. The CHT left engine gauge indicates 200F as the lower limit on the needle while the right engine CHT lower limit shows 100F. The varying size of temperature in degrees F scales on the two CHT gauges means that the needle positions are not generally parallel, thus requiring careful scrutiny of the actual readings rather than a normal scan which looks for similar parallel readings within average temperature parameters. The left oil temperature gauge has no numbers just a green arc and one red temperature limit mark. The right oil temperature gauge has graduations from 50F to 250F plus with three colour codes of green, yellow, and red. This means that a normal scan of engine temperatures and pressures in flight is not possible in terms of normal or abnormal needle positions. Instead a close scrutiny of each needle is needed which becomes a problem at night where cockpit directional lighting is poor by even automobile standards.
14. It is impossible to read the Directional Gyro at night because the internal lighting is inoperative. One needs to shine a torch on the instrument or have cats eye vision to read compass headings.
15. The upper switch panel over the pilots head houses the magneto switches. On the panel is a sign which says Alternators Press-to-Test. This refers to alternator test buttons that were presumably once installed. Instead there are two empty holes drilled into the vinyl roof and no buttons to press.
16. Both mixture controls are misaligned. The rear limit (idle cut-off position) actually coincides with a decal marked Lean that itself is supposed to indicate typical cruise position of the mixture control when leaned correctly. In other words, if the pilot leaned the mixture levers to the position marked Lean both engines would stop. Similarly the full forward rich mixture limit stops one and a half inches from the forward stop. The available movement of the two mixture controls is only slightly more than half of the total quadrant distance between ICO and full rich lever position.
17. There is intolerable noise in the No 1 VHF set and it sounds like a parrot squawking. The No 2 ADF volume control (Bendix) has no decal indicating volume direction. The HF volume control knob is un-marked and the decal obliterated. Similarly the circuit breaker panel has various switches such as landing and taxi light controls. There is no decal showing on/off positions which is confusing, particularly as the alternator field switches lay fore and aft.
18. The metal vertical cover which protects the left engine fire fuel shut-off handles (behind the pilots seat) from inadvertent actuation, does a good job indeed. It is tightly jammed and no amount of effort could move it in event of an engine fire - apart from using a set of pliars or a screw driver. The right engine fire fuel handle cover plate is not jammed. It is so loose that it is normally left laying on the cockpit floor.
19. On top of the right engine cowl a crack is evident adjacent to the hinge line of the oil cap cover. The crack is proceeding nicely but there is no stop drilling present.
20. Exposed and unprotected electrical wiring is readily visible coming from behind the left fuselage vinyl wall covering, and running behind the copilots seat and leading to the fuel system panel. The wiring is partially secured by masking tape which has peeled away. As the gap between the copilots seat and the passenger compartment wooden separation panel is used for maps, brief cases etc, it is easy to snag the wiring.
21. There is an electrically operated passenger seat belt sign attached to a portable wooden bulkhead. The box in which the sign is installed has a thick dark brown plastic cover. The seat belt signs are not visible in daylight, but with much peering one can just see the sign at night. It is quite useless for its task in daylight and only maginally better at night. There is no sign to indicate to passengers that the box displayed to their view is indeed a seat belts fastened device. It is just looks like a dark coloured box with no function.
22. Now here is a real beauty. Above the front right passenger window there is some light coloured masking tape. A closer inspection reveals the faded word EXIT in red but under the masking tape. It would be impossible to read at night in a dim passenger cabin. It is difficult to see in bright daylight. The emergency exit handle is covered by very tough plastic that requires a heavy pull to break in order to get at the handle. Lacerated fingers would occur. The handle assembly is situated in a position between two windows. There is no positive indication which of the two passenger windows is the emergency exit especially as the small red EXIT sign is covered over with masking tape. There is a decal which displays the following instruction: Emergency Exit Lift Latch Pull pin-Push window out. Which window? So there are two contradictory directions; One says Pull Pin, Lift Latch and the other says Pull handle Down. Very confusing even for the pilot, let alone a passenger at night. There is no doubt that the emergency exit window should be clearly outlined and the decal confusion sorted out.
23. The rear door can be used as an emergency exit. There is no decal indication that it can be used for this purpose. A passenger briefing card is available but the Navajo door opening procedure for the rear exit is complicated. In this aircraft the vital Press-to-Release knob which allows the main hatch to be operated that unlocks the exit door, is painted in faded white with what appears to be a faded red touch to it. There is no indication of the importance of that button to release the latch mechanism. There is also a chain and bolt attached to the door area which is supposed to be attached after the door is locked closed, in order to prevent inadvertent door opening in flight. With the chain in place the door can only open an inch or so. There is no mention on the passenger briefing cards of the function of this bolt and chain and no decals or instructions adjacent to the door of the vital need to undo the chain and bolt before attempting to operate the exit mechanism. In other words the whole emergency exit policy in this Navajo is shambles. But all is not yet lost because to balance things up there is a very clearly displayed sign opposite the rear exit which says Thank you for not smoking.
24. In front of the copilot position are situated the cockpit heat controls. Next to the levers is a decal marked Fuel On. But there is no switch to associate with the decal just another empty hole where presumably there was once a switch.
25. The fuel tank caps have a red decal stating that 100 octane fuel should be used. However the decal stating fuel tank capacity is missing on all caps.
26. The passenger emergency exit windows are not marked on the outside of the fuselage for ingress into the cabin. There is also no instruction on the outside of the rear door on how to open the door from the outside in event of an emergency.
27. In cruise the No 2 fuel pressure needle shows 3 PSI in excess of the red line limit.
28. The taxi light gives only five metres forward illumination about the same as the parking lights on a car. In other words useless for obstacle illumination.
29. The right windscreen has numerous small nicks, cracks and crazed areas. Landing at night, runway lights show very diffused patterns through the windscreen and would be impossible to have adequate vision towards the sun.
30. The left oil pressure gauge shows a green band 30 to 60 PSI. The right oil pressure gauge shows a yellow caution band 30-60 PSI then a green sector. Very confusing.
31. DME inoperative on last leg. Common defect on this aircraft.
32. Both pilots sun-visors flop down during take off, and in flight they dangle loosely and apparently have been like this for months.
33. There is a company checklist situated in the front of the Flight Manual. There is no specific pre-take off vital actions on this checklist. There is no check that the autopilot should be off for take off, no checklist of mixtures rich, no check of fuel pumps on, no fuel contents check for take off, no pitch full fine, no flight control check, no descent and approach checklist. I suppose there is no legal requirement for an approved checklist in the cockpit, but surely any operator would ensure certain airmanship items would be included in the company checklist in the aircraft.
.
Comments: Most GA pilots have learned to live with the type of unserviceablities I have described above. Some of these defects are minor, but in an emergency their nuisance value can add up to being more serious and certainly distracting to the pilot. This particular owner/operator could at little expense rectify 90% of the defects. Unfortunately the pilot who recorded these defects in the maintenance release (no one did) would soon find himself out of a job hence the clean maintenance release, regardless of unrecorded defects, on this and many GA aircraft.
It is annoying that CASA operations and airworthiness inspectors apparently do not investigate these dodgy operators unless led by the nose and then follow up action rarely takes place. Surely an airworthiness inspector could ramp check several aircraft each week just by opening the door and looking for the obvious, like I did. I was just an observer on the flight not the pilot-in-command.
The word would soon get around that frequent diligent on the spot inspections were causing embarrassment to operators and presumably things would improve on the maintenance front. The state of this particular Navajo based at Essendon, I believe represents just the tip of the iceberg among countless GA operators, particularly those away from CASA surveillance. I know of one country airport operator who when advised by CASA that a scheduled inspection party will arrive on a nominated date, flies his worst aircraft away to another aerodrome, returning when the inspection team has left.
25 YEARS AGO and Things Don't Change much
Back then I sat in the right hand seat of a Navajo engaged on a charter flight EN-Swan Hill-EN. The aircraft was based at Essendon. With several spare hours on the ground, and working on the adage The Devil finds work for idle hands I listed all the things wrong with that aircraft that could cause Human Factors problems particularly to an inexperienced IFR pilot, or a pilot not current on this particular aircraft. The maintenance release was squeaky clean of all endorsements and the aircraft had a shiny new paint job on the outside, but a diligent airworthiness inspector would surely have picked up the following on a ramp check or maybe however, he would think it all too minor to worry about?
It took me only 15 minutes to find the following defects seen from a pilots point of view but almost one hour to write them down. Starting with:
1. A placard on the pilots side-consul states that the aircraft is limited to a maximum landing flap setting of 25 degrees. The Flight Manual has a similar notice with a requirement that 2 knots be added to the flight manual Vref speed for 40 flap when landing with 25 flap. The flap indicator shows a white sector band from up to 15 flap and nothing else on the gauge to indicate exactly what flap setting in degrees is available beyond 15. When selecting the flap to down, the needle goes beyond 15 by Ύ inch into the unmarked areas and there is no indication if the flap micro-switch stops the flaps (via a limit switch) at 25 or 40. There is no external mark on the wings to indicate current flap position. This is common to many Navajos I have seen. In short, the flap indicator is misleading and impossible to comply with the flight manual restriction because there are no markings beyond 15 flap.
2. The rear baggage compartment aft of the rear door has no tie down net. However, the operator has thoughtfully supplied a brightly coloured carpet to throw over any cargo or bags. This rug has eyelets and tape attached to the retaining hooks in the floor. In other words there is no effective restraint.
3. The nose baggage compartment is not equipped with tie down devices or floor restraints. In this compartment are three metal wheel chocks, several empty soft drink bottles, a small metal ladder and various debris. The metal ladder is firmly wedged against thin electrical wiring emanating from behind the instrument panel and disappearing into the nose cone via the sidewall of the front baggage compartment. Everything in the baggage compartment is unrestrained and would float freely in turbulence.
4. Numerous oil leaks are visible through the front of the left engine cowl area with oil running from under the engine nacelle and through to the top surface of the flap area inboard of the engine. The operator is aware of the oil leak but says it is due to over-filling of the oil tank. He directs that that the contents should be 9 quarts maximum to minimize perceived oil loss. Both wheel wells also show signs of excess engine oil leaks.
5. Strong smell of fuel in the fuselage area when the aircraft is stationary. In the immediate vicinity of both cross-feed drains there is wet fuel stains on the fuselage belly with flow patterns extending several inches. The operator was previously advised but no action was taken. The problem of fuel leaks in this area are long-standing. Two wing fuel tank water drains drip fuel at one drop per 30 seconds on to the tarmac.
6. Autopilot when engaged causes very sudden in-flight manoeuvres and has to be hurriedly disengaged. There is no placard indicating an unserviceable autopilot and nothing in the m/r. The Century 111 autopilot control panel has a missing knob for roll mode it is just a bare metal rod on which the knob is supposed to be attached. The calibration wheel on the autopilot box has unreadable graduations thus it is not possible to note a specific setting in daytime worse at night, of course. There is a knob called Auto Pilot Nav Selector which can be selected to Nav1, Nav 2 or Off. There is no documentation on the specific use of this section of the autopilot. The operators policy is not to make the system serviceable because he deems it too expensive to rectify. The aircraft flies single pilot IFR with no autopilot. This is apparently legal on passenger charter operations but not on RPT flights. Passengers should be entitled to the same degree of safety regardless of the category of flight. The operator crews RPT flights with two pilots, with the second pilot paying for the right seat under the guise of in command under supervision but logging the total flight as in command. The autopilot has been unserviceable for 9 months and no action taken to rectify the problem. Single pilot IFR/IMC with no auto pilot is not conducive to a safe operation, regardless of the legalities.
7. Normally a green light appears when there is electrical power to the turn-coordinator. The light is inoperative. Next to the u/s light is an empty un-labelled lamp socket.
8. The two position voltage regulator switch is labeled only Main. There is apparently a second position hopefully for the Aux regulator if indeed one is installed. There is no Aux label on the switch assembly.
9. The circuit breaker panel has many obliterated decals or words with one or more letters missing. At night it is difficult to read the decals due grime and dirt or simply non-existent labels. The autopilot circuit breaker was out and easily reset because there is a piece of plastic or broken collar surrounding the circuit breaker shank. Nothing about this in the m/r. If the circuit breaker is inoperative or permanently collared out, then as a protection against circuit breaker resetting it is useless and potentially dangerous fire risk.
10. The green glide slope engaged light is inoperative on press-to-test.
11. There is a decal on the circuit breaker panel which on close scrutiny (impossible at night) says Turn and Bank Left/Right. There is however only one turn coordinator not a Turn and Bank Indicator which is situated on the left instrument panel in front of the left seat pilot. There is no similar instrument in front of the RH seat pilot only a couple of plugged holes where instruments were once installed. The circuit breaker marked Left Turn and Bank, appears to be a false circuit breaker as it does not pull out and on closer inspection it is merely a black painted knob which looks exactly like a circuit breaker in shape and size. The circuit breaker labeled RH Turn and Bank is a real circuit breaker but there is no RH instrument for it to supply power to. One can imagine the confusion in event of electrical smoke or fire when the pseudo circuit breaker is found to be jammed.
11. There is a Stormscope installed. It is well advertised by a decal situated on the fuselage near the entrance door which says Stormscope equipped. An identical decal advertising the presence of the Stormscope is situated on the left fuselage sidewall adjacent to the circuit breaker panel. Maybe this is to give an added sense of security to the pilot. However, above the actual instrument is a decal marked Radar. There is also a circuit breaker marked Radar. Only problem is that the aircraft is not equipped with weather radar.
12. There is a set of normal looking rudder pedals for the copilot position. They are identical in size and shape to the pilots rudder pedals. However, there are no brakes on the copilots pedals. There is no decal warning of this, nothing in the Flight Manual or the Operations Manual and no mention in the maintenance release. Simply, one would not know if the brakes were either not working from the RH side, or if they were not installed. I know of one endorsement carried out on this particular aircraft where the instructor was not aware that brakes were not installed on the right hand seat pedals, until after the flight with a student undergoing conversion training. The pilot under training had commented on the heavy nosewheel steering problems, so the instructor took control to free up the nosewheel steering by applying alternate foot pressure to each pedal on his side. The brake pressure appeared to lock solid on his pedals and the aircraft started to veer off the tarmac towards a nearby obstruction. The instructor quickly told the student to take over control. Later it was discovered that the copilots pedals indeed had no braking capability. The aircraft had flown for hundreds of hours and previous pilots had been unaware of the lack of RH seat brakes.
13. There are two engine gauges. Each gauge has an integral oil pressure, oil temperature and CHT sub gauge. In this aircraft the colour coding of the various instruments within the main gauge display do not agree with each other. For example, one oil pressure gauge shows 10 PSI red line limit for the left engine while the right oil pressure gauge shows 25 PSI red line limit. The green normal oil pressure operating range is quite different between the two oil pressure gauges. The CHT left engine gauge indicates 200F as the lower limit on the needle while the right engine CHT lower limit shows 100F. The varying size of temperature in degrees F scales on the two CHT gauges means that the needle positions are not generally parallel, thus requiring careful scrutiny of the actual readings rather than a normal scan which looks for similar parallel readings within average temperature parameters. The left oil temperature gauge has no numbers just a green arc and one red temperature limit mark. The right oil temperature gauge has graduations from 50F to 250F plus with three colour codes of green, yellow, and red. This means that a normal scan of engine temperatures and pressures in flight is not possible in terms of normal or abnormal needle positions. Instead a close scrutiny of each needle is needed which becomes a problem at night where cockpit directional lighting is poor by even automobile standards.
14. It is impossible to read the Directional Gyro at night because the internal lighting is inoperative. One needs to shine a torch on the instrument or have cats eye vision to read compass headings.
15. The upper switch panel over the pilots head houses the magneto switches. On the panel is a sign which says Alternators Press-to-Test. This refers to alternator test buttons that were presumably once installed. Instead there are two empty holes drilled into the vinyl roof and no buttons to press.
16. Both mixture controls are misaligned. The rear limit (idle cut-off position) actually coincides with a decal marked Lean that itself is supposed to indicate typical cruise position of the mixture control when leaned correctly. In other words, if the pilot leaned the mixture levers to the position marked Lean both engines would stop. Similarly the full forward rich mixture limit stops one and a half inches from the forward stop. The available movement of the two mixture controls is only slightly more than half of the total quadrant distance between ICO and full rich lever position.
17. There is intolerable noise in the No 1 VHF set and it sounds like a parrot squawking. The No 2 ADF volume control (Bendix) has no decal indicating volume direction. The HF volume control knob is un-marked and the decal obliterated. Similarly the circuit breaker panel has various switches such as landing and taxi light controls. There is no decal showing on/off positions which is confusing, particularly as the alternator field switches lay fore and aft.
18. The metal vertical cover which protects the left engine fire fuel shut-off handles (behind the pilots seat) from inadvertent actuation, does a good job indeed. It is tightly jammed and no amount of effort could move it in event of an engine fire - apart from using a set of pliars or a screw driver. The right engine fire fuel handle cover plate is not jammed. It is so loose that it is normally left laying on the cockpit floor.
19. On top of the right engine cowl a crack is evident adjacent to the hinge line of the oil cap cover. The crack is proceeding nicely but there is no stop drilling present.
20. Exposed and unprotected electrical wiring is readily visible coming from behind the left fuselage vinyl wall covering, and running behind the copilots seat and leading to the fuel system panel. The wiring is partially secured by masking tape which has peeled away. As the gap between the copilots seat and the passenger compartment wooden separation panel is used for maps, brief cases etc, it is easy to snag the wiring.
21. There is an electrically operated passenger seat belt sign attached to a portable wooden bulkhead. The box in which the sign is installed has a thick dark brown plastic cover. The seat belt signs are not visible in daylight, but with much peering one can just see the sign at night. It is quite useless for its task in daylight and only maginally better at night. There is no sign to indicate to passengers that the box displayed to their view is indeed a seat belts fastened device. It is just looks like a dark coloured box with no function.
22. Now here is a real beauty. Above the front right passenger window there is some light coloured masking tape. A closer inspection reveals the faded word EXIT in red but under the masking tape. It would be impossible to read at night in a dim passenger cabin. It is difficult to see in bright daylight. The emergency exit handle is covered by very tough plastic that requires a heavy pull to break in order to get at the handle. Lacerated fingers would occur. The handle assembly is situated in a position between two windows. There is no positive indication which of the two passenger windows is the emergency exit especially as the small red EXIT sign is covered over with masking tape. There is a decal which displays the following instruction: Emergency Exit Lift Latch Pull pin-Push window out. Which window? So there are two contradictory directions; One says Pull Pin, Lift Latch and the other says Pull handle Down. Very confusing even for the pilot, let alone a passenger at night. There is no doubt that the emergency exit window should be clearly outlined and the decal confusion sorted out.
23. The rear door can be used as an emergency exit. There is no decal indication that it can be used for this purpose. A passenger briefing card is available but the Navajo door opening procedure for the rear exit is complicated. In this aircraft the vital Press-to-Release knob which allows the main hatch to be operated that unlocks the exit door, is painted in faded white with what appears to be a faded red touch to it. There is no indication of the importance of that button to release the latch mechanism. There is also a chain and bolt attached to the door area which is supposed to be attached after the door is locked closed, in order to prevent inadvertent door opening in flight. With the chain in place the door can only open an inch or so. There is no mention on the passenger briefing cards of the function of this bolt and chain and no decals or instructions adjacent to the door of the vital need to undo the chain and bolt before attempting to operate the exit mechanism. In other words the whole emergency exit policy in this Navajo is shambles. But all is not yet lost because to balance things up there is a very clearly displayed sign opposite the rear exit which says Thank you for not smoking.
24. In front of the copilot position are situated the cockpit heat controls. Next to the levers is a decal marked Fuel On. But there is no switch to associate with the decal just another empty hole where presumably there was once a switch.
25. The fuel tank caps have a red decal stating that 100 octane fuel should be used. However the decal stating fuel tank capacity is missing on all caps.
26. The passenger emergency exit windows are not marked on the outside of the fuselage for ingress into the cabin. There is also no instruction on the outside of the rear door on how to open the door from the outside in event of an emergency.
27. In cruise the No 2 fuel pressure needle shows 3 PSI in excess of the red line limit.
28. The taxi light gives only five metres forward illumination about the same as the parking lights on a car. In other words useless for obstacle illumination.
29. The right windscreen has numerous small nicks, cracks and crazed areas. Landing at night, runway lights show very diffused patterns through the windscreen and would be impossible to have adequate vision towards the sun.
30. The left oil pressure gauge shows a green band 30 to 60 PSI. The right oil pressure gauge shows a yellow caution band 30-60 PSI then a green sector. Very confusing.
31. DME inoperative on last leg. Common defect on this aircraft.
32. Both pilots sun-visors flop down during take off, and in flight they dangle loosely and apparently have been like this for months.
33. There is a company checklist situated in the front of the Flight Manual. There is no specific pre-take off vital actions on this checklist. There is no check that the autopilot should be off for take off, no checklist of mixtures rich, no check of fuel pumps on, no fuel contents check for take off, no pitch full fine, no flight control check, no descent and approach checklist. I suppose there is no legal requirement for an approved checklist in the cockpit, but surely any operator would ensure certain airmanship items would be included in the company checklist in the aircraft.
.
Comments: Most GA pilots have learned to live with the type of unserviceablities I have described above. Some of these defects are minor, but in an emergency their nuisance value can add up to being more serious and certainly distracting to the pilot. This particular owner/operator could at little expense rectify 90% of the defects. Unfortunately the pilot who recorded these defects in the maintenance release (no one did) would soon find himself out of a job hence the clean maintenance release, regardless of unrecorded defects, on this and many GA aircraft.
It is annoying that CASA operations and airworthiness inspectors apparently do not investigate these dodgy operators unless led by the nose and then follow up action rarely takes place. Surely an airworthiness inspector could ramp check several aircraft each week just by opening the door and looking for the obvious, like I did. I was just an observer on the flight not the pilot-in-command.
The word would soon get around that frequent diligent on the spot inspections were causing embarrassment to operators and presumably things would improve on the maintenance front. The state of this particular Navajo based at Essendon, I believe represents just the tip of the iceberg among countless GA operators, particularly those away from CASA surveillance. I know of one country airport operator who when advised by CASA that a scheduled inspection party will arrive on a nominated date, flies his worst aircraft away to another aerodrome, returning when the inspection team has left.
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I still have the fax laying around here saying "no defects will be
written on the maintenance release without the express permission of the GM". The same GM when I first met him said "Do you know who I am? I said no and he said I am
en God". That was 2000 or 2001.
written on the maintenance release without the express permission of the GM". The same GM when I first met him said "Do you know who I am? I said no and he said I am
en God". That was 2000 or 2001.
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"TE" ..............god you brought back some funny memories re the Penguin runs. I could fill these pages with 'duck run' stories 'till the cows come home!
Even though at the time it was risky to say the least we few who did those runs night after night learnt a lot of airman-ship or was that luckman-ship? More so purely to stay alive:-)
'MM' was a real character & 'SR' was like his twin bro in some ways, one at each end of the 'duck run' to keep you on yr toes
The Doves where a classic, in more ways than one!
"TID" an 'XT' these days would be far better maintained than any old GA machine that's for sure !
Gee 'Centaurus' yr lucky you had one of the few PA31's that was in top shape there!
I flew one at times where the gear would only come up at random times !!
Wmk2.............ahhh the memories of days gone bye,feel sad for all the cadets of the future they will have zip in the way of old war stories to tell the grand kids
Even though at the time it was risky to say the least we few who did those runs night after night learnt a lot of airman-ship or was that luckman-ship? More so purely to stay alive:-)
'MM' was a real character & 'SR' was like his twin bro in some ways, one at each end of the 'duck run' to keep you on yr toes
The Doves where a classic, in more ways than one!
"TID" an 'XT' these days would be far better maintained than any old GA machine that's for sure !
Gee 'Centaurus' yr lucky you had one of the few PA31's that was in top shape there!
I flew one at times where the gear would only come up at random times !!Wmk2.............ahhh the memories of days gone bye,feel sad for all the cadets of the future they will have zip in the way of old war stories to tell the grand kids
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The unfortunate thing is Centaurus, that Navajo is probably still flying around 25 years later in worse condition than it was then
As you alluded to in your post, a diligent airworthiness inspector would/should have picked those things up, however it seems these days that as long as the paperwork is in order, they're not interested.
As you alluded to in your post, a diligent airworthiness inspector would/should have picked those things up, however it seems these days that as long as the paperwork is in order, they're not interested.
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How true Oliver,
The dodgy operators know that when it comes audit time Mr CASA is going to go through the paperwork with a fine tooth comb, never mind the heap of crap on the tarmac pissing out oil and fuel with bald tyres.....as long as those placards are up to scratch.
The dodgy operators know that when it comes audit time Mr CASA is going to go through the paperwork with a fine tooth comb, never mind the heap of crap on the tarmac pissing out oil and fuel with bald tyres.....as long as those placards are up to scratch.
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Maybe CASA should just get in a charter category aircraft and go for a flight, then compare what is U?S to the MR and then go after the pilot who flew it last and the head LAME and the GM?
Funny thing was I did an IFR charter in a company aircraft and wrote up some things on it that made it unsuitable for both charter and private IFR operations. Next person who flew it was the local CASA FOI, didn't read the MR, blasted of under an IFR flight plan and was essentially none the wiser about my endorsement on the MR.
CASA FOI landed then in a passing conversation with myself mentioned that several things went U/S on him in flight. I took great pleasure in showing him the MR with my endorsements
I also noted that this FOI didn't sign the MR prior to his flight (first flight of the day) 
Hard to enforce things, if they do not even play by the rules....
Funny thing was I did an IFR charter in a company aircraft and wrote up some things on it that made it unsuitable for both charter and private IFR operations. Next person who flew it was the local CASA FOI, didn't read the MR, blasted of under an IFR flight plan and was essentially none the wiser about my endorsement on the MR.
CASA FOI landed then in a passing conversation with myself mentioned that several things went U/S on him in flight. I took great pleasure in showing him the MR with my endorsements
I also noted that this FOI didn't sign the MR prior to his flight (first flight of the day) Hard to enforce things, if they do not even play by the rules....
Hey Tee Emm I'm really confused now!
I thought that it was a requirement that to make a proper pilot you had to fly dodgy GA aircraft? I mean, really, if pilots aren't exposed to this kind of thing then where an earth are future Captains going to get their command experience from, ICUS
I think that there should be a submission to the senate enquiry concerning the improvement in some GA operations and the direct consequence that will have on the quality of GA pilots coming into airlines.
It is only ineveitable that with any improvement in the conditions of GA we will see a corresponding drop in the quality of command hours that any future pilots may have when considering their command potential
I thought that it was a requirement that to make a proper pilot you had to fly dodgy GA aircraft? I mean, really, if pilots aren't exposed to this kind of thing then where an earth are future Captains going to get their command experience from, ICUS
I think that there should be a submission to the senate enquiry concerning the improvement in some GA operations and the direct consequence that will have on the quality of GA pilots coming into airlines.
It is only ineveitable that with any improvement in the conditions of GA we will see a corresponding drop in the quality of command hours that any future pilots may have when considering their command potential
