Norfolk ditching- license back?
carry additional fuel and perhaps be overweight and cop the wrath if you get ramped,
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Neville, Sorry mate, but you should take a look at the dispensations for weight on international ferry flights in light to medium aircraft. These things are miles over MTOW and its all fuel. Been there done that.
You haven't an argument with this.
You haven't an argument with this.
carry additional fuel and perhaps be overweight and cop the wrath if you get ramped,
Neville, Sorry mate, but you should take a look at the dispensations for weight on international ferry flights in light to medium aircraft. These things are miles over MTOW and its all fuel. Been there done that.
I'll have to speak to CASA to mandate all MTOWs be increased as it must be perfectly safe to do so from your comments.
If you then arrived at your destination above MLW would you hold before landing? What if weather was approaching?
Its a ridiculous comment to say that you would compromise aircraft performance on a normal flight because the aircraft is marginal on that route for fuel. If you can't carry enough fuel to do it legally then don't do it. If the destination is known to be marginal have alternates available en-route and get up-dates on the weather enroute.
Ferrying is a completely different prospect and only operating crew are subject to the dangers.
How far above maximum weight could you go before all single engine performance is lost and you face ditching on take-off due to a failure?
From the report at AO-2009-072
At 0904 when the WX was obtained surely an immediate diversion to Noumea or Auckland wouldn't have put the a/c in the drink when it lists their 4th go-around as occuring at 1025 - so nearly an hour and a half and all at low altitude.
The flight crew stated that, on reaching the planned cruising altitude, the headwind gradually increased and, in response, the engine thrust settings were reduced to increase the aircraft’s range.
During the flight, meteorological information was received from Auckland Oceanic2 that indicated the weather at the island was deteriorating. The flight crew reported that they also monitored the weather reports for Norfolk Island during the flight and, at 0904, they requested the 0900 Norfolk Island automatic weather report3.
The crew subsequently received an updated weather report that was issued at 0902. The report indicated that the weather conditions had deteriorated from those forecast at the time of the flight’s departure from Apia.
At 0928, the flight crew contacted the Norfolk Island Unicom4 operator (Norfolk Unicom), advising that they were about 20 minutes from the airport. Norfolk Unicom provided an updated weather report, indicating a deterioration in the conditions to well below the landing minima5. Subsequently, the crew sought regular weather updates from Norfolk Unicom as they descended, and also requested the operator to proceed to each end of the runway to assess the weather conditions in order to supplement the official weather report.deteriorated from those forecast at the time of the flight’s departure from Apia.
During the flight, meteorological information was received from Auckland Oceanic2 that indicated the weather at the island was deteriorating. The flight crew reported that they also monitored the weather reports for Norfolk Island during the flight and, at 0904, they requested the 0900 Norfolk Island automatic weather report3.
The crew subsequently received an updated weather report that was issued at 0902. The report indicated that the weather conditions had deteriorated from those forecast at the time of the flight’s departure from Apia.
At 0928, the flight crew contacted the Norfolk Island Unicom4 operator (Norfolk Unicom), advising that they were about 20 minutes from the airport. Norfolk Unicom provided an updated weather report, indicating a deterioration in the conditions to well below the landing minima5. Subsequently, the crew sought regular weather updates from Norfolk Unicom as they descended, and also requested the operator to proceed to each end of the runway to assess the weather conditions in order to supplement the official weather report.deteriorated from those forecast at the time of the flight’s departure from Apia.
The pilot in command moved rearwards from the cockpit into the cabin and ascertained that the main door was not usable. Continuing rearwards to the two emergency exits in the fuselage centre section, the pilot in command opened the port emergency exit, and water immediately flowed in through the door opening. The pilot in command exited the aircraft. The copilot sustained injuries from a reported contact with the control yoke during the aircraft’s second impact with the water. The copilot was not aware of the pilot in command leaving the cockpit, and may have lost consciousness for a short period of time. The copilot experienced difficulties when attempting to find an exit route from the aircraft by the main door. The copilot then swam rearward along the fuselage, located an emergency exit door by touch, and exited the aircraft.
From the time line in the preliminary report it would appear that the PIC was in complete violation of CAR 224 par 2 & 2A involving the responsibilities of the PIC. I find it very difficult to see how he could defend himself in a court if he chose to take legal recourse against CASA in connection to his licence suspension.
Once it was established that an alternate (excluding WX of course) was in fact not required for AWK operations, the question of when the PIC became aware of Norfolk deterioating to below the Alt Minima really is what all this is about.
If he did recieve the information with time to divert, then why didn't he?
If he did recieve the information with time to divert, then why didn't he?
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Based on what I have read in the various threads dealing with the matter and in the preliminary report, it was a charter flight - Pelair was not the air ambulance operator, careflight was. Pelair was just a chartered aircraft supplier.
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43 Inches......Nothing is compromised. It is not a permanent increase, but a dispensation for the ferry. These ferry aircraft are seriously over MTOW. Yes occassionaly there is a requirement to return to the point of departure, and yes they are landed grossly over MLW. However like all good pilots, the landing is endorsed on the M/R for perusal by the LAME.
"How far above maximum weight could you go before all single engine performance is lost and you face ditching on take-off due to a failure".............. Its line ball even below MTOW in most light twins!!
"I'll have to speak to CASA "..... Please do, I'm sure you would have a direct line by now!!
"How far above maximum weight could you go before all single engine performance is lost and you face ditching on take-off due to a failure".............. Its line ball even below MTOW in most light twins!!
"I'll have to speak to CASA "..... Please do, I'm sure you would have a direct line by now!!
Last edited by PA39; 8th Aug 2010 at 06:58.
43 Inches......Nothing is compromised.
"How far above maximum weight could you go before all single engine performance is lost and you face ditching on take-off due to a failure".............. Its line ball even below MTOW in most light twins!!
Imagine if this scenario was different and he had overloaded the aircraft had a failure on take-off at V1 and went through the fence on the runway trying to continue?
How much fuel is going to be worthwhile carrying? 100kg over is going to buy no useful time in this situation the result would have been the same.
A bit of thread drift here, but as regards ferrying: The so-called 'wet footprint' in a single is the entire time it is beyond gliding distance to land. The wet footprint of a piston twin will be AS A MINIMUM the entire time it is overweight. Which, from the west coast of the USA to Hawaii would be about half or more of the entire leg. With twice as many engines to fail but being only exposed to the possibility of a ditching for half the distance (until the excess weight is burned off), my attitude towards it was that the odds of going for a swim were about the same ferrying an overwight twin as a single.
Even the turboprops when overweight will have a wet footprint, but not nearly as long for the engine failure case. The depressurization case is usually more of a worry.
Even the turboprops when overweight will have a wet footprint, but not nearly as long for the engine failure case. The depressurization case is usually more of a worry.
I spent a bit of time in the ferry game and worked sometimes with a guy who has been in the water 4 times. Twice in singles and twice in twins. The twins were both engine failures. One was a Chieftain and the other a BN2. He told me that he was able to fly the Chieftain in ground effect but the remaining engine was running so hot that he was afraid it would seize. So he elected to put it down while he still had enough control to select the wave of choice. I don't know why the Islander wouldn't fly, but guess it was also a weight issue and I don't suppose ground effect would do much for one of those anyway. From memory, the singles ran out of fuel. Back in the days before GPS when they had no real idea of the winds, running out of juice was just another part of the risk.
Back on thread - our man did have GPS, so he knew perfectly well where he was and presumably how much fuel he had left for a diversion. What he seemed to fail to compute, was the need for a diversion.
Back on thread - our man did have GPS, so he knew perfectly well where he was and presumably how much fuel he had left for a diversion. What he seemed to fail to compute, was the need for a diversion.
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PA39, you haven't an argument at all for overloading in this type of operation. Ferry and Air Work.....very different kettles of fish. If one needs to do this as standard operation, the aircraft is not suited to the task.
Whilst structurally one shouldn't compromise the wing integrity by loading extra fuel, many other factors come into play.
Neville, additional fuel (wing supported) should actually decrease spar loads, ever asked the question as to why tip tanks?
That said, rules and limitations are just that. Dispensations (as you state PA39), are just that, TEMPORARY!!
Whilst structurally one shouldn't compromise the wing integrity by loading extra fuel, many other factors come into play.
Neville, additional fuel (wing supported) should actually decrease spar loads, ever asked the question as to why tip tanks?
That said, rules and limitations are just that. Dispensations (as you state PA39), are just that, TEMPORARY!!
An interesting debate going on here but remember there would be a LOT of A/C taking off over weight due all sorts of reasons. But that aside & perhaps going off trk here a little but without going into all the facts this mission with a dist of around 1450 nms (off the top of my head) & with an airframe capable of say around 8000 lbs of gas on dept ( I think the WW1124A can carry that with the mission requirements,med team & pax etc) I am at a loss as to why this plane ended up in the drink with no fuel IF it had have taken off with the above amount of gas & diverted when it became fairly obvious that Norfolk was questionable.
8000 lbs would give the WW around 6 hrs to dry tanks just off the top of my head in LRC with say a 100 kts H/W there should have been around 2 hrs of gas remaining upon arrival. Am not too sure how much this airframe left Apia with though so my figures here is only based of full tanks. It begs the question & hindsight is a wonderful thing of course just how much commercial pressure was on this guy/crew to 'get in'? That I believe is the burning question at the end of the day along with what level of experience is enough to conduct these risky missions.
Wmk2
8000 lbs would give the WW around 6 hrs to dry tanks just off the top of my head in LRC with say a 100 kts H/W there should have been around 2 hrs of gas remaining upon arrival. Am not too sure how much this airframe left Apia with though so my figures here is only based of full tanks. It begs the question & hindsight is a wonderful thing of course just how much commercial pressure was on this guy/crew to 'get in'? That I believe is the burning question at the end of the day along with what level of experience is enough to conduct these risky missions.
Wmk2
Fuel planning is risk management. It revolves around probability and likelihood of certain events occurring e.g. fog etc.
This is not a comment on the investigation but on those that think that you can always guarantee that you will have enough fuel...
This is not a comment on the investigation but on those that think that you can always guarantee that you will have enough fuel...
there would be a LOT of A/C taking off over weight due all sorts of reasons.
The ferry exemptions as described above being (obviously) out of the question... for a CHTR or AWK op... is there ANY legit excuse for dep over MTOW??? ANY excuse?
"HL"I think you may have miss-interpreted my wording there. Ya gotta think laterally.
A LOT of A/c would take off over the MTOW purely 'cause pilots use std weights for Pax & many would not weigh the bags etc down to the last lb or know exactly to the ltr how much gas is on board so to put it simply even though pilots do generally not intentionally T/off overweight they would do so the world over daily inc Airliners (the S.G of fuel varies so much as an Eg for large fuel uplifts) knowing full well they "think" they are within limits & the paper work says so. Simple fact of life,stop to accurately measure EVERY A/C prior to T/off & few would ever leave the ground on time
"illusion" I too believe he may very well fly again (if he wants to) but it's not so much who will hire him(sure the event will limit his possibilities) it's more what got this guy in this position in the first place where he felt there was no way out enroute (other than to ditch) to anyone thinking of hiring him. That's what would worry prospective employers I would imagine.
Wmk2
A LOT of A/c would take off over the MTOW purely 'cause pilots use std weights for Pax & many would not weigh the bags etc down to the last lb or know exactly to the ltr how much gas is on board so to put it simply even though pilots do generally not intentionally T/off overweight they would do so the world over daily inc Airliners (the S.G of fuel varies so much as an Eg for large fuel uplifts) knowing full well they "think" they are within limits & the paper work says so. Simple fact of life,stop to accurately measure EVERY A/C prior to T/off & few would ever leave the ground on time
"illusion" I too believe he may very well fly again (if he wants to) but it's not so much who will hire him(sure the event will limit his possibilities) it's more what got this guy in this position in the first place where he felt there was no way out enroute (other than to ditch) to anyone thinking of hiring him. That's what would worry prospective employers I would imagine.
Wmk2
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Off topic: If such a thing does not already exist, can't some of the more advanced airliners determine their own weight based on pressure on the landing gear or something to that effect?
'Sarg' not that I am aware of but an happy to be corrected.The A320 for Eg by one Airline on Oz does a manual W&B for every flight all on paper with figures gathered from sources outside the control of the PIC.
Wmk2
Wmk2
