WA Air Operator sues CASA and Officials
The FACT that disputes catalogued in threads like this even exist is proof that CASA is a failed bureaucracy!!!
WIKIPEDIA
Bureaucracy is the combined organizational structure, procedures, protocols, and set of regulations in place to manage activity, usually in large organizations. As opposed to adhocracy, it is often represented by standardized procedure (rule-following) that guides the execution of most or all processes within the body; formal division of powers; hierarchy; and relationships, intended to anticipate needs and improve efficiency.
'Bureaucracy' is rule conducted from a desk or office, i.e. by the preparation and dispatch of written documents - or, these days, their electronic equivalent.
1 a : a body of nonelective government officials b : an administrative policy-making group
2 : government characterized by specialization of functions, adherence to fixed rules, and a hierarchy of authority
3 : a system of administration marked by officialism, red tape, and proliferation.
2 : government characterized by specialization of functions, adherence to fixed rules, and a hierarchy of authority
3 : a system of administration marked by officialism, red tape, and proliferation.
Wiki provides information that adhocracy is "any form of organization that cuts across normal bureaucratic lines to capture opportunities, solve problems, and get results". Maybe that's the direction in which CASA needs to head?
Clinton...
Indeed, and it should be a very interesting judgment. I wonder what the mob will do if the court finds the claims against the named officers to be without merit.
..and like Sunfish, I also say this in a caring and sharing manner in the hope that all of us will benefit.
Clinton, you are once again completely missing the point, and your own words convict you yet again.
As a bureaucrat, you don't get to abide by "general rules" at all, ever, unless your own internal procedures spell out, in writing, available to all, exactly under what circumstances an official is allowed to use their own discretion and apply "general rules", and that, in my experience in working in a bureaucracy is almost never.
The fact that in 2010 people are even arguing about the behaviour of officials in performing an engine out procedure is complete and damning proof that CASA has failed, not necessarily as a regulator, but as a bureaucracy.
Were CASA actually focused on being a good bureaucracy (in the best sense of the word) the "pull mixture" and other finer points of some of these discussions would have been settled Thirty years ago and committed to print for the guidance and compliance not only of students and organisations but also FOI's etc.
To put it another way Clinton, the fact that we are even having these discussions invalidates your argument that a lynch mob exists.
To put it yet another way. Nobody but a criminal does not want to comply with regulations, but there appears that there is ample evidence that "compliance" is in the eye of the CASA official. This is simply wrong.
CASA should direct how an engine is to be "failed" for testing purposes, then all this BS automatically goes away. This of course leaves CASA with the responsibility for accidents if such detailed procedure produces unwelcome ATSB statistics.
as a general rule,
The fact that in 2010 people are even arguing about the behaviour of officials in performing an engine out procedure is complete and damning proof that CASA has failed, not necessarily as a regulator, but as a bureaucracy.
Were CASA actually focused on being a good bureaucracy (in the best sense of the word) the "pull mixture" and other finer points of some of these discussions would have been settled Thirty years ago and committed to print for the guidance and compliance not only of students and organisations but also FOI's etc.
To put it another way Clinton, the fact that we are even having these discussions invalidates your argument that a lynch mob exists.
To put it yet another way. Nobody but a criminal does not want to comply with regulations, but there appears that there is ample evidence that "compliance" is in the eye of the CASA official. This is simply wrong.
CASA should direct how an engine is to be "failed" for testing purposes, then all this BS automatically goes away. This of course leaves CASA with the responsibility for accidents if such detailed procedure produces unwelcome ATSB statistics.
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Clinton;
I didn't attribute that quote to you, simply used it as an example to highlight my point, (which you missed), about probability vs possibility of shock cooling.
Having owned five aircraft, (still own one), I am vindicated in my decision to never allow others to hire any of them. Anyone doing a BFR with me would regret the day he mishandled my engine in a demonstration of engine failure.
Of course if you only ever hire someone else's aircraft you wouldn't bother would you???
However the thrust of the sunfish arguement holds more merit in the discussion.
I didn't attribute that quote to you, simply used it as an example to highlight my point, (which you missed), about probability vs possibility of shock cooling.
Having owned five aircraft, (still own one), I am vindicated in my decision to never allow others to hire any of them. Anyone doing a BFR with me would regret the day he mishandled my engine in a demonstration of engine failure.
Of course if you only ever hire someone else's aircraft you wouldn't bother would you???
However the thrust of the sunfish arguement holds more merit in the discussion.
Suiya, with respect Bureaucracy is not a dirty word. It is a system of work designed to ensure that Government officials cannot be corrupt and enrich themselves and their friends, or persecute their enemies, by a partial or biased application of the laws of the land.
Yes, it is slow and cumbersome, but it beats the alternative.
The system was first developed and applied in Germany to stamp out just such corruption. It embodies, among other things:
1. Rigid definitions of authorities and responsibilities.
2. Written procedures for the making of decisions.
3. A written system of checks and balances.
4. Transparent decision making on the basis of objective published criteria.
5. Open systems of competitive appointment and promotion strictly on written published criteria.
I can't be bothered with the rest, I'd have to drag out my notes from organisational behaviour at Melb Business School, and I need breakfast.
Yes, it is slow and cumbersome, but it beats the alternative.
The system was first developed and applied in Germany to stamp out just such corruption. It embodies, among other things:
1. Rigid definitions of authorities and responsibilities.
2. Written procedures for the making of decisions.
3. A written system of checks and balances.
4. Transparent decision making on the basis of objective published criteria.
5. Open systems of competitive appointment and promotion strictly on written published criteria.
I can't be bothered with the rest, I'd have to drag out my notes from organisational behaviour at Melb Business School, and I need breakfast.
I know that in Air Traffic Services there is a whole Department responsible for 'Standardisation'... so that individuals don't need to, and can't, interpret or mis-interpret the rules. Most of the time it is successful, as lives depend on it.
Does such a system exist within CASA?
If so, it appears, from what we read, to have failed.
If not, why not?
Does such a system exist within CASA?
If so, it appears, from what we read, to have failed.
If not, why not?
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I have in front of me a CASA approved flight manual for a widely used twin and I quote,
"Experience has shown that the training advantage gained by pulling a mixture control or turning off the fuel to simulate engine failure at low altitude is not worth the risk assumed. Therefore, it is recommended that instead of using either of these procedures to simulate loss of power at low altitude, the throttle be retarded slowly to idle position. Fast reduction of power may be harmful to the engine."
A certain CAR,
Pilot to comply with requirements, etc of aircraft’s flight manual, etc
(1) If a flight manual has been issued for an Australian aircraft, the pilot in command of the aircraft must comply with a requirement, instruction, procedure or limitation concerning the operation of the aircraft that is set out in the manual.
Penalty: 50 penalty units.
Does CASA regard a flight manual recommendation not to be a CAR requirement, instruction, procedure or limitation?
"Experience has shown that the training advantage gained by pulling a mixture control or turning off the fuel to simulate engine failure at low altitude is not worth the risk assumed. Therefore, it is recommended that instead of using either of these procedures to simulate loss of power at low altitude, the throttle be retarded slowly to idle position. Fast reduction of power may be harmful to the engine."
A certain CAR,
Pilot to comply with requirements, etc of aircraft’s flight manual, etc
(1) If a flight manual has been issued for an Australian aircraft, the pilot in command of the aircraft must comply with a requirement, instruction, procedure or limitation concerning the operation of the aircraft that is set out in the manual.
Penalty: 50 penalty units.
Does CASA regard a flight manual recommendation not to be a CAR requirement, instruction, procedure or limitation?
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Well Clinton,
By your very own logic on previous topics, not being able to prove something in court, does not mean it didn't actually happen either.
If CASA has made the choice of not mandating items in writing, such as approved methods of failing an engine for training purposes, why allow representatives of their organisation to present their own opinions to the industry as "law".
CASA opens themselves to a considerable amount of liability by doing so.
By your very own logic on previous topics, not being able to prove something in court, does not mean it didn't actually happen either.
If CASA has made the choice of not mandating items in writing, such as approved methods of failing an engine for training purposes, why allow representatives of their organisation to present their own opinions to the industry as "law".
CASA opens themselves to a considerable amount of liability by doing so.
Stink – if you think they are liable, make a claim against them. That’s what I do when I think someone is liable to me. That’s how the world works
Clinton,
Don't you think that if one manufacturer deams it unsafe to undertake a certain procedure in his equipment, that it would be prudent for other operators to err on the side of safety by not doing a similar procedure in his (possibly) different, but similar make of aircraft?
Or should the operator be forced to undertake that procedure ... because it's not specifically forbidden in the manual?
With that background, I agree that if the current flight manual – as defined in the current regulations - continues to include the recommendation you quoted, I would comply with that recommendation in the operation of that – repeat that - aircraft.
Or should the operator be forced to undertake that procedure ... because it's not specifically forbidden in the manual?
Clinton puts his foot in it again:
All that is required Clinton is an instruction from CASA, published to the industry, as to what CASA credentialed officials are to require in the matter of simulated engine failures. Argument over the matter demonstrates complete failure as a Bureaucracy (in the best organizational sense of the word).
All you are doing is digging a deeper hole. CASA must have an official position on this and other matters that deny FOI's etc. the ability to "interpret" the rules.
Leaving them "discretion" over pull mixture etc. must in equity, leave operators with the right to challenge that discretion without fear or favour.
To put it another way, what is acceptable to one FOI must by law be acceptable to every other FOI. Furthermore, every pilot and operator must know exactly what is acceptable and what is not. "Discretion" is not tolerable in a Bureaucracy unless the limits of that discretion are publicly acknowledged and available and agreed by all.
Jim: I don’t see the connection between Lindy Chamberlain’s wrongful conviction and the comparative, objective safety of lean pulls versus throttle pulls. If your point is that judges aren’t smart enough to understand the complexity of aviation-related issues, and that a meritorious argument will be lost on them, we’ll have to agree to disagree.
Brian – that extract was the subject of a discussion on a different thread that was unfortunately, but I’m guessing necessarily, ‘pulled’ by the moderators.
Before addressing the substantive example you’ve raised, I’d suggest you do a search of the term ‘CASA Approved Flight Manual’ in the current regs, and then work out what will currently satisfy the current regulations in respect of flight manuals for an Australian aircraft. I’d also note that over the years a number of changes have been made to flight manuals, as a consequence of regulatory authorities realising that some of the content simply perpetuated myths. LOP is a case in point.
With that background, I agree that if the current flight manual – as defined in the current regulations - continues to include the recommendation you quoted, I would comply with that recommendation in the operation of that – repeat that - aircraft.
What I wouldn’t do, and don’t do, is extrapolate the underlying assumption to the operation of every piston GA aircraft. That’s because I know that not all fuel/mixture/induction systems fitted to all piston GA aircraft are the same. I’m guessing that’s why there are different practices out there.
I will again suggest - as I suggested on the other thread - to those with open minds, that they find out what the actual fuel/mixture/induction system fitted to the actual aircraft they operate actually does. That way they may be able to do an objective assessment of the comparative risks of lean pull versus throttle pull on that aircraft. A first step would be a review of the publicly available material on websites like Avweb and Beechtalk.
Stink – if you think they are liable, make a claim against them. That’s what I do when I think someone is liable to me. That’s how the world works – it’s not something I made up. We will eventually see what the Federal Court thinks about the claims the subject of this thread, and some of will accept it and move on.
Brian – that extract was the subject of a discussion on a different thread that was unfortunately, but I’m guessing necessarily, ‘pulled’ by the moderators.
Before addressing the substantive example you’ve raised, I’d suggest you do a search of the term ‘CASA Approved Flight Manual’ in the current regs, and then work out what will currently satisfy the current regulations in respect of flight manuals for an Australian aircraft. I’d also note that over the years a number of changes have been made to flight manuals, as a consequence of regulatory authorities realising that some of the content simply perpetuated myths. LOP is a case in point.
With that background, I agree that if the current flight manual – as defined in the current regulations - continues to include the recommendation you quoted, I would comply with that recommendation in the operation of that – repeat that - aircraft.
What I wouldn’t do, and don’t do, is extrapolate the underlying assumption to the operation of every piston GA aircraft. That’s because I know that not all fuel/mixture/induction systems fitted to all piston GA aircraft are the same. I’m guessing that’s why there are different practices out there.
I will again suggest - as I suggested on the other thread - to those with open minds, that they find out what the actual fuel/mixture/induction system fitted to the actual aircraft they operate actually does. That way they may be able to do an objective assessment of the comparative risks of lean pull versus throttle pull on that aircraft. A first step would be a review of the publicly available material on websites like Avweb and Beechtalk.
Stink – if you think they are liable, make a claim against them. That’s what I do when I think someone is liable to me. That’s how the world works – it’s not something I made up. We will eventually see what the Federal Court thinks about the claims the subject of this thread, and some of will accept it and move on.
All that is required Clinton is an instruction from CASA, published to the industry, as to what CASA credentialed officials are to require in the matter of simulated engine failures. Argument over the matter demonstrates complete failure as a Bureaucracy (in the best organizational sense of the word).
All you are doing is digging a deeper hole. CASA must have an official position on this and other matters that deny FOI's etc. the ability to "interpret" the rules.
Leaving them "discretion" over pull mixture etc. must in equity, leave operators with the right to challenge that discretion without fear or favour.
To put it another way, what is acceptable to one FOI must by law be acceptable to every other FOI. Furthermore, every pilot and operator must know exactly what is acceptable and what is not. "Discretion" is not tolerable in a Bureaucracy unless the limits of that discretion are publicly acknowledged and available and agreed by all.
Clinton,
You lost me .....
Perhaps I should be more clear also. If the manual for a C310 says don't cut the mixture .... then I'm going to be a bit worried about cutting the mixture in my Baron ... even if the manual doesn't say so .... and even if they have different engine/induction systems. I'm going to err on the side of safety. Why go looking for trouble ?
But what does ‘(possibly) different, but similar make of aircraft’ mean, FFS? If your employer said to you: ‘Your pay next week will possibly be different but similar to what we owe you’, are you really not going to worry about that? Really? If you purchased a part for your engine, and the LAME said: ‘It’s possibly different but a similar part, but she’ll be right’, would you be happy with that? Really? If the PIC in an aircraft in which you were a passenger said: ‘We’re going to climb at a possibly different but similar speed to the best angle of climb speed, to miss that mountain’, would you be happy with that? Really?
If I’m digging myself a hole by pointing out that not all fuel/mixture/induction systems are the same, and therefore the objective and comparative safety of the method for simulating an engine failure is not the same for all engines, then pass me my Spear & Jackson #5.
Clinton,
To take it further ...
As SUNFISH alludes to, If CASA believes I'm being unreasonable by erring on the side of safety, then shouldn't they 'decree' something along the lines of ... "unless prohibited in the Flight Manual, you shall conduct engine failure training by pulling the mixture" ?
Then we all know where we stand. That's the issue.
P.S. In the above scenario, is the ME Endorsement of someone trained in a 'pull the mixture' aircraft better than that of somone who did a 'pull the throttle' endorsement?
Can you see how silly this is getting?
To take it further ...
As SUNFISH alludes to, If CASA believes I'm being unreasonable by erring on the side of safety, then shouldn't they 'decree' something along the lines of ... "unless prohibited in the Flight Manual, you shall conduct engine failure training by pulling the mixture" ?
Then we all know where we stand. That's the issue.
P.S. In the above scenario, is the ME Endorsement of someone trained in a 'pull the mixture' aircraft better than that of somone who did a 'pull the throttle' endorsement?
Can you see how silly this is getting?
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Clinton mon vieux, having sat through a trial or two with competent judges presiding, properly instructed juries and competently briefed barristers, I am sure you would agree, they rarely get it wrong and if they do there is always the appeal process.
A recent one in which the judge found for the plaintiffs against the pilot and operator was sufficiently technically complex to be beyond the ken of even some of the so called "aviation expert" witness. Point being the judge cut right through the smoke and mirrors defence and despite some rank incompetence by the investigators, got it, plain and simply and exactly, in its essence.
A recent one in which the judge found for the plaintiffs against the pilot and operator was sufficiently technically complex to be beyond the ken of even some of the so called "aviation expert" witness. Point being the judge cut right through the smoke and mirrors defence and despite some rank incompetence by the investigators, got it, plain and simply and exactly, in its essence.
Henry The Octopus,
One major part of the problem is that there is no standardization - Whether amongst FOIs or sundry instructors/ATO at large. As Clinton says: "Where do you think FOI's come from", or words to that effect.
In short, there are a wide variety of "techniques" being used in Asymmetric Training, and as the fatality record quite clearly shows ----- a significant proportion are deadly.
Yes! I do know what has been "required" (informally of course, nothing goes on paper) by certain FOIs in recent (and not so recent) times. Read the Polar Air story for a "not so recent".
A later post on this thread is calling for standardization on a training program that minimizes the risk of loss of control ---- the primary risk, and also recognizes the potential for engine damage to powerplants working at high stress levels and high temperatures ---- that binds all FOIs ----- I have been waiting for that for years ----- we could do worse than copy FAA requirements on the subject.
And, I might say, recognizes as valid the recommendations of the manufacturer's POH, by whatever name. It is a of bane of my existence that persons of limited understanding continually demand Operations Manual insertions that are contrary to the aircraft certification and POH requirements, by whatever name.
In one case recently, requiring a demonstration of a maneuver that is strictly prohibited by the manufacturer.
I do not accept the "position" that a manufacturer's "recommendations" made on clear safety grounds are "only recommendations", and do not need be observed in training. Before you jump on me, I am not talking about "Cautions" to be observed, but safety recommendations by whatever name.
Observation of such recommendations is a good way to stay alive.
Tootle pip!!
One major part of the problem is that there is no standardization - Whether amongst FOIs or sundry instructors/ATO at large. As Clinton says: "Where do you think FOI's come from", or words to that effect.
In short, there are a wide variety of "techniques" being used in Asymmetric Training, and as the fatality record quite clearly shows ----- a significant proportion are deadly.
Yes! I do know what has been "required" (informally of course, nothing goes on paper) by certain FOIs in recent (and not so recent) times. Read the Polar Air story for a "not so recent".
A later post on this thread is calling for standardization on a training program that minimizes the risk of loss of control ---- the primary risk, and also recognizes the potential for engine damage to powerplants working at high stress levels and high temperatures ---- that binds all FOIs ----- I have been waiting for that for years ----- we could do worse than copy FAA requirements on the subject.
And, I might say, recognizes as valid the recommendations of the manufacturer's POH, by whatever name. It is a of bane of my existence that persons of limited understanding continually demand Operations Manual insertions that are contrary to the aircraft certification and POH requirements, by whatever name.
In one case recently, requiring a demonstration of a maneuver that is strictly prohibited by the manufacturer.
I do not accept the "position" that a manufacturer's "recommendations" made on clear safety grounds are "only recommendations", and do not need be observed in training. Before you jump on me, I am not talking about "Cautions" to be observed, but safety recommendations by whatever name.
Observation of such recommendations is a good way to stay alive.
Tootle pip!!
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One brilliant blue sky day I was forced by the sound of a familiar hum to dash outside, in time to admire the lines of a 707 sailing overhead the house. The following day I endured the sorry sight of the same aircraft lying on the seabed, having crashed while practicing asymmetrics only 5 minutes after flying over the house.
Australia is replete with stories of asymmetric, for real and in practice, ending up other than the participants would wish. Off the top of my head.
King Air Sydney - all died
DC-3 Sydney ditched with no injuries
404 Jandakot - survivors and fatalities
402 Essendon - no survivors
RAAF C-130 spin safe recovery
RAAF P-3 ditto
Brasilia Darwin fatal
B55 Port Lincoln - one fatal, others injured
B76 Camden - one fatal, one injured
Clinton, I think that you are missing the point that the issue has absolutely nothing to do with a particular aircrafts fuel/mixture/induction system design. It has everything to do with conducting the training in as safe as possible manner.
From page 13 of FAA “FLYING LIGHT TWINS SAFELY”, produced under their Aviation Safety Program.
From “Engine out Booby Traps for Light Twin Pilots”
Australia is replete with stories of asymmetric, for real and in practice, ending up other than the participants would wish. Off the top of my head.
King Air Sydney - all died
DC-3 Sydney ditched with no injuries
404 Jandakot - survivors and fatalities
402 Essendon - no survivors
RAAF C-130 spin safe recovery
RAAF P-3 ditto
Brasilia Darwin fatal
B55 Port Lincoln - one fatal, others injured
B76 Camden - one fatal, one injured
Clinton, I think that you are missing the point that the issue has absolutely nothing to do with a particular aircrafts fuel/mixture/induction system design. It has everything to do with conducting the training in as safe as possible manner.
From page 13 of FAA “FLYING LIGHT TWINS SAFELY”, produced under their Aviation Safety Program.
TRAINING RECOMMENDATIONS
Regular training and practice with a qualified instructor is essential for proficiency in any airplane.
• Thoroughly brief simulated engine failures in advance. The pilot under instruction should know how such failures will be introduced, and what action is expected in response. Unannounced engine failures are suitable only in testing and checking scenarios, and when both pilots have agreed to such before the flight.
• Low altitude engine failure practice is never worth the risks involved. Multiengine instructors should approach simulated engine failures below 400 feet AGL with extreme caution; failures below 200 feet AGL should be reserved for simulators and training devices.
• All simulated engine failures below 3,000 feet AGL should be accomplished by smoothly retarding the throttle.
• Recognize that aircraft systems knowledge is critically important. Practice systems failures too, including partial panel instrument training.
• Occasionally practice OEI flight with a yaw string to observe bank angle and ball position for zero sideslip, particularly at Vyse.
• Do not alter the airplane configuration on the runway after landing unless there is a clear operational need. A striking number of inadvertent landing gear retractions have occurred when the pilot intended to retract the flaps.
Regular training and practice with a qualified instructor is essential for proficiency in any airplane.
• Thoroughly brief simulated engine failures in advance. The pilot under instruction should know how such failures will be introduced, and what action is expected in response. Unannounced engine failures are suitable only in testing and checking scenarios, and when both pilots have agreed to such before the flight.
• Low altitude engine failure practice is never worth the risks involved. Multiengine instructors should approach simulated engine failures below 400 feet AGL with extreme caution; failures below 200 feet AGL should be reserved for simulators and training devices.
• All simulated engine failures below 3,000 feet AGL should be accomplished by smoothly retarding the throttle.
• Recognize that aircraft systems knowledge is critically important. Practice systems failures too, including partial panel instrument training.
• Occasionally practice OEI flight with a yaw string to observe bank angle and ball position for zero sideslip, particularly at Vyse.
• Do not alter the airplane configuration on the runway after landing unless there is a clear operational need. A striking number of inadvertent landing gear retractions have occurred when the pilot intended to retract the flaps.
An analysis of light twin accidents following engine failure in the initial climb after take off showed that 57% of these accidents and 75% of fatal/serious injuries resulted from situations in which control was lost. Low airspeed results from vain attempts to climb or hold altitude under conditions which render this impossible. Loss of control typically results from low airspeed combined with too much or too little bank angle, i.e., either more or less than that corresponding to zero sideslip.
Analysis was conducted of light twin engine out stall/spin accidents in the initial climb out after take off. During a 28 month period there were at least 7.7 accidents and 24 fatalities per year with a 95% fatality rate for occupants.
Fatal stall/spin accidents over a six year period comprised 10% of all multi engine fatal accidents. Half of these accidents occurred during training situations.
Compared to a 95% fatality rate in stall/spin accidents, controlled force landings of light twins are virtually 100% survivable. During the 28 month period cited earlier showed 41 controlled force landings, including several into trees, with a total of 106 individuals involved. There were no fatalities and only 9% received serious injuries. The remaining 91% experienced minor or no injuries.
Analysis was conducted of light twin engine out stall/spin accidents in the initial climb out after take off. During a 28 month period there were at least 7.7 accidents and 24 fatalities per year with a 95% fatality rate for occupants.
Fatal stall/spin accidents over a six year period comprised 10% of all multi engine fatal accidents. Half of these accidents occurred during training situations.
Compared to a 95% fatality rate in stall/spin accidents, controlled force landings of light twins are virtually 100% survivable. During the 28 month period cited earlier showed 41 controlled force landings, including several into trees, with a total of 106 individuals involved. There were no fatalities and only 9% received serious injuries. The remaining 91% experienced minor or no injuries.
Clint, with respect, you still don't get it.
It is not up to CASA to speculate, or pontificate. The rules and compliance requirements and objective standards should operate from North to South and East to West. There must be no discretion. If I comply in Tasmania, I comply in the Pilbara.
We can then have discussions about mixture pull, etc. on a nationwide basis (type by type if necessary) and an end to uncertainty.
This is what is killing GA. "Maybe you comply, and maybe you don't".
It will kill RA too in due course. It has already deterred me from $60,000 worth of investment until (if ever) I can obtain certainty about construction and operational requirements.
It is not up to CASA to speculate, or pontificate. The rules and compliance requirements and objective standards should operate from North to South and East to West. There must be no discretion. If I comply in Tasmania, I comply in the Pilbara.
We can then have discussions about mixture pull, etc. on a nationwide basis (type by type if necessary) and an end to uncertainty.
This is what is killing GA. "Maybe you comply, and maybe you don't".
It will kill RA too in due course. It has already deterred me from $60,000 worth of investment until (if ever) I can obtain certainty about construction and operational requirements.
Clinton,
Could you please tell us what ...
"the differences between the risks arising from pulling the throttle on a carburetted engine, compared with a fuel injected engine,"
are, and if ....
"All of the simulated engine failures of which (you are) aware that turned into real engine failures occurred when the throttle was advanced after the failure was simulated by pulling the throttle."
were carbureted engines, or fuel injected engines?
Could you please tell us what ...
"the differences between the risks arising from pulling the throttle on a carburetted engine, compared with a fuel injected engine,"
are, and if ....
"All of the simulated engine failures of which (you are) aware that turned into real engine failures occurred when the throttle was advanced after the failure was simulated by pulling the throttle."
were carbureted engines, or fuel injected engines?
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this is a discussion about terminology..what you need to understand IMHO is that once the mixture is pulled and the engine stopped you are now dealing with a REAL EMERGENCY and not a simulation!
This is undesirable especially with training as you may not know the capabilities of the student and once a real emergency is happening there is no longer any room for error!!
This is undesirable especially with training as you may not know the capabilities of the student and once a real emergency is happening there is no longer any room for error!!
Further to MattyJ,
Do any of that in a GTSO and you've just killed that engine.
Do any of that in a GTSO and you've just killed that engine.
I don't see how it would kill it. Provided you chopped the throttle quickly without a slow retard to prevent gear 'chatter' then it would be the same as any other engine. obviously repeated assaults wouldn't be kind to the engine and I don't know to many operators that are happy for training to be conducted in their C404s.
