Army out of fixed wing...
I sincerely hope that isn't the case. There will always be a need for Army FW. It is as much a necessity for land force ops as RW, and irreplacable from a C & C p.o.v. Although the RAAF have never gotten over losing the battlefield helicopters, it would be a loss for the ADF as a whole to lose a FW capability and the corporate knowledge.
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There will always be a need for Army FW.
it would be a loss for the ADF as a whole to lose a FW capability and the corporate knowledge.
Gundog, do you appreciate that once a capability is lost it is virtually impossible to restore. The corporate knowledge I refer to extends far beyond the pilots, there is the RAEME FW capability, the GSE capabilty, the aircraft handlers knowledge of working with the asset etc. One of the reasons for transfer of the RW was the nature of the tasking orders and the potential for the Air Component Commander to be out of touch with the needs of the field commander. Having the ability to put the asset in In Spt, or DS (without pol) is a real advantage. Realistically AAAvn have been responsible for not fighting to keep a really quantifiable FW capability, which they lost with the demise of the Porter/Nomad combo. Unfortunately the higher echelons haven't got the FW background to appreciate the advantage of combined assets, they are too RW focussed. RAAF should retain a tactical transport capability, the Bou replacement is long overdue, but a Beechcraft is not and never will be a suitable replacement. That end of the spectrum should belong to AAAvn who can task more appropriately in a battlefield environment, ideally in aircraft like the Do228, ideal for RFSU support and 'Regional' operations.
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Bou replacement is long overdue, but a Beechcraft is not and never will be a suitable replacement.
As much as anything it is about training a whole bunch of analogue Bou drivers about flying a digital aircraft in preparation for the real new tac transport a/c.
Fair point on the corporate knowledge extending beyond the pilots. As per usual only thinking about my own kind.
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Agree with most of the comments on both sides, indeed King Air is a great short term asset but nothing else. C27J is the only real option for RAAF.
For Army ops, may i suggest upgrading the current 6 Chook D's into (the original RAAF number) 12 CH-47F's and adding few Do228NG's for FW?
Some times it takes a while for a spare engine or whatever to get out to the guys operating in remote areas, just one of the many uses for FW.
Seems many other Armys around the world (even the ever cash strapped Poms) apreaciate what benefits FW brings to the mix, very shortsighted decision if true and i feel we will only have to reinvent the wheel (waste of time,money and resourses) when something occurs and suddenly its decided FW is the go.
Whatever happended to corporate knowledge at the top? don't any of these guys stop and think about the very basic way AAAvn has worked (sucessfly intregrating RW and FW) the last 30 odd years?
For Army ops, may i suggest upgrading the current 6 Chook D's into (the original RAAF number) 12 CH-47F's and adding few Do228NG's for FW?
Some times it takes a while for a spare engine or whatever to get out to the guys operating in remote areas, just one of the many uses for FW.
Seems many other Armys around the world (even the ever cash strapped Poms) apreaciate what benefits FW brings to the mix, very shortsighted decision if true and i feel we will only have to reinvent the wheel (waste of time,money and resourses) when something occurs and suddenly its decided FW is the go.
Whatever happended to corporate knowledge at the top? don't any of these guys stop and think about the very basic way AAAvn has worked (sucessfly intregrating RW and FW) the last 30 odd years?
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Currently the major customer of the Caribou is the army and i wouldn't expect that to change when Kingairs transfer to the RAAF. Remember RAAF is taking over and hopefully enhancing the kingair capability not hijacking it.
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Plus, the Army has so much **** on its plate with bringing ARH and MRH into service that it's essential for them to free up staff. Seems like a solid plan to me.
Last edited by Point0Five; 28th Nov 2008 at 10:31.
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look what happened to the RAN fixed wing, they disbanded TA-4G/ A-4G, MB-326,S-2G and HS-748's so pinching your kingairs will be easy, and you will probably never get fixed wing back!!! It appears that fixed wing flying for the ADF is the RAAF's role regarless of the duties they are to perform.
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Army should not have choppers, and their maintenance and accident record would appear to prove this fact.
They've never known how to effectively use Aviation assets in a safe fashion and they never will.
They've never known how to effectively use Aviation assets in a safe fashion and they never will.
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Originally Posted by Point0Five
Plus, the Army has so much **** on its plate with bringing ARH and MRH into service that it's essential for them to free up staff. Seems like a solid plan to me.
They are off with a sub-standard "using local programmers" piece of crap! Such a shame! They were "Patch"ed.
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Army should not have choppers, and their maintenance and accident record would appear to prove this fact.
They've never known how to effectively use Aviation assets in a safe fashion and they never will.
They've never known how to effectively use Aviation assets in a safe fashion and they never will.
On the 'accident' issue, do you have access stats on injuries/fatalities per hour flown? I think we could admit a small group of aviators have had the majority of mishaps in recent times, that is a side issue and does not reflect on the Army's safety culture as a whole. When was the last time we stacked a Kiowa? Considering we zoom around at 10ft AHO day and night its about as safe as we can make it. Considering we have a miniscule (per airframe) budget compared to our RAAF cousins, our capability output is as good if not better. When was the last time the RAAF deployed to a free for all battlefield? (and please, stooging around the MEAO 100NM away from the nearest contact does not count)
Too much on their plate if you've had anything to do with their project (ARH/MRH). Can't even sort out the ground based Flight Planning System. 
They are off with a sub-standard "using local programmers" piece of crap! Such a shame! They were "Patch"ed.
They are off with a sub-standard "using local programmers" piece of crap! Such a shame! They were "Patch"ed.
The sooner the Army is out of aviation the better off (not to mention safer) the ADF will be!
Just my two cents...
The maintainers I have worked with are top notch and turn out a good product. 1000 times better than GA operators I have worked with. If anything they are too fusy with maintenance.
On the 'accident' issue, do you have access stats on injuries/fatalities per hour flown? I think we could admit a small group of aviators have had the majority of mishaps in recent times, that is a side issue and does not reflect on the Army's safety culture as a whole. When was the last time we stacked a Kiowa? Considering we zoom around at 10ft AHO day and night its about as safe as we can make it. Considering we have a miniscule (per airframe) budget compared to our RAAF cousins, our capability output is as good if not better. When was the last time the RAAF deployed to a free for all battlefield? (and please, stooging around the MEAO 100NM away from the nearest contact does not count)
On the 'accident' issue, do you have access stats on injuries/fatalities per hour flown? I think we could admit a small group of aviators have had the majority of mishaps in recent times, that is a side issue and does not reflect on the Army's safety culture as a whole. When was the last time we stacked a Kiowa? Considering we zoom around at 10ft AHO day and night its about as safe as we can make it. Considering we have a miniscule (per airframe) budget compared to our RAAF cousins, our capability output is as good if not better. When was the last time the RAAF deployed to a free for all battlefield? (and please, stooging around the MEAO 100NM away from the nearest contact does not count)
There are issues with the culture of Army aircrews, however only a minority. The Army ethos can be at odds with a safe aviation culture and this is a major point of difference between AAvn and the RAAF.
The senoir ranks of the Army don't see aviation as a core capability.
To quote the late Lt Col Glen Duus
Aviation in the Australian Army still needs to be sold. The simple fact that it has taken 35 years for infantry-oriented senior Army officers to decide that they need army aviation support needs no further elaboration.
And lets face it, AAvn has not deployed to a free for all battlefield (with quality air to air as well as surface to air threats) for a long time. The initial Chinnook dep to the MEAO was limited due to lack of EWSP as was the dep of C-130s. I have never been able to understand the annimosity between the RAAF/Army.
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slow n low, you beat me to it, but my two cents anyway.
The Army gained custody of the helos primarily because of the RAAFs failure to provide support during the Vietnam conflict - in my estimation. The RAAF had a policy of not permitting its helos to be used where they were, or may be, exposed to hostile action. Not of much help to the Army engaged in combat. Two examples of the failure to provide support were the Long Tan battle where the troops needed ammo resupply and RAAF tasking refused to provide an aircraft because it would necessitate flying in an active combat zone. The US Army offered to do the job but in the meantime a courageous RAAF junior officer (pilot of the Huey) took matters into his own hands and said "We're going" despite protestations from his co-pilot. And they got the job done, and subsequently justly decorated for a job well done.
Another occasion was when the Army suffered major casualties in the Long Hai mountains. The RAAF refused to supply support to evacuate the wounded, dying and dead and it was left to the Armys 161 Recce Flight using their Bell 47s and US Army Hueys to do the job. Once again the RAAF not permitted to expose themselves to possible hostile action. Of course all this is a result of policy made at a high level and is no reflection on the aircrew at the coal face.
A very well written paper addressing the Army/RAAF relationship can be found here Fourays - The Australian Army Aviation Association Inc
Any slight against the Army, their professionalism or ability when it comes to aviation, is just that - a slight. Their accident record is no different than any other aviation outfit when it comes to causes. In that regard ElPerro is just making cheap shots.
The Army gained custody of the helos primarily because of the RAAFs failure to provide support during the Vietnam conflict - in my estimation. The RAAF had a policy of not permitting its helos to be used where they were, or may be, exposed to hostile action. Not of much help to the Army engaged in combat. Two examples of the failure to provide support were the Long Tan battle where the troops needed ammo resupply and RAAF tasking refused to provide an aircraft because it would necessitate flying in an active combat zone. The US Army offered to do the job but in the meantime a courageous RAAF junior officer (pilot of the Huey) took matters into his own hands and said "We're going" despite protestations from his co-pilot. And they got the job done, and subsequently justly decorated for a job well done.
Another occasion was when the Army suffered major casualties in the Long Hai mountains. The RAAF refused to supply support to evacuate the wounded, dying and dead and it was left to the Armys 161 Recce Flight using their Bell 47s and US Army Hueys to do the job. Once again the RAAF not permitted to expose themselves to possible hostile action. Of course all this is a result of policy made at a high level and is no reflection on the aircrew at the coal face.
A very well written paper addressing the Army/RAAF relationship can be found here Fourays - The Australian Army Aviation Association Inc
Any slight against the Army, their professionalism or ability when it comes to aviation, is just that - a slight. Their accident record is no different than any other aviation outfit when it comes to causes. In that regard ElPerro is just making cheap shots.
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There are issues with the culture of Army aircrews, however only a minority. The Army ethos can be at odds with a safe aviation culture and this is a major point of difference between AAvn and the RAAF.
The senoir ranks of the Army don't see aviation as a core capability
The senoir ranks of the Army don't see aviation as a core capability
Trojan, spot on, we are caught in the grey zone between infantry soldier and air ace, we just have to make it work on the day. When push comes to shove I am almost certain most Army aircrew would put themselves in harms way to help out our ground dwelling brothers. Training is a different story, we can't throw ourselves at the ground every day for our soldiers (who don't understand our lack of commitment) for obvious reasons.
And lets face it, AAvn has not deployed to a free for all battlefield (with quality air to air as well as surface to air threats) for a long time.
The RAAF refused to supply support to evacuate the wounded, dying and dead and it was left to the Armys 161 Recce Flight using their Bell 47s and US Army Hueys to do the job. Once again the RAAF not permitted to expose themselves to possible hostile action. Of course all this is a result of policy made at a high level and is no reflection on the aircrew at the coal face.
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The other consideration is that the Army, by its nature, tends to have its aircraft somewhere near the front lines in the mud with a very short chain of command. The air force tend to operate from nicely paved runways well behind the front lines - air conditioning, mess halls, etc., with a different chain of command.
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What a great thread and a history lesson too!
Army aviation always looked very appealing to me compared to it's RAAF counterpart. I applied to the Army around the time of the first Gulf War, but was told that recruitment had been put 'on hold' due to reallocation of both resources and funds.
Would have loved to have been part of it, hat's off to you guys!
Army aviation always looked very appealing to me compared to it's RAAF counterpart. I applied to the Army around the time of the first Gulf War, but was told that recruitment had been put 'on hold' due to reallocation of both resources and funds.
Would have loved to have been part of it, hat's off to you guys!
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A Dark Day for Army Aviation
If this goes ahead it will indeed be a dark day for Army Aviation. As a past member of the "Horizontal Pursuit Squadron", I would hate to see it lose the fixed wing capability. Since leaving the Army I have worked with it in different capacities from maintaining their aircraft to working with them in safety-related positions. I haven't seen a more safety orientated group of professionals and they are no less so than the Navy and Airforce.
IMHO the incidents and accidents they have had are either directly or indirectly a result of the operational tempo they have experienced in the recent past. The quality of their people is no less than those of the other military aviation counterparts (and I have worked with them as well). Lets forget this inter-service rivalry crap. That sort of stuff carries on into the Defence/civilian/government world and only results in bad decisions like this.
IMHO the incidents and accidents they have had are either directly or indirectly a result of the operational tempo they have experienced in the recent past. The quality of their people is no less than those of the other military aviation counterparts (and I have worked with them as well). Lets forget this inter-service rivalry crap. That sort of stuff carries on into the Defence/civilian/government world and only results in bad decisions like this.
