RAAF pilots leaving
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Show me the money! The only things that will disqualify you are:
Exclusions that would deem personnel ineligible are:
The only possibilities now are EK or..... RAAF
Exclusions that would deem personnel ineligible are:
- Initial ROSO/IMPS;
- active UFFS (MSBS or PRB),
- LWOP periods >21days, and
- elective separation from service, etc.
The only possibilities now are EK or..... RAAF
Originally Posted by havock
shouldn't the thread now read "RAAF pilots returning - ex QANTAS?"
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Look the aircraft are to expensive to operate for your enjoyment
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Understand some news on capability patch early next year now.
Also understand we have too many FLTLTs and too few SQNLDR/WGCDRs. Rumour is the patch will be aimed to make promotion more lucrative as until this year far too many aircrew have been alllowed to 'remove their hat' from the promotion boards.
Should know soon.
Also understand we have too many FLTLTs and too few SQNLDR/WGCDRs. Rumour is the patch will be aimed to make promotion more lucrative as until this year far too many aircrew have been alllowed to 'remove their hat' from the promotion boards.
Should know soon.
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Army and Navy no longer support the capability allowance. The new one will have much tighter eligibility rules and will drop out after an officer reaches a certain seniority in rank, perhaps five years. This is to incentivise promotion. The new structure has not been exhibited as yet. The proposal goes to the DFRT in March.
too many FLTLTs and too few SQNLDR/WGCDRs
OK, I know I'm not one to talk about racing up the rank ladder, but an obvious question to ask would be why don't people want to be promoted?
As far as I could tell prior to departure last year, the administrative burden on SQNLDRs and above was one of the biggest turn-offs, and while some of it is no doubt necessary, I bet there's a good whack of reporting and email/paper shuffling that could be taken to with judicious use of the razor.
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I assume the turn off is partly increased work-load, partly that you're then much more moveable/postable, partly the increased chance of a non-flying job (with it's pay-cut) and for all of this you're getting a pay rise which is pretty much a slab of VB after tax!
Why not just kick back as a FLTLT and keep flying? And many people have, but obviously that's not working for the organisation hence the rumour of the better aimed retention package and also the next promotion board looking at everyone in the pool.
Why not just kick back as a FLTLT and keep flying? And many people have, but obviously that's not working for the organisation hence the rumour of the better aimed retention package and also the next promotion board looking at everyone in the pool.
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Army and Navy no longer support the capability allowance. The new one will have much tighter eligibility rules and will drop out after an officer reaches a certain seniority in rank, perhaps five years. This is to incentivise promotion. The new structure has not been exhibited as yet. The proposal goes to the DFRT in March.
With the amount of decent paying airline jobs out there I don't think they have to worry about separation.
So now let's force people into promotion. That should breed good leadership.
So now let's force people into promotion. That should breed good leadership.
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After joining the RAAF 27 years ago, I cannot shake the feeling that our pilot manning philosophy hasn’t really changed since WWII and is disconnected from present day reality.
When I joined in the mid eighties Qantas et al were hoovering RAAF pilots, effectively decimating some squadrons. I recall a certain Chief of the Air Staff (as he wanted to be called back then
) going through an uncomfortable experience on 60 Minutes answering questions about RAAF pilot manning.
One never saw ex-RAAF airline drivers trying to rejoin. The events of the last couple of years have taught me that the days of the massive recruiting drives by the major airlines are dead and gone. One only has to peruse the many threads on the topic right here to conclude that being an airline pilot ain’t what it used to be. Regular perusal of the RAAF’s posting and promotions website reveals a steady trickle of guys sneaking back in. I have seen the grass on the other side of the fence (not airline grass, granted), and will concede that for all its faults and failings the RAAF is a pretty good gig compared to what is currently on offer outside.
The days of pilots flying large formations of aircraft into battle (think the 1,000 bomber formations of WWII, and Operation Linebacker in Vietnam) are long gone and will never re-appear. Today we see smaller numbers of far technically superior and capable aircraft operating in a vastly more complex environment.
This is where I think the RAAF starts to go wrong with respect to pilot manning. Given the cost (both monetary and time) of training a pilot to the front line, I consider it essential that as much as possible is done to retain that training and experience where it will be of most benefit – on the front line. In 27 years I have witnessed the reduction of overall flying rates. Given the expense of acquiring and operating today’s aircraft that is somewhat understandable. However now we have more complex aircraft being operated in a more complex environment by aircrew with less hours in their logbooks.
Now I will concede that I have not read the RAAF’s Air Power Manual (gee, there goes my shot at the top job!), but I reckon my definition of “air power” will ring true with most others. That is; air power is the delivery of bombs on target on time, the defeat of enemy aircraft, the delivery of a bunch of grunts on target on time, the detection and destruction of enemy submarines. That’s it. That’s what we do – or should be doing!
So doesn’t it make sense to ensure that our expensive aircraft are operated by the best trained and the most experienced aircrew possible? Don’t we owe it to the Australian taxpayer to ensure our aircraft are operated by the most experienced aircrew possible?
Well from what I can see, those in the Ivory Tower have a vastly different definition of air power. They seem to think that air power is best served by more senior officers with less experience. “Au contraire”, I hear you say? Well have a look at the RAAF’s website on the DRN. In particular have a look at the “Know Your Leaders’” section and count the number of one-star and above appointments then count the number of flying squadrons. Long story short – we are grossly top heavy.
The paradigms have changed, and we haven’t changed our modus operandi to suit.
As we all know it’s of little use to anyone whinging without proposing a solution. So here goes.
1. Let’s have a look at all appointments above unit command that require aircrew experience and ask ourselves if that appointment is essential to the delivery of air power. If not, axe it. When it is vacated do not post someone in to fill it. Yes that’s right – let’s start turning the “stove pipe” back to a “pyramid”.
2. Go to every flying unit and ask who wants to stay there and not be promoted. I reckon you’ll get 95% putting up their hands. Now given that there are non-flying positions that do require aircrew experience, some turnover from the units will have to happen. But let’s do it with the capability of the front line uppermost in mind, not just to feed the promotion system.
Go back to the units in 12 months and ask the same question, and I reckon you’ll find a few who will opt to move up.
Now I will concede the RAAF has recognised the importance of retaining experience, but a half-assed specialist aircrew scheme and the (ab)use of reserves hasn’t really helped.
3. Now the net effect of the first two points on the training system can only be beneficial. Less pilots required means less demand and stress on the pilot training system. Less training equals less expense.
Now I’m sure I’ll be shot down in flames by someone espousing the “party line”. But ask yourselves why they defend it. Are they thinking about the application of air power in mind, or their own promotion prospects? The “party line” doesn’t work, amigos.
A rewarding, safe and enjoyable 2012 to all.
The above may or may not have been influenced by a bottle of Victorian shiraz.
When I joined in the mid eighties Qantas et al were hoovering RAAF pilots, effectively decimating some squadrons. I recall a certain Chief of the Air Staff (as he wanted to be called back then
) going through an uncomfortable experience on 60 Minutes answering questions about RAAF pilot manning. One never saw ex-RAAF airline drivers trying to rejoin. The events of the last couple of years have taught me that the days of the massive recruiting drives by the major airlines are dead and gone. One only has to peruse the many threads on the topic right here to conclude that being an airline pilot ain’t what it used to be. Regular perusal of the RAAF’s posting and promotions website reveals a steady trickle of guys sneaking back in. I have seen the grass on the other side of the fence (not airline grass, granted), and will concede that for all its faults and failings the RAAF is a pretty good gig compared to what is currently on offer outside.The days of pilots flying large formations of aircraft into battle (think the 1,000 bomber formations of WWII, and Operation Linebacker in Vietnam) are long gone and will never re-appear. Today we see smaller numbers of far technically superior and capable aircraft operating in a vastly more complex environment.
This is where I think the RAAF starts to go wrong with respect to pilot manning. Given the cost (both monetary and time) of training a pilot to the front line, I consider it essential that as much as possible is done to retain that training and experience where it will be of most benefit – on the front line. In 27 years I have witnessed the reduction of overall flying rates. Given the expense of acquiring and operating today’s aircraft that is somewhat understandable. However now we have more complex aircraft being operated in a more complex environment by aircrew with less hours in their logbooks.
Now I will concede that I have not read the RAAF’s Air Power Manual (gee, there goes my shot at the top job!), but I reckon my definition of “air power” will ring true with most others. That is; air power is the delivery of bombs on target on time, the defeat of enemy aircraft, the delivery of a bunch of grunts on target on time, the detection and destruction of enemy submarines. That’s it. That’s what we do – or should be doing!
So doesn’t it make sense to ensure that our expensive aircraft are operated by the best trained and the most experienced aircrew possible? Don’t we owe it to the Australian taxpayer to ensure our aircraft are operated by the most experienced aircrew possible?Well from what I can see, those in the Ivory Tower have a vastly different definition of air power. They seem to think that air power is best served by more senior officers with less experience. “Au contraire”, I hear you say? Well have a look at the RAAF’s website on the DRN. In particular have a look at the “Know Your Leaders’” section and count the number of one-star and above appointments then count the number of flying squadrons. Long story short – we are grossly top heavy.
The paradigms have changed, and we haven’t changed our modus operandi to suit. As we all know it’s of little use to anyone whinging without proposing a solution. So here goes.
1. Let’s have a look at all appointments above unit command that require aircrew experience and ask ourselves if that appointment is essential to the delivery of air power. If not, axe it. When it is vacated do not post someone in to fill it. Yes that’s right – let’s start turning the “stove pipe” back to a “pyramid”.
2. Go to every flying unit and ask who wants to stay there and not be promoted. I reckon you’ll get 95% putting up their hands. Now given that there are non-flying positions that do require aircrew experience, some turnover from the units will have to happen. But let’s do it with the capability of the front line uppermost in mind, not just to feed the promotion system.
Go back to the units in 12 months and ask the same question, and I reckon you’ll find a few who will opt to move up.
Now I will concede the RAAF has recognised the importance of retaining experience, but a half-assed specialist aircrew scheme and the (ab)use of reserves hasn’t really helped.
3. Now the net effect of the first two points on the training system can only be beneficial. Less pilots required means less demand and stress on the pilot training system. Less training equals less expense.
Now I’m sure I’ll be shot down in flames by someone espousing the “party line”. But ask yourselves why they defend it. Are they thinking about the application of air power in mind, or their own promotion prospects? The “party line” doesn’t work, amigos.
A rewarding, safe and enjoyable 2012 to all.
The above may or may not have been influenced by a bottle of Victorian shiraz.
Tut tut, not read the Air Power Manual? Which self-respecting 12 year FLTLT wouldn't?
That's sorted. Bring in the lateral recruits. Brilliant!
Don’t we owe it to the Australian taxpayer to ensure our aircraft are operated by the most experienced aircrew possible?
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CSD,
Nice post. I rarely contribute here but the quality of your argument deserves some extra discussion. I have also been around the 'post' a few times and experienced the airline world but I'm definitely no expert. I'm one of those too who has 'snuck back in'
. I agree with you that capability should be number one but I'm sure as you'd agree, over the last 20 years the military has changed. The battle hasn't but the effort required to run the organisation and satisfy the Government would be unrecognisable to someone who left pre 1990. For that reason I think your suggestion that there is too much brass is not completely fair. What is true is that we should focus on the core airpower delivery as you suggest. I think airpower is more than just bombs on target. It would be difficult to suggest that any airpower deliver could be achieved without intel, logistics, targeting, strategic HR (and the people to support these functions). Many of the things you suggest are fair and might work but they are ideas that have been suggested over and again. I think they are only nipping at the edges. The issue as you say is that the organisation as a whole is a 'tweaked version' of the one that existed post 1945. The RAAF has not undertaken any wholesale change since then. Any business that followed the same path would be long gone. So, to keep it manageable but add to your points here are some further ideas.
1. DP or for that matter Strategic Personnel ADF don't have the manpower or the scope to rebuild the organisation. There would need to be a top-down decision to run a project to fully reorganise and a commitment to accept the recommendations that come about.
2. We've made efforts to copy business management in the organisation in an effort to be more efficient and accountable. I suggest it hasn't worked. It has merely burdened those running the Units, WGs and FEGs with more work. Why? Because they are missing half the tools required to do the job. Managers in business have control of their budgets and the ability to hire and fire as they see fit for example. In return, they are expected to deliver and are individually held accountable for their failures (and rewarded appropriately). So, how would a SQN for example look if we gave the boss all the tools?
FEG Commanders would allocate budgets to OCs and COs to do their job. They'd have clear capability objectives to deliver and these would be independently measured. They would choose their own personnel by advertising jobs in the organisation. They'd use their budgetary flexibility to pay their staff as required to retain them. Unit structures would be based on their job and not the standard pyramid. Some aircrew would get paid less than others based on their value to the Unit rather than their time in service or a qual in the front of their logbook. If they didn't cut the mustard they'd be moved out of the organisation, rather than just posted to be mediocre elsewhere. The CO would manage the requirements of the organisation by having a true management team (no just and Admino). They'd have a Risk and Compliance Manager who'd have a safety and risk team working for them. Their role would also include compliance with governance like EEO, ethics etc. The CO would keep the Logo but they'd have an expanded role to manage the budget supported by a professional (non-uniformed) accountant. The admino would be a (properly qualified) HR manager. The XO would truly be an operations manager with lots of flying experience but in a non-flying position to properly manage ops.
Now the good stuff. Accountable managers would put some of their pay at risk. They could be rewarded with bonuses for meeting or exceeding their requirements or fired if they failed. Unit pay structures would be totally flexible. Some pilots would be salaried. Aircrew specialists might negotiate a bonus structure based on their ability to meet Unit capability goals. Pilots who want to stay in their job, would through negotiation with the CO and on an agreed package which is contractually binding on both sides. NCO pilot and aco aircrew could be used if it met capability requirements.
I could go on and on (as I have already done). The point is to suggest that the old solutions that have been banging around the RAAF and espoused ad infinitum by DP reps at 'Capability Project' meetings won't work, haven't worked and never will. We need to be more creative and no one below 3 Star level has the clout to initiated to change required to truly make the personnel system work. We also need to stand up and offer to be part of the solution as you rightly suggest.
Nice post. I rarely contribute here but the quality of your argument deserves some extra discussion. I have also been around the 'post' a few times and experienced the airline world but I'm definitely no expert. I'm one of those too who has 'snuck back in'
. I agree with you that capability should be number one but I'm sure as you'd agree, over the last 20 years the military has changed. The battle hasn't but the effort required to run the organisation and satisfy the Government would be unrecognisable to someone who left pre 1990. For that reason I think your suggestion that there is too much brass is not completely fair. What is true is that we should focus on the core airpower delivery as you suggest. I think airpower is more than just bombs on target. It would be difficult to suggest that any airpower deliver could be achieved without intel, logistics, targeting, strategic HR (and the people to support these functions). Many of the things you suggest are fair and might work but they are ideas that have been suggested over and again. I think they are only nipping at the edges. The issue as you say is that the organisation as a whole is a 'tweaked version' of the one that existed post 1945. The RAAF has not undertaken any wholesale change since then. Any business that followed the same path would be long gone. So, to keep it manageable but add to your points here are some further ideas.1. DP or for that matter Strategic Personnel ADF don't have the manpower or the scope to rebuild the organisation. There would need to be a top-down decision to run a project to fully reorganise and a commitment to accept the recommendations that come about.
2. We've made efforts to copy business management in the organisation in an effort to be more efficient and accountable. I suggest it hasn't worked. It has merely burdened those running the Units, WGs and FEGs with more work. Why? Because they are missing half the tools required to do the job. Managers in business have control of their budgets and the ability to hire and fire as they see fit for example. In return, they are expected to deliver and are individually held accountable for their failures (and rewarded appropriately). So, how would a SQN for example look if we gave the boss all the tools?
FEG Commanders would allocate budgets to OCs and COs to do their job. They'd have clear capability objectives to deliver and these would be independently measured. They would choose their own personnel by advertising jobs in the organisation. They'd use their budgetary flexibility to pay their staff as required to retain them. Unit structures would be based on their job and not the standard pyramid. Some aircrew would get paid less than others based on their value to the Unit rather than their time in service or a qual in the front of their logbook. If they didn't cut the mustard they'd be moved out of the organisation, rather than just posted to be mediocre elsewhere. The CO would manage the requirements of the organisation by having a true management team (no just and Admino). They'd have a Risk and Compliance Manager who'd have a safety and risk team working for them. Their role would also include compliance with governance like EEO, ethics etc. The CO would keep the Logo but they'd have an expanded role to manage the budget supported by a professional (non-uniformed) accountant. The admino would be a (properly qualified) HR manager. The XO would truly be an operations manager with lots of flying experience but in a non-flying position to properly manage ops.
Now the good stuff. Accountable managers would put some of their pay at risk. They could be rewarded with bonuses for meeting or exceeding their requirements or fired if they failed. Unit pay structures would be totally flexible. Some pilots would be salaried. Aircrew specialists might negotiate a bonus structure based on their ability to meet Unit capability goals. Pilots who want to stay in their job, would through negotiation with the CO and on an agreed package which is contractually binding on both sides. NCO pilot and aco aircrew could be used if it met capability requirements.
I could go on and on (as I have already done). The point is to suggest that the old solutions that have been banging around the RAAF and espoused ad infinitum by DP reps at 'Capability Project' meetings won't work, haven't worked and never will. We need to be more creative and no one below 3 Star level has the clout to initiated to change required to truly make the personnel system work. We also need to stand up and offer to be part of the solution as you rightly suggest.