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A good thing to review in a situation like this is what the hand maneuvers will be after touchdown. Especially if you were never on the old style manual deployment aircraft or haven't done it in a long time.
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Looks like Eastern kept the contract after this overrun.
Vice President-elect Pence is enroute DSM-IND at the moment on the sister plane N277EA, a B-738, using the callsign of 'TYSON TWO'. President-elect Trump is enroute DSM-LGA on 'TYSON ONE', N757AF. |
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Thanks for posting this. A lot of detail is in these dockets.
I think this link will take you directly to the CVR report: https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/59500-59...915/604111.pdf Some excerpts from the CVR transcript: 18:48:22.5 CAM-2 i-l-s one three please. autobrakes three. flaps thirty. 18:48:26.8 HOT-1 (you have to go) flaps forty don't ch'ya? 18:48:28.8 CAM-2 na-ahh. 18:48:29.3 HOT-1 seven thousand feet. 18:48:30.4 CAM-2 we don't need it. autobrakes three will do it. 18:48:34.0 HOT-1 alright. 18:48:49.2 CAM-2 when you landed back there...you still had a lottttt of runway after we stopped. ... 18:52:53.5 HOT-1 oh well. # happens. life’s a #. ... 19:01:43.7 CAM-2 autobrakes three. flaps ah thirty. questions 19:01:47.5 HOT-1 no questions. 19:01:48.2 CAM-2 alright. 19:01:48.6 HOT-1 live long and prosper ha ha ha. ... 19:25:54.1 HOT-2 what an interesting trip. 19:25:58.5 HOT-2 the most important thing is that we're safe. you know. we've been safe all the time. so. 19:26:03.3 HOT-1 ah these two are pretty good girls. you know. they try really hard. 19:26:06.4 HOT-2 yeah. 19:26:08.9 HOT-2 you know what this lady said. that they are here because of the (pretty) faces. she said that. 19:26:15.6 CAM-2 so wrong man. she's. 19:26:17.5 CAM-1 @? 19:26:18.2 CAM-2 yeah. she said that. 19:26:18.8 CAM-1 wow. 19:26:20.2 HOT-2 they're here because of the pretty faces. 19:26:22.7 HOT-2 well. guess what. they hired ugly people here too. ... 19:40:09.8 CAM-1 raining like a mother #. 19:40:12.3 HOT-2 okay autopilot's coming off. 19:40:12.9 AWM [sound of three low to high frequency tones, similar to autopilot disconnect] 19:40:13.5 EGPWS approaching minimums. 19:40:17.5 CAM-1 cleared to land. 19:40:21.1 EGPWS minimums. 19:40:22.2 HOT-2 landing. 19:40:22.9 HOT-1 roger that. 19:40:27.4 HOT-1 that's slightly left. 19:40:31.6 EGPWS one hundred. 19:40:35.1 EGPWS fifty. 19:40:38.2 EGPWS thirty. 19:40:40.3 EGPWS twenty. 19:40:43.3 CAM-1 ** down. 19:40:46.0 EGPWS ten. 19:40:46.6 CAM-1 down down down down you're three thousand feet remaining. 19:40:52.1 CAM [sound of rumble, similar to touchdown] 19:40:57.3 HOT-2 manual braking. 19:41:00.6 CAM-?**. 19:41:00.7 TWR Eastern stop stop Eastern. 19:41:01.9 CAM [sound of increased background sound, similar to thrust reverser application] 19:41:03.4 CAM [sound of click] 19:41:05.3 HOT-1 ahhhh. 19:41:07.4 HOT-1 errhm [sound of exertion]. 19:41:08.3 CAM [sound of rattle and rumble, similar to exiting runway] 19:41:11.2 HOT-1 #. **. 19:41:13.5 TWR we have an issue on the ah airport. 19:41:15.9 CAM [sound of decreased background noise, similar to reduction of thrust reversers] 19:41:18.1 CAM [sound of thump, thump, thump, similar to wipers, continues for next 9 seconds] 19:41:24.5 HOT-2 should have go around. 19:41:25.2 PA-1 remain seated. remain seated. 19:41:27.4 HOT-1 see that's what. 19:41:30.5 HOT-1 # me. 19:41:35.4 CAM-1 my career just ended. 19:41:37.3 HOT-2 we should have went around. 19:41:38.3 HOT-1 yeap. 19:41:40.0 HOT-2 #. ... 19:47:56.0 CAM-1 see unfortunately. I should have gone straight ahead and we would have been fine. when I made the turn is when I screwed up. 19:48:00.6 CAM-2 yeah I was- I was- I was fighting you. because I was trying to stay on the centerline. 19:48:05.1 HOT [sound of siren] 19:48:06.2 CAM-2 I was- I was trying to stay on the centerline and- 19:48:10.7 CAM-1 well. 19:48:13.7 CAM-2 we would have been fine. I- I- *** stay on centerline. you were fighting. 19:48:22.0 CAM-2 we would have broken just a few lights and that's it. |
I've never flown the 737 and some of this stuff depends on the regs and aircraft certification. But wouldn't the crew be required to do some sort of slippery runway inflight landing performance assessment?
In the larger Boeings I would have to go to a QRH table for minimum flap and autobrake settings for actual conditions and reported braking action. Also, a new runway condition reporting scheme came into effect a few weeks before this mishap, don't know if this will be a player in the analysis. To me the CVR sounds like an experienced crew trying to get it right. They will inevitably be gigged for a little non-pertinent conversation below FL 180. Landing with flaps 30 instead of flaps 40 will be questioned. As they repeatedly observed in their post-landing assessment, a go-around was definitely indicated. Also, sounds like the captain got on the controls on rollout perhaps trying to take the plane off the right side of the runway instead of going into the localizer antenna and the expressway. |
Here's the preliminary Boeing FDR analysis sent to the NTSB on November 17, 2016:
Preliminary Data Observations: • F30 approach to Runway 22 at LaGuardia (LGA) with a runway length of 7001 feet, at a gross weight of 116,560 lb. at landing (Max Landing Weight [MLW]=129,200 lb.). • Turbulent atmosphere with an increasing tailwind as the airplane approached the runway. At touchdown, the tailwind was approximately 10 knots. • Autopilot was disconnected at approximately 300 feet radio altitude, with the autothrottle disconnected approximately 7 seconds later at 200 feet radio altitude. • Shortly after autopilot disconnect, the glideslope deviation began to increase indicating the airplane was deviating above the glideslope beam. • The airplane crossed the runway threshold at a radio altitude of 66 feet with the glideslope deviation increasing beyond 4 dots and a descent rate (negative vertical speed) of approximately 750 ft/min. • The descent rate was reduced to near zero by 2500 feet beyond the runway threshold, resulting in the airplane floating down the runway. • The initial touchdown occurred at: 1) approximately time 9127.5 seconds, 2) a distance of 4242 feet beyond the runway threshold (~1900 feet beyond the recommended touchdown zone), 3) an airspeed of 123 knots (Vref-4), 4) a ground speed of 130 knots, 5) a sink rate of 3.3 ft/sec. • Upon main gear touchdown, maximum manual wheel brakes were commanded. • The nose gear touched down approximately 2 seconds after main gear touchdown, but then rebounded back into the air due to commanded aft control column. The nose gear was held off the ground until it touched down a second and final time approximately 5 seconds after main gear touchdown. • Speedbrakes were manually extended to full approximately 4.5 seconds after main gear touchdown (the speedbrakes were not armed for automatic extension upon landing). After initial touchdown, the airplane traveled approximately 1250 feet down the runway before the speedbrakes were extended to full deflection. • Max reverse thrust was commanded by time 9135.5 seconds (8 seconds after initial touchdown). From initial touchdown to max reverse command, the airplane had traveled approximately 1650 feet down the runway. • The airplane achieved good deceleration with speedbrake extension, maximum wheel brakes, and maximum reverse thrust, reaching 0.5 g’s of deceleration (negative longitudinal acceleration). • Preliminary calculation of airplane braking coefficient indicates that during the period of friction-limited braking (beginning when the nose gear touched down at time 9133.5 seconds, 5520 feet beyond the threshold and ending as the airplane entered the EMAS) the calculated airplane braking coefficient varied between 0.2 and 0.4. • As the airplane decelerated, increasing left control wheel was commanded, reaching 50 degrees of left control wheel by time 9145 seconds. The increasing left control wheel reduced the spoiler deflections on the right wing, per design. • The calculated in-air crosswind component indicated there was a left crosswind of 7 to 8 knots, reducing to 3 to 5 knots before touchdown. The winds that were present while the airplane was on the ground could not be calculated, but a left crosswind would typically result in a right rudder pedal input to maintain centerline (and left control wheel if the crosswind magnitude was large enough). • Some left rudder pedal was commanded as the airplane rolled down the runway, until it was removed and right rudder pedal was commanded at 6650 feet beyond the threshold. The airplane responded to the right pedal by deviating right of the runway centerline. • The airplane departed the end of Runway 22 while deviating right of centerline at a ground speed of approximately 40 knots. • The airplane crossed through the right corner of the EMAS and came to rest to the right of the EMAS, approximately 7180 feet beyond the runway threshold, and 114 feet right of centerline. • Preliminary analysis of the data indicates all systems were operating as designed. The automatic speedbrake functionality could not be verified as the system was not armed for landing and was reportedly on the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) as inoperative. |
The initial touchdown occurred at: 1) approximately time 9127.5 seconds, 2) a distance of 4242 feet beyond the runway threshold (~1900 feet beyond the recommended touchdown zone) |
Captain got demoted and FO got fired on this one.
Both should have been fired. |
Some possible answers to 'what were they thinking?' in the pilot interviews here:
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/59500-59...915/604022.pdf |
When asked if he had considered a go around at any point during the event, he said that he had but when he did the “moment had slipped past” and it was too late. 5,000 feet down the runway was too late for a go around? Didn't remember the EMAS was there? Actually, the whole last paragraph needs pasting here. When asked if he had considered a go around at any point during the event, he said that he had but when he did the “moment had slipped past” and it was too late. He stated that the moment he rounded out they should have gone around. He said he is now going to now require at least 8,000 feet of runway length for first officers to land. He said that that if the landing would have been firmer they would have stopped on the runway. He said he will reiterate with first officers in the future that they must land in the touchdown zone. He said again that he did consider a go around before touchdown but there was little time to verbalize it, and he said to “put it down” instead of Go around. When asked if he had been terminated before, he said that he had been terminated from Arrow Air. |
There is a lesson in here specific to Captains as well as the myriad of lessons for all crew.
The Captain thought that flap 40 was the wise choice, enough so that he said 18:48:26.8 HOT-1 (you have to go) flaps forty don't ch'ya? 18:48:34.0 HOT-1 alright. |
Originally Posted by rottenray
(Post 9791759)
That would be a fun bit to learn about.
"When asked if he had heard of any other crewmembers complain about flying with this captain he declined to answer." |
Originally Posted by back to Boeing
(Post 9558860)
Just an educated guess.
So whilst there had been an "incident" the crew decided to action the appropriate after landing scan/procedure. Also this would allow any fire services better access to wheel/engine areas. Hence flaps retracted and thus why flaps not in the 40 position. On second thoughts, I'd call that grossly unprofessional, if that is what happened. To allow fire services access! What a joke! Surely no one really "thinks" like that - do they??? But having read the rest of the reports/transcript I take that back. It is entirely in keeping with their level of "professionalism". The people who should be fired along with them are the idiots that hired that company to fly Mr Pence and his entourage - or were thet secretly Democrats? |
. . . that thought crossed my mind.
When such a notion makes more sense than any other scenario, life seems almost surrealistic. Bewildering, doesn't come close. |
briefing when the f/o didn't take the hint and the Captain failed to ensure the ship was configured how he thought was appropriate. |
According to their statements they didn't train flaps 40 at the airline. The FO had probably never done a flaps 40 on the Boeing. I certainly wouldn't push my FO into a 40 if he is completely uncomfortable with it. Flaps 30 wasn't the problem here, they would've had plenty runway if technique was proper, 30 or 40.
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JC07 then doing the landing yourself would be appropriate. (As you thought 40 was prudent)
Ah but that "might" upset the CRM dynamic. Just saying. |
Whatever happened to 'captaincy' and accepting that is where the buck stops?
I hope to xxx that no-one claims this accident was caused by bad CRM. |
Originally Posted by IcePack
(Post 9792508)
JC07 then doing the landing yourself would be appropriate. (As you thought 40 was prudent)
Ah but that "might" upset the CRM dynamic. Just saying. The Captain was used to flaps 40 from his previous operation, but this company used 30 as standard. Also playing in his mind no doubt was that the FO exhibited excellent flying skills during the previous approaches and landings. These are all things a commander takes into account. But by his own admission his failure was in not calling the go around after the float. I don't think this was a CRM failure. It was just a bad call during a very dynamic situation. |
I certainly wouldn't push my FO into a 40 if he is completely uncomfortable with it. Flaps 30 wasn't the problem here, they would've had plenty runway if technique was proper, 30 or 40. As a Captain some things you can compromise on if in your professional judgment it does not adversely affect safety. The Captain accepting a flap 30 would be a case in point - based on any performance graph no doubt flap 30 was more than adequate. Flap 30 is a perfectly acceptable landing flap setting in the 737. The answer is probably no. Obviously not making a go-around as they left the landing zone is the main problem but, the lack of 'command' displayed as they sailed past the landing zone is ( imo) the same lack of command shown when the f/o , ( with 220 hours relevant experience) wrote off the Captains suggestion that flap 40 was the most appropriate. In situations like this something along the lines of " yeah I'll tell you what, I'm stuck in my ways so we'll do it flaps 40 and then chat about it in the van on the way to the hotel" usually does the trick. |
According to the QRH, using F40 for landing only saves a few hundred feet of runway over an F30 landing. If the FO, had no experience of F40 landings, a wet La Guardia, was not the place to try it. It was the long landing that caused the overun and it sounds like the MEL'd speedbrake was extended late and the late reversers may not have helped.
The real issue is why the long landing occured and was not noticed by the FO and the go around not called by the Captain. Two engine go arounds are not well taught in my airline and there is no shortage of evidence saying that they are a real problem on the B737. There are so many possible go around scenarios and you have think out how you are going to carry out each one without scraping the tail, stalling out, nose diving in, overspeeding the flaps etc. If go arounds are not well trained, "hoping" that the aircraft will stop will seem like the better option in the heat of the moment....like in this case. |
The real issue is why the long landing occured and was not noticed by the FO and the go around not called by the Captain. The real issue is why the Captain (clue is in the name/title) did not call a go around. End of. What the F/o did is largely irrelevant. That Capt was in charge - rather he was supposed to be. And clearly wan't. The Capt manifestly failed to ensure his crew did a proper job and to manage his flight, yet the poor F/O got fired and the lousy incompetent Capt just got demoted. That is just so, so wrong. |
The real issue is why the long landing occured and was not noticed by the FO and the go around not called by the Captain. According to the QRH, using F40 for landing only saves a few hundred feet of runway over an F30 landing. If the FO, had no experience of F40 landings, a wet La Guardia, was not the place to try it That said, I agree with you that the primary problem is the lack of a go-around. |
314' landing distance decrease with F40 vs F30. They went maybe 75-100' off the end?
The big difference with F40 is it's very hard to float. My company uses F30 as standard. That's probably true for most operators. But everyone was exposed to F40 landings in training and IOE/LOE. |
The big difference with F40 is it's very hard to float. |
There's more to this story then meets the eye.
Crew composition being one of them. Company culture and all that. No doubt this incident cost Eastern its future as an airline. Simply the wrong people were flying the most important highest profile contract in the existence of this startup airline. |
Originally Posted by B2N2
(Post 9791741)
Captain got demoted and FO got fired on this one.
Both should have been fired. Both pilots are currently off line with full pay. He wanted to ensure that their retraining was good. The airline plans on recreating the night of the incident in future training and it should be complete within the next 15 days. He has elected to downgrade the incident captain as a first officer until the NTSB’s final ruling on the incident.
Originally Posted by JammedStab
(Post 9792047)
"When asked about the captain’s proficiency or for areas that could be improved, when compared to others he had flown with, he declined to answer."
"When asked if he had heard of any other crewmembers complain about flying with this captain he declined to answer." There have been no previous issues with the captain. He recalled that when he was in the simulator he had difficulties in flaring to [sic] high since he was flying bigger airplanes. ... Flew with incident captain a while ago. He would have been the incident captain’s first officer they did not dual captain together. He would characterize him as a “by the book” individual. The captain would have been one to criticize and he felt comfortable doing so if it was necessary. Very open minded great communication. He enjoyed flying with him. They were never in an emergency or abnormal situation. He has only flown as a dual captain on maybe 3 times in a year and half, unless it was training. With two captains there was no standard on who was the pilot in command it would be just a discussion to decide at the gate. ... He had flown with the incident captain at Eastern Air Lines, and has known him since flying the DC-10 with Centurion Air Cargo. He characterized the incident captain as friendly, polite, professional, and fair. He further stated that that incident captain was always providing explanations for what he wanted to do. The most recent flight with the incident captain was about a week prior to the incident. He was to fly with the incident captain on the incident flight; however, they were rescheduled because he had family issues and needed to return home. No issues with the captain, always helping and stated “no issues at all.” The incident captain was always helping with the weight and balance. He felt the captain was one he could ask questions to and considered him a friend as he has known him for about 10 years. He stated that the incident captain was a “pleasure to fly with.” He was “very friendly” and they joked about politics. He has not flown with the incident captain often at Eastern; however, he had flown with him a lot at a previous employer. He flew to Havana and also on the campaign with the captain. He felt comfortable with asking the incident captain questions. When asked about the captain’s proficiency as a pilot, he felt the captain was a “sharp guy” and always reading and checking. He was very detail oriented when it came to the standard operating procedures. He felt the captain’s greatest strengths were that he was one of the finest captains he had flown with. The incident captain was one that was preferred to fly with, by first officers, at the previous employer. Her felt that the incident captain flew very well and followed the procedure. When the incident captain needed to take a leg he was very polite and explained why he had made that decision. He had flown 10 hours straight with the captain in the DC-10 and reiterated that he was a pleasure to fly with. In the 737, they did short flights and felt that he could tolerate anyone in that time frame. ... When asked to describe any weaknesses that the incident captain could improve on, he said that he couldn’t recall any. At Eastern, the captain was flying very well. They’ve flown into windy with nice weather and short runways. The captain always took those legs. There were requirements for which airports that captain must land at, such as special use airports. He did not feel that the incident captain needed to provide a reason why he wanted to fly a certain flight, as the incident captain was a “gentleman” and respectful and friendly. When he had flown with the incident captain it was windy and when there was a short runway, the captain flew those legs. He could not recall if there was a specific wind limit for first officer. ... He has observed captains make minor mistakes such as forgetting to set missed approach altitude, adjusting airspeed for windy conditions, flying the appropriate speed. He has not seen the incident captain make any mistakes since he has been flying at Eastern Air Lines. ... He also stated that he flew with the incident captain June 2, 2016. He was a first officer at the time when he flew with the incident captain; however, they only flew one flight together from Phoenix to Atlanta. He remembered that the captain was the pilot flying and thought that he was a good pilot, open, and very experienced. There were no issues with the flight that he could recall and he felt as though he could have brought up any issues or concerns with the captain when they flew that flight. ... He clarified that he does not consider incident captain to be a friend and does not have a relationship with him. He described the flight as “all good.” The incident captain had him conduct the takeoff and fly most of the leg, and the incident captain landed the aircraft. He described the incident captain as nice. He further stated that the easy part of the flight was to be the PF and PM had a lot of paperwork which the incident captain completed. They transferred controls before descent. He said that the incident captain wanted to do the landing because Georgetown was a shorter than average runway. He didn’t consider it short as he’s landed on a runway less than 4,000 foot long runway in a Boeing 737-SFP25. The weather for the flight to Georgetown was good. There was no rain or wind and the visibility was “okay.” He said that there was good CRM and that incident captain was “open.” He described the incident captain as professional, and a normal guy. He said he was comfortable speaking openly with him. He enjoyed flying with the incident captain and said he was treated fairly, treated well, and felt comfortable. He said the landing at Georgetown was on the touchdown zone and he didn’t remember anything being different from normal. He said that before OPT, everyone [pilots] complained, but he described the incident captain as “not the kind of person to complain.” |
Originally Posted by Airbubba
(Post 9792769)
From the Chief Pilot's interview last year:
Do you have more recent information? The captain seems to get pretty good reviews in the personnel interviews: https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/59500-59...915/604028.pdf And no doubt he will rue the lack of a go-around for the rest of his days. But boy the armchair critics can be unforgiving. I guess you have to take that when you're in the hot seat. I think it's easier for people to try and make you out as an incompetent fool after an incident rather than acknowledge that the same can happen to them. One mistake, uncorrected. |
For me it's not about forgiving or blaming, it's about dragging lessons from it.
The lesson for me ( apart from the go-around call that never happened) is that the Captain should not be persuaded from what he or she thinks is most prudent without serious consideration. (equally important is that they do consider different assessments from the f/o ). It's like the Captain of a ship deciding not to enter the harbour until full tide and the first mate saying "nah I'll take it in now, you had miles of clearance at that last harbour we entered". And the Captain replying " alright". |
After shutting down the engines and starting the auxiliary power unit, the pilots opened the cockpit door to provide an assessment of the situation to a Secret Service agent. “Nice. Nice job,” the agent said, after being briefed. “Huh,” the captain replied. “Nice job,” the agent said. “You stopped it, at least.” |
Is American "Airline" training really so shonky that an FO can have never done a flaps 40 landing, and his Captains is scared to ask/tell him to? What goes on in US type rating courses? Coffee and poker? How can anyone convert to a type and not practice all the landing configs? It doesn't seem possible.
WTF? Is there some mystery to a F40 landing? Because if so I missed it. For several years. What other config would you even consider to use on a wet runway with a tailwind component? Is there one? - apart from asking for a runway change? Truly shocking. This is genuine Indonesian aviation standards - right there in the USA. |
737NG has some different handling characteristics with F40. Creates the increased possibility of lateral PIO's. It's something to be aware of. And it's hard to land smoothly with F40. So some pilots are leery to use it. Short, wet, tailwind? F40 it is. Plant it and park it.
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Originally Posted by noflynomore
(Post 9792627)
That Capt was in charge - rather he was supposed to be. And clearly wan't. The Capt manifestly failed..
There's something up with the human being. Give that captain a description of his scenario before it happened, and he'd tell you that he'd go around. 20,000 hours, and of course he knows that a long landing in those conditions mandates a go around. And sure enough, just after his scenario he verbally wonders why he didn't go around. I have had it. Different scenario and I got away with it. It was an instant loss of nearly all visibility in the flare, due to a freak shower. Should have gone around, but the startle factor causes 2-3 seconds of non-thinking, or an attempt to continue with the thinking you have been doing, even though you know you need to change thinking, but the thinking-inertia needs to be overcome. I was left (after a very untidy landing) wondering why I didn't go around. We need training and exposure to this phenomenon. Of course flying gods and Pprune retirees need not apply. |
Hundredpercent, I agree with you that more training and knowledge is required about startle factor. I think you're being a bit harsh on those who identify errors the Captain made though. If someone believes that the Captain made an error of judgement/leadership/ communication ( whatever) and they thInk there is a lesson in it for themselves and others, suddenly they're macho and an armchair expert/ flying god?
We have to be able to say what we think if we want to use a site like this for learning and it is inevitable that others will disagree. |
framer,
Pilots want a no-blame culture or a "just culture" when it comes to dealing with mistakes. A culture that looks at the source of the mistake, learns from it, and then passes on the newfound wisdom to other pilots in order to improve safety. Yet pilots come on here, point the blame finger, and deride. It's those that I have issue with. I like to look at incidents like this as deeply as possible, to try and work out what caused (in this case) an experienced captain to not go around when clearly it was required - and he knew it. I would suggest others do too, it may help one day! |
Exactly. As a 737 commander myself you bet I have learnt from this incident. The modern "just culture" has been hard-won yet those on here who noflynomore or those who never did, want to crucify the crew for their mistakes.
Originally Posted by noflynomore
Truly shocking. This is genuine Indonesian aviation standards - right there in the USA.
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As usual the prune professional slaggers crawl out from under their stones to deride anyone with an opinion that isn't exactly in line with theirs or that they think they can belittle for not being exactly like them - ie retired - generally considered in our society a very boorish and unacceptable, bigoted thing to do while ignoring the fact that the retired are quite likely to be more experienced than they are, but of course they cannot know but shoot from the gob anyway.
50%Nothankyou, it may have escaped your notice that there is a chain of command on an aeroplane and that the Captain is at the top of it. I gather you take the modern view that no one is ever at fault for anything but believe me you are just plain WRONG. The final responsibiity rests with the Captain. I this case he didn't just make one cardinal mistake, he made a whole string of them, none of them excusible and as NHP without the possibility of being maxed out by flying. These errors are so fundamental that there can be no excuse. No one has said we shouldn't learn from this incident or examine it deeply, least of all me, yet this accusation seems to have been pointed in my direction in the usual prune baseless slagging-off style by people who invent things others have never written. Equally I have never suggested crucifying anyone in this case - an utterly baseless accusation as ever - I merely stated the obvious that no one else could shoulder the blame. Because they can't. "Just culture" involves not crucifying people for human errors, not gross professional misconduct which imo is the only definition possible for landing on a wet runway downwind with a spare stage of flap unused, and then failing to go around after the f/o floats half the length of the runway. "the monment had passed" had it? Bloody long moment, that one, he had what must have felt like aeons to think about it. No-one at fault my @rse! Even so I haven't suggested any form of punishment - merely responsibility. A fact that some holier-than-thou false accusers who can't be bothered to actually read other peoples' posts before slagging them off - like JC07 might like to take on board. Talk about pot/kettle! You are a paragon, sir! I may be considered old-fashioned by taking the view that Professionalism involves Responsibility - and that includes shouldering the responsibility, even when your colleague screws up, because YOU ARE IN COMMAND. I am certainly not a crucifier and believe 100% in a just culture but I also cough to my errors and am happy to take what's coming if I deserve it. I do NOT agree with the namby-pamby notion that finding fault is undesireable and people shouldn't suffer sanctions if they get things culpably wrong. Also, perhaps actually reading what is written and not inventing stories/opinions/scenarios between other peoples' lines might result in a more "just culture" here... think about it. |
Just me.
I first flew the 737 in the Middle East a long time ago. We used only flaps 15 or 40 for all landings. Was not a problem.
Used 30 and 40 years later in the BBJ. |
Interesting, shows how company culture affects such things. I never did a F15 landing in 12 yrs on the 737-3/400. We (3 UK companies) only ever used F30 and occasionally 40 as we were seldom length limited.
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Originally Posted by Old Boeing Driver
(Post 9795720)
I first flew the 737 in the Middle East a long time ago. We used only flaps 15 or 40 for all landings. Was not a problem.
Used 30 and 40 years later in the BBJ.
Originally Posted by noflynomore
(Post 9796007)
Interesting, shows how company culture affects such things. I never did a F15 landing in 12 yrs on the 737-3/400. We (3 UK companies) only ever used F30 and occasionally 40 as we were seldom length limited.
And, I can see where the FO might not want to do flaps 40 if it wasn't a normal flap setting covered in the company training program. And, I'll agree with those who say that the flap setting was not the probable cause of the mishap. |
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