Mike Pence's plane skids off runway at LGA
High and Hot
We flew into some high elevations at high temps. Single engine go around performance was the reason for the flaps 15 landings.
I believe I'm correct in saying that F15 was not approved for normal landings under JAA/EASA. F30/40 are the only options.
Europe doesn't really offer the kind of terrain or elevation that might need that kind of performance.
Europe doesn't really offer the kind of terrain or elevation that might need that kind of performance.
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: Rockytop, Tennessee, USA
Posts: 5,898
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
Here's the NTSB's announcement of the release of the final report on this accident:
https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-rele...20170921b.aspx
Pilot Actions, Decision Making, “Lack of Command Authority” Led to New York LaGuardia Runway Excursion
9/21/2017
Several failures in close succession by a jetliner’s flight crew were the probable cause of Oct. 27, 2016, runway excursion at LaGuardia Airport, according to the National Transportation Safety Board’s final report issued Thursday.
The Eastern Air Lines Boeing 737-700, a chartered flight carrying then vice-presidential candidate Mike Pence and campaign staff, overran Runway 22 during landing on the rainy evening. The airplane departed the runway and partially transited an arrester bed of crushable concrete before coming to a stop about 170 feet past the end of the runway. None of the 11 crewmembers or 37 passengers were hurt in the incident. The plane sustained minor damage.
Data from the flight recorder and post-incident interviews with the flight crew indicated the 737 was on a stabilized approach to Runway 22 until the landing flare, when it “floated” for thousands of feet, finally touching down more than 4,200 feet past the threshold of the 7,001-foot runway, leaving less than 2,800 feet of runway surface for the 737 to decelerate and stop.
The NTSB said when the first officer, who was at the controls, failed to get the jet’s wheels on the ground within the first third of the runway, or 2,300 feet, he should have executed a go-around maneuver instead of continuing the landing attempt.
During the landing roll, contrary to procedures, the captain didn’t announce he was assuming control of the airplane, which resulted in each pilot attempting directional inputs that were at odds with the other. This breakdown of basic crew resource management along with the captain’s failure to call for a go-around demonstrated, “a lack of command authority.” This, along with pilot actions, including starting the flare at an altitude almost twice as high as Boeing recommends, delays in reducing throttles and manually deploying the speed brakes, all contributed to the excursion, the NTSB said.
Eastern Air Lines management told the NTSB that it has since developed specific flight crew training to address the safety issues identified during the investigation.
The 24-page final report is available at https://go.usa.gov/xRJ4v.
More information about the excursion, including a link to the accident docket, which was opened to the public June 1, 2017, is available at https://go.usa.gov/xNNCf.
9/21/2017
Several failures in close succession by a jetliner’s flight crew were the probable cause of Oct. 27, 2016, runway excursion at LaGuardia Airport, according to the National Transportation Safety Board’s final report issued Thursday.
The Eastern Air Lines Boeing 737-700, a chartered flight carrying then vice-presidential candidate Mike Pence and campaign staff, overran Runway 22 during landing on the rainy evening. The airplane departed the runway and partially transited an arrester bed of crushable concrete before coming to a stop about 170 feet past the end of the runway. None of the 11 crewmembers or 37 passengers were hurt in the incident. The plane sustained minor damage.
Data from the flight recorder and post-incident interviews with the flight crew indicated the 737 was on a stabilized approach to Runway 22 until the landing flare, when it “floated” for thousands of feet, finally touching down more than 4,200 feet past the threshold of the 7,001-foot runway, leaving less than 2,800 feet of runway surface for the 737 to decelerate and stop.
The NTSB said when the first officer, who was at the controls, failed to get the jet’s wheels on the ground within the first third of the runway, or 2,300 feet, he should have executed a go-around maneuver instead of continuing the landing attempt.
During the landing roll, contrary to procedures, the captain didn’t announce he was assuming control of the airplane, which resulted in each pilot attempting directional inputs that were at odds with the other. This breakdown of basic crew resource management along with the captain’s failure to call for a go-around demonstrated, “a lack of command authority.” This, along with pilot actions, including starting the flare at an altitude almost twice as high as Boeing recommends, delays in reducing throttles and manually deploying the speed brakes, all contributed to the excursion, the NTSB said.
Eastern Air Lines management told the NTSB that it has since developed specific flight crew training to address the safety issues identified during the investigation.
The 24-page final report is available at https://go.usa.gov/xRJ4v.
More information about the excursion, including a link to the accident docket, which was opened to the public June 1, 2017, is available at https://go.usa.gov/xNNCf.
Join Date: Aug 2005
Location: fairly close to the colonial capitol
Age: 55
Posts: 1,693
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Data from the flight recorder and post-incident interviews with the flight crew indicated the 737 was on a stabilized approach to Runway 22 until the landing flare, when it “floated” for thousands of feet, finally touching down more than 4,200 feet past the threshold of the 7,001-foot runway, leaving less than 2,800 feet of runway surface for the 737 to decelerate and stop.
The NTSB said when the first officer, who was at the controls, failed to get the jet’s wheels on the ground within the first third of the runway, or 2,300 feet, he should have executed a go-around maneuver instead of continuing the landing attempt.
The NTSB said when the first officer, who was at the controls, failed to get the jet’s wheels on the ground within the first third of the runway, or 2,300 feet, he should have executed a go-around maneuver instead of continuing the landing attempt.
Join Date: Sep 1999
Location: United Kingdom
Posts: 929
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Back in the day I was taught to "drive" a 737 onto the rwy. None of this pussy footing about trying to land it like a light aircraft. Seems to me, to be poor training in jet techniques that are causing more than the fair share of over runs. Maybe training departments should look back to when pilots were being converted from heavy props to heavy jets and re introduce some of those lessons.
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: last time I looked I was still here.
Posts: 4,507
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
No apologies, but this is plagiarised from my post on Tech Log B737 Over-runs thread.
I found many pilots were not advised how to 'put it down'. If it became necessary it was often caused by too much back elevator; thus the answer was to relax the nose and land flat; or worse. The other danger is pulling back even more. My technique, if tending to float a couple of feet above the tarmac, was to 'drop a wing', remembering of course where the wind was. Immediately a main wheel touches down the speed brakes deploy and the a/c sits down.
It's a simple technique, it works, and is not emphasised; but I used to teach it.
I found many pilots were not advised how to 'put it down'. If it became necessary it was often caused by too much back elevator; thus the answer was to relax the nose and land flat; or worse. The other danger is pulling back even more. My technique, if tending to float a couple of feet above the tarmac, was to 'drop a wing', remembering of course where the wind was. Immediately a main wheel touches down the speed brakes deploy and the a/c sits down.
It's a simple technique, it works, and is not emphasised; but I used to teach it.
Longtimelurker
Join Date: Nov 1998
Location: killington Vt
Posts: 391
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
[QUOTE=RAT 5;9909507]No apologies, but this is plagiarised from my post on Tech Log B737 Over-runs thread.
I found many pilots were not advised how to 'put it down'. If it became necessary it was often caused by too much back elevator; thus the answer was to relax the nose and land flat; or worse. The other danger is pulling back even more. My technique, if tending to float a couple of feet above the tarmac, was to 'drop a wing', remembering of course where the wind was. Immediately a main wheel touches down the speed brakes deploy and the a/c sits down.
It's a simple technique, it works, and is not emphasised; but I used to teach it.[/QUOTE
Don’t know about on a 737 but in other types that’s an easy way to drag a wing tip or engine pod. We used to correct that technique if it was noticed on a line check .
I found many pilots were not advised how to 'put it down'. If it became necessary it was often caused by too much back elevator; thus the answer was to relax the nose and land flat; or worse. The other danger is pulling back even more. My technique, if tending to float a couple of feet above the tarmac, was to 'drop a wing', remembering of course where the wind was. Immediately a main wheel touches down the speed brakes deploy and the a/c sits down.
It's a simple technique, it works, and is not emphasised; but I used to teach it.[/QUOTE
Don’t know about on a 737 but in other types that’s an easy way to drag a wing tip or engine pod. We used to correct that technique if it was noticed on a line check .
Join Date: Feb 2000
Posts: 40
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I taught myself to sideslip just before touchdown and it worked every time and a smooth TD on one main gear. This has always prevented any floating and gave me a pleasant feeling of being in control!!! 16 years 737 LHS, now retired.
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: last time I looked I was still here.
Posts: 4,507
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
filejw. B737 ground contact threat is outside training edge/corner of the flaps. Complete side-slip to touchdown is limited by X-wind = bank angle at touchdown. I can expect a 4 engine short gear a/c would have other problems. Like I said my technique is when you are stuck in ground effect at <2'.
In light/medium winds I liked the side-slip approach at <300'. I found on B757/767 it worked a treat and then transferred to B737 if wind limits allowed. Boeing offers 3 methods. I've heard some operators teach only 1 technique. I wonder why a correctly trained pilot is not allowed to choose whichever method from the manufacturer's list is best for the conditions at the time. But we are then back to a common subject about how deep or shallow some training syllabi are.
I used to ask students what they would do if they found themselves floating down the runway. What was the best technique to land the darned recalcitrant beast? Silence, but to their credit they recited the well known get of of jail free card of Go Around. True, but that is some seconds after the flare & float. The wing nudge is something that can be done immediately after you realise the flare was too high. It's not such a good idea if the flare was too strong. That needs to be recovered with elevator first and then see what the state of play is. Nose high and wing down can end in tears.
In light/medium winds I liked the side-slip approach at <300'. I found on B757/767 it worked a treat and then transferred to B737 if wind limits allowed. Boeing offers 3 methods. I've heard some operators teach only 1 technique. I wonder why a correctly trained pilot is not allowed to choose whichever method from the manufacturer's list is best for the conditions at the time. But we are then back to a common subject about how deep or shallow some training syllabi are.
I used to ask students what they would do if they found themselves floating down the runway. What was the best technique to land the darned recalcitrant beast? Silence, but to their credit they recited the well known get of of jail free card of Go Around. True, but that is some seconds after the flare & float. The wing nudge is something that can be done immediately after you realise the flare was too high. It's not such a good idea if the flare was too strong. That needs to be recovered with elevator first and then see what the state of play is. Nose high and wing down can end in tears.
But we are then back to a common subject about how deep or shallow some training syllabi are.
As most type rating syllabus in simulators require the "student" to cover all the sequences required of a command type rating, then before being certified as competent on crosswind landings the competency should include landings up to the crosswind limit for the aircraft type they are trained on.
Rarely does this happen mainly because the syllabus is tight, is biased towards full use of automation and thus little time is available for manual handling. It is a good bet that the complete type rating syllabus on (say) a 737 would include not more than three or four crosswind landings spread over ten sessions - and then only 15 knots crosswind component.
For pilots new to type - especially cadet pilots going directly into the right hand seat after a few hours on light twin trainers - max component crosswind landings are daunting if not terrifying. I cannot count the number of times I have seen in the simulator pilots failing to adequately remove drift before touch down. If only the simulator instructor could take the time to slip into a control seat and personally demonstrate how to handle a 35 knot crosswind then his student would have some idea what ideal to aim for. That never happens of course in a time poor simulator environment. More likely few instructors would risk their reputation by trying their luck for fear of loss of face if they stuff up.
Some students have difficulty "seeing" drift at the flare and then assault the runway with stacks of drift still applied. A technique some instructors find useful is to freeze the simulator at the instant the main wheels impact the runway. This permits the student to observe the difference between aircraft heading and runway heading at his leisure.
With simulators, another method to get practice over a short period of available time is to position the aircraft at (say) 300 feet with max crosswind set in the simulator and allow the student to get continual practice at the flare and touch down technique to pull off a safe landing with drift removed. This includes day and night scenes.
Often at least ten practice attempts at touching down with no drift at max crosswind component will be needed before the student can be relied upon to consistently touch down with drift removed. If, as some argue, a simulator cannot accurately replicate a strong crosswind landing, then a fidelity check on the simulator is in order.
Last edited by Centaurus; 11th Oct 2017 at 13:27.
Guest
Join Date: Apr 2009
Location: On the Beach
Posts: 3,336
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Back in the day I was taught to "drive" a 737 onto the rwy. None of this pussy footing about trying to land it like a light aircraft. Seems to me, to be poor training in jet techniques that are causing more than the fair share of over runs. Maybe training departments should look back to when pilots were being converted from heavy props to heavy jets and re introduce some of those lessons.
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: last time I looked I was still here.
Posts: 4,507
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Centaurus: a man after my one heart. We speak the same truths. You are spot on. I've had to tick the box on cadet x-wind landings. There were more important things in the syllabus (IHO of HOT), but as a confidence booster or crusher a x-wind landing is high up there. We were told to "train to a satisfactory standard", but how when the session is filled with other exercises which are deemed by the powers that be to be more significant.
Then, oh my word, I hear from mate that some airlines, to boost the cadets' flying skills are dropped in th deep end with 35kt x-wind sim training. How can you train that to a satis standard to a 150hr prop pilot in the 3 attempts the syllabus gives you time for. Of course a demo is the best option, and doing so building up from 15-20-25-35; the is if you think that 35kts is a good idea in the first place. I've no idea of their command course, but I wonder how much x-wind & gusty training is given to the gu who 2 weeks earlier was limited to 15kts as an F/O. Windshear training is not the same; the idea is to GA not land. And s Sod's law is that in the 1st 100hrs of command a testing x-wind will raise its ugly head.
Then, oh my word, I hear from mate that some airlines, to boost the cadets' flying skills are dropped in th deep end with 35kt x-wind sim training. How can you train that to a satis standard to a 150hr prop pilot in the 3 attempts the syllabus gives you time for. Of course a demo is the best option, and doing so building up from 15-20-25-35; the is if you think that 35kts is a good idea in the first place. I've no idea of their command course, but I wonder how much x-wind & gusty training is given to the gu who 2 weeks earlier was limited to 15kts as an F/O. Windshear training is not the same; the idea is to GA not land. And s Sod's law is that in the 1st 100hrs of command a testing x-wind will raise its ugly head.
