SWA lands at wrong airport.
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It will be interesting to see the results of this if we even get to see them. It's not an accident in the official sense and I don't know how much of the investigation would be made public. Certainly civil lawsuits are likely and SWA has to be prepared to defend those.
It's very possible the airline will not fire the pilots as long as they didn't do anything blatantly outside of SOPs or negligently disregard SOPs. Still, one wonders how it's possible to do this and still have followed SOP. It's possible there will be some question that the airline's procedures need tweaking and they probably will be.
Many years ago an ATR landed at the wrong airport up in Wisconsin? (going from memory here)...I think it was destined for Appleton and landed at Oshkosh? In that case the pilots ended up in serious trouble not so much because of the wrong airfield but because of what they did after....told some lie to the passengers and then took off and again (without a dispatch release) in order to proceed to the correct airport.
I wonder at what point the crew of this SW flight discovered the mistake and what kind of words were said. I'll bet it was one hell of a moment of realization. It's how they behaved after this moment I think that truly defines their character and professionalism. We all make mistakes, we just hope they aren't big ones like this.
It's very possible the airline will not fire the pilots as long as they didn't do anything blatantly outside of SOPs or negligently disregard SOPs. Still, one wonders how it's possible to do this and still have followed SOP. It's possible there will be some question that the airline's procedures need tweaking and they probably will be.
Many years ago an ATR landed at the wrong airport up in Wisconsin? (going from memory here)...I think it was destined for Appleton and landed at Oshkosh? In that case the pilots ended up in serious trouble not so much because of the wrong airfield but because of what they did after....told some lie to the passengers and then took off and again (without a dispatch release) in order to proceed to the correct airport.
I wonder at what point the crew of this SW flight discovered the mistake and what kind of words were said. I'll bet it was one hell of a moment of realization. It's how they behaved after this moment I think that truly defines their character and professionalism. We all make mistakes, we just hope they aren't big ones like this.
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At a guess, they only recognised it after they selected reverse, otherwise it would have made for an easy touch and go. In my view this is inexcusable at this level of the profession.
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A lot of this chat here is from US guys. Please help the rest of us here. I fly B737NG's. This was a night incident, which I expect therefore to be dark. Some have said it was a -300 or -700. Both have MAPs and IRS, VNAV & LNAV. Thus, how can the magenta line take you to the wrong place? I assume the destination was programmed correctly before departure. If this was a visual diversion from the STAR I assume the Clark airport had its RW lights on, otherwise how could there be a visual manoeuvre. But the MAP & PROG 1 and the NAV aid for approach into Branson would all have been screaming to 2 pilots that all was not as it seemed. What nav aids does Branson have, and what does Clark have?
If the VNAV had been set up for arrival at Branson then it would have showed >2000' error on the path. I don't know the relative positions of these airfields, but in one case there might have been a dive for the path, and in the other a reduction in ROC and an increase in power.
Please can some SWA locals explain to us how an LNAV/VNAV a/c can end up so far from the target.
If the VNAV had been set up for arrival at Branson then it would have showed >2000' error on the path. I don't know the relative positions of these airfields, but in one case there might have been a dive for the path, and in the other a reduction in ROC and an increase in power.
Please can some SWA locals explain to us how an LNAV/VNAV a/c can end up so far from the target.
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From an air traffic controller's point of view, I too am bewildered as to how this can happen.
Does anyone know whether when flying into Branson you do so under a radar service or procedural service?
If the aircraft was under a radar service, how on earth did the radar controller not notice!?
If it was on radar, I imagine the aircraft was released from vectors to fly a visual approach. But that still doesn't mean the controller can forget about monitoring it on radar.
Does anyone know whether when flying into Branson you do so under a radar service or procedural service?
If the aircraft was under a radar service, how on earth did the radar controller not notice!?
If it was on radar, I imagine the aircraft was released from vectors to fly a visual approach. But that still doesn't mean the controller can forget about monitoring it on radar.
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Pilots who exercise proper disciplines and are qualified instrument rated pilots with all charts and at least one NAV tuned and identified and course selectors properly set won't find themselves landing at the wrong airport.
This is right out of the Boeing FCOM:
This is right out of the Boeing FCOM:
When executing a visual approach, the use of navigation aids (ILS, VOR), MAP display, VSD and FPV is recommended to enhance situational awareness
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Originally Posted by Landflap
I have said it many times on this forum; until we get back to proper pilot training selection testing , proper pilot training, airline funded training & therefore, proper selection, this is going to happen over and over again.
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Not so long ago a US crew landed their Boeing on the wrong airport as well.
Here a report by Atlas Air about the reason for this unwanted diversion.
Atlas Identifies Causes of 747?s Landing at Wrong Airport | Aviation International News
Here a report by Atlas Air about the reason for this unwanted diversion.
Atlas Identifies Causes of 747?s Landing at Wrong Airport | Aviation International News
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ah yes, pilot skill got them out of the situation that the same pilot skill got them into?
at least they got peanuts, and probably 15K freq flier miles for the near death experience.
bright lights, bright lights..we need to land..
at least they got peanuts, and probably 15K freq flier miles for the near death experience.
bright lights, bright lights..we need to land..
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It was a series 700.
Thanks: which means it was a GPS a/c with a MAP. And, guys, don't forget there are 2 pilots on board. At night, if no radar, then I'd expect some kind of procedural arrival & approach. If on radar then vectors to a position where perhaps the crew called visual. Thus, via one method you end up in the correct place following the magenta line; via the other the talkie talkie chappie points you at the correct bit of tarmac.
It's a mystery. Was the B747 Atlas a MAP or needles & dials? That too was a night. The A320 that missed Belfast was a daytime NPA to a visual transition. The recent B767 in Africa is also a mystery. That too was a MAP a/c.
I can understand, with a cockpit gradient, the odd hot high approach instead of a go-round. However, diving into the wrong bit of terrain with 2 pilots…..? Who was PF? I've heard of captains spotting the airfield during the 1st visit by a PF F/O and talking them onto finals like a radar. "there it is, can you see it. Would you like to go visual?" etc. etc."left a bit, down a bit, etc. etc." What nag aidf was tuned? The VNAV/LNAV could not fly the wrong approach, neither could the ILS. Let's hear about this so we can learn.
Thanks: which means it was a GPS a/c with a MAP. And, guys, don't forget there are 2 pilots on board. At night, if no radar, then I'd expect some kind of procedural arrival & approach. If on radar then vectors to a position where perhaps the crew called visual. Thus, via one method you end up in the correct place following the magenta line; via the other the talkie talkie chappie points you at the correct bit of tarmac.
It's a mystery. Was the B747 Atlas a MAP or needles & dials? That too was a night. The A320 that missed Belfast was a daytime NPA to a visual transition. The recent B767 in Africa is also a mystery. That too was a MAP a/c.
I can understand, with a cockpit gradient, the odd hot high approach instead of a go-round. However, diving into the wrong bit of terrain with 2 pilots…..? Who was PF? I've heard of captains spotting the airfield during the 1st visit by a PF F/O and talking them onto finals like a radar. "there it is, can you see it. Would you like to go visual?" etc. etc."left a bit, down a bit, etc. etc." What nag aidf was tuned? The VNAV/LNAV could not fly the wrong approach, neither could the ILS. Let's hear about this so we can learn.
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According to FlightAware, the flight was 5 hours late. The tower would likely have been closed at the time of their arrival.
Actually, it could happen very easily. Here is an example...
SWA: runway in sight. We will take the visual...
ATC: roger, cleared for the visual approach runway three-two. Contact Branson Tower on 128.15. Good night
SWA: cleared for the visual. Contact tower. Good night...
[crew flips switch to tower frequency]
SWA: Branson Tower, Southwest 4013 visual to runway three-two.
ATC: southwest 4013, roger. Not in sight, cleared to land runway three-two..
SWA: Roger... Cleared to land...
[airplane lands at wrong airport]
[sound of that irritating woman's voice, in a demeaning manor] Recalculating...
Actually, it could happen very easily. Here is an example...
SWA: runway in sight. We will take the visual...
ATC: roger, cleared for the visual approach runway three-two. Contact Branson Tower on 128.15. Good night
SWA: cleared for the visual. Contact tower. Good night...
[crew flips switch to tower frequency]
SWA: Branson Tower, Southwest 4013 visual to runway three-two.
ATC: southwest 4013, roger. Not in sight, cleared to land runway three-two..
SWA: Roger... Cleared to land...
[airplane lands at wrong airport]
[sound of that irritating woman's voice, in a demeaning manor] Recalculating...
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I'm willing to guess....again this is just a guess, that the FMS was not programmed incorrectly. If this is true it's also extremely unlikely that the FMS was sending bad information to the instruments leading to the wrong airport.
The automation systems and the procedures in place to operate them are pretty robust and reliable making it unlikely this was caused by a failure of the automation and navigation.
I'm willing to bet (and maybe I'm wasting my time here but just for the sake of discussion) that this was purely a pilot error. One pilot probably said..."I have the runway and the other pilot may have just taken his (or her) word for it and gone alone for the ride.
In the United States (for the sake of our overseas colleagues) airline pilots routinely fly visual approaches but are supposed to (required) to still have the proper navigation selected and programmed but I can see how it's easy to become complacent and ignore this.
Some of you may say "I never would do that" but I've witnessed it myself. I was jumpseating on a nameless major carrier in the US many years ago and observed the crew of an MD-80 nearly landing on a closed runway.
The FO spoke up but the captain was confident he was doing it right and the FO said..."oh ok" and remained quiet. I then spoke up and agreed with the FO which was enough to make the captain look again and he sidestepped at about 500' (I was commuting into my home base airport so I must have been more convincing because from what he said I think he just took my word for it). It was night and there were men and equipment on the closed runway but for whatever reason the runway lights were on.
Both pilots had the correct ILS tuned in but ignored the increasing localizer deviation as they approached the runway. Not sure what the flight director was up to that night.
We'll never know if my presence on the flight deck that evening saved them or just helped the pilot avoid a last minute go around. My point is that it's a mistake that can happen to anyone under the right set of circumstances and the only way to avoid it is to fight complacency and really pay attention all the time.
The automation systems and the procedures in place to operate them are pretty robust and reliable making it unlikely this was caused by a failure of the automation and navigation.
I'm willing to bet (and maybe I'm wasting my time here but just for the sake of discussion) that this was purely a pilot error. One pilot probably said..."I have the runway and the other pilot may have just taken his (or her) word for it and gone alone for the ride.
In the United States (for the sake of our overseas colleagues) airline pilots routinely fly visual approaches but are supposed to (required) to still have the proper navigation selected and programmed but I can see how it's easy to become complacent and ignore this.
Some of you may say "I never would do that" but I've witnessed it myself. I was jumpseating on a nameless major carrier in the US many years ago and observed the crew of an MD-80 nearly landing on a closed runway.
The FO spoke up but the captain was confident he was doing it right and the FO said..."oh ok" and remained quiet. I then spoke up and agreed with the FO which was enough to make the captain look again and he sidestepped at about 500' (I was commuting into my home base airport so I must have been more convincing because from what he said I think he just took my word for it). It was night and there were men and equipment on the closed runway but for whatever reason the runway lights were on.
Both pilots had the correct ILS tuned in but ignored the increasing localizer deviation as they approached the runway. Not sure what the flight director was up to that night.
We'll never know if my presence on the flight deck that evening saved them or just helped the pilot avoid a last minute go around. My point is that it's a mistake that can happen to anyone under the right set of circumstances and the only way to avoid it is to fight complacency and really pay attention all the time.
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According to FlightAware, the flight was 5 hours late. The tower would likely have been closed at the time of their arrival.
How would the lights have been on? 3700' at night would look very short to what your used to. My neck hairs would've been twitching. It must have been a very crowded cockpit as he stood on the brakes.
How would the lights have been on? 3700' at night would look very short to what your used to. My neck hairs would've been twitching. It must have been a very crowded cockpit as he stood on the brakes.
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I flew the 767 for two different airlines and the procedures were similar.
The flight plan was loaded by datalink into the fms and then checked against the paper flight plan before start.
In the terminal area the correct approach was loaded pre approach checklist and checked against the approach chart. the approaches were from the data base and applied to the destination airport that had been checked prestart.
In the case of the visual, the runway centerline was extended for SA. this was not an optional technique.
finally, the egpws would issue a warning if you were more that a few miles from the programmed destination airport and below a minimum altitude agl, like 500 feet or so. I heard this warning going into San Juan PR once when a couple of VOR's were notamed out and we had some map shift over water.
Minimum runway width for normal ops was 50M/150ft. 100 feet would require a lot of special considerations and is possible for 737 but would be a restricted operation and special qual.
KPLK runway thresholds are marked with 8 bars not 12 like KBBG 150 foot runway.
KPLK has mirl and KBBG hirl so probably wouldn't look much different except since both are instrument runways they would turn to amber for last 2000' or 1/2 of runway so looking at KPLK, 1/2 of the runway edge lights would have been amber. depending on ambient light and light intensity, this may not have been obvious.
KPLK has about 300 feet of displaced thresholds and KBBG has overruns.
Don't know what the visibility was but KPLK has terminal and hangars close to the runway and south while KBBG the terminal is detached and north.
I know very well how easy it is to become complacent with repeated familiar operations.
definitely not saying this couldn't have happened to me but thinking about how it could have happened allows us a nice review of how important it is to study and get a picture of what the runway and airport envoironment are supposed to look like once we get there.
The flight plan was loaded by datalink into the fms and then checked against the paper flight plan before start.
In the terminal area the correct approach was loaded pre approach checklist and checked against the approach chart. the approaches were from the data base and applied to the destination airport that had been checked prestart.
In the case of the visual, the runway centerline was extended for SA. this was not an optional technique.
finally, the egpws would issue a warning if you were more that a few miles from the programmed destination airport and below a minimum altitude agl, like 500 feet or so. I heard this warning going into San Juan PR once when a couple of VOR's were notamed out and we had some map shift over water.
Minimum runway width for normal ops was 50M/150ft. 100 feet would require a lot of special considerations and is possible for 737 but would be a restricted operation and special qual.
KPLK runway thresholds are marked with 8 bars not 12 like KBBG 150 foot runway.
KPLK has mirl and KBBG hirl so probably wouldn't look much different except since both are instrument runways they would turn to amber for last 2000' or 1/2 of runway so looking at KPLK, 1/2 of the runway edge lights would have been amber. depending on ambient light and light intensity, this may not have been obvious.
KPLK has about 300 feet of displaced thresholds and KBBG has overruns.
Don't know what the visibility was but KPLK has terminal and hangars close to the runway and south while KBBG the terminal is detached and north.
I know very well how easy it is to become complacent with repeated familiar operations.
definitely not saying this couldn't have happened to me but thinking about how it could have happened allows us a nice review of how important it is to study and get a picture of what the runway and airport envoironment are supposed to look like once we get there.
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WHILE I have not checked the notams, the INTENDED destination has an ILS for runway 32.
AT night, I would always tune, identify and follow the ILS, even on a visual approach.
You get a better landing off an ils, than a visual as your approach is right on the glideslope, and you are sure of the correct runway and airport!
You are also practicing the procedures in case you have bad wx at that airport and need the ILS.
I am sure the pilots just got lazy, or perhaps complacent is the better word. I am not so sure they will keep their jobs.
SWA fired the captain who landed on the nosegear at LGA. And she got the right airport.
And it was luck that they stopped in time. Maybe the pilots did see the red lights indicating the end of the runway and made max use of the brakes.
(the lights marking the ends of the runway emit red light toward the runway to indicate the end of runway to a departing aircraft and emit green outward from the runway end to indicate the threshold to landing aircraft.)
AT night, I would always tune, identify and follow the ILS, even on a visual approach.
You get a better landing off an ils, than a visual as your approach is right on the glideslope, and you are sure of the correct runway and airport!
You are also practicing the procedures in case you have bad wx at that airport and need the ILS.
I am sure the pilots just got lazy, or perhaps complacent is the better word. I am not so sure they will keep their jobs.
SWA fired the captain who landed on the nosegear at LGA. And she got the right airport.
And it was luck that they stopped in time. Maybe the pilots did see the red lights indicating the end of the runway and made max use of the brakes.
(the lights marking the ends of the runway emit red light toward the runway to indicate the end of runway to a departing aircraft and emit green outward from the runway end to indicate the threshold to landing aircraft.)
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The sad thing here is that these pilots were probably sitting back and wondering aloud how those dummies at Atlas could have ever landed at the wrong airport just a month or so ago? One of the best things in aviation is letting the other guy make the stupid mistakes so that you don't repeat them yourself. 
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Skyjob:
Apparently the local controller at KBBG had his head inserted in a dark place by issuing a landing clearance without having the 737 in sight since the weather was obviously sufficient for a visual.
Having said that, we don't need ATC in the cockpit anymore than they already are. Plain and simple this was a case of gross crew negligence.
Apart from the pilots having made a gross error, considering the frequency of events of this type, maybe it is time the US look carefully at monitoring the flightpath and not giving early landing clearances like in some other countries they practise.
Resultant would surely be a more aware ATC of where the aircraft are not just where they say their are and going to. Monitoring the aircraft/pilots and ensuring the plane lining up to the correct runway and advocating if they are not sounds like a standard job for ATC.
I vote for a rethink in the US ATC system procedures for one....
Resultant would surely be a more aware ATC of where the aircraft are not just where they say their are and going to. Monitoring the aircraft/pilots and ensuring the plane lining up to the correct runway and advocating if they are not sounds like a standard job for ATC.
I vote for a rethink in the US ATC system procedures for one....
Having said that, we don't need ATC in the cockpit anymore than they already are. Plain and simple this was a case of gross crew negligence.