AA Crash Jamaica

[protectthehornet]

Remember when:

remember when a commercial pilot (let alone an ATP) had to demonstrate that he was master of the craft and could land within 200' of his chosen spot?

We are losing certain skills. We seem to go for a smooth landing so often that we lose the spot landing skill.

Now...maybe something happened to really screw up this landing...but more than likely the pilot had lost that special skill of planting the wheels exactly where you want them.

Day or night, a narrowbody plane (ok, I might give a very long narrowbody like the 757 a break) should touchdown on those nice big rectangles painted on the runway...(certainly if you are following a heavy jet, wake turbulence may make you choose to land past the preceeding plane's touchdown point). And if you can't see white rectangles, then use alternate methods of determining a touchdown point equivilent with the above. (See Davies' "Handling the Big Jets" for a description of this)...or touchdown abeam a standard vasi, or where the ILS GS is taking you, or count a certain number of runway lights down the runway.

Always AIM for something...don't just get near the runway and hope for the best.

Now I know this airport didn't have touchdown zone lights...that certainly would have helped...but all runways have different colored runway lights to let you know where you are...check AIM for thorough discussion.

Now, if someone changed the color of the lights...that would be a hell of an excuse...but it probably didn't happen.

Spot landings...make them a habit...be as skilled as Lindbergh or our forefathers in aviation...(and you navy guys...don't gloat!)


I just read that the FAA is monitoring the American airlines pilots for landing skills now.

[captjns]

Excerpt of post from Portectthehornet---

Now I know this airport didn't have touchdown zone lights...that certainly would have helped...

Still... landing some 4,000 feet beyond the threshold is not justified... don't you think?

[UALSIC]

Does AA have circling approaches in their OPS Specs?

[Zeffy]

MKJP has RNAV (GPS) approaches to both runway ends.

Rwy 30 minima are 373' HAT and 1.9 Km.

[misd-agin]

411A - when has any organization thrown it's members 'under the bus', especially before the investigation is complete?

[misd-agin]

fireflybob - "Also the energy is proportional to the speed squared so a few knots fast makes a big difference in terms of stopping. Throw in a wet limiting runway with poor drainage and you may not make it."

We can debate "a few" and "a BIG difference", but your performance pages will show you what each knot of speed equates to in landing distance. Touchdown point is much more critical than speed.

[Doors to Automatic]

If crews are used to crossing the threshold, closing the throttles within 2-3 seconds and touching down a second or two later then surely they must have known something was a miss. 4000ft would equate to 20 seconds or so after crossing the threshold.

[galaxy flyer]

In this day and age of FMS/IRS wind readouts, doesn't anyone check and "call-out" winds on final? Maybe an USAF habit, but I always call out the wind component during final and over the lights on short final. This goes a long ways to awareness of wind and its effects.

GF

[vapilot2004]

The crew was aware of the prevailing conditions, and the amount of runway that wizzed by before they decided to continue the landing phase.

I find fault with this statement.

[SK8TRBOI]

But VA...it's much worse if they did not have this awareness! So whether or not you find fault with that statement, the alternate 'aint no better. Consider: "The crew was clueless as to the prevailing conditions, and the amount of runway that wizzed by as they decided to continue the landing phase." Yikes!

I mean, what's left? They either were aware and blithely "kept to the mission", or were ignorant of their speed, position, condition of runway...and options.

It'll have to be an uterally fantastic set of circumstances for this not to be primarily PE.

Not that this might not happen, though. Take a look at the preliminary NTSB report on the recent taxiway landing(!) at ATL by a DL 763...indeed, a truly amazing set of events really does mitigate (not eliminate) some of the PE. It's very intersting reading - check it out.

[PJ2]

Doors to Automatic;

If crews are used to crossing the threshold, closing the throttles within 2-3 seconds and touching down a second or two later then surely they must have known something was a miss. 4000ft would equate to 20 seconds or so after crossing the threshold.

Exactly right.

To your excellent point:

Touchdown from an altitude of 50' above the runway, (our FOQA event uses time from 30'), nominally occurs within 3 to 5 seconds. All other factors being equal, (threshold crossing height, approach speed, rate of descent all nominal), a touchdown longer than six seconds from 50' indicates the landing is "going long". Timings greater than about 10 seconds correlate to a touchdown beyond the TDZ and heighten the risk of an over-run accident.

While a number of factors likely were in play in this accident such as a higher groundspeed through the contributions of a tailwind and a slightly higher TAS due to slightly higher-than-standard SAT and possibly higher airspeed than Vref +5, varying visibility in heavy rainshowers (+SHRA), night-time with possible "black hole" phenomenon in the transition from "inside to outside" leading to lack of depth perception and subsequent long (floated) landing, wet, possibly flooded runway, possible late/no spoiler deployment, choice of landing flap and possibly other, less likely factors, FOQA data still has a role to play in examining the historical record of the fleet type's approach and landing performance.

Examining it from a safety investigation pov, if the record indicates that the performance of this aircraft during the approach and landing rollout was a relative outlier, a different causal chain and airline response may be indicated.

If on the other hand the FOQA data indicates that long landings with higher than normal approach speeds with reduced flap settings and idle thrust, (not the case here, we must assume!), both of which are being widely implemented as fuel saving techniques, then examination of this accident will necessarily take a different approach. The ATSB Report of the QANTAS B744 over-run accident at Bangkok made just such an observation. We will have to wait for the final report before we know which is the case.

Along with ASAP, (which has been reinstated I believe, after the APA withdrew their cooperation/participation, accusing AA management of using such safety information to go after individual pilots - anyone?), American also runs a FOQA Program. Such a Program will have a number of landing events which would monitor approach and landing performance.

Depending upon available parameters for the NG, (like the 320, they should number in the thousands), LFL design/installation and other FOQA Program features and protocols, such events, with associated levels of severity, may include:

Glideslope & Localizer deviation below 500',
Heading Changes Below 500',
Rate of Descent Below 500',
Airspeed Deviation from Vref+5 at 50', (greater than 20kts),
Thrust/N1 levels near/at Idle thrust,
Landing distance from 50' AGL,
Time from 30' to touchdown,
Time from main gear compression to nosewheel compression
High Vertical 'g' at touchdown
High Longitudinal 'g' during rollout
High Lateral 'g' at touchdown
Heading Changes During Rollout
Excessive Aileron, Rudder Deflection During Rollout
Non-standard/Reduced Flap Setting for Landing

and other events, again, depending upon the FOQA Program design and how interested the airline is in actually knowing what its fleet is doing on a daily basis. There are carriers around who don't want to know, mainly to avoid the higher costs of "knowing", a point raised numerous times in other threads.

Each of these events would have nominal performance numbers, the exceedence of which would produce a FOQA Event, the greater the exceedence, the greater the severity of the event.

This information would be trended, the outliers examined and so on. Where the outliers are signficant, a call to the crew to further understand the event can be made.

So, for example, if the 737NG fleet was showing a trend to long landings including long hold-off times greater than the times you mention, (eight seconds is about the upper limit from 50' to t/d and will likely produce touchdowns outside the TDZ which is normally the first 3000' for 1/3 of the runway whichever is less, but practically speaking anything longer than beyond the first 2000'), then questions will arise about what was done, if anything, about the trends in terms of flight crew awareness programs, during recurrent training highlighting the importance of landing within the TDZ, etc.

If the landing was indeed as reported, about 4000ft past the threshold, the question clearly becomes why and was it inevitable and if so, from what point might it have been rescued. Most pilots are reluctant to initiate a go-around after touchdown and before reverse has been selected but it can be done, (certainly NOT after reverse is selected, the associated risk being far higher than the risk of a lower-speed over-run). Both the aircraft's DFDR/CVR and the broader "upstream" safety tools described herein will assist in answering this question. This is the second serious overrun accident of this specific kind in a decade for American so establishing these facts, including an examination of the operational culture, is important to either rule out or deal with any related factors.

PJ2

[SK8TRBOI]

Good post...quite the read!
A few 'off the cuff' remarks (dangerous, I know):

#1 If the 738 does prove to have unusual, um, 'tendencies', I would "think"(hope) an experienced crew in-type would be intimately aware of these tendancies. Heck, I'd like to think I would...the -11's sure got plenty of 'em!

#2 I think you may have it it at the end of your article...um, POST I mean. And that would be "an examination of the operational culture (@AA)"...

[Doors to Automatic]

At a landing speed of 140kts the aircraft would cover 3000ft in approx 13 secs and 4000ft in approx 17 seconds.

[protectthehornet]

Yes, 4000' is way too long, touchdown lights or not.

to my knowledge, all big airlines in the USA don't do circling approaches....unless the weather is above basic VFR mins.

Indeed, my ticket even says something like: circling not authorized below basic vfr.

(just another cheapening of the sim time)

ok...the crew screwed up badly...shall we move on?

[fireflybob]

We can debate "a few" and "a BIG difference", but your performance pages will show you what each knot of speed equates to in landing distance. Touchdown point is much more critical than speed.

misd-agin, I couldn't agree more and I was not playing down the importance of touching down at the correct point on the runway but merely pointing out that if you are landing in a tailwind other factors can also come into play. Also, if you have a few extra knots the tendency is to float.

[p51guy]

AA can circle to land if it is 1000 & 3. The weather that night was but they decided not to. We should get some FDR and CVR info to see why they chose to land downwind. We get reporters saying they landed in a driving rain storm but METAR reports say it was VFR. I know, things can change in minutes, but only when the real time data comes out will we be able to see how this happened.

[pattern_is_full]

I've been eyeing those yellow cement(?) landing light pylons and imagining the effects if the plane had skidded another 20 meters or so - especially now we know there was fuel for the return flight still on board....
________

On the larger question of rejected or aborted landings, is there anything to be learned from naval aviation, where the operating assumption, at least as built into the procedures and hardware, seems to be to assume a go-around when conducting carrier landings, arguably the most critical form of fixed-wing aircraft landing?

1. First action by the pilot after touchdown is to firewall the throttles in case a GA is needed.

2. Auxiliary stopping device (tailhook) does not impede flying characteristics of the aircraft if a GA is required (except for a touch of drag).

3. The "other brain" monitoring the landing - the LO on the deck - is primarily there to order a wave-off if the approach is flawed in any way.

Not suggesting arresting gear for airliners Just wondering if there is some room for more of the Navy mindset that "Every landing is a likely wave-off unless the approach is nailed all the way."

[misd-agin]

GalaxyFlyer - "In this day and age of FMS/IRS wind readouts, doesn't anyone check and "call-out" winds on final? Maybe an USAF habit, but I always call out the wind component during final and over the lights on short final. This goes a long ways to awareness of wind and its effects."
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Personal technique - I pull up the wind page, gives headwind and crosswind values, on all approaches. Compare tower reported winds vs. FMC winds vs. outside visual clues, to include windsock if visible.

[vapilot2004]

But VA...it's much worse if they did not have this awareness! So whether or not you find fault with that statement, the alternate 'aint no better. Consider: "The crew was clueless as to the prevailing conditions, and the amount of runway that wizzed by as they decided to continue the landing phase." Yikes!

I mean, what's left? They either were aware and blithely "kept to the mission", or were ignorant of their speed, position, condition of runway...and options.

I can tell you with 98% certainty the crew was well aware of their speed and options Mr. Skates.



Runway condition - braking reports on water contaminated runways are moderately uncommon and have inherent inaccuracies compared to their cold weather counterparts. All the same, the industry standard 15 percent fudge factor has worked reasonably well thus far.

Runway position - this is where I found the most fault. Obviously, had they known where they were, the crew would have gone around. What could have led to this lack of positional awareness? Severely restricted visibility is the number one suspect whose accomplice could most likely have been a gust of wind from the rear.

[p51guy]

Where did you come up with this
wag?