If you fly a military attack aircraft from whatever service and you are in fear of running out of fuel, having to ditch in a hostile area or environment then are you in the right job?

This mission was highly complex but at the end of the day the crew did EXACTLY what they trained for, what they were paid for and what they volunteered for.

I salute them for doing it but if they had refused then I would like to think that a) Others would very quickly have taken their place

b) Their refusal to carry out a lawful command would be looked at by their senior officers.

As others have said it is silly to compare mission 'x' with mission 'z' and we should all applaud everyone that is prepared to put their lives on the line when it comes to carrying out their duty.

If the title of the documentary had been 'The Falklands Most Audacious Mission' or even the 'Most Complex Mission' then I am positive there would be applause from every corner in recognition of what was achieved, but the instant self praise, or even a nomination for an exemplary act of 'Daring, do' is put onto any forum, then it will draw criticism.

Respect for all those that took part in that conflict and double respect for those that flew over, walked over, or sailed into, or under so called 'enemy' territory.

Mick, I was presenting a very subjective and simplistic argument to illustrate how a definition of daring could be considered against a risk register.

I had considered the Harrier case but didn't want to cloud the argument. I accept that CO will depart the launch point which is only prudent. However the missions would all have been planned with enough fuel for recovery ie not a one-way mission. It is true there may not have been a conveniently placed Spanish mership when you needed one.

On the question of one-way missions - a mission that has sufficient fuel to reach an LZ is not a one-way mission. A mission that has sufficient fuel for half the planned route is! I accept that walking out is an additional risk.

Was the opposed mission that you refered to RW or FW? If the latter then I would agree that the risk was high. If the former the risk from a covert insertion is lower than from an overt bomb run.

"If the title of the documentary had been 'The Falklands Most Audacious Mission' or even the 'Most Complex Mission' then I am positive there would be applause from every corner in recognition of what was achieved, but the instant self praise, or even a nomination for an exemplary act of 'Daring, do' is put onto any forum, then it will draw criticism."

If the RAF had made the documentary then the criticism would be deserved. Blame the meedja

Totally agree with you and we are all old enough, wise enough and been around the block enuff to know that the truth sometimes does not make interesting viewing.. The media needs to 'sell' their story and to get the thing into print they will have learned how to glamorise, exaggerate or distort events just to sell their product. It is surely up to better informed folks to say when something is wrong factually incorrect or over 'egged' to portray the event as being more spectacular than it was.

was this documentary 'over egged'? Unfortunately, yes and that is sad as it stands on its very own amazing merits :ok:

Allegedly, the thin red line had some fat blokes in it ;)

'Most Daring Raid', possibly debatable, programme an oversimplication of the event for the general public. As an observer of BB1 and a participant of subsequent BB's I think that rather than 'dashing daring do' a far better commendation of the participants should be to praise the many examples of cold courage displayed by both Victor and Vulcan crews. Tanker crews were just as inexperienced as the Vulcan in operations of this complexity and the pressure was enormous. Lets leave it at that.

Whether RN, Army or crab, as a Cold War Armed Forces, we were all equally as "inexperienced" in a conventional warfighting role. We were also all doing complex operations under enormous pressure, so it seems incredulous to single out one cadre, operation or crew to heap praise upon.

Mick, agreed. The whole operation was daring in the extreme. So Most Daring RAF Raid? The other thing is that Joe Public probably has a different interpretation of Raid and probably equates Raid with Air Raid and Air Force whereas we know raids can refer to many other offensive sorties.

Two Vulcans to BA (or wherever)
 

All this from the Daily Mail is very interesting. But was if 44(R)/44(Z) Sqn were planning Vulcan one to do a little SEAD with 4 x Shrike and some 9Ls, presumably it would've carried the bomb-bay tanks like the Shrike BB missions, no? In which case, what effect would this have had on BEagle's putative tanking plan?

Cheers,

S41

Presumably it would have made it work even better.

Indeed, but how much better?

S41

Could a Vulcan actually carry 4 x Shrike, 1 x 101-10 ECM Pod and 2 x Sidewinder?

Considering that it only had 2 external pylons, and could carry 1 x 101-10 on one side and either 1 or 2 Shrike on the other using a double carrier.

Where were they proposing to mount the extra Shrikes and the Sidewinders?

Dale Brown writing for the Mail nowadays?
 

All this talk of Vulcans with lot's of extras reminds me of dale Brown's first book 'Flight of the old dog'. B52's with all sorts of missles and other exotic stuff on multiple rotary launchers etc.

Maybe Mr B has another career as defence correspondent for the Mail?:hmm:

I don't think so. Not Mr B.

I hope he doesn't mean me:E

Mister B

Mr B
 

I'd never call anyone on this forum a journalist, 'twould be an insult too far I think!
:ouch::=

Vulcan Refuelling
 

Has anybody got a picture taken through the Vulcan windscreen of the aircraft being refuelled from a Victor? Very understandably I'm not sure there is one but it would be a great picture and I would love to use it in the Falkland chapters of my Victor book.

I glanced across this thread for the first time yesterday and feel I must post a reply here to answer some of the forum’s many unanswered questions, and also to dispel a few myths and un-truths about Black Bucks 4, 5 and 6, the SEAD (suppression) missions or, more correctly, DEAD (destruction) missions. Many of you may have read Vulcan 607. The Shrike missions were not referred to in Roland White’s book and a re-release of his book last week to coincide with the Falklands 30th anniversary contains some lazy journalism and fails to report the events accurately or honestly. The following are accurate and truthful statements about these 3 missions from an impeccably reliable and authoritative source that may help some of the posters here appreciate some of the complexities and difficulties conducting a DEAD mission without the opportunity to trial or live fire the munitions being used and utilising totally improvised tactics developed by the crew the day before the actual first mission itself, Black Buck 4.

• Prior to Black Buck 4, the crew was not briefed on, or made aware of, any suitable Brazilian military diversion airfields should the final re-fuelling bracket on the return leg fail for any reason. The crew had calculated that they would have insufficient fuel to make landfall in Brazil should an in-flight emergency arise. The official brief was to abandon aircraft.

• Black Buck 4 was aborted 4 hours into the mission due to the failure of the tanker’s HDU and its inability to transfer fuel to the Vulcan (total flight time 8 hours).

• The MARTEL ARM was not used due to its predicted pK of 0.6 and relatively large warhead (330 lb), and intelligence reports that identified 3 possible locations for the TPS-43 mobile radar, one of which was in the vicinity of Port Stanley. The crew was concerned about possible collateral damage to the residents there.

• The mission was re-staged the following night (Black Buck 5) with 2 Shrike AGM-45A ARMs optimized against the TPS-43 search radar (E-H band). An improvised tactic was developed by the crew to entice the radar operators into switching the radar on. The radar was switched on and off intermittently as the Vulcan manoeuvred into a launch position and a game of ‘cat-and-mouse’ therefore ensued.

• To achieve a pK of 0.9, 2 Shrikes needed to be launched in a 20 degree dive from a precise range of 6.9 nm. A launch error of only 0.5 nm saw the pK curve diminish steeply to below 0.7. This required the Vulcan Navigator (Radar) to identify the location of the TPS-43 on his H2S and call the release range to the AEO who had in front of him an ILS type localiser meter to ensure the Shrike seeker head was aligned with the target.

• Following launch of the 2 Shrikes, their predicted time of flight was 30 secs. The TPS-43 went down after 31 secs. INTEL reported that the TPS-43 impacted some 6m from the radar damaging its waveguide assembly (the blast fragmentation warhead was only 145 lb in size) and a spare waveguide and antenna was flown in the following day.

• During Black Buck 5 the crew had also identified Sky Guard fire control radar emissions in the I band and so the following day the crew re-launched on Black Buck 6 with a total of 4 Shrike AGM-45As, this time with 2 optimised against Sky Guard.

• Black Buck 6 followed the same Hi-Lo-Hi profile of the preceding Black Buck missions but this time without the benefit of surprise! The TPS-43 did not want to play (probably due to a coordinated GR-3 airfield attack). SEAD worked! Close to BINGO fuel after 40 mins in the overhead of Stanley and with 4 ARMs still on the 2 pylons, the crew elected to enter a steep dive to entice the Sky Guard radar to attempt a lock. The Sky Guard achieved a lock and the 35mm Super Oerlikon guns engaged the Vulcan and opened fire as it descended as low as 6000ft from its sanctuary height of 12 000ft. Fortunately the Vulcan was not hit and the crew manoeuvred into a firing position for the 2 Shrikes. The Sky Guard was completely destroyed killing 4 operators and injuring another.

• On its return to Ascension Island, the Vulcan broke its probe during the final re-fuelling bracket and was fortunate to make landfall in Rio de Janeiro. This, however, is another story which won the captain of Black Buck 6 the DFC. For those interested in the tale of this extraordinary excursion, the nearest an article gets to the truth is one written by Mark Khan for the magazine ‘Falklands – a 30th Anniversary Souvenir Issue’ released last week, a sister publication to ‘Britain at War’.

Fascinating read about the S/DEAD missions, and made me realise there's plenty more left in the Black Buck stories untold.:D

Very impressive Darvan. Hopefully, this will put an end to the inter-service politics of Black Buck that are still rolling on.