finestkind wrote:I've just been watching the old Look At Life film 'School for Skymen', made not long after I'd won an RAF Scholarship. Some quotes:

"...Cranwell's 70-odd Jet Provosts"

"Pilot cadets will get 170 hours of training..."

"The old propeller powered aircraft beloved of past generations have no place here!"

How lucky we were back then. Perhaps there are lessons to be learned from that era?

LJ,

.

Nail on Head.....NOT.

You hit the buzz words used today....and absolutely no mention of "Leadership" and all that includes.

You have just described in British Military Speak the same failure we see in some branches our American Military.

The Military is not a corporate firm and must have Leaders....who have a Warrior Ethos that can lead people into combat and creating a system that rewards "Yes Men" and the mindset that numbers, data, equipment, facilities, and people are all just so many "items" to be managed is the Achilles Heel of current thinking on both sides of the Atlantic.

Our military is focused upon learning how to honor Pronouns and Trans People in shower rooms rather than being focused upon War Fighting Skills much as your own are having to suffer through as has been mentioned by others here.

We had McNamara during my time in the Army and we saw what a disaster that kind of thinking was back in the 1960's....and what you just described is very much akin to that kind of thinking.

Good Leaders make good Commanders.....and not the other way around.....anyone can be a Commander...all it takes is the Rank and the Brown Nose......Leaders are held back in Rank because they are more likely to have bloody noses rather than one with brown on it,

A good Leader will fight for his Troops and see to it they are properly trained, equipped, and their needs provided for so they are ready for battle when called.

Commanders on the other hand will see to it they do not exceed their budgets and always do exactly as told to do so by their next senior commander in order to gain a favorable report card that will lead to promotion and never mind the Troops.

That is how most militaries work unfortunately.f

This is not a new problem. The pre WW2 RAF had essentially the same problem and it is a reflection of all Military Forces in peacetime. Leaders are not wanted in peacetime, managers are. Managers will compliantly go along with what the politicians want which will have everything to do with buying off the constituent of the day and nothing to do with actual operational readiness.

This mess is just a symptom of the larger problem. The RAF has not had an “enemy” since the end of the Soviet Union. That means the senior leadership is now almost entirely composed of managers, not leaders and they ensure any new promotions are like them.

I think all middle powers with the possible exception of Australia, have this issue; Canada certainly does.

The sad reality is the recent events in Ukraine have now amply demonstrated what a hollow force our Militaries really are, yet all I see is the deck chairs on the Titanic getting rearranged in bureaucratic MBA speak “process review” exercises

For me the height of irony is the Japanese with its history of constitutionally endorsed pacifism, is starting a huge ramp up in military capability with an emphasis on attaining deterrence through offensive capability. Go figure…..

Have I imagined my numerous deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan?

Or did I misunderstand what you were saying?

Defense against the Soviet Union was an everyone, all the time mission. It directly affected every aspect of defense planning and operations. I do not mean to trivialize the Iraq and Afghanistan actions but they were deployments of the RAF not THE mission of the RAF.

Isn't that what the US do with their Reserve Squadrons, apart from an agreement with an airline of stepping out of the military into a commercial cockpit. I believe, once was don't know about now, that is how it works with the RSAF and Singapore Airlines.

Tend to disagree. It is that complex. It is not just training people. It's maintaining standards whilst having the number to do the job if required, whilst allowing a wastage rate (the correct one) from resignations, retirement, moving up the ladder (off front-line op's), at exactly the correct amount, to train the right amount at the right time, to fill these holes whilst allowing them time to gain experience to.........If it was just training there would not be an issue.............apart from numbers, such as how many do we train. Well let's look at our expected wastage rate which will have to include the economic situation as the (once upon a time) attractive package offered by the airlines will entice our lad's and laddet's to depart. Well, have I got a job for you if you can accurately forecast the economic situation. I mean it cannot be that complex as all investment brokers are millionaires and we never have a recession or market crash. Sorry got carried away and my tongue in cheek was a bit too cheeky.

Having seen the boom and bust over a number of decades with the knee jerk reaction whereby we end up with more aircraft than aircrew or that many aircrew we need to invent new ground jobs to allow the ROSO to be paid back or allow early (which has happened) departure ignoring ROSO. Yes, one of the biggest issues is "admin and business BS for too long - mimicking so much the MoD appears to damage" but that also can be attributed to the nature of the beast, which is the posting cycle. We post SQNLDR/WGCDR/GRPCPT to this post, with no or minimal experience in this area. By the time they become an effective functioning body they are posted out. So, the complexity is compounded by the "time to train" that body in that position whereby they may have a positive impact.

Simply put the complexity or lack of it is probably mirrored by our economic situation.

SASless - agreed, which is why we have CLM - Command, Leadership and Management. Three separate things that need developing as you progress. It’s important to know the difference between the 3. Command is an appointment, a position of responsibility with legal liabilities for those that sit under them. Leadership is the ability to project your personality to inspire others into doing things - popular and unpopular. Management is a sub-set of command and sees to the planning, organisation and execution of defence. If you don’t have all 3, then you will likely fail. They also don’t grow on trees!

execution of defence…….. destruction of defence….. killing of defence

Yup you got that right.. all equals reduction off.

Not necessarily cheaper, just more predictable costing on a year to year basis.

I missed this the first time:

What does any of that; (points 1,2,3 in bold), actually mean?

Perhaps:

1. = being a training manager and understanding the training management task ?
2. = a spreadsheet ?
3. = a management plan ?

These sort of statements always seem to me to be the sort of thing that bosses, CEOs and managers should have demonstrated that they know and understand BEFORE they are awarded the jobs and positions they are in ?

What is the point of having university and management degrees, when at signs of trouble or problems, the people supposedly in charge run away and pay vast sums to someone else to come and explain how to do the managements' jobs - that they are already supposed to know how to do ??

Doesn't that result in paying twice for management ?

Why aren't these requirements written in plain English?

My best guess is that what they are REALLY asking for is:

1. A proper understanding of the existing aircrew recruitment, training and deployment problems.
2. How and why it keeps getting f**ked up.
3. How to fix it.

One problem is that MoD's 'procurement' side has 'Team Leaders', and under them 'Programme Managers'. When, in practice, they are Team Managers and Programme Leaders; and the latter deliver, often despite the former.

I've seldom come across a Team Leader who has the slightest idea what is required to deliver the requirement. Whereas a Programme (or even project) Manager is required to be able to do every job in the team. Sort that out and you're a long way to getting it right.

....and let's sub out those flying roles which might have provided some respite for hard-pressed crews whom are/were remaining.

I am aware of one young person who spent most of her youth hankering after a career flying for the RAF and as far as I am aware had got through the first stage of doing that.

She's neither male nor white and the related political shenanigans which occurred recently was a big factor in her decision to change course for a career at an airline. She did not wish to be seen as a diversity hire.

It's a bit much when the air arm of the British military is being less fair than an Emirati airline. I mean, people of South Asian descent are routinely treated appallingly in the middle east. Not a great look, is it?

P

See this:

Lockheed details low Hawk T2 availability rates that will push UK training overseasHow on earth did they let it get to this state?

RAF Valley going 'Black' everytime there's a frost doesn't help matters. This has been happening rather a lot lately with the cold snaps.

Putting all the (flying training units) eggs in one (airfield) basket was never going to be a recipe for success.

The Ascent contract will have many MoD dependencies, which Ascent will understand and perhaps knew many were undeliverable due to conflicting MoD policies.

For example, it is common for MoD to have to provide Government Furnished Services/Equipment/Facilities (GFX). Most would think this reasonable, to avoid having to buy them all over again. And some are strategic UK assets, with no alternative permitted. But a few years before the T.2 was bought, the Chief of Defence Procurement banned all GFX in contracts. While at the same time pushing ‘incremental acquisition’ (another name for existing policy), which by definition requires GFX.

There is a direct correlation between successful projects of the time, and staff completely ignoring CDP and his Executive Board. But most didn’t ignore him, and even if the policy was eventually rescinded the immediate cuts in the necessary staff and resources meant the long-term effect is still felt. This entire function was controlled within Service HQs. As none of them retained the staff, it was now down to the project teams. If they didn't have someone who'd done the job in Service HQ.... For example, the RN had four people doing this on aircraft and equipment. The same four managed all the prerequisites to facilitate (e.g.) the pilot numbers calculation Lima Juliet mentioned earlier. The posts are long gone, and the last incumbents long retired. Instead of being a core central function, like many activities it's done by hundreds once in a while, with no training. A related problem was ‘training’ becoming part of ILS. It’s not. By definition it arrives too late.

My guess is the flying training people in MoD didn’t stand a chance. This is part of a much bigger problem, and MoD needs to get back to basics. It needs to understand what jobs are not volume-related.

Is this a case of the system determining the size of the front line command pilot numbers/crews without taking into account training billets/OE posts/Staff or desk officers requiring that type rating. And then not taking into account the platform primes contractual obligation to provide instructional staff, particularly for overseas exports now as well as in UK. How many defence prime contractors train their own people to fly type's like Typhoon for example? Once you take into account the total size of the pilot cohort both serving and non-serving then you start to see the shortfall in the training pipeline. The pull through into industry will prevail and the contractors rarely train someone from scratch; perhaps there is a need for a contribution to the training pipeline funding required of the contractors where skills are to be capitalised on post mil aircrew requirement......