NGAD and F/A-XX
 

A question for those of you from the greatest nation on the face of the earth...
You currently have the USAF procuring (and apparently already flying) the NGAD.
At the same time the USN is procuring the F/A-XX.
I get that when it comes to the Navy and Air Force there is intense rivalry - and that the last time someone tried a common jet design, it ended up with three variants and a huge sticker price.
But the combined cost of these two new programs must also be astronomical.
How does procurement in the US armed forces work on these mega projects?
Forgive the gross oversimplification, but do the heads of each service just say "...we're designing our own jet because the other guy's jet won't work for us..."
Does the Pentagon have any authority to reign each service in - or does that rest solely with Congress approving or not approving funding?

"Forgive the gross oversimplification, but do the heads of each service just say "...we're designing our own jet because the other guy's jet won't work for us..."

Yes and of course we have to provide a route for retired officers to get jobs in the aerospace industry

And remember the enemy of the USAF is not the Russians - its the US Navy

The inter-service rivalry between them is just - astonishing.
What I'm trying to understand is who bashes their heads together... is it Lloyd Austin?
Or procurement wise, are they just basically laws unto themselves - that can only be restrained by lawmakers refusing to give them any more cash?

You are talking 2 different aircraft, so first the overarching program is NGAD, the USAF fighter is PCA (penetrating counter air) and the USN is FA-XX program, NGAD also contains the skyborg program and probably stuff we dont know about

Both of them want different fighter USAF is looking at a large fighter with extreme combat ranges ( thousand plus nautical miles ) and laser and all the bells and whistles basically rumors are saying its going to be between an F111 and a B-21 in size. USN is getting a smaller less fancy aircraft that can be flown of aircraft carrier

An intriguing question for British posters....:rolleyes:

Jack

The reason there are two programmes is that the requirements are different - and history has shown that trying to make one type fit both land-based and carrier-based is rarely successful. F111B is the poster-boy for that.

What that tends to suggest is that the airframes have to be different in both strength, low-speed response, approach characteristics etc and then you're into material resistance to seawater corrosion, sealants, EMI/EMC when in proximity to high-power emitters.

That doesn't stop you using common components in the design - engines (if materially compatible), radars, comms etc (see EMI/EMC), seats and so-forth. It's probably where you might find the most savings logistically, but the devil will be in the detail. Which is probably why most primes spent quite a bit of time re-inventing the wheel so to speak, because its sometimes quite difficult to prove that component X (acquired for an AF programme) meets all the requirements for operating off ships.

Not entirely sure in this case that the performance / role requirements are that different. The USN could really do with leggier jets than the SuperBug.

"and history has shown that trying to make one type fit both land-based and carrier-based is rarely successful."

that's sometimes correct but often the "other service" makes so many crazy demands for changes it turns out to be another aircraft all together - read Bill Gunstons "Jet Bombers" for the saga of the A3d Skywarrior/B66 Destroyer saga - they took out the wing fold, changed the profile and plan, changed the engine type, redesigned the slats and leading edge, took out the extra strength for carrier ops etc etc etc and finished up with an aircraft that did exactly the same things but was slightly faster. had shorter range and was 3 years later than if they'd just bought the Navy aircraft to start with

Back to the original question, the services have input, but the political realities are often very complex, and often driving, factors. The US services do not seem to be the ones driving combined programs, it has usually come from higher in the organization, namely the Secretary of Defense and senior Pentagon managers, Congress and other pressures for jointness and perceived cost savings. If it were left to the services they would prefer aircraft that best suit their unique requirements. Cost realities do come into play, and the services sometimes realize that they need to bundle programs, and it would be cost prohibitive to have multiple programs going at once- and the fact that if a program gets to "too big to cancel" that might be better to have a "good enough" aircraft than no program at all. The services do provide requirements (often changing, often gold-plating) to the program offices for solitary or joint programs. Some requirements are complementary, many are not.

The joint F-111 was largely driven by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who as one derider noted "knew the cost of everything, and the value of nothing"

The jointness on the MV-22 Osprey (before the Army dropped out) was largely driven by a convoluted allegiance of senior DoD, congressional and industry partners. A later SecDef tried to cancel it, but got out maneuvered.

The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) resulting in the F-35 was largely driven by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, and was a conglomeration of a dizzying array of JAST, CALF, MRF programs to replace various US, UK and allied airframes. There has been general acknowledgment that the diverse requirements for the A, B and C versions compromised each one, and continued arguments whether two or three different aircraft would have been better off after all. While the F-35 is maturing, I cant help but think that it was over compromised.

...posted with deep irony!

Thank you - that was the kind of insight I was looking for.

Salute!

Only two jets I can think of that had good use by the carriers and USAF were the F-4 variants and the A-7D or A-7E.

The new F-35 seems to be a player, especially with the Bee for the USMC and foreign customers.

Problems is roles and missions that determine the required capabilities of the planes as much as the politics.

Gums sends..

Here in the UK , the Navy & RAF made good use of the Buccaneer , but I think the RAF only got it as a result of TSR2 cancellation & us being too poor to buy the F-111.
Others will know more.
gums It ain’t a Jet but in your time in Vietnam , didn’t both the airforce & Navy use the Skyraider too?
Is this mainly a fixed wing difference in requirements?
Both seem to use quite a few of the same helicopters.
Whatever the rivalry , your kit budget seems bottomless!

They did, also the South Vietnamese Air Force. Like the F-4 and A-7, the A-1 was first designed and built as a naval aircraft.

"the Navy & RAF made good use of the Buccaneer , but I think the RAF only got it as a result of TSR2 cancellation "

The RAF fought for years to avoid taking the Bucc. - it was only when it was that or nothing they relented

Similar problems with the Wessex 2 v Wessex 5 when the RAF found they had to go to sea occasionally...

It was only when Healey changed UK defence policy that the UK abandoned F-111K following the assassination of TSR-2 by the Wislon government, which assassination had earlier been aided and abetted by Mountbatten and Zuckerman...

The P.150 version of the Buccaneer which was proposed for the RAF in 1968 was considerably superior to the S.2, but Healey wouldn't hear of it... So the RAF had no option but to order the S2.

There was also the AFVG - but rather like P.1154, competing RAF and RN requirements put the kybosh on it - and the French pulled out of the programme too.

I'd say that's the exception rather than the rule. Everyone points to the F-111B, but conveniently forget the F-4, A-4, Buccaneer, F/A-18, Rafale, etc, that are all highly successful carrier and land-based aircraft.

I didn't want to highlight the common factor in those successful types, lest I be accused of bias.

Procurement of major weapon systems in the US Armed Forces is a complex process that involves multiple stakeholders, including the military services, Congress, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Each service has its own unique mission requirements and priorities, which can result in different procurement decisions and programs.

In the case of the Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program, the US Air Force (USAF) is responsible for procuring a new advanced air superiority fighter to replace its aging fleet of F-22 and F-35 aircraft.

Similarly, the Navy is procuring the F/A-XX program, which is a new advanced carrier-based fighter for the US Navy (USN) to replace their F/A-18 Super Hornet aircraft.

It's true that the cost of these programs can be astronomical and the different services may have different requirements and priorities. This is why the OSD and Congress play a critical role in the procurement process to ensure that the programs align with the overall national defense strategy and are cost-effective.

The OSD is responsible for overseeing the procurement process and ensuring that the programs align with the National Defense Strategy. This includes working with the services to establish requirements, evaluating program proposals, and making recommendations to Congress on funding levels.

Congress also plays a critical role in the procurement process by approving funding for weapon systems and overseeing the program's execution. They also have the power to authorize, fund, or de-fund programs based on their priorities.

In summary, while each service has its own unique mission requirements and priorities, the procurement process is guided by the overall national defense strategy, and the OSD and Congress play a critical role in ensuring that the programs are cost-effective, align with the national defense strategy, and has appropriate funding.

well going the other way

Gladiator, Hurricane, Vampire, Hornet, Fury,..................... ;)

Cease of talking the merde du taureau, espece de rosbif!

Srsly, Dassault did a pretty good job on the Rafale, in terms of balancing cost-driving differences (different parts assembled in different structures) against leaving carrier-related "scar weight" in the landbased airplane. The challenge of optimizing the design with a lot if iterations on a reasonable time period was one reason that they developed CATIA, which has also done well in terms of keeping the Dassault family off the breadline.

It also definitely helped that the AdlA had a tradition of relatively light and efficient fighters.

In the case of NGAD and F/A-XX, a check of public sources indicates that the mission requirements are very different. What we don't know is the extent to which the Pentagon has managed to ensure that both new programs (and the F-35 upgrades) use common technology, but given the classification levels I'm not optimistic.

There is a practical limit to how big and heavy and aircraft can get and still be viably carrier based. Not just takeoff and landing, but fitting into the hanger deck. That's what really killed the naval variant F-111.
The Air Force doesn't have a similar concern - if they need to make it bigger to carry a certain weapon system or radar, so be it.
What does make sense is developing common systems and avionics - especially now days where such a huge amount of money goes into the electronics. That's basically what Boeing did with the 757/767 - different aircraft but with a common flightdeck and systems.
Of course, that requires a high level of cooperation between the different services, which is far easier said than done.

Well, the F-111 was a metre shorter than the A-5 and three metres narrower with the wings swept, so I wouldn't agree that size is what killed off the F-111B for the US Navy.

But it also worth pointing out that the F-4, A-4, Buccaneer and F/A-18 (and A-7 and E-2) were designed for naval carrier operations, not as joint programs. They just so happened to be of utility, and good all around aircraft, for some land based air forces. The USAF and Royal Air Force had little to no input on their original specifications (the F/A-18 did have some heritage from the YF-17). Had they been forced as joint programs the planes likely would have been further compromised from their original Naval requirements. The Rafale does get credit from starting with both requirements.

But size does mater, as tdracer pointed out hanger size is an issue, and so is "spotting" or "spot factor", basically footprint. Yes the Vigilante was large (and so was the A-3 and the E-2), but in most applications there would only be 4 RA5C Vigilantes aboard (and more commonly only 4 A-3 tankers and 4 E-2's).

Using the common air wing model with 2 fleet air defense squadron/fighter squadrons with 12 twelve aircraft each, or even with just one heavy Fleet Air Defense squadron with @12 aircraft, the 12 (or 24) F-111B's would have taken up a tremendous amount of real estate. This would impact the number of other aircraft the airwing could carry. The ultimate replacement the F-14 also had a large spotting factor, but could do just about everything (except loiter time) much better than a F-111B.

"Size" also implies weight, and the F-111B had significant weight issues.

The thing that surprised me is the degree of sway influential Chief Designers had in times past.
Maybe they still do.
I'm trying to remember where I read it - but there was an anecdote of a very senior military officer being openly threatened by a very well known designer during the procurement process for a particular platform - essentially "...you need to consider doing what I say or it could impact your career..."

Realistically, after getting the B-21 contract they know they won’t get the NGAD contract, as the DoD struggles to maintain the 3 remaining main manufacturers. With LM having the F-35 contract Boeing should be in the prime position - if it wasn’t for their current appalling performance on their programmes which makes them high risk on bith cost and timeframe.

https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023...-ngad-fighter/

Northrop Grumman won’t bid on Air Force’s NGAD fighter

Interesting - I was just re-reading Neville Shute's 1948 "No Highway" about fatigue issues in a supposed UK airliner... as Shute was of course a designer himself I assume he knows what he was talking about. He describes the Designer.....

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....61da1b4f18.jpg
https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....e1f02abce9.jpg

Why the F-111B never made the cut. Having flown both F-111B and F-14, USAF test pilot George Marrett thinks it was a good idea to cancel the F-111B, and considers F-14s “the best all-around fighter I ever flew", also commenting of his test flying the F-111 in its early days as the worst aircraft he had ever flown.

https://www.smithsonianmag.com/air-s...b-1-180969916/

https://aviationweek.com/defense-spa...t-navy-fighter

White House Connects Secret Code Name To Next Navy Fighter

The Biden administration has requested funding to develop an NGAD Navy fighter under the special access Link Plumeria program.

A tiny crack has opened in the U.S. Navy’s closely guarded plans for a next-generation crewed fighter, with the White House confirming a relationship between the F/A-XX project and an apparent special access program code-named Link Plumeria.

The disclosure adds new depth to the Defense Department’s ongoing investment of more than $40 billion to develop a new family of Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) technology for the Air Force and Navy, with the latter facing calls by some lawmakers for a potentially devastating budget cut in fiscal 2024….

….Funding for the F/A-XX program had been hiding all along under the Link Plumeria special access program (SAP) code name, which—although classified—ranked as the Pentagon’s fourth-largest research and development program.

The fiscal 2023-27 $11.5 billion budget for Link Plumeria in the fiscal 2023 request fell behind only the spending levels for the Air Force’s Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, NGAD and Next-Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared programs.

In fact, the requested budget for Link Plumeria exceeded the proposed $10 billion outlay in research and development for the Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider during the same period.

Despite its size, Link Plumeria was a public mystery. Although the large investment pointed to a known, classified development project such as the F/A-XX, Navy officials refused to connect the programs as recently as two months ago.

“As stated in the budget exhibit, details are classified per Executive Order 13526, Sec 1.4 (a),” a Navy spokesperson stated in an email to Aviation Week on May 23.

But the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directly tied Link Plumeria to the F/A-XX program for the first time in a July 10 communication to Congress.

The House Armed Services Committee has passed a version of the fiscal 2024 defense authorization bill that proposes to reduce a $2.1 billion spending request by the Navy for Link Plumeria to $1 billion, citing only “unjustified requirements.”

In response, the OMB said the committee’s proposed spending cut for Link Plumeria would harm the Navy’s development plans for the F/A-XX fighter.

“The language makes it impossible for the Navy to satisfy a critical element of the [national defense strategy] in support of Joint Force priorities,” the OMB letter stated. “The 70% reduction breaks the program and leaves the acquisition strategy unexecutable.”….

FORTY BILLION........... my god .......................... and that's just for initial development.........

We could probably just buy the PLA for that ....

https://defaeroreport.com/2023/11/02...sk-dr-science/

"There is another program for a much more capable reconnaissance aircraft..There are articles that have already been delivered, but there are challenges with that program & the program has been rescoped to get to the next block of a/c" ~ Vago Muradian

On the Next Generation Air Dominance NGAD program, it is claimed that USAF prefers Boeing over Lockheed's design. Vago Muradian reports that LM has pursued an "evolutionary" capability building on its F22 & F35 prgms, while Boeing has pursued a more ambitious "fresher" approach.

The @defaeroreport also reports that the US Navy's FAXX next gen fighter contract is likely to be awarded ahead of USAF's NGAD EMD award. Northrop Grumman, one of 3 teams to have designed & flown a NGAD demonstrator, withdrew from the competition but is in the running on FAXX.

It is getting close to the culmination of the tech development and demo phases of the NGAD & FAXX efforts that started nearly a decade ago under the Aerospace Innovation Initiative. We are likely less than a year away from both FAXX and NGAD program awards.

https://www.aerosociety.com/news/nga...tional-divide/

NGAD - a generational divide?

….Kendall, now Air Force secretary, stated in May 2023 that the service had issued a request for proposals covering engineering and manufacturing development of NGAD. He earlier raised eyebrows by stating that the unit cost of NGAD would be “multiple hundreds of millions” and “too expensive to be purchased in large numbers” and has also said that the plan is to team each NGAD with two CCAs.

The cost is high, but not surprising for an F-22 follow-on: a 2009 RAND Corporation study calculated that continued production of the F-22 would cost $173m per unit – almost $250m in today’s money. The USAF probably hopes to acquire enough NGADs to replace 187 F-22s, but fewer than the 339 F-22s that the service once aspired to buy. No initial operational capability date has been announced, but NGAD is not expected in service before 2030.

Faced with an expensive competition, a short production run, and government control of future development, Northrop Grumman has decided not to bid on the NGAD prime contract (the company’s Mission Systems’ sector could still be involved) and is focusing on US Navy’s F/A-XX programme. That leaves the USAF to choose between a Lockheed Martin monopoly of its fighter force or make an award to Boeing – whose performance on recent USAF programmes has been disappointing and characterised by delays on seemingly straightforward projects. Some observers believe that the scope of the programme, and the defence industry’s shortage of modern facilities and engineers, will result in a leader-follower award and a ‘national team’ approach.

NGAD itself is likely to be quite large. A 2018 USAF presentation includes a slide outlining the adaptive engine programme, and it makes a clear distinction between the 45,000lb/thrust-class flight-weight demo engines (GE’s XA100 and P&W’s XA101) sized to re-engine the F-35, a smaller ‘scaled core’ engine for AS2030, and a further derivative for retrofit to ‘fourth-generation’ fighters. That implies a maximum thrust of around 35,000lb for the NGAD engine. NGAD will probably be as heavy as the F-22, or slightly larger.

NGAD’s size may be the primary reason why it is a separate programme from F/A-XX, although the requirements are also believed to diverge in other ways. For example, the Navy may favour range and stand-off weapon capability over stealth. Other than engine technology, very little has been said about the extent of technology sharing between the two programmes.

The use of the adaptive engine indicates that NGAD will be designed to operate efficiently at both subsonic and supersonic speeds. It has been claimed that in a supercruise-capable fighter, adaptive technology can increase mission radius by 38%. However, Grynkewich’s comments imply that it may not have traditional fighter attributes, such as high manoeuvrability. A sustained 9G capability sets a high floor to the thrust/weight ratio and wing loading of a fighter aircraft and increases empty weight.

On the F-22, ‘supermanoeuvrability’ demanded heavy vectoring nozzles and enormous tail surfaces. Smaller – or even absent – tails are compatible with all-aspect, wideband reduction of radar cross section (RCS), previously associated with subsonic tailless designs, like Northrop Grumman’s flying wings or Boeing’s Bird of Prey. The ‘bowtie’ signature pattern of the F-22 and F-35, with a stronger signature on beam aspects than to the front or rear, was optimised to penetrate a linear air defence system – but in the South China Sea, radar threats are found at all aspects.

At this years Air Force Association (AFA) convention near Washington DC, one exhibit pointed to the possibility that NGAD will have a longer endurance than earlier aircraft. Martin-Baker showed a concept mock-up of a proposed Mk 20 ejection seat that resembled a home recliner, with control inceptors forming part of the seat.

Martin-Baker consultant and former USAF pilot and physician, Kathryn Hughes said that the company expects NGAD missions to be long and cognitively intensive. In addition to offering a reclining position, the Mk 20 concept removes much body-worn equipment from the pilot and incorporates it in the seat, and includes Wi-Fi-type devices to monitor the pilot’s physical condition….

But will they incorporate the BVR, non-co-operative, pronoun identification system which will probably be a requirement?

Mog(him/sir)

Only if they introduce 5he breathalyser pre-start,,,, 🙄🙄🙄