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Originally Posted by BATCO
(Post 11106883)
PapaD
Thanks for response. You have correctly identified II Sqn RAF Regt as participating in operations in SL. However some of your detail is wrong. II Sqn's first involvement came as part of a concurrent Op (MAIDENLY), with a Flt deploying just as 42 Cdo (follow-on force to Para/Gurkha BG) withdrew at the conclusion of the major intervention. We arrived by C130 (conventional landing). The second involvement came a year or so later with the Sqn parachuting into Op SILKMAN to demonstrate the UK's ability to reinforce rapidly 'from over the horizon'. I was honoured to have participated in both (PM me if you want to know my position/role). Given the debate on whether Op PITTING should be recognised by a medal/clasp I might add that I missed the SL/OSM medal for MAIDENLY by one day and SILKMAN by several (and the days could not be added together). But I think PITTING should be recognised with the OSM with a 'PITTING' clasp. Qth Batco I do sympathise with the guys from 1 Sqn but sometimes you go, sometimes you don't, and it looks like there at least some RAFR in theatre anyway. Lots of politics and an element of right place right time? I'll also add that we had: II Sqn doing FP for us at the 'real' start of Ops in AFG in October 2001 but then had 40Cdo doing FP in Bagram in December (I guess because of who we supporting plus I don't think they were there purely for FP?) Our SH Squadron Rocks deployed with us at the beginning of Pallliser and operated as door gunners (amongst other things) so there was a RAFR presence in theatre from day one. This sort of thing has happened before and will doubtless happen again- The debate over the Guards going to the Falklands with 5 Bde as a starter for ten? |
From my time in the RAF, what I remember is the RAF Regiment always seeming to try and distance themselves from the rest of the RAF. Always (unjustifiably in my view) considered themselves to be some sort of elite, both above the RAF as a whole and also other units of the British military.
I guess if they said it to themselves enough times, they would start to believe their own hype. Without the GBAD role, I really wonder what their future is. If as someone earlier suggested, their current strength is around 1,800, is that really sustainable? Seems very small. |
Originally Posted by Foghorn Leghorn
CG has handed his notice in about it though.
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Things must have changed a great deal since I left the RAF. It seems unthinkable that a member of the RAF Regiment might write a letter.
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Originally Posted by J.A.F.O.
(Post 11107171)
Things must have changed a great deal since I left the RAF. It seems unthinkable that a member of the RAF Regiment might write a letter.
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Originally Posted by MPN11
(Post 11107099)
Any further scuttlebutt on this? A bit extreme for a 1-star.
No further scuttlebutt on this unfortunately! |
Would have been different under Tiger Tim Thorn.
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And under Bootsie Griffiths.
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Originally Posted by langleybaston
(Post 11107190)
Would have been different under Tiger Tim Thorn.
That CG was very well liked and respected amongst our ranks. |
Whatever the reasons behind it, a letter like this is not the way to go, no matter how strong the feelings behind it.
What would be even more worrying would be a unit warned off to deploy saying 'We don't want to go, send someone else'. |
From my time in the RAF, what I remember is the RAF Regiment always seeming to try and distance themselves from the rest of the RAF. Always (unjustifiably in my view) considered themselves to be some sort of elite, both above the RAF as a whole and also other units of the British military. "pot calling kettle, send colour state over" :) |
Seems all is not well in the Royal Air Force.
I seem to remember that a Valley sqn. ldr QFI recently went public about the rather shambolic training programmes at Valley. Anyone know the consequences. ? |
Originally Posted by BATCO
(Post 11106883)
PapaD
Thanks for response. You have correctly identified II Sqn RAF Regt as participating in operations in SL. However some of your detail is wrong. II Sqn's first involvement came as part of a concurrent Op (MAIDENLY), with a Flt deploying just as 42 Cdo (follow-on force to Para/Gurkha BG) withdrew at the conclusion of the major intervention. We arrived by C130 (conventional landing). The second involvement came a year or so later with the Sqn parachuting into Op SILKMAN to demonstrate the UK's ability to reinforce rapidly 'from over the horizon'. I was honoured to have participated in both (PM me if you want to know my position/role). Given the debate on whether Op PITTING should be recognised by a medal/clasp I might add that I missed the SL/OSM medal for MAIDENLY by one day and SILKMAN by several (and the days could not be added together). But I think PITTING should be recognised with the OSM with a 'PITTING' clasp. Batco |
I don't recall any RAF Regiment airmen doing a turn on gate guard at a certain Wiltshire unit in the seventies. So much for airfield defence specialists... :}
(Flippant comment before the assault starts.) |
Originally Posted by tucumseh
(Post 11106424)
I recall, about 20 years ago, Director Infantry and Commandant Infantry Trials and Development Unit being highly complimentary about the RAF Regt, in particular a certain Sqn Ldr (Ian C) during a lengthy tour at ITDU when he was put in charge of the flagship programme. One of his colleagues, a Black Watch Major, thought likewise, which is of course much higher praise.
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One question I have - if the RAF Regiment had deployed, would it have been able to immediately call on all the Combat Service Support that 16 AA has assigned to them? Medics, Logs, Int, Eng etc? There was a very short fuse of this Op and to spend a few days putting together a force package around the RAF Regt would have been very wasteful of time. Ultimately it would have been a COMJFC call, and why not use the VHR force that is on readiness?
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Originally Posted by stevef
(Post 11107661)
I don't recall any RAF Regiment airmen doing a turn on gate guard at a certain Wiltshire unit in the seventies. So much for airfield defence specialists... :}
(Flippant comment before the assault starts.) At night, the Regiment gunner was withdrawn, a police dog handler and his pooch were assigned to patrol the site and a handful of airmen in the Ops building were armed. The standing joke was that the Regiment were afraid of the dark! |
For those that cringe every time they see VSOs tweeting #NextGenRAF #ASTRA #WholeForce et al, here is a fun parody account @NextGenRAF to follow for a laugh.
His latest offering is a Ladybird Book of Air Mobility - scroll through the thread and there is a page for the RAF Regiment. And there's more in an earlier post: |
Originally Posted by Whenurhappy
(Post 11107935)
One question I have - if the RAF Regiment had deployed, would it have been able to immediately call on all the Combat Service Support that 16 AA has assigned to them? Medics, Logs, Int, Eng etc? There was a very short fuse of this Op and to spend a few days putting together a force package around the RAF Regt would have been very wasteful of time. Ultimately it would have been a COMJFC call, and why not use the VHR force that is on readiness?
I don't think the argument is that the RAF Regt could have produced all that 16AA did in terms of numbers and capability. The point was that certain tasks should have been allocated to RAF Regt units (many of which are also VHR). That said, later posters have put up evidence that that was the case. So, the letter to OC 1 Sqn might not be entirely accurate re PITTING (albeit force allocations to other current and recent ops seem to have added as much to frustrations on 1 Sqn). I suppose a potential, and future equivalent more for the aviators here, might be if CHF Merlins were to be continually overlooked in favour of Chinooks on QE/PoW Op deployments. Batco |
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