Hardly my crusade alone LJ, as you well know. I guess this isn't the time or place to talk of airworthiness though. I was merely instancing the proven past illegal actions of certain RAF VSOs that led to the UK Military Airworthiness Systems becoming dysfunctional, and the continuing cover up of their actions by other succeeding RAF VSOs. All that constitutes a reneging of the Duty of Care owed to those they command in my view and hence shares common ground with the ideals of the IDA. Sorry.

All these arguments seem to miss the elephant in the room - The UK MoD mindset is fixed over Crown Immunity and the official policy for Crown negligence has not changed in a century: "Deny, deny, deny, obfuscate, obfuscate, compensate - then continue to deny."

You will never get the guilty to admit they caused and injury or death when the Crown policy forbids that. They will simply repeat the official mantra when in a court of law. Unless you change that policy, the Crown and its servants (us !) will continue to behave in a non-accountable manner in regard to duty of care. I understand the principle of what Graham and the team are trying to achieve here, I just hope they have a few Ministers and PUS in their sights if they want to make a real difference to government sanctioned negligence.

With the MoD it's never a conspiracy, it's always rank incompetence, which often makes the outcome worse.

I thought the point was that the "system" was okay, but hadn't been implemented? That's the message I got from the Nimrod review. I remember reading somewhere that immediately after Hadden-Cave reported somebody proposed cutting airworthiness funding in the SDSR. If that remains the level of training in the RAF then go for it Chugalug.

dervish, thank you for your kind words. In return might I suggest that all who care about the future of the Royal Air Force; of its personnel, aircraft, and systems, should "go for it". Technology has given us all a voice that can be heard around the world. All that is required is the will to make your voice heard.

Two's in, The picture you paint of an obdurate and defiant MOD cannot be doubted. All the more reason to challenge it then, from within and without. The Royal Air Force is particularly vulnerable to its baleful influence by the very nature of its formation, designed from inception to directly adhere to central policy. In my day that was ameliorated by the powers of subordinate commanders, ie the SO's (and the occasional 1 star), who directly commanded personnel behind the station gates; the unit, squadron, wing, and station commanders.

I had a boss who challenged and won against the might of NAAFI HQ, in ensuring that a private contractor provided the 24Hr service to his personnel (air and ground crew) that NAAFI refused to on financial grounds. He was supported by the Station Commander who agreed that the operational effectiveness of the Squadron surmounted the historic NAAFI trading monopoly on MOD land. The arrangement continued until that Station closed. I offer this anecdote merely as an example of how those who commanded personnel (ie the real commanders!) had the discretionary powers to do so. The contract was simplicity itself, you owed your loyalty to your boss, he owed a duty of care to you. I could bore with many instances of how I was the personal recipient of the latter but suffice to say when it worked it worked well. Of course there were exceptions, commanders who should never have been in charge of a whelk stall let alone RAF personnel, but such is life.

I understand that these days much of that power has been removed upwards, into the bureaucracy that exists outside of those gates; to Group, Command, and thence to the MOD. None of those institutions command, they direct, and with the leaden hand that has brought about the likes of the IDA. I don't doubt that many who strive in that pyramid do their best and are mindful that there are human beings at the other end of whatever directive they are publishing, but the personal touch, the caring initiative of your own boss, is now replaced by policy document XX/A19 or whatever.

Reinstate the original powers of subordinate commanders (the only real commanders of personnel in the RAF) and thus raise morale and hence fighting efficiency. It might not be tidy, it might even be more expensive initially, but in the end it will save many fold in operational effectiveness (well it did with the NAAFI spat anyway!).