Russia - Improving forces
 

from the Economist:-

Russian military forces dazzle after a decade of reform - NATO will need to step up

Europe​​​​​​​AFTER THE Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia’s once-mighty armed forces were laid low. “No army in the world is in as wretched a state as ours,” lamented a defence minister in 1994. Yet few armies have bounced back as dramatically. In 2008 Russian forces bungled a war with Georgia. In response, they were transformed from top to bottom.That began with large sums of money. Russian military expenditure approximately doubled between 2005 and 2018, when measured in exchange rates adjusted for purchasing power. , Russia’s annual military spending probably stands somewhere between $150bn and $180bn, says Michael Kofman of the Centre for Naval Analyses, a think-tank. That is around three times as much as Britain and close to 4% of GDP.

Much of that money has been spent on kit. In the past decade, Russia added around 600 new planes, 840 helicopters and 2,300 drones,. Whereas 99% of Russian armour in 2007 was classified as “legacy”—ie, introduced into service more than three decades ago—today 27% is modern, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Russia’s warplanes have gone from being 97% legacy to being 71% modern.

The most important investments were in precision missiles like the land-based Iskander, sea-launched Kalibr and air-launched Kh-101, putting in range targets across Europe. A decade ago the idea that the Russian navy could accurately strike targets in Syria from warships in the Caspian Sea would have been science fiction, notes Dmitry Stefanovich of IMEMO, a research institute in Moscow.“ n a European war, the idea would be to use such missiles to threaten civilian and military infrastructure deep behind the front lines on the ground, ensuring that a conflict over, say, Tallinn would stretch far to the west of the Rhine.

Russia’s ultimate aim is to create a “reconnaissance-strike complex”—originally a Soviet idea—in which data from vehicles on the ground, drones in the air, satellites in space and radio signals emitted by enemy units are collected, processed and fed to the weapons in real time. Any “sensor” (for instance, a drone) can feed a target to any “shooter” (like a faraway ship), with targets prioritised centrally and struck, ideally, within minutes. Though Russia is behind America and probably China in this ambitious endeavour, it has made “huge leaps”, says Dima Adamsky of IDC Herzliya, a university in Israel.

Russian forces are not just better armed, but also more fleet-footed. Thanks to improvements in readiness, Russia could probably get 100,000 troops, complete with heavy armour, to a European hotspot within 30 days. NATO might struggle to muster half the number, of lighter forces, in that time. Around 5,000 of Russia’s airborne troops are said to be on two hours’ notice. Soldiers are kept on their toes with huge exercises. The latest, Kavkaz (Caucacus) 2020, involved 80,000 personnel and concluded on September 26th. “Russia has traded mass for tempo,” concludes Lt-General Jim Hockenhull, Britain’s chief of defence intelligence.

Russian officers in Syria have even shown signs of shedding the Soviet legacy of rigid, top-down command and acting with more autonomy and creativity, a practice known as “mission command”, observes Mr Adamsky. That, he says, would be “a major departure from the Russian military tradition”. And in both countries, Russia has honed its skills in electronic warfare by jamming radios, radars and drones. R

Not everything has been fixed, of course. Viktor Murakhovsky, a former officer who now edits a military journal, is positive about the reforms. But he says that shipbuilding is painfully slow and that the country lags behind its rivals in long-range drones. The new T-14 Armata tank, the next-generation Su-57 warplane and new submarines have all been delayed. The biggest problem of all, is the limited capacity of Russia’s defence industry, including shortages of skilled personnel, machine tools and components.

The trade-off between hardware and humans is also apparent. Mr Murakhovsky points out that a skilled tank commander in his 20s can expect little more than 43,000 rubles ($532) a month in peacetime, lower than the national average. Morale among conscripts, who still make up 55% of the force, remains low, and the short duration of their service limits their usefulness in combat. And though the days of renting out warplanes may be over, last year Russian military prosecutors announced that 2,800 military officials had been charged with corruption, with the amount stolen totalling around $90m.

Nor has military renaissance bought peace of mind. In a war with NATO, Russia “would have conventional superiority for a limited period”, concludes the IISS, but would be outgunned if the conflict dragged on. In recent years, Mr Putin has therefore worked to ensure that a conflict would not drag on. To that end, he has invested heavily in nuclear forces, unveiling a host of lurid weapons such as hypersonic gliders, radioactive torpedos designed to pollute coastal areas and nuclear-powered cruise missiles capable of circling the Earth indefinitely.

For its part, NATO has largely focused on Russian threats to the Baltic states, and the challenges of reinforcing Europe over weeks and months. It has underestimated how Russia’s new firepower might be used in a shorter, sharper and more expansive war that would stretch far beyond the Baltics. Its planners, and the national politicians that set military budgets and priorities, need to adjust their strategies and spending in the light of these new threats.

The 2019 Russian GDP is about $ 1.7 Trn ( UK $ 2.8 Trn ) which means a defence spend ( as quoted ) of around 10% of GDP: if that is correct, then Russia is going to fall off an economic precipice very quickly. For the quoted % spend to be correct, the GDP would have to be around $ 4 Trn, which is more than Germany ( $ 3.8 Trn )

A bug somewhere, I think.

Prune wouldn't let me give links to the site used for dataused. It was tradingeconomics

A lot depends surely on how committed the 55% who are conscripts are?

Which in turn depends on how committed the Kommissars are behind them...

For all their investment in new mil tech, its still enormous massive country to defend (how many Su-57s per 1000 kilometre of border - one?)

I do get the sense the Russian public is growing increasingly weary of all this expenditure when they're seeing their living standards declining year-on-year (which could explain Vlad's reluctance to step up in places such as Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh).

I think the Commissars left a while back - it's now just straight abuse and bullying on an epic scale

TF - I think you have ot be careful calling GDP numbers - Russia provides a lot of its internal market - more so than most Western countries so the GDP figures aren't calculatable exactly the same IIRC

What exactly does this mean ? If anything needed explaining about the GDP data, I would have expected the Economist to have annotated it to that effect.

The Economist's Defence expenditure are in purchasing-power terms, so that items such as the $532 per month tank commander would be revalued upwards by 5 to 10 times to get their Western equivalent. The GDP numbers are calculated using market prices and thus comparing military expenditures to GDP is like comparing apples and oranges.

Same with China and North Korea.

And Argentina & Venezuela!!

Interesting tho that 30% of Russian Aircraft air still counted as "legacy". When you see the problems they had with their aircraft carrier and the time they've spent (around 8 years) rebuilding their major N airfleet base at Severomorsk 1 near Murmansk it suggests that all is not well in several branches of the Russian armed forces.

usedtobeATC,

Er, highly selective use of dates there!

I think that you'll find that World War Two started in September 1939, and involved a stab in the back invasion of Poland by Russia.