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-   -   Fire - USS Bonhomme Richard LHD-6 - 12 Jul 20 (https://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/633983-fire-uss-bonhomme-richard-lhd-6-12-jul-20-a.html)

NutLoose 20th Oct 2021 19:21

I am amazed the RAF were still using the sump plugs in the Bulldog, most light stuff replace them with a quick push drain that is a permanent fit in the sump plug hole between overhauls. Though I do know of one failure, on retracts the push bit pulls off and is clipped to the firewall, one company fitting a new engine and with out thinking fitted a normal push drain as there is lots of clearance around the engine….. or there was until it took off retracted the gear and the leg pushed the drain open…. One forced landing later and another engine change..

Anyway, sorry for the thread drift.

You mention the Station Commander can lose his job over an incident, it happens in civi street too, I believe I know of one case of an accountable manager who lost his as he was prosecuted following an incident, even though he didn’t even work on the same site, but couldn’t hold the position with a conviction.

It does appear all the holes sadly lined up and resulted in the loss of the ship.


​​​​​​…

Asturias56 21st Oct 2021 07:24

" fundamental problems with how the U.S. Navy trains sailors to fight fires in shipyards "

When they make up the list of training tasks I'll bet that comes near the bottom in terms of chance of occurrence

But its much the same in Civvie Street - how many buildings burn down when they are under repair? Windsor Castle, the art gallery in Glasgow (twice), the opera house in Venice (twice), a couple of office blocks I've worked in in London.................

ORAC 21st Oct 2021 09:14

Notre Dame cathedral…

RAFEngO74to09 21st Oct 2021 12:51

USN Official report & endorsement / actions:

For Release Major Fires Review (18 Oct 21).pdf (navy.mil)

https://www.secnav.navy.mil/foia/readingroom/HotTopics/BHR and MFR Investigations/For Release BHR Command Investigation (20 Oct 21).pdf

Old-Duffer 21st Oct 2021 16:34

Burnt Down - HQ Training Command (Brampton) autumn 1985 whilst being repainted!!!

OD

tdracer 21st Oct 2021 18:04


Originally Posted by Asturias56 (Post 11129849)
When they make up the list of training tasks I'll bet that comes near the bottom in terms of chance of occurrence

Yea, but I'd bet they were all up to date in the diversity and inclusion training.
Got to make sure you prioritize the important stuff. :rolleyes:

etudiant 21st Oct 2021 22:04


Originally Posted by ORAC (Post 11129917)
Notre Dame cathedral…

Spot on!! Thumbs up

Asturias56 22nd Oct 2021 07:29

Suspect D&I was immediately above "Dockyard Fires"...................

I guess on the issues with "repair" fires is that often the regular crew/clergy/galleristas/royalty/office drones aren't there - just a bunch of guys from outside fixing things and that's their priority. HSE has probably gone on holiday as well

NutLoose 22nd Oct 2021 12:41

https://news.usni.org/2021/10/21/nav...blazes-in-port


After losing an amphibious warship to a fire, the Navy will elevate the head of service safety to a two-star billet and create a new oversight board meant to improve fire safety throughout the fleet.

In response to findings from a Navy investigation into the fire aboard the former USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) and multiple fires aboard other ships in the last few years, the service will have the elevated two-star billet take charge of the non-nuclear surface force safety standards and report directly to the Chief of Naval Operations, Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Bill Lescher told reporters on Wednesday.

In addition, Lescher has established an oversight board to help identify changes to improve the fire safety posture of the service.

Two's in 22nd Oct 2021 17:36


Originally Posted by SLXOwft (Post 11129665)
From line one of the USNI report of the investigation's findings onwards, it's is clear it was a systemic failure leading to 'an inability to extinguish the fire'. I infer that failure was caused by those at many levels of the chain of command failing to discharge their duties including ensuring their juniors were aware of, and capable of performing theirs. To me that smacks of the VSOs tolerating a slack safety culture. It remains to be seen if punishment is inflicted at the top and corrective training lower down.

Exactly this. The arsonist may have set the fire, but the institutional failure to train and prepare for a relatively likely occurrence (fire) on board the vessel was the reason for the loss. The report is a damning catalogue of complacency, confusion and missteps. This is not about blame, it's about accountability. The fact that this happened just 8 years after a nuclear submarine was written off in exactly the same circumstances, and the subsequent Navy manual for avoiding a repeat performance was either ignored or not correctly disseminated should be grounds enough for some career limiting actions.

Lonewolf_50 22nd Oct 2021 21:19


Originally Posted by NutLoose (Post 11130577)

Life is a funny old dog, Nutty.
Bill Lescher was the CO of the USS Inchon, based in Ingleside Texas, around the time it had a fire in 2001.
I guess he may know a thing or two about amphibs and fires. (I do not remember if it was before or after the Change of Command though).
Hadn't realized he's still serving until I read this article. (Getting a bit long in the tooth, he is, but VCNO's a nice final tour).
Helicopter pilot. All around good egg.

SLXOwft 9th Feb 2022 17:19

The investigation appears to be having concrete results with the Naval Safety Center being upgraded to the 2* Naval Safety Command which reports directly to the CNO.

https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Ne...d-established/

The CNO Adm Mike Gilday has not been pulling his punches:

“We are not operating to our full potential. Over these last few years, I think we have learned some hard truths about ourselves,” Gilday said in a speech broadcast to the Surface Navy Association symposium.“We have seen examples of significant organizational drift – instances of unsatisfactory unit performance, late completion of shipyard maintenance availabilities and failure to deliver game-changing, innovative technologies and concepts at pace.”

Gilday highlighted the inconsistency in performance from unit to unit. Those faults contributed to public failures, like the 2020 fire aboard the former USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6), which showed that sailors and their commanders weren’t ready to fight a fire on a ship undergoing maintenance.
https://news.usni.org/2022/01/11/cno...surface-vision


“The gap between our most and least capable performers is too large. There is unacceptable variability in our performance. This variability cuts across different units, organizations, and communities, both at sea and ashore,” Gilday said.
“At the lowest end of the performance spectrum, we see tragic results like the Bonhomme Richard fire – along with 14 other major fire events in the last 12 years and excessive cost and schedule overruns in key acquisition programs.”

Gilday’s proposed fix is to have commanders and sailors be more realistic about their performance and not ignore or minimize problems.

“The solution lies in focusing on how we can be more self-assessing and self-correcting so that we identify problems before they grow into larger, more systemic issues,” Gilday said.
“Every Navy leader must be ruthlessly honest in how they self-assess and understand their unit’s performance. They have to act boldly and embrace professional risk, elevate problems, welcome transparency, clearly articulate their challenges and leave their egos at the door. If our performance is not as good as we thought, we do not hide our assessment or ‘keep it inside the lifelines.’”

Part of that effort will be to install a two-star – who reports directly to the CNO – in charge of the emerging Navy Safety Command. Creating this new position is one of the recommendations from the Major Fires Review report following the Bonhomme Richard fire investigation. Gilday also alluded to coming Navy organizational changes that will contribute to the cultural shift.

“The critical imperative here is that the self-assessment culture and tools must be widely adopted across the Navy. I expect every sailor to adopt this mindset. Anything less would shortchange our team and our teammates,” he said.

https://news.usni.org/2022/01/11/cno...surface-vision
<pre-emptive strike> There are plenty of aviation focused items on NAVSAFECOM website e.g. "One of the most common things we see at the Naval Safety Center, when it comes to aviation ground mishaps (AGM), is aircraft being damaged during an aircraft move. There are several factors that contribute to aircraft move mishaps, but in most cases it is complacency and lack of oversight by highly experienced senior leaders. So how can we reduce the number of aircraft damaged during a move? It all starts with an effective aircraft move brief." https://navalsafetycommand.navy.mil/...ovement-brief/ </pre-emptive strike>


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