Things I (we?) didn’t know about Falklands Nimrod MR ops
 

Things I (we?) didn’t know about Falklands Nimrod MR ops

Someone very kindly recently sent me some files that are open in the National Archive at Kew, including ORBs and DEFE 58/265 (201 Squadron: Operation Corporate (Falklands Conflict); deployment of Nimrods; lessons learned).

In these files there were sketchy details of a plan for a Nimrod Detachment at Easter Island, described in the 201 Squadron documents.

One of the files detailed an initial “warning of requirement” on 6 April for two aircraft and three crews to be on two hour standby to deploy Westabout to Easter Island for a self-supporting 30 day detachment. Kinloss had to prepare up to six Mk 2 aircraft for this, each armed with three Mk 46 torpedoes.

By 8 April the priority was for two Mk 2s on 12 hour standby to deploy to Ascension Island and the Easter Island option was now priority 2, on 24 hour standby. The Pacific requirement was now to carry six Stingray torpdoes in one aircraft, and for both aircraft to be painted in hemp colour. Chaff cartridges were demanded.

Intriguingly, it then said: "The Pacific (redacted) cancelled." I can't see what the redacted word or words say. My best guess is (Operation *Something*)

The DEFE 58/265 document revealed that on 19 April GCHQ specialists arrived at Kinloss “to fit RACAL RX and recorder to Nimrod Mk 2. Intention being to try out kit at Kinloss before deploying it.” This was then installed as STF080 and air tested overnight, with “No problems.”

I understand that the rack was designed by EWAU, and mounted a stack of Racal radio receivers and a reel to reel tape recorder. The rack was COMINT only and was interchangeable on the C-130K and the Nimrod MR.Mk 2 by rotating the feet through 90°. On the Nimrod MR.Mk 2 these had to attach to the fore and aft rails for the sonar operator’s seats, and had to clear the refuelling hose strapped to the floor, whereas they fitted to a different kind of attachment on the Herc.

On 24 May it was “confirmed that the Nimrod MR2(P) standard crew size when flying from Ascension Island consisted of 15 personnel (including an extra pilot and air engineer) plus 3 GCHQ personnel.”

I was fascinated by the reference to the standard crew size including three GCHQ personnel - that seems a bit generous, when the aircraft was fitted with one single-seat SIGINT rack! It raises the question as to whether it was GCHQ guys from the Two Boats GCHQ monitoring station at Ascension Island that were used to man the racks, and why they used civilians, and didn’t use 51 Squadron guys. There have been all sorts of references to 51 Squadron C Flight personnel deploying on other aircraft types during the Falklands campaign, and I had assumed that the Hercules/Nimrod SIGINT rack would have been the most likely destination for these chaps.

Finally there were the four 42 Squadron personnel detached to fly with the Hercules detachment from ASI, according to these documents. They were: MAEOp T Blezard (from crew 2), MAEOp R Kutassy (crew 1), MAEOp BRA Mildwater (crew 7) and FS ME Turner (crew 4). I wonder (but am not asking anyone to tell me) what they were up to?

Having had a look on the map to see where Easter Is was in relation to what was going on I would say that was a very ambitious bit of planning, a logistics nightmare.

Easter Island is about 2,500 miles from Santiago, Chile. At about 300 kts it would take about 7 hours for landfall in S America (and that is the West Coast.

It's very hard to see what interests would have been served by such a deployment, really.

A name from my training days Tom Blezzard. He was my Air Screen during my AEOp training at Topcliffe 1972.

Jacko, the 4 AeOps in your last paragraph were used to provide Maritime communications/procedures knowledge for the C130s when they flew on the long missions to support the Task force. The C130 force did not often work with the RN, and incorrect procedures may have resulted in a blue on blue event. I flew on one of the C130 missions, but it aborted when we were unable to refuel from a Victor.

I have a feeling I read that Easter Island was only a cover to explain why they would be operating (from Chilean bases on the mainland) in S Chile near the border.............. Can't remember where I read it tho'...

AM,
we did not, as you say, often work with the RN at least not until Op Corporate.My log book tells me that In September 1973 we dropped some supplies to HMS Kent and I can still recall the crew being handed pics of Kent (from Janes ?) to help us identify the correct ship and not give the USSR 'shadower' a free gift. Comms with the RN were always a problem as we never seemed to be on the same page of the code book. This happened during Corporate when drops to the task force ramped up considerably.

Thanks Alan, mystery solved! Lovely that it's something straightforward and not sneaky beaky, as that makes it easier to doff one's cap in the direction of MAEOp's Blezard, Kutassy and Mildwater and FS Turner. Were you another Nimrod AEOp yourself, Alan - I imagine that goys from several squadrons were involved, and that I've only named those from 201.

If you do remember, that would be interesting!

RN comms always seemed to be a problem - even on maritime before Corporate. Wrong codebooks, wrong authentication, wrong time (codes were time dependent, but ships never seemed to work on Z on which the codes were set). Exercises were difficult (although other allied ships hardly ever had a problem) but mail drops could be even worse. A final call of 'do you want it or not?' sometimes worked better.

Excellent anecdote, AA, that illustrates some of the problems, thank you so much!

Shackman,
yes we have resorted to the 'want it or not' on more than one occasion. Although when we inserted the word 'mail ' in the conversation that usually did the trick. Rather disconcerting were the 'sparkles' that their AD radar caused on our CCWR.

Re Easter Island, this is not directly related to MR Nimrod ops but may be of interest (It does mention what is likely to be the 51 Squadron aircraft)

https://en.mercopress.com/2012/04/05...lands-conflict

Can't get that link to work at all!

But it is cached at:

https://webcache.googleusercontent.c...&ct=clnk&gl=uk

I recall that San Felix was the Pacific airfield used for Nimrod R1 ops?

Interesting read, i have never heard of the Pacific angle before now
When i flew south it was with Spanish speaking 51 sqn manning the aux radio rack down the back beside the launchers, they were very useful when flying surveillance off the Argentinian coast. The four AEOp were operating some new to the Herc fleet ESM equipment, i could be wrong in that and that might have happened later though.

Its all detailed in "My Secret Falklands War" by Sidney Edwards - you can get it from Amazon I think.

He was sent to liaise with the Chilean AF at the start of the war - based in the Embassy in Santiago.

Chapter 6 describes how they decided to use San Felix Island and he went out to check its suitability - problem was still fuel so there was an RAF Hercules sent to Easter Island and repainted into CAF colours to run supplies from the Mainland - even then it was touch and go so they fixed it so the Nimrod could refuel at night at Conception on the mainland and stay on San Felix during the day.

The book is a mine of information on RAF ops in and around Chile - only 100 pages and its not a great work of literature but you can see why it's something no-one wants to talk about for 99 years...............

They bumped him up to Group Captain afterwards & he was given a Civil List OBE with no mention of his "services" in the War - but it was given to him by HMQ herself.

JN, I was a Nimrod AEO, 206 Sqn Mike Blee as captain. Did 1 "deep South " sortie. I think Dave Ford did the most.

Nihil Nos Effugit, eh? (My Dad flew Liberators with 206 in 1944-45)