It troubles me that some seem to find Andy Hill almost blameless, and looking back through some posts that is how it reads to me. Whatever the regulatory issues, however they were set and how the show was organised, neither the CAA nor the show organisers were at the controls of that Hunter that day and making the final decisions that led to it hitting the ground.

Regarding the AAIB report, while it was certainly poor in some areas, it was infinitely better than any MoD report, which tend to look only at the final act.

What interested me most was that it refers to MoD aircraft publications containing the information MoD and the HSE claimed Martin-Baker hadn't provided when prosecuting them in the Sean Cunningham case.

As the AAIB report pre-dates the sworn evidence in court, and the HSE made a large contribution to it, that would confirm the HSE and MoD lied in court.

Nothing new there, but an important point nonetheless on a military forum.

Well, I guess things are different on Mars!

The point is that whatever happened in the air, the facts demonstrate with complete clarity that AH was able to survive the crash.
The only reason there are fatalities is that people were allowed to congregate where the risk to their lives had already been recognised, and the decision taken not to implement the mitigations which would have prevented them being in harms way. That has nothing to do with AH, and everything to do with the organisers and the CAA

In my view, the culpability either lies with the people responsible for every layer of the Swiss Cheese, or with none of them. If one party can claim that their error was only consequential because other parties screwed up, then everyone else can make a similar claim, and it was always "someone else's fault".

"That has nothing to do with AH, "

the dead didn't crash the aircraft

The Hunter Crashed due to pilot error. Everything to do with the pilot crashing a serviceable aeroplane on people doing their normal business on a road outside an airfield.

I'm afraid your claim as to serviceability is wrong.

The AAIB report confirmed it was neither airworthy, serviceable, nor fit for purpose. The pilot was not told this.

Regardless of any airmanship shortfalls (which I cannot and do not comment on), no pilot should be given an aircraft in such an appalling state.

We await an explanation from the CAA as to why the airworthiness certification was based on the premise that the RAF (not MoD) was the Hunter Design Authority, and therefore responsible for the Safety Case and an Aircraft Document Set which the AAIB reported was decades out-of-date.

MoD later confirmed it was NOT the Aircraft Design Authority, further proving significant liability on the part of the CAA.

You never just look at the final act. It's moronic.

BCAR A8 is a pile of rubbish compared to Part M. Argee on your points that the aircraft should not have been flying. However it crashed due to a badly flown manoeuvre by the pilot flying it.

As mere self-loading freight, I keep up with this sad thread from time to time.

If ever "an accident waiting to happen" has ever applied to any accident, this one is surely it.

Unserviceable aircraft. Non-current pilot. Inadequate supervision. No ground mitigations present.
And seemingly nobody to take the rap. Why am I not surprised?

You may very well be right that the aircraft was unsserviceable, but that has nothing to do with the accident. No-one has made any claims that the aircraft failed the pilot in any way. The failure was entirely his. There were failures by others that:
put this unqualified pilot in charge of the aricraft, and
approved a display plan that put the public at risk
but none of these were in any way related to airworthiness of the poor old hunter, the opportunity of flying which was no doubt enthusiasticly grabbed by the pilot concerned.

Idle B (and Diff)

It's not that I 'may very well be right', it's that I'm simply repeating the conclusions of he AAIB, which I agree with. And where they did not comment or explain, I'm relaying the meaning of the evidence they reproduced. (e.g. the incorrect certification). Unfortunately, the legal ruling meant there was little opportunity to discuss technical details, like the fuel pump being completely buggered.

Had the CAA got the facts right, then the aircraft would not have been flying. That's a root cause, in the same way the pilot's actions were. (In saying that I'm accepting the word of pilots here, coupled with his own admissions). Elsewhere, there were many Contributory and Aggravating factors. Each is part of an insidious chain, and the opportunity was there to break that chain long before the pilot climbed in.

I'd like to understand the CAA's thinking when predicating the Airworthiness Approval Note on the RAF being the Aircraft Design Authority. If they were, that would be the largest project team in MoD. Did they not even ask MoD? Does someone not go through the certification and double check the assumptions? And it's pretty clear MoD weren't told of this assumption, because when it was pointed out they very quickly refuted it. Given the duties of a Design Authority, the required output, and the pilot's complete dependency on it, there was simply no legal authority to fly that aeroplane. I came to realise long ago that pilots tend not to think of this, because it's taken as a given that the legal and technical audit trail resulting to them being given an aircraft to fly has been satisfied. After all, the grown ups in the CAA tell them it has.

I think you're probably right when saying the pilot grabbed an opportunity. I guess many would. But I'd like to hear his response if asked 'What would you have done if told the aircraft was manisfestly unairworthy and unserviceable?' If he said 'Fly it', then that would be a far greater sin than the error of airmanship he made. The obvious question is - Why wasn't he given that opportunity?

and the CAA is also guilty for letting him (and others like him ) be approved for low level aerobatics in front of a crowd with minimal currency. I'm surprised he was deemed current enough not to be dual!

I'm also amazed at their response to move the flight line (slightly ) further away from the crowd line and call it job done.

?



Whaaat? Are we saying that flying an aircraft that is a former military aircraft, withdrawn from service half a century ago, which flies under a PTF, is not airworthy as there is a question as to who was the approving office for the Military COA that the aircraft had around the time that the Wright Bros had tired of trying to chase flight attendants with bicycles and decided that a natty cap and bars would serve better?

I presume you wish to terminate the BBMF at the same time? After all, they are not CS-LIGHT/Part 23, or CS-LARGE/Part 25 and therefore should not be gracing the skies and threatening the public with the potential for a cloudy with a chance of meatball event. The Hunter crashed as the apogee of the manoeuvre did not have sufficient blue space below it for the speed that the aircraft was at, and the g that it could sustain to keep the shiny bits all in one piece. If the UK wishes to vacate the skies with the aircraft that are used to show the heritage of the country, which is a show of respect to those that have dedicated to protecting the very turf that your comment appears to be objecting to having their demonstration continue, then, please make sure I get an invite to the auction, there is a whole bunch of these that I would like to find a home in a country that is not run by tossers.

IMHO. If you can show any evidence that the aircraft crashed as the CAA or the RAF were remiss in 0.03 grams of paperwork stuck to the side of the cockpit, then I may reconsider the position that has been presented. I have less than 1,000 hours flying ex military high performance aircraft and only 5000 in uniform flying some state aircraft that were basely able to keep up with the ones I owned. If we enter a vertical manoeuvre and have failed to verify our energy state at the top of the manoeuvre, then in the unlikely event that we are still around to comment thereafter, I doubt that I would be complaining that the AFM was in Russian, and was last updated when Robin Olds was pushing tin over the highlands of North VietNam. To blame the CAA for this as far as the aircraft documentation goes is embarrassing. Again, if you guys don't want them, there are a lot of guys in other countries that would be happy to take them. (I prefer T-birds, it tempers one from getting too close to the edge of sanity). [The other 22,000 hours is common or garden heavies, R&D and certification, so maybe my opinion is irrelevant]

The Manoeuvre done on this occasion was badly done, and the fact that the pilot suggests that the event that took the lives of many other people was a medical condition that impacted his competency is not a grand basis to then come back and say, "I'm better now, whatever that was is over, can I go and do some more please?" If that is assumed to be prudent by the CAA and courts of the land, then perhaps y'all should turn up somewhere else where the barking mad is becoming the norm.

:}

That did seem a staggering statement, given that pretty much any average aviation spotter would likely tell you DA would be held by BAe given its inheritance of all Hawker designs, just as the CAA knew it was BAe in its dealings with the Vulcan, BAe having inherited the DA for all Avro/EE/HP/Hawker/Bristol/DH/Supermarine etc designs during the amalgamation of all the old companies into HS and BAC and then BAe.

It is rather depressing that after all the airworthiness related fatal accident threads to be found in this forum, people can still refer to airworthiness (or more appropriately the lack of it) in flippant and truculent ways. Those threads account for over 100 avoidable deaths, the Mull of Kintyre crash of Chinook ZD576 costing 29 deaths alone. The RAF/MOD has still failed to explain why that accident happened, given that the infamous finding of Pilot Gross Negligence by the Inquiry Reviewing Officers was overturned by SoS for Defence Liam Fox. It seems that RAF leadership shares the same cavalier views exhibited by some posting here.

Tucumseh (and I, FWIW) have not claimed that the display pilot involved was not culpable in any way for this tragedy. What he has claimed is that the aircraft was unserviceable and unairworthy. The latter can and does kill. It is a serious matter that has not only cost needless deaths but has eaten away at our national defence capability. That one lone ex-military aircraft flying on a PTF happened also to also be unairworthy would scarcely have merited comment were it not for the tragic accident it was involved in. fdr mentions the a/c of the BBMF. Like all aircraft, they should have a complete sequential library (a lot more than 0.03 grams!!!) of fully audited paperwork to confirm that they are airworthy. No point asking tucumseh about that, try the MAA (and good luck!).

This thread seems to have moved on somewhat from the OP. That is perhaps no bad thing. Instead of so much emotional and angry outcry, perhaps it is time to step back and see the wood for the trees. Whatever Hill's part in this accident, his aircraft was unairworthy and should not have been flying. How many other such aircraft are also unairworthy? No matter where the CAA places its flight line, if an aircraft is unairworthy it remains so in transit to a display, during a display, and from a display, and in an overcrowded island at that. It should be doing none of those things and remain on terra firma. That the CAA assumes ex RAF aircraft to be airworthy simply because they are ex RAF is risible. Better they be assumed to be unairworthy unless proved otherwise!

Read the AAIB report, Appendix L, Airworthiness Approval Note No:26172, Issue 2, paragraph 3.

'Approval basis. ... The Design Authority now rests with the RAF, and support is supplied, if requested, by British Aerospace, Farnborough'.

Plainly. 'if requested' applies to the RAF, as no-one else is mentioned, and it is they (the RAF, not MoD) who the CAA assume have British Aerospace under significant contract.

This was signed on 3 July 2008. It refers to that date, forward. Not decades ago. The premise is completely wrong, and always has been. MoD was asked to comment, and agreed.

Now go and read what an Aircraft Design Authority does, and delivers. Their output is a prerequisite to declaring airworthiness, which is a prerequisite to declaring serviceability. The reason why most pilots don't see what an ADA does is because these prerequisites should be done and dusted before you see the aircraft, and for the most part invisible to you. The tiny bit that is visible may indeed be 0.3 grams of paperwork. But the true ADA will have hundreds of people working on the task, at huge cost. The AAIB report is chock full of shortcuts being taken because the ADA output was simply not there.

The AAIB report identifies the issue of the cartridges life as an airworthiness matter and it is however the timex status of the seat had no bearing on the accident. The state of supply of cartridges is a problem for this case, not that they don't exist, they are not available for purchase in general, and that constraint conflicts with the CAP requirement as stated. CAR 632 in the AAIB report is stated to indicate that swept wing aircraft must have their ejection seat serviceable:

"CAP 632 requires the pilot escape systems of swept-wing jet aircraft, such as the Hawker Hunter, to be ‘fully serviceable’. The use of time- expired ejection seat cartridges meant that the ejection seats fitted to G-BXFI did not meet this requirement." [section 3, p201 or the AAIB report] That is not what is stated in the CAP 632, at least at rev 8.

yet:

"If an aircraft is fitted with ejection seats that are an integral part of the aircrew escape system, these should be fully serviceable for all flights. New operators must seek approval from the CAA GAU at the earliest opportunity if it is intended to operate with inert ejection seats or other escape systems, prior to inclusion in their OCM". CAP 632 rev 8, §5.7, p25,

Whether this is post the event is unknown. There are PTF aircraft that it would be unwise to operate without a live seat, there are others that are tolerable risks to the occupants depending on the environment. Having operated both inert and live, there are merits to both cases, however, what they don't do is make the aircraft unsafe to operate, and the opportunity to inert the seats existed within the rules. I would be more concerned with the conduct of aerobatic operations without an operable G-meter, that is not a good look at all, particularly in the light of a botched vertical manoeuvre. The other noted non compliances are of a lesser form than the dropping of a plug from a Boeing, cowls opening up on engines in flight, and the rest of the saga of aircraft production we have grown accustomed to. In the report, there is enough to dwell on related to the processes of maintenance but nothing that was germaine to the failure to achieve entry speed, gate height, or energy over the top. A surprise admission was that the pilot was not trained in the escape manoeuver for missing the gate conditions.

The event was a horrific tragedy, however, IMHO, airworthiness and the PTF did not directly result in the accident.

In respect to Appendix L, what is stated is an issuance of a NPTF, duly signed on 6 July 2006, for the CAA. If there is some confusion on the background, that is a matter for internal review within the CAA or delegate system to correct, however there is a required signature on the document, and that would suggest that the aircraft was legally issued a PTF. The defect in the PTF does not itself invalidate the PTF. Consider the Max8 debacle, the plane was compliant with the TC as approved by the state of manufacture. The latent defect that existed was not known, and at the time of departure the aircraft was operated IAW the TC and associated requirements. After discovery, the issue of the AOM did not alter the airworthiness of the aircraft, that arose belatedly with the issue of an EAD.

The PTF, pyros didn't cause the accident. Running out of altitude did.

fdr

It would have been nice of you to acknowledge what the Approval Note does indeed say what I said it did. You might even speculate as to why the CAA didn't bother checking with MoD/RAF. Notably, at the same time (2008) the main evidence to the Nimrod Review had been submitted, demonstrating that the RAF/MoD had slashed the funding for such contracts by ~28% in the 3 years 1991-94, and it had never recovered. Waste of money apparently.

As to your new issue, at 1.18.15.2 the AAIB note that Martin-Baker withdrew all support for legacy seats in February 2015, six months before the accident. Their reason was that the design data had become obsolete, and what had been perfectly good documentation was now inadequate due to lack of training in how to apply it. (MoD denied this, saying lack of training is irrelevant). The AAIB reported that, like any good Design Authority, M-B took steps to assist an alternative source of support. What is lacking is an explanation as to how that evolved into someone being authorised to service the seats in his garden shed. Who was the Design Authority or Design Custodian for the seats at the time of the accident? As stated before, 'going there' would be highly inconvenient to the HSE and MoD, because the AAIB cited the information HSE and MoD had claimed M-B didn't provide in the Sean Cunningham case. And it raised the issue of whether the seats in Hawk T.1 were 'legacy' in this sense, because MoD chooses not to use the Design Authority approved ALARP build standard. Such a can of worms.





.

The emergency services had to deal with a badly injured pilot who was still strapped to a live ejection seat. Presumably expired cartridges are potentially more unstable and dangerous than ones that are in date?

As an aside, given the danger these seats pose in the event of an accident where they haven't been fired, for whatever reason, and indeed the risk of accidental activation on the ground (as demonstrated tragically by the Red Arrows accident) should they even be allowed in vintage aircraft in civilian hands? After all the Red Arrows seat accident happened to very current professionals with ever resource at their disposal.

Well, as far as the UK is concerned that's largely irrelevant now, given the new CAA rules, plus MB's own withdraw of support for civvie owned 6 months prior to the Shoreham crash.

Seems to me that rather than wanting safety to be managed properly, some are advocating that it’s okay to somehow retrospectively waive parts of the process after an accident. Surely the general principle of not compromising on safety applies, and also taking equally seriously safety failures that the investigation identifies, even if not directly related to the immediate cause?The pilot was given a non-airworthy aircraft. If he hadn’t been, the accident wouldn’t have happened.

Sorry, unfamiliar with today’s terms. “Airworthiness certification” can’t be issued until the regulator is satisfied the aircraft can be put to safe use, which requires aircrew and groundcrew training. So training is a consideration in certification. If Mr Hill wasn’t properly trained, then the certification and safety cases were no longer sound. Looks like the CAA issue a lot of regulations, but don’t make sure they’re implemented. That rings a bell!!

Not sure I agree with this part. Yes, the pilot was given a non-airworthy aircraft. However, if he'd been given an airworthy aircraft the accident could still have happened.

The accident still would have happened. He looked at the tech log and it was clear. Assume it was a MoD form 700 hunter layout. When ever did a pilot ever read a CLR or short forecast. My present employer only has a maintenance statement for Check to Check "A" only and LC1s as scheduled and B ADDs with limited deferment dates in the Tech Log with limited OOPS statements if requied. Anything else is computer recorded and thrown out by planning docs. Pilots do not see that.

And let’s not forget that the safety case was predicated on there being no static traffic at the junction. The traffic lights were supposed to have been disabled. Without the traffic queue, the casualties would surely have been fewer.
And while advocating not forgetting material facts, let’s remember AH was found not guilty. Love it, hate it, our courts are generally very good.

What have traffic lights got to do with Mr Hill crashing a working aeroplane?

Appendix L includes a signed and authorised approval. What is your malfunction of note that is pertinent to the crash of this aircraft?

Whether that is correctly actioned is a matter of process of the delegate of the CAA, it did not alter the airworthiness at the Time of issue.

As far as the MB seats go, you are giving a compelling basis to terminate all legacy fast jets from demonstration. Well done.

When those of us that have owned or operated ex mil aircraft do so, we are assuming risks inherent in their use. It doesn't matter if it is a Mustang, B-29, or Mosquito, to assume that they meet 2024 CS rules is asinine. The objective of a PTF is to manage risk to the public, there is no particular emphasis on the safety of the individual that is on board the aircraft. That is a risk that is accepted in taking aircraft that will have a 120-140 kt or greater approach speed and flying it without a hot seat. My most recent live seats have used FSR sourced pyros, and to have those live we actually had to get a production line restarted. Vlad's actions put that out of availability now. Without in date pyros, then the seats should be inerted. At that point, the choice is to fly with cold seats or not fly at all.

The seat state did not cause the accident. You are however insinuating a blame to the operator for what was a confusion in the process of the issuance of the PTF. The PTF did exist, had an inked signature on the document as far as the evidence that you presume I need to acknowledge states....exactly what???? It is Appendix L, it is signed, and whatever curiosity exists prior to signing that does not alter the fact that it exists. You refer on multiple occasions to facts that are not in evidence, perhaps you have the source documents for that, I do not know and really don't particularly care. The parties that may care are the CAA system that has oversight on the process of issuance of PTFs, and the review system within CAA.

The rest of the world will be quite happy taking some of the lower Vs aircraft that had seats in them that are precluded since 2022 in operating where they had MB seats, as the inerting of the seats, while increasing the risk to the crew only alters risk to the public by making the skies quiet in the absence of these exemplars of our history and service.

To the emergency services/RFF attending an accident scene where a live seat exists, there is risk, it is directly related to the seat. Where the pyros have timed, then the manner by which they are deactivated is normally by removal of the pyros. Should the seats have been inerted? As they were timex, and no approval existed to extend their life towards the shelf life, then yes, they should have been. Did that materially impact the casualties in this tragedy? No. The casualties were the direct consequence of an error in flightpath/energy management, and had nothing to do with the status of the seat, the curiosity in the PTF.

You are however acknowledged to be a component of the cadre that will remove flying examples of our aviation and military legacy from the air, so, well done, Sir! Kudos for removing the risk from the masses. However, as demonstrations (for reasons that are unfathomable) serve as a reminder of what those that served did in the past, whether a Hurricane, Ferret, or SLR, and are often a basis for some of those that serve thereafter as a point in time where their interest in service was piqued... then perhaps reinstating conscription would be also worthwhile.

While you are active in terminating ex-mil aircraft, perhaps you can turn your interest towards the more entertaining matters of RPT aircraft that kill more public for more inane reasons than stated in this case.

At this time, about the only supportable ejector seat is the FO-1, and that is only if Vlad stops his compensation for his stature.

Interesting time to be arguing that. I tend to think that the Post Office scandal has made clear just how vulnerable our courts are to being misled by bulls*** presented as fact by expert witnesses. But perhaps that's just me.

Watch out for CAA surveyor that oversee that type. He is not the most competent in knowledge. I was in disbelief on his knowledge of a 5A1. You know what a 5A1 is?

Are we referring to the MAA TAE 5000 series or to the Master Servicing Schedule such as the BAC T5A's A.P. 109B.2303.5A1? That is as understand from a review of the MAA DSA structure last year for bilateral military approvals would presumably fit now under the UK DSA's 4000 Series: Continuing Airworthiness Engineering Regulations (CAE).

With respect to the Airworthiness of the Hunter, the UK CAA spoke to that in their action on terminating the safety directive that had grounded the aircraft.

Reference: SD-2015/003
Title: Hawker Hunter Series Aeroplanes on UK Civil Register
Description: On 6 July 2017 the CAA withdrew the Safety Directive which grounded all Hawker Hunter aircraft on the UK register. This Safety Directive was introduced in the immediate aftermath of the tragic Shoreham airshow accident as a precautionary and unprecedented measure.

This action is a result of the CAA concluding there were no airworthiness issues relating to the Hawker Hunter aircraft that caused or contributed to the accident. This is based on our own extensive review and the AAIB’s final accident report.

All aircraft of this type will have to comply with enhanced maintenance and inspection requirements and, following normal practice, secure all relevant permits and other approvals before they are allowed to fly again.

The restriction on aerobatic manoeuvres by ex-military jet aircraft, now including the Hawker Hunter, at overland airshows remains in place. This means that they continue to be restricted to flypasts and associated manoeuvres only.

Status: Cancelled on 6 July 2017


Like it or not, the UK CAA reviewed the AAIB report on Shoreham and made their determination which is being challenged by those on this forum. The UK CAA, like the signatory have the right to conduct their duties and make determinations. If those are disagreed with, then the party that is objecting to the manner by which the CAA conducts its duties can presumably make representations to the UK CAA or to the DoT, or to their local MP.

None of this alters the stubborn fact the aircraft itself didn't cause this accident.

There was a single PIC determining the aircraft's trajectory, and stuff happens. My concern is that where cognitive impairment was raised as a mitigation of the event previously, how does someone then believe that it is reasonable to return to flying status medically? Latches applies does it not?

No, it is not I who is 'giving a compelling basis...' It is a combination of:

a. Martin-Baker (correctly) withdrawing support for old seat designs in legacy aircraft, negating the Safety Cases and hence the airworthiness approval, and;

b. The apparent confusion caused by the CAA allowing inert seats in some aircraft, but not in others; and other EU countries mandating inert seats.

(I don't know what the CAA's argument is; they tend to state things without explanation or offering procedures for compliance. Like MoD's MAA. And it wasn't said how much notice Martin-Baker gave. The wording seems to indicate there was a hard cut-off in February 2015. Was there prior warning, and this was just the end-of life date? There seems little doubt this was in part influenced by the Hawk XX177 accident in 2011, where the evidence showed MoD had lost all corporate knowledge of how to maintain a seat with such an old design, and totally disregarded Martin-Baker's servicing instructions. M-B knew this immediately, when MoD visited the factory within days and admitted not using the correct tools, and not following correct procedures. That would have raised alarm bells, from which I infer they gave notice).

As a result of these decisions there MUST have been a major contract let on the Aircraft Design Authority to assess impact. If any aircraft type using the same seat, or variation thereof, was to be allowed to continue flying, then a decision had to be taken on various issues such as emergency egress. Who paid for that? Is there an 'Owner's Club' who share the costs by agreement? Perhaps the major user funds it and everyone else gets a freebie. Was the Shoreham accident aircraft flying under a Concession pending a decision? Given (e.g.) the cartridge issue outlined by the AAIB, I'm not sure I would have much faith in the Approved Maintenance Organisation knowing where to begin.

Which brings up the recurring point that many people miss. An Approved Maintenance Organisation is not necessarily a Design Authority. They can be, but there's a difference between Accreditation and Appointment. MoD's new regs make the same mistake, and it's dumbed down the entire safety management process to a dangerous level. Similarly, in this case, the CAA and AAIB, where the latter argued that the accident aircraft AMO was in every way an ADA. No, they 'do' (badly, according to the AAIB) continuing airworthiness, not maintaining airworthiness.

As for the rest of your post. Your first question rejects the premise upon which airworthiness approval is granted, and all accident investigations procedures. In that we shall have to agree to disagree. I happen to agree with the regulations and procedures, but also agree they are not implemented well. (The thrust of the Nimrod Review, which simply repeated the evidence presented to it). I think it is for you to explain why you don't, or which ones you would be willing to ditch. They're not always perfect by any means, but there is world-wide agreement on these two fundamental issues. A slightly different way of making the same point Dervish did above.

I don't think anybody is saying that they did.

However, the accident has served to highlight a whole number of safety issues / failings that otherwise may not have been noticed. I assume you are not suggesting that any "inconvenient" regulations should be ignored just so that historic fast jets can wow the crowds?

Also, as I have said earlier, I fail to see how in most circumstances pilots can have sufficient relevant currency on these types of aircraft to safely fly aerobatic routines in public. I have also mentioned the crash of the Gnat at a show less than a year before Shoreham. If I remember correctly the pilot had just enough total flying hours in the preceding year to maintain a PPL! Yet he was legally qualified to display a historic swept wing fast jet at a public show! Something very wrong with that situation.

I completely agree. The Gnat pilot not only had inadequate currency but woefully inadequate total experience, having been medically discharged from the RAF while still a student at Valley. He, along with another Gnat Display Team (!) member whose only military flying was on a University Air Squadron (!!), was presented on the operator's publicity material as an experienced former RAF pilot. I regret to say that this clown show was indulged by a genuinely experienced veteran QFI, enjoying a bit of Gnat flying underwritten by what effectively were "pay to fly" display pilots with more money from their business careers than sense. The dead pilot left a wife and young children. I wonder what the QFI's reflections are.

The Gnat crash at Car Fest was barely 5 weeks before the Shoreham crash.

Thanks for that. However my points relating to it remain and I still feel that in many respects (apart obviously from the outcome) it raised even more concerning issues than Shoreham, yet has received very little publicity.

It was also pointed out earlier in this thread that a tiny variation in the Gnat's trajectory could have lead to an even bigger catastrophe than the Shoreham crash.

One further related point....

Some years before the Shoreham (and Gnat) accidents I remember seeing the Hunter (and also the Jet Provost) being displayed at Old Warden on several occasions. From what I remember these were "flat" displays with some elegant top side passes round the famous curved display line. Surely this is a vastly safer way of displaying this type of aircraft for all kinds of obvious reasons?

The admission that the pilot had never trained the escape manoeuvre for the sequence he was flying pretty much sums up the risks that were being assumed. To do so would not have taken a great deal of flight time, and could have been accomplished at a height that would permit learning from errors. Seeing these aircraft fly does not need a show of exacting skills and daring. most of the crowd can't see the aircraft when it flies down close to the ground, and noise is not particular to much other than r^4. Conducting low level aeros with verticals benefits from a level of proficiency, however smoking holes exist in various locations from highly proficient operators who had bad days. Occasionally, level demonstrations go bad, but that is most often due to mechanical failure.


It's about 5 years since I strapped into a hot seat, (not an MB) and about 15 since last sitting in a MB seat, which was inert. In between, both live and inerted Russian seats of various voltages. MB has done what they think is a good idea, I personally disagree, but they are free to do what they do. There are aircraft that I would not taxi without a live seat, there are others that the seat is just a discomfort to the driver. In all of these cases, live or inert, the airworthiness was not affected, the operator had a choice as to what risk they were prepared to take for their occupants. As far as the CAP goes, unless thee is one that predates rev 8 that states otherwise, the UK CAA does not mandate the seat to be live, it is an election by the applicant for their conditions of the NPTF. There is no confusion in the CAA accepting one operator electing top paint their plane pink and another wanting their plain in plaid, nor is there with an election for a seat being inert or not. MB, while undertaking a CYA did nothing to further the interests of safety by denying support for what you refer to as old, and what the counter view is tried and tested. My greasy "old" wright cyclone may be old, but they are pretty well tested by time as well. Fortunately, there are parts of the world that permit the operator to determine the risk they are prepared to assume, where there is no increase in risk to the public. There are also a few other seats out there, once Vlad stops being uppity.

Thanks for that. As I suggested before, have a look at what an appointed Design Authority is required to do. It's far more than the accredited Aircraft Maintenance Organisation.

You have your experience flying aircraft, which I respect. I have mine, appointing and managing Design Authorities amongst other things. And, importantly, withdrawing that appointment if they don't abide by the regulations. The decision to withdraw an appointment is 100% one of safety. No notice is required. The last time I did it, I stopped a meeting, told the managing director I was suspending his appointment due to breach of contract (making his only experienced engineer on one product, a safety critical aircraft system, redundant) and said he could phone me any time to tell me when he'd reinstated him or employed someone of equal skill and experience. It took him 5 seconds to make his decision. These contracts are very expensive, for a reason. They are the means by which companies retain their corporate knowledge. And the means by which aircraft can be given certification, and retain it.

Martin-Baker acted as I would have expected and required them to. In being open and honest about their inability to support very old designs, which no longer meet modern standards, they met a OBLIGATION. If they didn't do that, I would deem them unfit to hold the appointment. In this sense, they are not free to do what they want to do.

As I said, I suspect an important factor was the MoD/RAF's decision to completely ignore their advice on how to maintain the seats, and then have to listen to MoD and the HSE perjure themselves in court in a (successful) effort to shift blame for a fatal accident.

Indeed, but it was largely because of the ground fatalities at Shoreham which thus overshadowed the Gnat crash just 5 weeks earlier, and I don't think the AAIB prelim report on the Gnat crash had even come out when Shoreham happened....??
Ironically both aircraft were operated out of North Weald.

There were indeed many such displays of Hunters in the previous years to Shoreham by higher time ex-Hunter service pilots, such as Jonathan Whalley, Craig Penrice, Dave Roome and the late Mark Hanna etc. There a very good in-cockpit film on Youtube of a display by Mark at Duxford in the Hunter, with excellent overdubbed commentary by Mark, and this display contrasts dramatically. IIRC, Mark Hanna was on the final TWU course that used the Hunter.