IIRC the fatal crash of XV180, shortly after takeoff at RAF Fairford, on 24 March 1969, was attributed to one the props going into Reverse. The aircraft then stalled.

Yes, it was:
UK Military Aircraft Losses

Accident report here:
https://aviation-safety.net/database...?id=19940923-0

The propeller stuff is way over my head. I remember something about pitchlock, NTS and helical splines but I forgot it after the oral. Was 'E-handle, HRD' the start of the Navy's version of the shutdown checklist?

Would there be a CVR or FDR on a Guard C-130 going to the boneyard? I was surprised to find both on the Navy T-45 that crashed in Tennessee last year.

Mighty Gem

Thanks for the confirmation that the " Little Grey Cells " are still functioning to some extent.

85 Accidents in 1969 - so different to now - Thank God.

Shytorque

Different accident, but coincidently the No 4 in both cases. Is the Savannah accident the third, or have there been others?

Shy Torque, thank you for the link to the L100-30 fatal accident at HKG 22.09.1994. It had eerie reminders of XV180 at RAF Fairford 24.03.1969 as posted by Tengah Type:-

https://aviation-safety.net/database...?id=19690324-1

Your link to that of PK-PLV's accident summary leads in turn to the very detailed, thorough, and excellent report by the HKG CAA, with input by the UKAAIB, the RAF, and the aircraft, engine, and propeller manufacturers:-

http://ebook.lib.hku.hk/HKG/B35839806.pdf

For those interested I would point to the conclusion that the most probable cause was the failure of the #4 throttle cable system (pdf P80) , the cables as fitted (7x7 carbon steel, rather than the later 7x19 stainless steel ones - see pdf P89), and the sheer complexity of the engine control cable runs (pdf P's 157, 158, and 162).

Of course we must await an interim report at least of the OP tragedy before ascribing to it a similar cause, but the vulnerability of the Hercules to an engine control cable break at a pulley, fairlead, or due corrosion, etc, in these two accidents alone is indication of it being somewhat of an Achilles Heel to this very successful workhorse.

There have been others. Numerous sources say that a prop reversal is the cause of the loss of control in this one. I don't know know the total number of accidents due to props entering beta range, but I suspect that it's more then the ones which have been mentioned here. I have a co-worker who was involved in one whcih didn't turn into an accident due to his quick thinking. He was engineer on an checkride, and just as the plane lifted off it started an un-commanded turn that the pilot was unable to control, heading for a hangar. He saw that one of the beta lights was illuminated, and reached up and shut down that engine using the T-handle.

CCTV definitely looks like uncommanded Beta on the left wing. Check out this footage at 2:36 - aircraft will appear top right of the frame.

😳
 

Many years since I operated Albert, but the Brit ones had the Beta light microswitch disconnected - we never had that warning system in my time. I forget now, did it light up the LSGI selector button? And yes, suspect throttle cable failure, T-handle shutdown, leave the throttle alone in case it fouled other systems.

RIP gents, got some old Albert friends up there waiting with a cold one for you.

Can't speak as to the veracity of this report, but it seems the pilot may have had some serious misgivings about this particular aircraft and flight WC130 Co-Pilot did NOT want to fly that plane ? PR informa

According to the recently released 911 tapes, one eye witness reports one of the props wasn't turning after take-off.

http://www.militarytimes.com/news/yo...ollowed-crash/

911 audio here:
http://www.savannahnow.com/news/2018...nt-plane-crash

After a string of deadly aviation accidents, the Air Force has directed all of their wing units with flying and maintenance functions to ground aircraft for one day to conduct an "Operational Safety Review."

Active duty wings will have until May 21 while National Guard and Reserve units will have until June 25 to complete the review.

The order from Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen. David Goldfein comes after a WC-130 aircraft that belonged to the Puerto Rico National Guard crashed outside Georgia last week, killing all nine airmen on board. The 53-year old plane was heading to its retirement in Arizona when it spiraled out of the sky just outside the Savannah/Hilton Head International Airport.

“I am directing this operational safety review to allow our commanders to assess and discuss the safety of our operations and to gather feedback from our Airmen who are doing the mission every day,” Goldfein said in a press release on Tuesday.

https://abcnews.go.com/US/air-force-...ry?id=55017106

A very trivial question given the tragedy, but are these airframes still considered WC's? I note the airframe 65-0968 was likely delivered as a HC-130H and even retained the chisel nose but with the Fulton recovery arms long removed, and were later designated WC-130's. Some articles even still call this airframe a "Hurricane Hunter" (like here: http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/20590/puerto-rico-national-guard-wc-130h-hurricane-hunter-crashes-in-a-ball-of-fire-in-Georgia but I presume it has not operated as a hurricane hunter for years. Is WC gear still retained or removed? So once a WC always a WC, or would reversion to C-130H be appropriate? I realize it does not matter, but just an interesting side note to the fascinating history of the C/MC/HH/HC/WC etc -130 line and to their crews over decades of service.

The USAF report into this crash has now been published. The summary conclusion is

"The board president found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the cause of the mishap was MP1’s improper application of left rudder, which resulted in a subsequent skid below three-engine minimum controllable airspeed, a left-wing stall, and the MA’s departure from controlled flight. Additionally, the board president found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the MC’s failure to adequately prepare for emergency actions, the MC’s failure to reject the takeoff, the MC’s failure to properly execute appropriate after takeoff and engine shutdown checklists and procedures, and the Mishap Maintainers’ failure to properly diagnose and repair engine number one substantially contributed to the mishap."

https://media.defense.gov/2018/Nov/0...E%20REPORT.PDF

Thanks for posting the link. Without meaning to be disrespectful of the crew, it's hard to believe that the emergency was handled that badly. An engine flameout at a relatively light gross weight in good vfr conditions should have been something that ended in an air return, not the way it did. I'm surprised not to see a summary of the flight crew's experience and recent experience as would normally be included in a civilian accident report done by the NTSB.

That information is on pages 25-28 of the report.