IIRC the fatal crash of XV180, shortly after takeoff at RAF Fairford, on 24 March 1969, was attributed to one the props going into Reverse. The aircraft then stalled.
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IIRC the fatal crash of XV180, shortly after takeoff at RAF Fairford, on 24 March 1969, was attributed to one the props going into Reverse. The aircraft then stalled. During climb out from Fairford, Gloucestershire the captain asked the co-pilot to feather No4 engine. However the engine went into full reverse thrust which rendered the aircraft uncontrollable. It entered a starboard wing over, crashed and caught fire. All six on board were killed |
Accident report here:
https://aviation-safety.net/database...?id=19940923-0 |
The propeller stuff is way over my head. I remember something about pitchlock, NTS and helical splines but I forgot it after the oral. Was 'E-handle, HRD' the start of the Navy's version of the shutdown checklist?
Would there be a CVR or FDR on a Guard C-130 going to the boneyard? I was surprised to find both on the Navy T-45 that crashed in Tennessee last year. |
Mighty Gem
Thanks for the confirmation that the " Little Grey Cells " are still functioning to some extent. 85 Accidents in 1969 - so different to now - Thank God. Shytorque Different accident, but coincidently the No 4 in both cases. Is the Savannah accident the third, or have there been others? |
Shy Torque, thank you for the link to the L100-30 fatal accident at HKG 22.09.1994. It had eerie reminders of XV180 at RAF Fairford 24.03.1969 as posted by Tengah Type:-
https://aviation-safety.net/database...?id=19690324-1 Your link to that of PK-PLV's accident summary leads in turn to the very detailed, thorough, and excellent report by the HKG CAA, with input by the UKAAIB, the RAF, and the aircraft, engine, and propeller manufacturers:- http://ebook.lib.hku.hk/HKG/B35839806.pdf For those interested I would point to the conclusion that the most probable cause was the failure of the #4 throttle cable system (pdf P80) , the cables as fitted (7x7 carbon steel, rather than the later 7x19 stainless steel ones - see pdf P89), and the sheer complexity of the engine control cable runs (pdf P's 157, 158, and 162). Of course we must await an interim report at least of the OP tragedy before ascribing to it a similar cause, but the vulnerability of the Hercules to an engine control cable break at a pulley, fairlead, or due corrosion, etc, in these two accidents alone is indication of it being somewhat of an Achilles Heel to this very successful workhorse. |
Originally Posted by Tengah Type
(Post 10139307)
Is the Savannah accident the third, or have there been others?
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CCTV definitely looks like uncommanded Beta on the left wing. Check out this footage at 2:36 - aircraft will appear top right of the frame.
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😳
I’m glad I hadn’t seen that video before getting on a Herc two days ago. It’s mind boggling how quickly it went from level flight to impact. Poor buggers. BV |
Many years since I operated Albert, but the Brit ones had the Beta light microswitch disconnected - we never had that warning system in my time. I forget now, did it light up the LSGI selector button? And yes, suspect throttle cable failure, T-handle shutdown, leave the throttle alone in case it fouled other systems.
RIP gents, got some old Albert friends up there waiting with a cold one for you. |
Originally Posted by Bob Viking
(Post 10139961)
I’m glad I hadn’t seen that video before getting on a Herc two days ago. It’s mind boggling how quickly it went from level flight to impact. Poor buggers. BV |
It wasn’t a J! BV |
Can't speak as to the veracity of this report, but it seems the pilot may have had some serious misgivings about this particular aircraft and flight WC130 Co-Pilot did NOT want to fly that plane ? PR informa
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According to the recently released 911 tapes, one eye witness reports one of the props wasn't turning after take-off.
http://www.militarytimes.com/news/yo...ollowed-crash/ 911 audio here: http://www.savannahnow.com/news/2018...nt-plane-crash |
After a string of deadly aviation accidents, the Air Force has directed all of their wing units with flying and maintenance functions to ground aircraft for one day to conduct an "Operational Safety Review."
Active duty wings will have until May 21 while National Guard and Reserve units will have until June 25 to complete the review. The order from Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen. David Goldfein comes after a WC-130 aircraft that belonged to the Puerto Rico National Guard crashed outside Georgia last week, killing all nine airmen on board. The 53-year old plane was heading to its retirement in Arizona when it spiraled out of the sky just outside the Savannah/Hilton Head International Airport. “I am directing this operational safety review to allow our commanders to assess and discuss the safety of our operations and to gather feedback from our Airmen who are doing the mission every day,” Goldfein said in a press release on Tuesday. https://abcnews.go.com/US/air-force-...ry?id=55017106 |
A very trivial question given the tragedy, but are these airframes still considered WC's? I note the airframe 65-0968 was likely delivered as a HC-130H and even retained the chisel nose but with the Fulton recovery arms long removed, and were later designated WC-130's. Some articles even still call this airframe a "Hurricane Hunter" (like here: http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/20590/puerto-rico-national-guard-wc-130h-hurricane-hunter-crashes-in-a-ball-of-fire-in-Georgia but I presume it has not operated as a hurricane hunter for years. Is WC gear still retained or removed? So once a WC always a WC, or would reversion to C-130H be appropriate? I realize it does not matter, but just an interesting side note to the fascinating history of the C/MC/HH/HC/WC etc -130 line and to their crews over decades of service.
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The USAF report into this crash has now been published. The summary conclusion is
"The board president found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the cause of the mishap was MP1’s improper application of left rudder, which resulted in a subsequent skid below three-engine minimum controllable airspeed, a left-wing stall, and the MA’s departure from controlled flight. Additionally, the board president found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the MC’s failure to adequately prepare for emergency actions, the MC’s failure to reject the takeoff, the MC’s failure to properly execute appropriate after takeoff and engine shutdown checklists and procedures, and the Mishap Maintainers’ failure to properly diagnose and repair engine number one substantially contributed to the mishap." https://media.defense.gov/2018/Nov/0...E%20REPORT.PDF |
What a very bad outcome that could so easily have been avoided. The Report makes sad reading. |
Originally Posted by Liffy 1M
(Post 10307952)
The USAF report into this crash has now been published. The summary conclusion is
"The board president found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the cause of the mishap was MP1’s improper application of left rudder, which resulted in a subsequent skid below three-engine minimum controllable airspeed, a left-wing stall, and the MA’s departure from controlled flight. Additionally, the board president found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the MC’s failure to adequately prepare for emergency actions, the MC’s failure to reject the takeoff, the MC’s failure to properly execute appropriate after takeoff and engine shutdown checklists and procedures, and the Mishap Maintainers’ failure to properly diagnose and repair engine number one substantially contributed to the mishap." https://media.defense.gov/2018/Nov/0...E%20REPORT.PDF |
Originally Posted by A Squared
(Post 10308017)
Thanks for posting the link. Without meaning to be disrespectful of the crew, it's hard to believe that the emergency was handled that badly. An engine flameout at a relatively light gross weight in good vfr conditions should have been something that ended in an air return, not the way it did. I'm surprised not to see a summary of the flight crew's experience and recent experience as would normally be included in a civilian accident report done by the NTSB.
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Originally Posted by Liffy 1M
(Post 10308040)
That information is on pages 25-28 of the report.
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FE calls "power set" when it clearly wasn't before Vr. If he'd called "No 1 engine not responding" (or whatever) then they could have safely abandoned the take-off. Having got airborne the aircraft banks right to keep flying straight ahead, but left rudder is subsequently applied! This leads directly to the aircraft crashing (the left wing stalls in the sideslip). The very first thing you learn in asymmetric training is "Dead foot, dead engine". That simple slogan could have saved their lives. It had clearly been forgotten (for surely it was taught?). The after take off checks were not completed resulting in TO flaps remaining set.
As mentioned in the Accident Report, the first flight of the day was usually preceded by a standing start take off to ensure all engine parameters were normal. On RAF C-130Ks, this allowed setting the throttle lever gubbings to ensure max torque was not exceeded (though subsequent TOs from a different a/f would need it readjusting). |
Originally Posted by Chugalug2
(Post 10308268)
FE calls "power set" when it clearly isn't. If he'd called "No 1 engine not responding" (or whatever) then they could have safely abandoned the take-off.
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Indeed, A Squared. You have here the classic case of an experienced aircraft captain and a new/inexperienced co-pilot and FE. After the Staines Trident and the Kegworth 737, we still have crews not challenging the captain/flight deck when they clearly know that a situation is being mismanaged. Whatever happened to CRM?
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The very first thing you learn in asymmetric training is "Dead foot, dead engine". That said, this accident was the result of some inept aircraft handling combined with equally poor CRM. |
HP:-
I'm not so sure that saying is used to help you decide which boot to move, rather than help you diagnose which engine has failed from the resultant rudder deflection! Agreed, and they had already identified the failed engine (#1) but an incorrect left rudder input was subsequently applied. The Report considers that P1 was suffering a sensory overload. If he had simply remembered that simple mantra he would have realised that his left foot should have been the 'dead' one, ie applying no rudder, and fed in right rudder instead. The sideslip that killed them could then have been avoided. Given how much else was going wrong it is by no means certain it would have saved them but it would have been a start, at least... |
Qualified 2004......made a captain in 2016.....and an instructor later in the year; that's a bit odd. Very few hours in recent months too. With a very inexperienced group around him in the front 3 seats, the captain's mishandling was unlikely to be picked up. I wonder who authorised the flight........in my day, I would have thought very carefully before doing so.....
The supervisory chain needs to conduct a fair amount of corporate investigation in my opinion. A very sad end. |
Originally Posted by A Squared
(Post 10138025)
Well, I'm not sure what an "ex-albert driver" is, but if we assume that you at one time flew a c-130, we have to also assume that it was a while ago, because your systems knowledge is pretty lacking. Spouting the numerical specs for the prop is not the same as understanding how it works First the prop does not have "stop pins", I don't know where you got that but there's nothing in there that could be remotely described as a "pin". Regardless, the props go into reverse at high airspeeds on almost every flight. That's what you do on landing. It doesn't activate the NTS and it doesn't decouple the prop Besides, even if it *did* decouple, that doesn't prevent the prop from going into reverse. The safety coupling has nothing to do with prop function or control, All the safety coupling does is disconnect the reduction gearbox from the turbine, the prop is still out there in reverse. You may (or may not) recall that there is nothing to prevent you from moving the throttle into the beta range in flight. All you have to do is pick the throttle up over the flight idle gate and move it back into the ground range, and the prop will got to flat pitch, then reverse. It won't NTS because the NTS linkage is cammed out of engagement when you move the throttle into the ground range. Obviously that's a really bad thing to do in flight, so you don't do that. But, here's the thing; if you have a throttle cable break, the effect on the throttle coordinator out on the engine can be essentially the same, the throttle coordinator doesn't 'know" whether the cable broke or the throttle was moved into the ground range, all it knows is something just rotated it into the reverse range, and it does what it does in the reverse range ..whcih is this: it moves linkage to the valve housing whcih causes a prop pitch change into the reverse range and it cams the NTS linkage out of engagement. There you go: One single point of failure, and you have a prop reversing in flight. This isn't just speculation or theorizing this is the actual, real, cause of actual, real inflight prop reverse incidents. It seems odd that you claim to be a C-130 pilot and don't know about this. I thought that was one of those things that all Herc crews knew about. That's why you have a special Engine Shutdown Procedure which is different than a standard ESP when there's a known or suspected throttle or condition lever cable failure. You do remember that from your "albert" days, right? That a throttle cable failure had a special procedure? It's in all the Lockheed manuals, I don't know how you could have missed it. That's the reason, because it can cause the prop to reverse in flight.
Hope this clarified. |
Originally Posted by KenV
(Post 10309141)
A quick note about NTS. I'm not a C-130 driver, but was a P-3 driver which shares a lot of the propulsion systems with the C-130. NTS will NOT be engaged due to the props going into reverse whether in flight or on the ground. NTS is designed to decouple the prop from the engine when the prop drives the engine.
Anyway, all this is beside the point. It is pretty clear from the AIB report that this was not a case of in-flight prop reversal as we earlier speculated. It was simply a mishandling of an engine failure. |
Originally Posted by A Squared
(Post 10309169)
No, NTS does not de-couple the prop from the engine.
Anyway, all this is beside the point. It is pretty clear from the AIB report that this was not a case of in-flight prop reversal as we earlier speculated. It was simply a mishandling of an engine failure. |
One minor point that has been overlooked is the aircraft behaviour at rotate as it almost departed the runway. Normally the pilot will remove his hand from the nosewheel steering at around 60 kits. In this instance it was immediately before rotate at around 95kts, whereupon the aircraft began to veer to the left. This sounds similar to the RAF incident during a practise windmill start where the pilot subconsciously/inadvertently was using nosewheel steering against the swing of the inoperative engine. At 60kts when he removed his hand to take the control column, the aircraft veered off the runway. Incidentally, as I recall, normal practise was not to do a standing start to adjust ‘throttle gubbins’ as stated earlier - there was nothing to adjust. Not was it routine on the first flight of the day in the RAF. The only time I recall it being mandated other than for performance was when we had bleed air issues. However, I think most people would have carried out a standing start on an aircraft that had RPM problems on its last flight and had had work carried out to rectify the issue. Inevitably a ‘chain’ of errors leading to a tragic loss of life. Very sad. |
DCT:-
Incidentally, as I recall, normal practise was not to do a standing start to adjust ‘throttle gubbins’ as stated earlier - there was nothing to adjust. I agree though that with previous engine performance issues a standing start was called for in this case. |
Very sad state of affairs all round, if the report is as accurate as it appears to be. The report makes some observations that I presume are more formally addressed in a classified version, can anyone say? I note that the documentation of aircrew records is incomplete. Also, the pathology reports are not supported by statistics and the alcohol measurement is not given. The actions of the maintenance crew appear to have been inept. The flightdeck crew seem to have been incapable of operating the aircraft. I would suggest that the report describes the performance you might expect of an untrained and unqualified crew. Bad
OAP |
Originally Posted by Onceapilot
(Post 10309699)
The report makes some observations that I presume are more formally addressed in a classified version, can anyone say? I note that the documentation of aircrew records is incomplete. Also, the pathology reports are not supported by statistics and the alcohol measurement is not given.
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Originally Posted by A Squared
(Post 10309709)
I expect that you would find all that information in the Tabs, which are not included in the document released to the public. There is an index to the investigation tabs on page 46-47.
OAP |
Not being a pilot nor a Hercules engineer, air or ground, I have hesitated before raising my head above the parapet. However I did have a foot in two camps. I worked on the Javelin, Hunter and Lightning and flew for almost 30 years on the RAF C130K as a loadmaster . With my tech background I took an interest in the workings of the aeroplane. so I can follow well enough the technical discussion in the report.
That the maintenance team did not carry out the task in the prescribed manner is beyond doubt. But there is probably not a tradesman in any force in the world who has not had to 'work around' due to pressure to get the a/c back on line. The report highlighted the usual culprits of lack of tradesmen, spares (robbing is a wasteful and morale sapping necessity in most forces) and confusion about the paperwork qualifications. Often also the manuals do not reflect the actuality on the a/c. It also flagged up the disassociation some feel when the a/c do not 'belong' to them. To my mind it was an implied criticism of the 'system' something I have never encountered in my experience of inquiries in the RAF. This of course in no way exonerates the tradesmen, it is just an attempt to understand from one who has been in analogous situations. Can we say that this situation is absent from the RAF today ? Are there any lessons to be learnt ? As for the pilots and air engineer, I have struggled to understand the mindset. An Hercules crew knows that the propeller is a fickle friend who needs constant attention. They knew it had a valve housing change and the minimum of common sense would have required a very attentive run up as described by 'chugalug' and others. Then to get airborne with the a/c in the state it was in beggars belief. What was the engineer looking at ? I have been in the a/c when we have taken it over after prop work. A fuselage rattling, tailplane shuddering run up was always the outcome to ensure that all was well..And a very careful monitor by the engineer as we rolled for T/O. Time to duck before the sniping starts. |
Originally Posted by ancientaviator62
(Post 10309928)
It also flagged up the disassociation some feel when the a/c do not 'belong' to them.
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AA62:-
Can we say that this situation is absent from the RAF today ? Are there any lessons to be learnt ? |
One thing that the investigators of this unfortunate accident had was recorders ! Those investigating the RAF C130K crashes were severely hampered by this vital lack of evidence as our a/c were never fitted with them.
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Video explaining sequence of events of this Aircrew Error mishap:
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