OAP
 

How was the trend caught in order to be identified and used in the report? I don't know, but evidently it is possible.

I suppose it's like the invisible spaceship at Lord's that used the SEP (somebody else's problem) cloaking device to avoid being seen. (Douglas Adams)

Hi Bob,
The parameters that the operator (StanEval, QFI, Company Senior Pilot etc.. as decreed ) wish to have flagged-up are decided and programmed. The monitoring goes along recording all parameters and every flight goes into the system record. The records are all routinely and automatically trawled and a print or electronic copy of the trends and levels is produced at whatever period is decreed (often, monthly), the monitoring agent (on the Sqn) then formally reviews the stats, reports, action a/r and signs off the file . The severity of the parameter thresholds is simply altered to achieve the level of alert required. For instance, if a G-Loc profile was worth watching for, a suitable threshold profile could be decided and tracked. Generally, there will be some thresholds that should imply remedial action before next flight and, it is possible to do that. However, the primary aim is really trend and performance monitoring.
Now Bob, I believe that you are a QFI? Can you not think of a way to use flight data monitoring to monitor early initiation of rotation and unstick ?

OAP

Could one assume, in such a hi-tech airframe, that very basic piloting skills/discipline don't feature on the Supervisory radar? The focus may be more on the utilisation of the airframe in its intended environment ... off the ground and in a combat scenario?

OAP
 

It's an old enough mistake to make. An RAF student colleague of mine was criticised by his QFI after a dual training flight for applying the toe brakes during the takeoff roll (they were normally given a quick application to stop the wheels after lift off before they were retracted into their bays).

Shortly after the sortie debrief the line chief asked to speak to the instructor. The main undercarriage doors had an inch of metal missing off the lengths of the outer edges. The brakes possibly hadn't been applied after all, but the gear had been retracted too early and as the aircraft settled slightly, the doors had scraped the runway.

A similar thing happened to one of the Red Arrows pilots in the late 1980s - but he ended up riding on the belly tank as the rest of the formation took off around him. He decided to leave the aircraft.

Well Bob, I guess that the Raptor Guys are just going to have to live with the same jokes and songs that the Eagle drivers used to get at Red Flag....unless they raise their game. But, its a bit late! :E
Professional aviators should realise that there is no shame in having your performance monitored. Even if you don't screw-up, it might save your life to have an early call on trends or weaknesses in your outfit. :)
Hmmm, Four-Hundred Million Dollars! They certainly should be good to fly that!
Cheers

OAP

OAP
 

Because Bob......all phases of flight have critical handling aspects. Careful analysis can reveal the important skills and parameters that need to be tracked and monitored. Comparison with other aircraft/systems may reveal other considerations that need tracking. Just look at the Handling Manual, the ODM, the FRC's, the Abnormals etc... Now, Take-Off is a very dynamic and historically risky event. Even a FJ has a considerable amount of critical handling on Take Off (even if you don't think so). Some of the most critical factors on Take-Off are weight, configuration, engine performance and handling. The handling includes rotation initiation speed, rotation rate, Alpha and pitch attitude(s). Individual types may have additional Take-Off handling specifics. :)

OAP

SESMA ........... No need to guess. ;) ...... LFH ... cfs ;);)

........

Why bother having any computed TOLD if you promptly ignore it?

BV

Just to keep the nomenclature straight, we are talking about flight data monitoring, not FDR monitoring. FDM is usually extracted from the FDR, but it can also be picked off from elsewhere in the system that feeds the FDR, especially when it's digital data. The data frame is set by the operator, as OAP pointed out, which means you decide what parameters (Key Point Values) you are particularly concerned about and set the alerts accordingly. I am not an expert in setting KPVs but a programme that looked at control inputs, pitch attitudes and pitch rates on take-off would show when you were getting low pitch rates compared with stick position. Match that with expected airspeed (because a FBW platform like the F22 is likely to know...) and you have a clear indication of the size of the problem. You are right that you would have to know what to look for, but routine monitoring would have picked this problem up.

There is work going on at the moment looking at FJ FDM for the RAF (it's already being done for Chinook and Puma). Some people get it, but the more senior FJ guys don't. They will eventually, whether they like it or not.

Quite. It depends on the sophistication of the FDR whether it can be used to pick up and record the data that you are interested in. Most modern machines can and do, but are not mandated to do so.

That is interesting Fortissimo. Do you have any update on FJ TCAS please?

OAP

One last try...
 

You should do stand up BV. That made me chuckle.

I wish you a safe rotate and landing on your next sortie.

Data is downloaded from each aircraft, as is presumably the case for engine health monitoring. Data is uploaded to a computer. Man (Flight Safety Officer?) decides which parameters need to be monitored. Computer scans data looking for events when parameters are exceeded (Vr below set figure in this case, rate of change of G loading between say 5g and 9g in another case with perhaps significant stores loading.) Computer churns out number of occasions parameters have been exceeded (may be de-identified in first circumstances, but open to further investigation if serious issues arise). Man looks at printout, daily, weekly or even monthly. Man does not have to study and interpret raw data.Trends can be highlighted for specific aircraft, mission profile, operating unit or individual pilot. Protocols are put in place for remedial action depending on circumstances and severity of events.

Never having used TOLD I have no idea whether it is calculated on board or not, nor what the usual range of Vr is. If it is calculated on board then it is recordable, if not then I would imagine that deciding a gross estimate would not be difficult and could, if required, be modified for for daily analysis depending on the exercises being flown, averaged gross weights, altitude etc...

The idea of studying graphical traces doesn't really come into this scenario until detailed investigation is warranted. Most airlines seem to be able to manage this type of analysis without necessarily employing an extra individual solely for the task. Perhaps it would benefit the military if they were to look at other aviation sectors to see if they can learn anything that helps.

Before you ask, yes I am ex RAF FJ, QFI and airline.

Bob's point is: Why does the FSO make this decision unless there is already some hint/suspicion that such a parameter needs monitoring.

You may think it obvious that such a parameter should be routinely monitored, but it appears that view is not universally shared.

Well I suppose he could start with the manoeuvre envelope and then expand through the order book and add commonsense like not going the wrong side of the drag curve at low altitude.
On the other hand he could just assume that all FJ pilots are skygods and turn a blind eye to tools available since they're not required

BigDotStu
 

​Yes.
Normalisation of the deviation is a big problem, especially in small 'elite' units. Monitoring helps prevent it. We had formal interviews and pilots sent home from detachments for cowboy behaviour and cavalier attitudes. The monitoring then was human navigators and they only reported a part of the problem. We lost a crew a year in fatalities, I lost good friends.

I'd be surprised indeed if any routine monitoring of rotate speeds was conducted. But for a Sqn QFI to devise SOP speeds from the ODM seems so last century - these days a simple software program should be able to provide the necessary 'on the day' values given aerodrome elevation, slope, OAT, W/V, QNH and aircraft AUW / fit.

Deviance from TOLD values should have been picked up by whoever was conducting the simulator training, surely? As there's no 2-seat F-22, it'd be difficult to check pilot standardisation any other way.

Back in the Stone Age, Pilot's Notes would include handling information, e.g.:

Surely much more modern aircraft will have been assessed by test pilots and similar information included in the aircrew manual flying?

Sorry to quote your whole post Bob but, you are a stuck record and, you keep missing the points, like the leader of the opposition! :)

I was going to try and cover some of this again but, I have re-read and, everything has been covered but you have a fixed opinion, in my opinion. :oh:

The simple reality is, Flight Data Monitoring does provide early heads-up on trends and errors.

On a happier note, it is a good thing that modern automated monitoring of flight parameters and crew performance will eventually cross over into FJ flying. It gives a real benefit in improving standards and is actually the friend of professional aircrew.

Cheers

OAP

Unfortunately BV, I am neither military nor a pilot (my qualifications in either category are limited to a few trips in the back of a Chipmunk with 5AEF in the 80s), but I am a software engineer (sometimes on projects in the military arena), and this approach to detecting 'defects' in pilots is remarkably similar to various of the testing approaches used in software. No matter how many things you instrument and test, you will always find a tester/end-user who finds new and interesting ways to abuse the product that are neither expected nor intended. It seems to me that pilots and aircraft are subject to the same sorts of issues - once you've seen someone do it, it's obvious it needs handling....

Hi BDS!
Yes, there are always things that can jump up and surprise everyone. However, inaccurate flying and non adherence to targets/limits of flying SOP's, equipment use, procedures and the flight envelope are the bread and butter of automated flight data monitoring. In this case, any half-decent FDM application would have picked this up in short order. TBH, I do not know how such basic mishandling became so entrenched as the report seems to indicate. Of course, I know no detail of F-22 training and procedures, only what is listed in that unclassified report. I do wonder if the F-22 uses a FDM system but, they failed to consider the non-compliance with TOLD parameters as worthy of tracking or taking action on? If that was the case, they were plain dumb. Maybe that is the great unpublished part of this report? Anybody know? OTOH, I do know what an effective tool and contributor to Flight Safety FDM can be. Cheers

OAP

Hi OAP,

I think your question above ties in with BVs perspective - he wouldn't have considered it worthy of consideration prior to this event. I can understand his perspective, especially if (like myself prior to now) he was not aware of what is considered standard coverage in FDM. I don't think anyone would deny it is a valuable tool which can only improve flight safety.

Every day is a school day...

Stu

BV - I was in a similar situation to you when my unit introduced FDM .The mindset you're in is "what would I think is important to look at" and obviously rotate speed doesn't make the cut.

The misunderstanding is the mindset there - you don't look at what's important, you look at literally everything on the aircraft that has a limit or rule that has any chance of being machine processed.

The challenge on a unit that flies dynamically rather than procedurally (FJ Vs multi as an example) is that last bit. For example, FDM would never be able to tell you that you were using too much or too little G in BFM to get a shot, but it could easily be programmed to recognise someone routinely using more G than the Sqn beefer is comfortable with on a VRIAB.

We had basically every parameter from the ODM, RTS and FOB looked at, plus all "standard" profiles that could be automatically analysed. The FDM provider was helpful in that regard. Even ground taxy speed was included.

All of the above said, I've yet to ever actually see anyone get booked by it, but I can conceive how it would have picked up the trend of underspeed rotating - the key is in looking at every bit of performance data and limitations/rules that you use when you fly, whether you think it'll be broken or not - it doesn't cost extra!

It's not about anyone 'being booked by it' it's about stopping people killing themselves or wasting valuable resources through unchecked human frailties (hubris etc..) if it's used wrongly it becomes counterproductive.

PBA
 

Arty
 

Arty
 

We seem to assume all FJ pilots are the same, regarding planning and procedures. My experience of operating with FJ on numerous AAR Trails and AAR supported operations and exercises over 40 years ,is that they are not.
As an example, an AAR Trail to Alaska via Goose Bay for Tornado GR1 and F3. At the Face to Face Brief at Goose Bay the GR1 crews all had Terminal Approach Plates for all possible diversion airfields and were aware of facilities available such as LOX. Also Runway lengths and Take Off requirements, as well as full chart coverage of the route. Not so the F3 crews.
After the brief the Sqn Cdr of the F3 squadron asked to borrow the 1:6 million scale chart of the whole of Canada/ Northern USA which had the route marked on it, together with Refuelling Brackets and Abort Points in such a way as to be visible at the back of the briefing room. When I asked him why he told me it was so he could photocopy it and gives his crews copies "so they had some idea of where they were going!". Several questions were asked about my choice of Diversion Airfields, one being " Why are we not using Lynn Lake, as it en-route?" " Because it is a lake! You need floats to land there!"
Unlike the tankers who were used to frequently operate at MTOW for the conditions and therefore calculated the Take Off Data accurately and flew within the narrow performance margins available, the F3s seemed to work on the principal that if the runway was 6000ft plus, all you did was "Bang it into Burner and Go". There was always Martin Baker if it went wrong.
In the case of this F22 incident, it appears that the training unit was teaching/accepting the 120kt rotation technique, as half the pilots were doing it. The TOLD Data was also wrong, but if nobody was using it that was no big deal. They were also retracting the undercarriage below Take off speed. Spicy!
If the person who was doing the FDM was an F22 pilot who used the 120kt technique, would he have flagged it up as a problem?

That would depend if he used to be an Eagle driver? :)

OAP​​​​​​​