Ken Baker.

At the time of this crash the Vulcan was operated to 104% take-off power, later it was restricted to cruise power which was quite adequate.

I am sure BEagle can retell the proper throttle management for a roller after a simulated engine failure. While it is correct that there was insufficient rudder authority the problem was the live engines had a more rapid response to throttle movement than the two at idle.

I wonder how many fatalities were caused from practising asymmetric than actually occurred for real? How many actual asymmetric incidents were saved from previous practise? I know the later figure is probably too difficult to assess, but in addition to the notorious Meteor and Canberra crashes, the Vulcan one mentioned, I know of a Valetta one, essentially the same as the Hastings one above where the wrong engines were shut down. The Kegworth crash was also mishandling but was an actual emergency.
.

TO ALL CONCERNED,

Brian 48nav (#78) is right ! I've got my Hastings and Hercs in a twist ! Put it down to Senile Decay. Apologies for any confusion caused !

Danny.

Re post 80/83, I understand that Ken Baker did something similar in a Valiant, when he was a sqn ldr and was v-lucky to get away with it.

We are just a month away from the 53rd anniversary of his playing the same trick in a Vulcan B2.

O-D

During my Vulcan time I do not recall any occasions when I rolled from an asymmetric approach. A simulated Double Engine Failure After Take off was initiated by throttling back the pair on one side. After a routine heavyweight circuit and instrument approach i believe 93% on the working pair was more than enough for a safe climb away. Asymmetric safety speed was one of those things demonstrated on an early OCU sortie, never approached again in real life.
OCU QFIs may well correct me, but I never found the excess power available a problem. Was roller from asymmetric landing demoed on the OCU? Too long ago for my memory.

My 1st ever PAR in a JP3 - not briefed, as the Lincolnshire weather had turned for the worse after a bright start to the flight.
Landed, after a fashion, but with a lot of moisture shed from the pores. Taxying in carefully, as visibility was an issue.
"Well, r1, your first instrument approach, eh? Reminded me of a Shakespeare play"
Thinks ...
"Ah, 'As You Like It' sir..."
" Err, I was thinking of the 'Comedy of Errors' actually..."

Polish fighter pilot WW2, later QFI RAF and civilian instructor to ab initio service pilots. Aircraft lands after a dual sortie, instructor and student dismount;


Instructor: "What does your mother call you Taylor?"


Taylor: "Michael Sir",


Instructor: "Well Michael, you're chopped".

50 Ray, I see you are a little younger than me so you were obviously on the OCO much later than this. Ron Dick had also recovered from a similar situation a little earlier when his sqn cdr managed to loose a wheel which bounced through the QRA dispersal.

I think you are right about not rolling but that does not mean that experienced captains will not do an overshoot if their co-pilot's need more practise. Ken was an experienced sqn cdr, except his experience was not on Vulcan and he was a brand new sqn cdr.

As you say, 2 at 93% and 2 on flight idle was enough but 2 at 104% was way too much.

A 4-e roller following a 2-e approach was only flown with an OCU QFI as captain. It was part of the Intermediate Co-pilot Course. I can clearly remember that part of that trip: "I have control" followed by the OCU boss carefully and deliberately going through the procedure - zero scope for error!

Following the landing, all engines were brought to idle, the nosewheel placed on the RW and the rudder trim centred. Then the engines were cautiously brought up to the normal take-off setting; once airborne only 80% was needed for climbing into the visual circuit and 72% when level. In the latter part of the visual approach on 4-e, only 66% was needed, then hi-drag airbrake at 300' decelerating from approach to threshold speed.

With a DEFATO, once the landing gear was up and pattern speed achieved, 93% would give a climb rate of about 1500 ft/min.

53 years ago - my how time flies. For the record Ken Baker was not doing a roller at the time of the accident. It is believed the co-pilot came heads up below 200 ft and got confused by the bright starlit night and the airfied lights and overshot. The inevitable happened. Also for the record I was at dinner when it happened and the result was horrendous. There were other issues which are better left untold now.

ACW

Another story about the Hastings and Taff John

The Hastings was a bit of a handful, especially during the approach and landing, when the handling pilot needed both hands on the control column and then asked the Flight Engineer to select the desired power setting, using his own RPM and power levers. By the commencement of the approach RPMs were max, and hence just the Boost settings were called for. On an ideal approach, and from memory the sequence of calls was:

"Two-six inches engineer"
followed further down the approach by
"Two-two inches engineer"
followed by
"One-eight inches engineer"
and finally at the point of roundout
"Slow Cut engineer
When the handling pilot started the roundout and the Flight Engineer slowly brought the throttles to idle power.

With luck, the aircraft would then settle, but more often than not - BOUNCE

During a copilot trainining sortie, with Taff as the instructor, Taff finished the sortie after a runway kangaroo by the copilot with the words:

Copilot, the call is "Slow Cut" not OH ****" !!

DGAC, during a round dispersal CT sortie the QFI to stn cdr after approach at Lyneham said "if that was at Lindholme you would have hit the boundary fence"

Back at Lindholme he hit the boundary fence.

Never a truer word.

I was a stude, learning to fly helicopters on the Whirlwind (big aircraft, single jet engine which could, and was often, flown with a manual throttle!).

Trip 4, and I am wobbling back towards dispersal at Tern Hill. Both of us are wearing throat mics, combined with a bad aircraft intercom.

QHI says to me "Have you seen a Hover Engine Off yet?" I reply no. "You need to see one... crackle...... solo." He takes control, then says "Put your hand.. crackle... Speed Select ..crackle.." So I put my hand on the Speed Select Lever [like an automatic throttle]. He goes on "crackle... crackle ... retard it rapidly...crackle.." I look at QHI, QHI looks at me and nods his head. So I rapidly retard the SSL to Ground.

There is a scream from the QHI, the ac lurches around, controls move in a blur and we hit the ground like a jangling sack of spuds.

After a short period of silence, QHI says "F*** me, that one was for real. What I said ..crackle...crackle.. on the count of three, retard the Speed Select... crackle.."

Ah. But at least I got a tick for a Hover Engine Off demo!

Overheard in standards office at a long ago jet refresher school:

Senior QFI has just completed a FHT on V senior officer and is completing " assessment of ability" on report.

QFI looks at VSO then writes Ab. which he then crosses out and writes "average".

Hang on, says VSO, you were going to write "above average", why the change of mind?

No sir, says QFI, I was going to write abysmal but I couldn't spell it !

Or it could be silence.

Told this tale by a 2FTS QFI

One of his students missed an item or two in his pre-start cockpit checks. A bit of prompting and he got it. Same for the post-start.

And then again at the runway hold point. No more prompting. Flight cancelled.

Was told it was a very quiet taxi back to dispersal.

KG86 - am I missing something?

O-B,

I guess my crackles got in the way of the story!

What he had actually said to me was, 'On the count of 3, pull the Speed Select Lever back.' He was then going to count '3... 2... 1... Pull'. He would then be ready for the rapid yaw, sideways movement and descent.

Because I pulled it back with no countdown, as I hadn't heard that bit due to the crackling intercom, he was completely wrong-footed, and faced with a 'real' no-notice, engine-off in the hover, an extremely challenging exercise in that ac.

Hence his bon-mot 'F*** me, that one was for real.' It was a remarkably calm response, bearing in mind my actions.

A similar thing happened to an ex-QHI colleague of mine. The pre-brief went along the following lines, as per the SOP:

Student was to handle the throttle whilst the QHI flew the aircraft throughout. The run in was at 120 kts and 200 ft agl (might have been lower, it was a very long time ago). The aircraft was to be "zoom" climbed and a variable flare EOL carried out to the airfield (again Tern Hill).

Commands from the QHI were to be: "Identify the throttle" (student to reach up and to place hand on throttle, situated on overhead panel).

Then QHI: "On my command, 3-2-1 NOW!" (On NOW! the student was to fully retard the throttle).

What happened was: "Identify the throttle" - Student reaches up, grabs throttle and retards it!

Gazelle incapable of reaching airfield....but thankfully it was a safe, albeit embarrassing, landing in the adjacent farm field.

There can also be problems when the instructor has a significant foreign accent....

During an early ciné weave sortie ("Co..........mmence. Track, track, throttle back, roll, airbrake, power") with our French exchange officer, I was at the 'power, stage when he announced "Poweurre eurff", which surprised me. So I did as he instructed and closed the throttle, whereupon the lead Hunter disappeared upwards and we knocked it off....

"Non, non - I say poweurre eurrpp, not poweurre eurff!" he explained...:\

Great chap, but the crew room would go IMC with garlic when he opened the lunch box his wife had provided! Normally on asked one's instructor whether he would like a coffee during the debrief; Roger would always reply "Non, merci. But eef you 'ave a little red wine...??". So one day towards the end of the course, that's what I offered him after an ACM trip. It was accepted with alacrity!

Another TWU instructor was a Luftwaffe exchange pilot. One day he went off with his student for an ACM 1v1 trip. "Outwards turn for combat...go" "Inwards turn...go!" was quickly followed by his student calling "Splash, knock it off" as he sat firmly in the Luftwaffe mate's six. So they set up for another run....with the same result. After which his student called "Just like the war, eh Reiner?"....

The reason for his success was that the said student was in fact a highly capable Gnat QFI on his way to flying the Jaguar!

A certain French exchange QHI at Shawbury often had temporary difficulty finding the correct words. According to a fellow student, in the late stages of an eventful engine off landing in the Whirlwind, the words had been something like:

"Pull up more on ze... Pull up more on ze, er...!

"Boing!"

"Ze collectif!"

On the Vulcan OCU, we had to get the 'challenge and response' checks word perfect...

Some USAF exchange pilot was in the RHS. Came the co-pilot's left-to-right checks:

"Engine Air Switches?"

"Off"

"No...."

"Shut"

"Still No...."

"CLOSED, SHUT, OFF whatever...NOT goddam ON!"