IIRC the red container held the umbilical cables.

There was a single key I believe? There was a Newsnight feature on this several years ago-a big stink over the lack of a 'dual key' feature on the weapon?

Treble One.

WE177 did not need a "dual key" arrangement on the weapon itself because it was an entirely UK owned weapon.

Physical access to weapons was controlled iaw the provisions of Secret Document 814 (SD814) which included a "No Lone Zone" around the weapon and detailed arrangements for transfer of custodianship from storage > Weapon Loading Supervising Officer > Aircrew.

There was indeed one keyset - shown in this photo in the public domain. The key was for weapon enabling control, the allen key for setting burst and drop conditions, and a gripper device to assist removing control covers when wearing NBC IPE gloves.

Very "Heath Robinson" compared to, for instance, the contemporary US B61 which has a Permissive Action Link (PAL). It is currently planned to bring 400 x B61 up to Mod 12 standard for strategic and tactical use.

http://nuclear-weapons.info/images/kemble-keys-1w.jpg

Wow.
As mundane looking as that.

tartare. Yes the first time I saw one I thought it was remarkably similar to the key to my STOPLOCK car steering wheel lock arm (remember those ?).


https://images.lteplatform.com/image.../549770021.jpg

Contemporary US PAL Controller from 1980s.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MujGv4r5P9A

B61-12 being loaded on F-15E at Nellis AFB for trials at Tonopah.

Note the use of the 1950s vintage design MJ-1 jammer for loading - still a great functional piece of kit.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FBm74WiCL1g

The 'dust cap gripper' merely removed the cover over the Strike Enable Function key aperture - most people found it easier to use their fingernails. The panel under which the SEF aperture lived was secured by Dzus fasteners, hence the 'Allen key' also includes a blade for these fasteners.

The SEF key was unique to each weapon and an unauthorised key would not fit.

As with every aspect of access to a special weapon or an aircraft loaded with a special weapon, a minimum of 2 authorised people had to be present when opening and setting the panel, each of whom was capable of detecting an unauthorised act or incorrect procedure on behalf of the other.

Regarding the gripper, it pre-dated NBC kit in the RAF, certainly the V-Force, by 5 years at least. One weakness was the dust cap tended to fly off in the wind under the Vulcan which dreadfully upset the plumbers.

Regarding the key/lock which is almost as ubiquitous as web enabled devices, the first time I saw one of these locks in the wild was 1966 in Motor Sport magazine as an aftermarket fit for your sports car. I fancy the lock had been designed to MoS requirements but no one had thought to patent it.

Regarding each weapon lock being unique, it also seemed to apply to training rounds until one day we found two identical sets.

As there were only 56 B rounds I guess uniqueness was not a problem.

Thanks PN

The aforementioned Panorama clip I saw showed a single individual being able to set the parameters you mentioned with the key set in the photo.

They did mention the 2 man principle in the report. The big stink was over the lack of national command and control and lack of PAL'S as used by the US.

They actually referred to it as 'The Dr Strangelove Scenario'

Fortunately General Ripper was never a commander on a V Force or other nuclear enabled squadron.....

Many thanks
TO

Presuming that the arming and parameter setting on the V Force was to be done at a dispersal Base should the need ever arise....?

A pilot at Laarbruch in the mid-80s managed to "lose" one of his 2 key sets when had a wander around the QRA site (with a golf ball and club, I think) which made the handover to the next pilot rather problematic.

Peter G-W, the pilot would only ever have one key. The second key was kept separately against that possibility.

Treble One, regarding the one individual being seen with the key, remember this is a TV Clip. The second man does not have to be joined at the hip. As long as two conditions are met: that the one with the key can be monitored by the other. That the one with the key can observe the actions of the other as well.

For instance, provided the man observing the key holder can be seen to be clear of the weapon, or any aircraft component, then the principle is being observed.

Two instances:

A co-pilot, exiting the aircraft last, caught his raincoat on the ladder and re-entered the cockpit. The captain, at the critical moment, had his back to the co-pilot thus breaching the 2-man principle and I failed the crew accordingly. That captain was the sqn cdr and is an active member in this forum though he cant remember the incident.

The other was when I was doing my own acceptance. Ordinarily the weapons team chief would do a final check being overseen by another armourer. Then I would do the acceptance being overseen by the nav plotter. In practice I would do the acceptance at the same time as the team chief did his final check. Halved the time and shaved 5 minutes off the load to combat ready time. This was critical as the YS2 could be loaded in 7 minutes whereas the 177, with a worked up team, took about 35 minutes.

See PMs as well.

PN. Thanks for the attempted correction but if you have 2 targets then you need 2 bombs and 2 bombs required 2 sets of keys. We didn't mess around!

Peter, thank you for the correction. Interesting as we had previously only tested SACLANT crews the two-weapon case. RAFG only had one weapon per Bucc in the 70s and they were the A version. I know the C was coming in in mid-70s so obviously the numbers increased.

Surely the Wasp must be the most "interesting" WE177 delivery platform...single pilot, doors off, weapon mounted askew, a splash of gas and away we go!!!

Wasp + WE177
 

Holy smoke. What was the escape manoeuvre after dropping that?

I suspect 'kiss your a*** goodbye' 57 mm?


These weapons could be retarded of course?

Just the same as the Sea King and the Wessex dropping the 600lb Bomb: no retardation apart from the drogue chute, select yield before drop, Vne off the drop and wait for the splash.

Sink rate to explosion depth was briefed as long enough to get clear, but the admonition to open doors and windows to avoid overpressure was somewhat optimistic, IMO. It was, after all, an NDB so the explosion was at depth and wouldn't have propagated as fast as a surface or air burst.