TwoDeadDogs,

"on the plus side the RAF did buy King Airs and Bell 212's..."

Er, I don't think the RAF did anything of the sort. The MoD bought a capability from a consortium who then went out and bought said aircraft. They are owned and serviced by the contractor and flown by the RAF on a MOCO deal, (military operated contractor owned)

Hi PDR

thanks for the reply. You raise some really interesting points and its nice to see that some hard data has been generated in favour of co-operation. Ultimately, (after requirements gathering) a contract is only ever a start point and after 5 years or so, it becomes increasingly irrelevant.

Some of the examples you describe really are at the difficult end - an F-35 programme for instance, as opposed to generating a refurbished KC135. I'm going to ponder further on your post :)

Actually Bell 412 FB or Now CObham Helicopter Services for the DHFS M/E SARTU part of the contract and for 84 Sqn use - COMR - Commercially Owned Military Registered ,

Bell 212 went to AAC for use in Brunei and then Belize and MW for training

cheers

It's not MOCO or COMR, the correct term is MRCOA - Military Registered Civil Owned Aircraft.

Indeed... a few years back, I was involved with the Pilot Cooling Unit for JSF pilots (which pumps coolant through the flight suit).

The unit had an EMC susceptibility requirement that was laughable... power levels 1/4 of the spec would have killed the pilot...

I tend to get a bit passionate about this one (which is how the dissertation ended up at 54,000 words!) and it kinda suited my general outlook on life to challenge the assumption that competition is always a "good thing", although that wasn't where I intended to go when I started it.

One of my core findings was that, in an availability/capability contract, if you observe that the KPIs drive the behaviours it follows that the KPIs influence system performance - ergo they are actually PART of the system. It therefore follows that KPI Design is an engineering activity which needs as much science, rigour and care as (say) the design of the low-observability solution. In hindsight this is glaringly obvious, but when initially suggested to people (both in the MoD and in Industry) it was treated as heresy. The initial response was that KPIs were a purely commercial issue and engineers should stay away from them...

PDR

Historically, the RAF's least 'effective' combat aircraft have been acquired through formal OR and procurement. Conversely, those aircraft the RAF had "no operational requirement" for but fell 'off the shelf' into service have been among the most effective.
Discuss...

Hmmm... Spitfire, Hurrican, Tempest, Typhoon, Hunter, Tornado, Harrier II, Hawk - all these came from ORs didn't they?

PDR

The first four were pretty much private ventures with constantly changing AM specs following them around. You could have mentioned the Fairey Battle, that was what the boys in the front line really wanted.
The Hunter was rejected, twice. "Swept-winged nonsense". And we had to buy Sabres whilst the AM procrastinated.
I'll grant you #6 but not #7. The GR5 was not the GR5 of first choice but was the off the shelf version.
Hawk? I did say combat aircraft. And didn't it replace an OR'd twin jet at 'short' notice?

Well they did arm the Hawk as an air defence last resort sidewinder armed variant did they not ?

"on the plus side the RAF did buy King Airs......"

"Er, I don't think the RAF did anything of the sort."

Hmm, 14 Sqn might take a different view....

I assume Buccaneer was one of those, a sort of RN "hand me down" to fill the gap left by TSR2? Perhaps Phantom was another, but in those days we took what we were given and made it work

I'm not sure the phrases 'RAF Phantom' and 'Off the shelf' have any business being near each other.

Indeed - the RAF OTS Phantom was i9nconceivable because it had been Spayed.

[I'll fetch my coat]

PDR

The Buc and F-4 both found ample space in the TSR2/B111 void, though the Speying of both had little to do with the RAF.