well on Monday morning I presume all we'll hear is vast sigh of relief from inside the MoD and the hum of shredders...... and box loads of documents heading for Kew with "Do Not Open for 50 years" stencilled on the outside

MB will sign a cheque, tell everyone to say nothing and "slightly" increase prices for 2019 & 2020

A classic British outcome............ but hardly "justice"

Looking at the photos used by the BBC the RAF could go with some new spanners, all the grollied up bolt heads. I wonder if they have to share one multi purpose adjustable between the squadrons.
Absolute crazy out come.
Cunningham Dad summed it up nicely with his comment over lack of RAF in Court.

Harry

They'll try, but unfortunately one aircraft project team released under FoI the information that another tried to conceal, revealing MoD's guilt. Classic MoD. The HSE confirmed they had not seen it. Some would say they were then duty bound to report this to the judge. This report, and associated papers, proved that, even if M-B didn't send out a piece of paper in 1990, MoD knew of the precise risk in 1990 by another means, and in 1993, 1998......; because they'd consciously rejected the mitigation that would have eliminated it.

I do hope people here realise that a root cause of Flt Lt Cunningham's death was the same refusal to implement mandated regulations that was confirmed by Mr Haddon-Cave in 2009; which merely repeated the same warnings by the RAF Director of Flight Safety in 1992, 96, 97, 98....; and internal MoD audits from 1988.

I know Tuc , I know... but they can bury this one and they will

And in 2-4 years we'll be on here again with another case with some poor sod dead or seriously injured because no-one will do something

Short of a PPrune reader becoming PM and instituting changes I can't see it changing

I have a recollection that Jim Callaghan had a list of things he'd come across all the way from his RNVR days that were acted upon (quietly) when he became PM in the mid-70's........................................

Tuc for PM?

we could, and probably will, do worse.

Personally, I hope and pray that this awful `airworthiness` saga can be resolved. with, , at the very least, those responsible being forced to account for their actions.

However, I suspect this will not happen and the MoD will probably disband itself before admitting its `mistakes`.

In these days of contracting out, I wonder how much it would cost to get the CAA to oversee military airworthiness? Of course I do realise that this would never happen and the MOD is quite happy with its incestuous approach to independent oversight.

Para 2 (page 1) of judge's statement,

"his seat was inadvertently ejected, something that is a recognised risk"

And that is why Martin Baker recommended the fitment of a shroud on the ejection handle, in order to mitigate that risk. But the RAF/MoD rejected a solution that had been applied for many years on earlier RAF seats, and still used world wide.

Some will say it was not liked, fine, so have it modified, which is precisely what is happening (may have happened) right now. Too late.

DV

Notwithstanding the comments made on this thread ref MB and MOD and the way that this has evolved over the last 6 years - it is the interview given by Sean’s father to BFBS News that shows what a sorry state of affairs that we have found ourselves in. Obviously, there is both sadness and anger in how he describes what his family has gone through, but more damming is the fact that he states not a snr RAF Officer attended the court when the fine was given to MB. I appreciate that there will be politics and legal nuances associated with the proceedings but, if true, to not be represented at the court, presentationally is very poor.

https://www.forces.net/news/breaking...ws-pilot-death

The news broadcast was watched on BFBS (not in the UK) due to bandwidth this is the closest I can get to the segment that was broadcast.

Do you have link detail for the BFBS news please

Para 2 of page 5 of Judge's statement.

This design is now an ”old” design. Since about 1984 MBAL has not designed any new seats with a mechanical scissor shackle. Rather it uses an improved gas-release shackle system, available for new aircraft and also for retro-fitting. The MOD contracted MBAL to carry out such retro-fitting on all in-service ejection seats, with the exception of the seats in the Hawk aircraft.

I will deal with the last issue first, a question that no one asked, why were RAF Hawk seats not modified?

The main thrust of this statement gives the impression that the MoD initiated a retro-fitting programme to replace "old" design shackles. We have no idea who fed the Judge with this information but we know, thanks to the 2002 QinetiQ report, that this is false. The QinetiQ report makes it clear that prior to a new jamming problem that occurred in 1998 there was no intention on the part of MoD to retrofit Tornado GR4 and F3 aircraft with the gas shackle. The only mods in the pipe line related to the replacement of the GQ1000 parachute with the GQ 5000. It was only when the problem occurred during a re-qualification trial for the new chute that MoD swung into action. It then took a further seven years before Tornado seats were modified.

The HSE was aware of the 2002 QinetiQ report and the chain of events leading up to the gas shackle fit in Tornado. However, they never brought this information to the attention of the judge and the court. Clearly, a major HSE failing.

DV

I heard Mr Cunningham's comments toward MOD and the RAF on BBC Radio Lincolnshire on Friday afternoon. Unfortunately I can't find the programme on their web-site. However, here's a link the to BBC news web-site which reports part of the family's statement.

Red Arrows death: Ejection seat firm fined £1.1m - BBC News

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england...shire-43171049

OMS, Same was reported by the BBC. Hope the link works.

You mentioned somewhere above about a supply Officer being HOB back in DGSM days. Yes but the Gp Capt was suitably qualified. The supply Officer never had any LoD other than for counting the beans. When the IPT was set up in 1999/2000 things were reasonably managed. Three years later the Gp Capt PVRd.
Then we saw the two Civi Guys come into play. I would not let either one fix my bike. Tech Pubs in Brown Street shut up shop leaving no one with the skills to manage the publications.
Skills have been eroded on the front line. I think Tuc mentions how it was second nature not to overtighten the mechanism, assuming the tradesman knew how the mechanism was supposed to operate. Not sure what the standard of trade training notes are today. I still have some of my dads from 50s through 70s. For these applications thin headed shear bolts were the order of the day with pinned castlated nuts.
For Designers the SBAC published guidance books on everything from pipe fittings to riveting. Never saw these updated since 70s.
How do folks learn these days?

HH can you tell Mr Fox about Jim. The impression is that all Labour MPs of the era were Soviet Sympathisers.

DV

More like perverting course of justice if they held back evidence.

A recognised risk?
So how many such inadvertent ejections have there been?

I can think of 2, perhaps 3:

1. The Harrier pilot who it seems stood on his seat firing handle at Yeovilton but hadn't replaced the pins. Fatal accident.

2. The Fighter Controller who managed to bang out of a Hawk over the North Sea. Fished out safe and sound. I watched the Hawk landing at Wattisham - it looked very odd with the pole sticking out of the back cockpit.

3. Details rather hazy, but many years earlier, turbulence caused a Canberra seat to drop with sufficient force to fire the main gun. Sudden ejection came as a surprise to the occupant, who managed to complete the manual separation procedure despite the surprise?

To place her words in context, she also criticised poor training, and the SI report is excellent in that respect. The risk was indeed low, but increased to a significant degree when MoD diluted training and weakened other defences in depth, without making compensatory provision. I was but a lad when the Service HQ posts responsible for identify these things and making provision were chopped. Numerous official reports have criticised this move, I suppose the most notable being in 1996 as it was direct to PUS.

By coincidence I was airborne on the same exercise and heard the MAYDAY call, including the amusing description of water entry, disappearance of survivor, followed by reappearance a few seconds later.


The seat occupant has always said the seat just fired without any warning and that his hands were nowhere near the handle. There was a lot of chat at the time that suggested the close-aboard cross turn may have had a bearing on events and that, if the seat was ever found, the handle would be fully extended. Only one man knows the truth and we must take him at his word but I believe that, other than some of the early top latch failures, it is the only case of an inadvertent ejection that did not involve some form of physical interaction with the system.


Back to the thread...

Harrier pilot dragged out through canopy.

:(

As glad rag says, the Taylor Scott tragedy and there was also an event in the late 80s or early 90s at Boscombe when a Tornado seat went through the hangar roof, apparently severing a gas pipe as it went. A near miss for the maintainer that day, I believe.

Risk is the possibility of harm because of a hazard, which can, and was mitigated against. Martin Baker made it clear in their response to the coroner's Regulation 28 report on 17th April 2014 that misrouted strapping is "well known risk". The risk was effectively managed by a number of factors, the main one being shrouds over seat firing handles.

The MoD has a reactive, rather than a proactive approach to risk assessment, it is only regarded as a risk if an incident has occurred.

DV