Looking at the videos and the aircraft recovery it would appear the aircraft operated into its 3 main sections during the first seconds of impact; the tail, main fuselage and wing tanks and the nose section. The nose section being recovered from the far side of the trees towards the airfield. I would speculate that his survival was substantially aided by his slower deceleration through the vegetation and being thrown away from the conflagration caused by the wing and fuselage tank explosions on the road itself.

http://i.telegraph.co.uk/multimedia/...1_3417045b.jpg

http://cache4.asset-cache.net/gc/485...3u%2Bo2A%3D%3D

This is an interesting article:

Shoreham Airshow disaster: Hawker Hunter's final take-off 'unusual' expert says (From The Argus)

The video is here:

It might be completely irrelevant, but worthy of investigation?

Wingswinger,

Thank you for responding. Regarding use of flaps in the Hunter, I agree with the point you made at your last post. BEagle has commented on this quite succinctly - he has an uncanny memory of technical and handling information of pretty much everything he's flown; lots of good stuff in his head about Hunter and Gnat. He deals specifically with formation aeros here:

As in...

http://www.fradu-hunters.co.uk/fradu...es/fprm306.jpg
FRADU

He also remarked on the use of flap in solo aeros here:

Here's a Sweedish Air Force Hunter (photo by Alan Kenny) taken at the Jersey Air Show in 2013 - posted as a link as the image is too big for PPRuNe: http://www.airforcesmonthly.com/cent...llery/7474.jpg which just about shows the use of a notch or two in a solo display. My point being that use of flap in aeros has been standard practice in some cases for a long time.

G-loc: you are absolutely right about both delayed onset and physiological factors affecting g tolerance, but I would not wish to comment on the latter here as that could mean too much fuel for the blame-the-pilot brigade (hopefully not PPRuNe posters, but the lurkers that read this - I think we hit around 1,000 people viewing for the past few days!).

From my wonderful few days doing the USAF's g training and riding their centrifuge I recall a couple of relevant points. Most people's resting g tolerance seems to be around 4 g (with considerable variation) and onset of symptoms above or around that are generally limited to peripheral dimming followed by greying. At higher g levels (8 plus for most) without effective straining the effects are likely to be seven seconds of consciousness (due to oxygen stored in the brain) followed by rapid blackout. There is, of course, an in-between. The rapid, insidious onset is not normally a factor in aeros - but as you stated and demonstrated by personal experience, there are exceptions. I would add that variations with age do not appear to be particularly significant, although I don't recall the age band their research covered.

I've been watching the videos that surfaced after the crash with great interest, and my opinion poor decision making is the main factor of this accident, for reasons I will describe below.

The following is worth noting about the Reverse ½ Cuban 8 maneuver:
The Reverse ½ Cuban 8 maneuver is used as an end turn-around maneuver, and may be offset well to the left or right for this purpose.

** This is important, because the same is visible in the video referenced below.

To begin with, the airplane is seen in this video to approach A27 from the North, doing a low level left hand turn, which it finished on an approximate South-Eastern heading, roughly above the Cuckoo's Corner (Coombes Rd).
At that point from what is visible in the video, he was flying roughly around 100 feet AGL, at which altitude, he began a Reverse ½ Cuban 8, which when he started he was flying roughly parallel to A27 as seen in this video.

** This is important because starting that evolution parallel to the highway, also implies the possibility of it ending parallel to the highway (or directly above it), which it did.

Low level flying coupled with poor situational awareness amount to a poorly judged evolution with equivalent results, for reasons described below:

For what it's worth, I think any display pilots of highly maneuverable planes (such as Eurofighter, Rafale etc) would be reluctant if asked to start a Reverse ½ Cuban 8 at that altitude. Simply because it's a dangerous proposition, regardless of the airplane you are flying. Even if done right, it implies you would also finish the maneuver very close to ground level. Which is not a way to do things generally, let alone at an airshow, and much less in a vintage aircraft, equipped with a turbojet engine which even under perfectly functioning conditions, is likely to have a longer spool up time (like the L-39 does) and you will waste precious seconds close to ground level waiting for that power to be delivered to an otherwise not very energy-efficient air frame.

It is then wise, to allocate an altitude buffer for maneuvers such as Loops, Split S, or Reverse ½ Cuban 8.

Whether there was an unusual takeoff in a lower power setting than usual, or the usage of flaps influenced the elevator authority can be debated until the technical investigation is finalized. If the airplane didn't deliver enough power upon taking off, and the pilot was aware of the limitation, that means he had even less reasons to attempt that maneuver in the first place.

I believe if the pilot would have decided to go for a ½ Cuban 8, instead of Reverse ½ Cuban 8, the evolution would have ended at a relatively safe altitude and we wouldn't be having this conversation today.

Anyone flown a Hunter from Weald? Is this an "oddly flat" departure or just hot day and fuel in the underwings?

Mr Hatcher stated: As one who has only flown aeros for personal enjoyment at 'HASELL height' and above*, rather than in displays, I'm not qualified to comment on Mr. Hatcher's comments regarding minimum height criteria. But surely they form part of the pilot's DA? Does a DA include 'Rule 5' exemption?

PS - Thanks for your kind comments, Courtney Mil. Usual fee....;)??


*Although I did win the Bulldog aeros pot on my CFS course - unfortunately the other chap, who probably should have won, overstressed during his manoeuvre, so that was that. But the rest of the course must have been pretty cr@p as I was distinctly 'average'!

Does anyone know when this particular T7 airframe was released from HMS ?

T7 Anti-g system
 

Despite many hundreds of hours on Hunters I cannot recall if the T7's anti-g supply is the same as the single-seaters i.e. an accumulator or if it is supplied with bleed air. I do recall that it was quite disconcerting on a range sortie to suddenly run out of anti-g usually on pulling off the target.

My apologies if this has already been covered

WV372 was built as an F.4 in 1955.
Converted into a T.7 in 1959
Flew as a civilian a/c in 1998.

It has been. Post320. Here you go.

Looping the Hawker Hunter
 

Attached are links to videos showing 22 RAF Hawker Hunter aircraft looping in close formation at world famous airshows.

So why in 2015 is a single Hunter unable to loop successfully and safely at an airshow?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_record_loop

Black Arrows - CXI (F) Squadron

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uwn9DSG6Hvo

I do believe that is precisely what the Uk AAIB are trying to determine. :rolleyes:

Well said, ATC. And it wasn't a loop.

But to be fair, it did appear to have a long ground roll - in excess of 30 seconds, I think. An improvised reduced power T/O?

Hardly standard practice. I wonder how anyone would calculate take off data at an intermediate power setting. Anyone here have a Hunter ODM handy?

Athonite:

Well if you read it in a book it can't possibly be the claptrap that I think it is.

North Weald 02 is only 6200'. I think there was no headwind component, a hot day.

TOD MAUW would have been in the region of 4000ft.

Take-off Distances
 

From my Pilot's Notes (last amended in 1972!) with Zero Wind and +15 the Ground Run with 2 x 100 gallon drop tanks is given as 950 yards and +30 it is given as 1120 yards. There are no figures for a reduced power Take-off.

Since starting the thread I have avoided inputs of a speculative nature to a possible cause for this tragic event and I really don't want to now, other than put some thoughts out there for others with more experience working on and flying the Hunter.

For the engineers out there if I say "Gundip" system and this particular airframes form 700 would you understand where I am coming from and what system was affected, the required "mod" residual wiring, due to spurious inputs into a particular system.

When WV372 was in HMS she was converted to a T7 then had periods of long term storage before coming in to civilian operation, did the complete "mod" get done before leaving HMS.

Now a video showing what seems to be an extended take-off run from North Weald departing for Shoreham, and that is all it shows, but refer to the "mod" again.

Discussions and statements of possibility not making the entry altitude/height for manoeuvre recovery and the unusual shape of the manoeuvre during both vertical phases, but refer to the "mod" again.

Also bear in mind the picture I posted and what I said earlier in post 38 and taking the above points into the equation.

No speculation just comments to provoke a thought process for those who understand the aircraft in depth.