Without disagreeing with your point about the relative capability of F35, why should the the fact that it's a civilian organisation disqualify the analysis? The official govt intelligence agencies didn't exactly excel when we last relied on their analyses, dodgy dossier and all.

Indeed, one organization that springs to mind is the RAND Corporation, including RAND Europe.

Sorry guys but either the author does not understand deterrence, or I don't! Assuming Russia is the prime threat, surely they say, "do as we say or Brum (or other large city) is flattened". We say no, they launch and we try and send some F35s to retaliate. The carrier has a Russian SSN in tow (crikey knows where it would need to be to raid St Petersburg,but not anywhere safe) and every RAF tanker is well and truly marked. Likely outcome is we can't afford the risk and we agree to the Russian demand. Deterrent failed!

So this only really works for roque now nuclear states that acquire longer range rockets. Is that really what we intend the deterrent to provide?

The core thing is do we spend money on successor, or go without and trust the USA to look out for us. (Like Italy, Germany, Spain etc) They are the only sensible choices. And if we choose to go without, the money is more likely to go away from defence. When we spend £50 billion a year on interest, it would be wrong to spend money just because we cut a programme.

My belief is we are a much safer nation with the deterrent. However, whether we can afford a replacement is a real question that needs an answer. Spending money on a watered down non-effective alternative is a nonsense.

The only other route I see is agreeing with the USA that we provide a core non nuclear capability they rely upon, in return for providing our cover. This may hold some water as their Ohio replacement costs really do make the eyes water!

Not at all, one that doesn't account for all the variables is. Its all about how they see the future. There are no shortage of retired military people of good caliber to provide input. Also no shortage of useless ones.:p

The metrics they use is the same problem we have with every thing else we are doing these days, colored by politics and personal philosophies.

Reality Check
 

There are some very good think tanks and ex-military people that are able to advise on future conflict scenarios etc. I'm unaware of any that have access to, or can use, classified information on potential adversary capabilities. Wrong information in, wrong answer out.

It has been stated before, the stand-off required in some scenarios will dictate the systems needed. Add to that adversary defensive capabilities, then any relevant analysis conducted must be able to stand up to scrutiny.

The CentreForum paper offers some interesting perspectives. At the moment we are faced with the prospect of spending a vast sum of money to replace Vanguard, which, while absorbing a large proportion of the defence budget, is totally inflexible and has actually no military relevance. At the same time it prevents us in the foreseeable future from deploying capabilities which have real strategic and tactical flexibility and military relevance, such as proper aircraft carriers, effective naval and airforce combat aircraft, MPA, proper AAR etc.

In my opinion, as we already possess it, the UK would be foolish not to retain some measure of independent nuclear deterrent as a last ditch card that also delivers some political advantages. However, I also believe that a Vanguard submarine based deterrent, while making some sense in the Cold War threat scenario, is no longer purposeful. Who or what is the threat to the UK alone that it is supposed to deter?

If we proceed as currently planned we will end up for the coming decades with two vast, expensive helicopter carriers which can carry a single, expensive, high risk, second best fighter type with which the RAF will also be saddled, no effective escorts to protect them, no useful means of on board aerial replenishment or AEW, and no MPA. We might, however, be able to deter Russia from taking over Europe using nuclear weapons, though not if they stick to conventional weapons and if that is their intention.

Does that really make proper sense? Better to reduce the mirage of a strategic nuclear deterrent to a more realistic minimum to permit our conventional military capabilities achieve a proper footing.

The defence of the UK? We seem to have forgotten how to go about doing that. Carriers have limited relevance to the defence of the UK.

Against an adversary with SSNs they'll last a few days in the open ocean. Against an adversary with SSKs and strike aircraft on the continental shelf the clock will also be ticking. They're just bigger more valuable targets. They require a lot of manpower - compromised aircraft - and a long logistic trail.

They're not about defence but politics or going after an adversary without submarines and strike aircraft.

If that's tactical flexibility - then it's a luxury to have after you sorted out defence of UK. Worse - it's a tactical flexibility that can within the next decade probably be delivered by other means using a smaller carrier designed to operate drones and backed by SSGNs.

And in the midst of this we seem to have forgotten the issue of confidence. The deterrent is ultimately one big shreiking hysterical "we will F*** you if you come near us" - that works if your adversary is convinced that you will use it. And if it comes to it as long as they have food and enough life left in the kettles they can skulk off to whereever they need to in order to deliver some instant sunshine to somebody you decide not to like on the other side of the planet. In a really nasty world that's real flexibility.

First off, your exam question is wrong. It is important to understand what effective deterrence is.
Cheap may get you a "we can claim we have deterrence" but it may not give you what you are trying to achieve.
So, what is the most cost efficient EFFECTIVE deterrence. To be effective, it must be credible.
Deterrence is by its nature a DEEP fight. The TACAIR answer is risible. "Stealth" is as much a marketing ploy as capability, which erodes over time in its ability to "try not to be seen."
The TLAM-N deterrent model might be viable against mid to low tech enemies. For example, if you were a mid to low level power and had as your deterrent object a mid to low level nation, you might get away with X number of diesel subs able to carry X dozen TLAM-N equivalents.
Against any significant EW/IAD architecture that deterrent doesn't fly. (Pun intended)

As this is a Brit topic, I'll back out now. I am also a few years beyond being involved in such theater strategic level issues to be current in my thinking.

It is interesting to watch the discussion.
Any number of mid sized powers are keen to establish a deterrent capability: Iran, for one. I daresay they want a legitimate deterrent, not a paper tiger deterrent. For that matter, the NorKor goons are striving mightily to establish a credible deterrent that goes beyond the local theater in reach.

A national nuclear deterrent is only of use in deterring other nations who possess their own nuclear weapons, the means to deliver them and the ideology and intent to countenance their apocalyptic use. Can you name any?

However, there are many nations and ideologies that are capable and willing to employ lethal conventional force to further their aims and are constantly doing so.

As a nation we in the impoverished UK need carefully to balance our capability to combat both threats. It is not logical, sensible or cost effective to put massive funding into the former when it is at the expense of the latter.

That ain't necessarily so. Not all deterrent is based on MAD.

But a nuclear deterrant will only be used by a civilised society in the event of a nuclear attack.

Actually the deterrent value is "might only be used etc etc"

If you have them the bad guys have to think that someone MIGHT fire back at them - you are increasing their downside a longggggggg way

Surely the credibility of the deterrent would be in question with an air launched system?

There is little doubt that such as system would be cheaper compared to SSBN (and their replacement), but the whole idea of going down that route to replace the V Force was because the system became too vulnerable to an attack.

"Vulnerable to attack by ICBMs". Unless we are attacked by Russia, France or the US that is an unlikely scenario post-Cold War.

In the post-Cold War scenario the threat has changed and there is no longer the justification to maintain a vastly expensive SSBN force which can only come at the expense of conventional defence capability, for which there is a constant requirement.

HH
"Actually the deterrent value is "might only be used etc etc""

No. The deterrant is only effective if the perception is "will be used".

I don't think you understand that deterrence is a living concept, not confined to the East and West Bloc. Your assertion about "only be used" is a guess, at best, since so far all that deterrence has done is made people reluctant to use the weapons at all, be it for tactical or strategic reasons.
It's a multi polar and far less rational world nowadays. I offer as exhibit A Pakistan's nuclear capability. :mad:
Wrong again. "Is likely to be used" is far more accurate, and "will be used" is a simpleton's explanation.

The very uncertainty is an advantage: will they or won't they?

Some will argue that Ronald Reagan introduced greater uncertainty when he was in office and that uncertainty scared people on BOTH sides of the wall.
THAT is effective deterrence, of one form, but it isn't the only one.

PS: never show your hold card.
Never rule out first use.
Make the bastards sweat.

Lonewolf.

While I find you dismiss my views rather condescendingly, I suppose I understand where you are coming from.

http://www.youtube.com/embed/Vt7FDTpzGvo?rel=0

Gen, apologies if the tone came across as harsh, but your repeated use of an outdated trope, and assumptions/assertions that don't fit the year 2015, evoked comment. I know (and you know) how the old model of deterrence was constructed. The world has changed, including deterrence and (which you acknowledge) the perception element. To be clear, we agree on the importance of perception.
What does the object of deterrence believe? That applies to conventional as well as nuclear models of that tool.
As another thought experiment for you, consider the deterrent as applied by the Israelis -- it doesn't fit the narrow confines of your assertions as posted.
Neither does that of the NorKors.

And no, you don't get where I'm coming from.
PS: Apologies to all for staying in thread longer than intended, but I suppose deterrence ends up being an alliance thing, not just a given nation's thing ... Charles De Gaulle's point considered.

New Paper?
 

I don't think you could replace Trident with one made of Paper, new or otherwise.

Paper planes and Paper Tigers maybe!