The contracts do need Iraqi approval, but similar contracts in 2011 and 2014 have been effectively allowed to proceed, although Baghdad considers them illegal*. The p!ssed-off routine just appears to be for internal political consumption and presumably also a way of upping the bribe money. Most commentators seem to think that ExxonMobil do not make these moves until they have been given the nod that they will be approved. There comes a point, however, when the risk of the Kurds having a viable Kurdistan and attempting it increases markedly. The geopolitics is interesting. The Iraqi politicians may feel it's an inevitability, and they have zero political weight up there anyway, so they might as well just make the maxi dosh out of it. The Turks have long felt it threatens their nation state, so their concerns may be of a different nature to the Iraqis, and also more sensitive. A viable Kurdistan, even if incorporating purely currently Iraqi real estate, will (they fear,I suspect rightly) lead to Kurdish regions of Turkey joining it eventually.

* It's a messy one. ExxonMobil also has a large stake in Iraq. After the first Kurdish deal, the Iraqis threatened to ban any further contracts for Exxon. They in turn started negotiations to pull out of Iraq. Iraq reportedly offered sweeteners if they'd stay in Iraq and pull out of Kurdistan. It's all gone very quiet, but Exxon are still drilling in Kurdistan.
Under the U.S.-drafted constitution, Iraq lacks centralized legislation to govern foreign oil companies, revenue sharing and contract negotiation. Hence the "considers them illegal", rather than a definitive "are illegal".

You need to separate the Kurdish Autonomous Region of northern Iraq from the Kurdish independence movement in SE Turkey. Turkey has good relations with the autonomous administration, who themselves are distancing themselves from the PKK who operate just inside the Iraqi border. There was a Twitter feed today urging the PKK to take the fight elsewhere after unverified reorts of civilian deaths in a TAF air raid on PKK fighters who have melted into local villages. Sadly, even otherwise intelligent Turks become rather emotional about 'the mountain Turks' but the PKK are a rather murderous bunch (40,000 have been killed since the early 80s; the Turkish government downplayed attacks against SF over the last two years, even though many soldiers and police died, in an effort to keep the ceasefire/peace talks with the Kurds on track.

Erdogan finally realises that ISID can and do operate in Turkey and, as such, threaten his regime and kelptocracy of his close family and senior AKP officials. Corruption, in favour of the ruling party pervades almost every aspect of business and political life in Turkey. Luckily the forces remain pretty clean, although it is likely the young conscripts manning border posts could be bought for a few dollars. However, as posted above, go are the days of alcohol and very Western hosting by Turkish officials; also too, head scarves are very common now reflecting the wider Islamist shift of the country.

I don't need to, but Turkey does! ;)

There's quite a good summary on the BBC, along with a condemnation from the Irqi Kurds. The UK has tweeted a mild rebuke 'to both sides', but as anyone here can imagine, U.S. and UK need Turkish cooperation to prosecute an effective campaign against ışıd. once again, Turkey needs to decide whether it wants to be a Western or Islamic country. It can't be both...at least not whilst Erdoğan has a controlling influence in domestic politics...the formation of a government (or fresh elections) within the next month will see some rather mendacious behaviour - with his AKP party attacking the Kurdish-friendly and liberal HDP By accusing it of siding with the PKK.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-33747980

This explains the different Kurdish groupings.