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"TO THE the logical mind, the most surprising element of the 2007 decision to build two Canberra class LHDs was the acceptance by the Australian Government of advice from a lobby group that fighter aircraft based in Australia, with their limited radius of action and fixed supply chains, could provide support for these ships and their ‘all-arms’ battle groups wherever they might be deployed.

The Government had already stated its intention to procure the land-based F-35A Lightning II joint strike fighter but showed no interest in the STOVL F-35B variant (pictured) being developed specifically for amphibious operations with the US Marine Corps. Protagonists of the limited ability of ‘land-locked’ air forces to project power pointed to the availability of air-to-air refuelling to extend the range of fighters but there has, as yet, been no break-through that allows them to be re-armed in flight, and crew fatigue on long sorties must be a significant factor that degrades performance.
In 2008 the Sea Power Centre studied the relative value of shore and sea-borne aircraft and noted the observed historical fact that terminal air bases associated with distant crises are seldom secured beforehand and usually lack the capability to provide immediate support at the level of operations needed for crisis response. The same document notes, on the other hand, that embarked aircraft are fully mobile, operational to their maximum level of performance on arrival in the crisis area and largely secure from ground-based interruptions and asymmetric attacks....

...The best example of rapid and effective reaction to an unexpected crisis is the Falklands conflict of 1982. Possession of the two flat-tops, Hermes and Invincible, allowed the Royal Navy to deploy a task force with naval Sea Harriers and helicopters that were able to fight on, under and over the sea surface. RAF Harriers were subsequently able to join Hermes’ air group but it needs to be pointed out that the ship’s highly skilled aircraft handlers were able to cope with their lack of experience and naval pilots were able to teach them how to operate in a maritime environment. In other words the RAF squadron was not in its primary environment and a force that relied on it for both offence and defence would have been weaker and less effective without the naval professionals who specialised in embarked flying.

A ship that was not as worked up and specialised could not have coped with the new-comers’ inexperience and the example of Illustrious in 2007 is interesting . With no Harrier squadron of her own she embarked 16 AV-8Bs of USMC squadron VMA-542 which flew 152 sorties in twelve hours. In contrast an RAF Harrier squadron embarked in Ark Royal in similar circumstances in 2010 had to carry out several days deck landing training before being considered operational and, in the ensuing exercise, flew less sorties in five days than the USMC had flown in Illustrious in two. Unlike the Marines the RAF were not able to fly at night because of their lack of carrier experience. A land-based unit that undertakes random embarkations as a secondary function will never demonstrate full operational proficiency.

Future conflict in the Pacific region may well rely on control of the sea and that control may not be possible for navies that lack effective aircraft able to operate as an integral part of a triphibious task force. An increasing number of navies have carriers and LHD-type ‘flat-tops’ and Prime Minister Tony Abbot’s May 2014 instruction to planners working on the next Defence White Paper that they are to examine the possibility of putting a squadron of 12 F-35B Lightning II joint strike fighters onto the LHDs to “ensure that Australia maintains a sustainable, versatile and highly capable defence force” shows a ray of hope that the full potential of these ships might be realised. Fortunately their design originated from the Spanish Juan Carlos 1 which was intended to operate STOVL fighters as well as helicopters and even retains the ‘ski-jump’ (it cost less to leave it in place than to redesign the bow to remove it) but significant modifications would be needed to embark F-35Bs on a regular basis. These would include the fitting out of air weapons magazines and handling systems together with the autonomous logistic information system, ALIS, which is at the heart of F-35 operation and maintenance and other arrangements. Aircraft handlers would need training in the operation of both fixed and rotary wing aircraft on deck and sortie generation would require the installation of briefing and flight planning facilities, simulators for pilots to ‘pre-fly’ missions and maintain training standards...."

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"Paul Dibb (The Dibb Report June 1986) emphasised that as far as is possible, we should ensure that Australia's equipment purchases are 'Force Multipliers' by which he meant that as far as possible, defence equipment should serve, in addition to its primary purpose, to support other areas of defence and so maximise its utility. We are presently on the brink of acquiring a number of equipment items that could form the basis of the best 'force multiplier' that the ADF has ever possessed, but sadly it would appear that government is unlikely to see the need to properly equip two of the platforms presently in the pipeline....

...Objections have been raised in various quarters to the proposal to acquire a fixed wing integral air capability and it would be worthwhile identifying some of these and challenging them.

*Navy will be fully committed in handling all the equipment currently owned and in the pipeline, given the constraints of personnel available.
The proposal does not consider an increase in equipment for Navy. Air Force would bring its aircraft, spares, maintenance equipment and personnel aboard Navy platforms and if one has to consider detail, Air Force could contribute to victualling and any other incidental costs for which it would be responsible should the aircraft be in service elsewhere....

...*RAAF opposition has long been a barrier to the acquisition of a shipborne (integral) air capability. Having long ago lost its control of rotary wing flying, it wishes to retain control of fixed wing aircraft, no matter where they are operated.

This proposal supports that aim and supports the one service control of the F35 and all its support facilities. It requires only that the aircraft is made available to the navy when required, to provide the support with which the air force has long been tasked. The essential difference this time is that would be a credible, an achievable support.

There is still an urgent need to develop a defence force that is, to the extent that is economically feasible, self reliant, and a fleet without integral fixed wing air support cannot, in this day and age be considered to be self reliant. The force requires to be able to respond to situations which may develop in and around our island home and in our neighbourhood, embracing at least New Zealand and our island dependencies. We must also be able to a reasonable extent, to protect our sea lines of communication, the loss of which would deny the nation the ability to resist an aggressor for more than a very limited period of time, given the crippling effects on our economy that would be suffered. Our 'Neighbourhood' should additionally encompass Papua New Guinea and our neighbour allies in the island chains to our north and in near Southeast Asia. A self reliant fleet is an essential element of any force charged with these tasks...."

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"Steve George was an air engineer officer in the Royal Navy for 28 years, and served in HMS Invincible during the 1982 Falklands operation. During his career, he was closely involved with the Sea Harrier, and also with joint RN/RAF Harrier operations. Retiring from the RN as a Commander, he joined the JSF programme to work on F-35B ship suitability. He is now an engineering consultant."

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"EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The submission argues that acquisition and operation of the F-35B aircraft from the Canberra-class Land Helicopter Docks (LHD) is affordable, feasible and desirable. Embarked air power would give the Government of Australia (GoA) and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) a significant and necessary increase in decisive air power to support deployed ADF forces and assist the prosecution of foreign policy objectives.

The submission describes the strategic and military considerations surrounding embarked air power. It addresses the technical and organisational issues involved and outlines a scenario where embarked air power would have a decisive impact in ADF operations.

Finally, it provides conclusions and recommendations for consideration by the Defence Review....

...The Author
David Baddams, 55, was a fighter pilot in the Royal Australian Navy from 1978 to 1984, and then the Royal Navy from 1984 to 1999. In the latter he commanded 800 Naval Air Squadron on multiple operational deployments, including strike fighter operations over Iraq from HMS Invincible in the North Arabian Gulf, and over Kosovo. In 2000 and 2001 he was the Hawk Production Flight Air Test Pilot for most of the RAAF's 33 Hawk lead-in fighter trainers. Since then he has been sales director for Britten-Norman, and in 2013 founded his own aviation support company, Snow Goose International. For SGI client BAE Systems he planned and piloted air support for Nuship Canberra in Port Phillip Bay during her final contractor's sea trials in August 2014. David was appointed MBE in 1998 for Leadership in Air Operations. He lives in Tamworth, New South Wales."

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"...In an input to the Defence White Paper process, David Baddams has had his paper on F-35Bs published on the Australian Ministry of Defence website...."

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"This report argues that the costs of Australia acquiring F-35B Joint Strike Fighter short take-off, vertical landing aircraft outweigh the potential benefits.

Overview
Is there a case for Australia to acquire F-35B Joint Strike Fighter short take-off, vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft to operate from the two new Canberra-class landing helicopter docks (LHDs)? The government has directed that this question be addressed in the development of the 2015 Defence White Paper.

This report is an independent assessment of the costs and potential benefits of such an acquisition. Reintroducing organic naval air power into the ADF would be a big strategic decision, and very complex and expensive, so it’s important to have a clear view of the circumstances in which it might be beneficial enough to be worth pursuing. And it’s important to be aware not only of the direct costs but also of the potential risks and opportunity costs. Overall, this report concludes that the benefits would be marginal at best, wouldn’t be commensurate with the costs and other consequences for the ADF, and would potentially divert funding and attention from more valuable force."

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"...Minor refits indeed. The never-ending claim that the Canberras are not F-35 capable is the bloviating of spectacularly ill-informed mugwumps. The Canberras are delivered with the same hardened fast-jet deck and underpinnings as the Spanish navy’s lead ship, and all essential internal aviation spaces for fast jets have been retained. All of them. This was intentional and a specific factor in the acquisition process. The much-maligned aviation fuel bunkers and weapons stowage spaces have near-identical capacity to the enormous ones in the Spanish ship. Senior personnel have been poorly briefed if they state otherwise.

The fast jet and helo aviation capabilities of the French Mistral and Italian Cavour class were closely examined at the time, and the Spanish design came up trumps in all respects. Right now, the known requirements at refit for F-35Bs are a precision landing light called a HIHAT – it looks like a long green crucifix and is attached the middle mast – some sensor enhancements and Thermion coating on the flight deck. Some existing kit might need to be moved from A to B for electro-magnetic reasons. The glide slope kit, known as GLIS, is already fitted to the Canberras. This is the stuff of minor refit, and no more.

Refit and F-35Bs would deliver a motza more capability. More choices. There is no “niche capability” about six or eight embarked F-35Bs, where sensor fusion and data networking go merrily berserk when four are in the same airspace. That picture of threat and strike solution available to both pilots, controllers and commanders will offer startlingly long reach that any enemy is highly unlikely to penetrate without huge loss. He who sees first and shoots first wins. The days of close-up dogfighting or chasing missiles are long over, and a bad guy sneaking through a “niche” 4-ship of ADF F-35Bs protecting an LHD force would face being seen and shot at before he knew he or his ammunition was a target.

It is no good for pontificating PhDs of think-tankery to praise and extol emerging threats and the peril they pose to the LHDs and then dismiss the essential counterpunch as a tiny and extravagant toy. Further, their doctoral eminences need to learn that of 100 ADF F-35s only 60 or so will ever be in line service. The rest will be in attrition reserve, maintenance, repair or required for development work. The mooted 28 F-35Bs would easily provide three for attrition reserve, three in deep maintenance, one hangar queen, two flights of six or eight for the Canberras and a flight for conversion, training and reinforcement.

There is nothing “niche” in the relative or actual of these numbers. They are the sorts of numbers that current and probable F-35B operators use. So long as the powers-that-be are committed to supporting this through the F-35B’s life-of-type then the ADF can do this in a doddle...."

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