Agreed. The MAA concept is sound but severely flawed in that it is manned by people from the front line who are on 2/3 year tours.

And so by definition know the square root of eff all about the problems that caused all this in the first place. Having read the evidence I now realise I knew next to nothing about what makes an aircraft airworthy. I only knew how to make it serviceable.

Thank you Orgasmic for supporting the need for a good boss.

Just think what a difference that one person makes compared to those that you dont want to work with.

A particular position and/or personality affects any culture - good or bad.

Chug raises an interesting dilemma about RAF Flight Safety. If the MAA is the regulator, independent or otherwise, are they not really the equivalent of the airline safety department?

Now we're getting somewhere. IMO, the next logical step to that argument is to look at the Gp and/or ODH structure. Why do we have so few platforms split across so many masters? Why do all of the ODH insist on assessing and managing Risk in different ways, given that the required output is the same in terms of the Regulatory intent?

To answer the previous poster, the RAF Safety Centre is exactly akin to an airline safety organisation which would report direct to the CEO. Each functional area then has it's own safety specialists. Of course in our case it would help if we had some BM guys doing BM assurance work, rather than an aircrew mate and some engineers. Not knocking the individuals BTW, who are doing some good work.

tff:-
Definitely otherwise, and like any airline safety department is obliged to do as its employer dictates at the end of the day. "Independence" seems to depend upon no such dictates being made. Given the evidence that dervish refers to, we can have no confidence in such assurances being adhered to in the future.
Independence not only has to work, but be seen to work. A truly independent MAA and MAAIB, separate from the MOD and from each other, sistered with the CAA and AAIB respectively, and headed by civilian DGs will thus work. Then, and only then, can the long long task of rebuilding and restoring UK Military Flight Safety begin.

Chug

While I agree in principal, why does the DG need to be a civvy? The RNLAF's equivalent organisation (the closest any other nation has to the MAA) has a serving 1 Star DG but the difference is that the incumbent must be on his last tour of duty so that he is not worried about his promotion prospects. Could that work for us or would people worry that the DG would then not care enough to do a decent job as it would not matter to him?

But what about his chances of getting a good job thereafter in civvy strasse? Comply and be recommended as a good egg by other serving/recent VSOs or fight his corner and be tarred with the "bolshie" brush?

This was discussed a few years ago and one conclusion was a last posting civvy would be ideal as their retirement age is 65 and fewer seek second careers. The stumbling block today is fewer are trained properly, which could also be said of servicemen of course. I'd wager none could write the evidence submitted to Phillip, which I'd also wager the MAA finds embarrassing.:E

Or, perhaps, fight his corner and be tarred with the "professional" brush? And then be recognised for having made a genuine improvement to the system? Perish the thought.

The only thing lacking in the current system is moral courage.

IMO that's been broadly lacking from the junior officer corps since the mid-90s, where achievement has been measured in departmental name changes, fringe and faddy projects and chronic short-termism.

Do you mean 'the officer corps of the Junior Service' as opposed to the junior officers of that service, as they don't get to influence the sort of nugatory staff work you cite? In my experience, you are more likely to get the truth from lower down the food chain. Maybe that's why I am never going to be a wg cdr.

"The RNLAF's equivalent organisation (the closest any other nation has to the MAA) has a serving 1 Star DG..."

Quite a few European nations besides NL have a similar approach to the MAA, e.g. France, Sweden and Finland; and on other continents, Australia and Canada also come to mind. I don't know of any that are as independent as some would seem to prefer. Haddon-Cave made a mini-world tour looking at a few of these MAAs before writing his report.

As an aside, the last incumbent for Director of the NL MAA was Air Commodore Chris Lorraine, a Brit.

Orgasmic, I agree that a lack of moral courage within the RAF is the problem, although I would blame the Wg Cdr and above level. They are the ones that set the tone for the Sqn and the operators are usually at their mercy.

I was witness to someone committing a few acts of willful gross negligence in the air when I was on a Sqn based at Brize. I told my Flt Cdr and together we told the Boss as a courtesy before reporting it to the RAF Police (as some of the incidents went a bit further than flying discipline) and Stn Flt Safety. The Boss' reaction was a bit out there frankly - he was unashamed in being explicit that his priority was protecting the reputation of the Sqn. I was ordered not to take it any further, but I decided to report it to the Police anyway. It came to head with the Boss phoning me at 8.30pm to tell me he would make sure my next job was in M&S if I didn't with draw my report! He also pulled a reason out of his backside to ground me from flying myself that same evening.

The reaction I'd witnessed scared me and as you said, it demonstrated that on that Sqn at that particular time there was a complete lack of moral fibre and willingness to put the effort into self analysis.

orgASMic:-
I'm afraid that the betrayal in the late 80s/early 90s by certain VSOs of their duty, by issuing illegal orders to suborn the Airworthiness Regulations and by sacking those who would not comply, make that quite impossible because those who did comply (thus acting contrary to Military Law) have never been punished for it. In contrast those who did not comply have suffered greatly, much as Running In describes. You either learn the lessons of history or you are doomed to repeat them.
I would guess that the RNLAF has not so been betrayed by its High Command. That is its good fortune. The RAF that I served in was not thus betrayed, as far as I know. That is my good fortune. All that changed post 1987, and that is the reason that we must ensure that it must never happen again. If the MAA DG is civilian, it shouldn't, providing the MAA is outwith the MOD.
I cannot comment about the moral fibre of the present RAF leadership, for that is the business of the RAF, though it is sad to think that it could be wanting. Flight Safety though is my business, I was told that when I served and I still believe it to be true

A predominantly civilianised MAA was something I was going to mention. It's one type of organisation that would benefit greatly from a static staff, independence from the chain of command and, God forbid for a safety/regulatory authority, have the ability to learn.

Civilians in MAA
 

That point is made here.......

https://sites.google.com/site/milita...-authority-maa


To paraphrase, the failures were spotted and reported by civvies who were hounded by RAF VSOs. (Which I think is accepted now.) Yet none of these civvies are in the MAA and nor has the MAA sought their input. (Can't comment but it is accepted the MAA isn't addressing the failures that resulted in its formation.) The MAA is dominated by RAF officers, whose past and present hierarchy was responsible for the failures and still sees no wrong in what it did. (I think also widely accepted given their outpourings in the press.) IMO, the main point the author makes is that on MoDs own admission no member of the MAA reported failings, which either means they are unsuited or lacking moral fibre. Pretty strong argument IMHO.

There are few people, not many, who have been senior engineering officers in the RAF/MoD and have subsequently gone on to hold executive positions in the airline industry as CAA Nominated Post Holders and even CAA Accountable Managers. These people thus have direct experience of airworthiness regulation and implementation in both the military and civilian arenas.

One might think that such knowledge and experience would be of direct relevance to the MAA, yet I am not aware of any of these people being contacted by the MAA.

Whilst I am sure that Baines Simmons, a respected consultancy, has provided the MAA with good advice (at what cost?) I can't help feeling that the MAA has missed an opportunity to tap into expertise that would have helped the organisation in its early years.

Inward looking ?
 

1.3V stall, I have found that there is a small but very vocal minority in the RAF who think that there are two ways to fly......... The RAF way and the wrong way.

I suspect that a little of this culture has crept in to the decisions that resulted in the set up of the MAA.

There seems to be a misconception that the MAA is solely about Air Safety - It is not, it is the Regulator in the same way the CAA is the national regulatory representative of EASA. In that way it assures airworthiness and audits; application of regulation, management of Risk To Life (RtL) and the individual Duty Holders.
Making it a civilian or civilian led organisation would potentially fall back into the previous traps of malaise that befell certain IPTs in the past.
Military Flight Safety is not the issue, inter-service bickering at the senior levels and individual failings have been.
I do like the suggestion though, that the DG should be at the twilight of his career and therefore not be seeking further promotion.

Splash,

Do enlighten us on how the MAA does this. Unlike the CAA, which is wholly independent from the operators and government, the MAA is not independent of the RAF, nor the MoD.

By the use of SQEP (Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel) staff, who have the appropriate skill and qualfications to review, monitor and audit. It isn't rocket science, but needs both sides to be professional, diligent, aware and not cut corners. At times therefore it may be initially painful, but ultimately beneficial.

I'd question how independant the CAA is of Government as it is funded by them and sits below DfT. Probably not too much more or less than the MAA in many ways and effectiveness. The real difference is between the MAAIB and AAIB and the MAA and CAA!!

Splash,

I might be able to help here a little. I'd argue that the MAA really is all about Air Safety. Its website gives these definitions:

MISSION

Enhance the delivery of operational capability through continual improvement in military Air Safety, appropriate culture, regulation and practice.

VISION

A world class military Air Safety regulatory and assurance model that is proactive, innovative, modern, efficient and effective.

Now that looks to me like a fairly clear 'Air Safety' focus. Regulation and the rest is how it delivers the Air Safety.

Inter-service bickering - not sure how that affected the events that led to Haddon-Cave and the MAA. However, there were certainly big politics played by the RAF in the aftermath.

We now have an allegedly independent regulator whose head, according to its own internal rules, has to be a three star with aviation command experience - neat. That would be an RAF officer then then. Has been ACAS twice in a row now. And this for an organisation that was brought about by an inquiry into the failings of the MoD' airworthiness management systems that were devised and led by senior RAF officers. Go figure.

My preference (not that it matters in the least) would be for the MAA to be aligned with the rest of the Defence Safety boards (nuclear, explosive, ship, etc) and headed by a two star civilian brought in from outside the MoD to encourage fresh thinking and transference across all areas of Defence safety management. Honestly, I'm not sure that 'Air Safety' is any more demanding than nuclear safety, or any of the other safety management areas.

Oh, and I'd take the accident investigators out of MAA, relocate them into the AAIB, and require all three Commands to provide properly trained and accredited investigators to that organisation. Not expensive and can provide a very effective organisation. (The FAA did it for many years).

Not that any of that is going to happen any time soon, but always nice to see an open, polite and interesting debate taking place.

Best Regards as ever to all those actually contributing to safer military aviation,

Engines

Splash1983
 

The CAA is not funded by the government, it is funded by the fees it charges the industry................ And it feels like my company is funding most of it !

I stand corrected, my apologies you are absolutely right.

So can anyone say what part the MAA plays in fitness for purpose? I only ask because IIRC this caused confusion at an inquest. Can't recall which one.


Engines. Really good post sir.

Yes, really good post Engines, thank you. I'm afraid that my distrust of the MOD regarding suborning of the Regulations and the subsequent cover up, would not enable me to have confidence in any Board that came under its umbrella though. I am now starting to worry about Nuclear, Explosives, and Ship Safety, but one thing at a time perhaps. ;)
One thing that you mentioned confuses me though, ie:-
Why on earth should Air Accident Investigators be within the MAA in the first place? As soon as we have yet another airworthiness related Military Air Accident, will we have Investigators employed by the Regulatory Authority responsible for that Airworthiness investigating it? How does that work, other than very badly?

Splas1983, this is all about Flight Safety (or Air Safety if you insist). It is also all about independence, the lack of which led to the "malaise that befell certain IPTs" and a whole lot more.
As for SQEPs (who invents this dross?), the MOD used to be awash with them, and very "Q" and very "E" every man jack of them was! It sacked them, or at least the ones that would not obey illegal orders to suborn the Regs. That is what must never happen again. The MAA as it exists now, together with the MAAIB, cannot ensure that it won't.

Dervish,

Hope I can help a bit here. 'Fitness for purpose' or 'fit for purpose' appears all over the MAA regulations set, in a number of contexts. Personally, I think it's a bit of a vague phrase, and used too liberally, probably because the politicians started appropriating it. I have a sinking feeling that the MAA probably thought it would look jazzy in the regs.

But to address a very good point you made - when looking at whether an aircraft's design (or a modification) meets operational 'fitness for purpose', my feeling is that the MAA regs have not much to offer. There is one clear link to the phrase in a recent update to 00-970 that includes the following:

Def Stan 00-970 is not intended to provide requirements to ensure the fitness for purpose of Type Designs or Major Changes.

Here's my take. It's probably wrong, but here goes anyway. When assessing a project, I put requirements into three (probably overlapping) bins:

1. Pure 'air safety' - the 00-970 stuff
2. Fitness for purpose
3. Operational effectiveness

To illustrate the idea, here's those three 'bins' applied to requirements for a new radio:

1. Pure air safety - does it catch fire? Does it fall out of the aircraft and kill someone? Does it irradiate users? EMC, Etc.
2. Fitness for purpose - can it be used by the aircrew without spending excessive time heads in? Does it clearly tell the user what it's condition and state is? Can it be maintained? Is it reliable? Does its basic performance meet the requirement (range, clarity, etc) Lots of HMI stuff here.
3. Operational effectiveness - does the HQ/crypto function work? Does it meet operational requirements for coalition/joint ops? Will the OEU accept it for service?

Like I say, these three may overlap, especially the last two, but I found that they help project teams work out the boundaries between the ATEC ITE folk and the OEU. They also help build a good requirements set, which is the foundation of any project.

So who's responsible? My call is that the project team are responsible for delivering a product to the user that is 'fit for purpose' as defined in the requirements PLUS (important point) any other aspects that they could reasonably be expected to apply to the job. (After all, they are supposed to be the procurement professionals, right?). And they're accountable to the user for doing this.

The Duty Holder is then responsible for accepting the system. Or rejecting it. Once accepted, the user maintains that 'fitness for purpose' via their CAMO and aircrew and personnel training systems.

In both cases, they are required to apply the relevant MAA regs while they discharge these responsibilities.

Now, does all this actually happen all the time in the real world? That's the big question, to which I don't have the answer.

Hope this helps a little, best regards as ever to all those reading these big books,

Engines

Chug,

Saw your post after I'd posted my last one - sorry.

We're loudly agreeing on one point. The accident investigators should never have been put in the MAA in my view. Haddon-Cave made a passing reference to how the RAF did accident investigation, made a number of incomplete and inaccurate statements about the other services and then produced a wholly unrelated recommendation. That then got hijacked into the MAA 'land grab'.

I will gently differ from you on ownership and independence. The MoD has a duty to endure the safe operation of its systems, and that is properly discharged via what was called the Defence Safety Board, which is where the nuclear and explosive safety boards (e.g. the old CINO) used to report into. MAA should have plugged straight into that.

My concern has always been that making the MAA a three star reporting directly to S of S was an overreaction to Haddon Cave, that was not required and gave the MAA a level of 'heft' it didn't actually need.

True and complete independence is always going to be a problem - 'who watches the watchmen'? The MAA's own Safety Advisory Committee is supposed to 'challenge' the MAA, but looking at it's composition (Chair is a retired Air Marshal), it's doesn't look as independent as it might - just too much hefty blight blue stuff around for my comfort - but I'm probably biased.

Best regards as ever to all those who damn well care,

Engines

Chug

Interesting that on the MAA website it defines "independent" as "external to the MoD."

Military Aviation Authority | MAA Safety Advisory Committee






Engines

Thanks for reply. Something to ponder. Thinking about it I believe it was the C130 IPTL who stated in court he didn't know how to achieve fitness for purpose or who was responsible. Glad to be corrected if wrong.

It's an interesting discussion as ever, although starting to creep away from original Just Culture question.

I'd just like to come back on a few points. Firstly, regarding Splash' comment about Air Safety, my understanding is that Air Safety = Flight Safety + Airworthiness + All the other new MAA stuff. I remember when DASC was formed it was all about Aviation Safety = FS + AW, but whilst it was a nice idea the reality was somewhat different.

In terms of independence, perhaps a radical approach is for the European Defence Agency to assume an EASA type role, at least in terms of airworthiness.

Finally, to come back to Just Culture. Normally, it is considered in the personal sense but I think more needs to be done to consider Just Culture in the organisational context. When organisational failings are identified then there should also be a way to hold parts of an organisation to account for deliberately breaking rules.

Sorry, too many points in one message but hopefully you get my drift.

dervish:-
I see that they are referring not to the MAA itself, but to their Safety Advisory Committee, which as has been pointed out already by Engines is headed by a retired Air Marshal! I seem to remember that the MAA used to trumpet itself as being independent once, perhaps pennies are beginning to drop even there?

Engines:-
The $64,000 question of course. I would merely point out that when they are Regulators and Investigators they may have have less compunction about enforcing Regulation and performing stringent Investigation when it is not directed at their employer.
It is that simple, and the mess that is UK Military Airworthiness and Air Accident Investigation can be traced back to that one factor. Perhaps Explosives and Nuclear Devices have their own ways of discouraging messing about with. As to ships, they seem to be much in the news recently and, as one who used to disgrace himself while on a Paddle Steamer ride around Bournemouth Bay, I am in no position to comment either on their seaworthiness or fitness for purpose. It may of course just be the difference between Air Marshals and Admirals...