Just Another Jockey.

I took care not to quote you, I replied to your point, and my view is simply a counter to yours.

Cheers,

Orca.

(Excellent - just got another Sharkey thread to three pages!;))

Sharky Watch LIVE
 

Please allow me to briefly play devils advocate, just to stir things up a little.
How many frontline FJ Sqns does the RAF have? Ooh ooh, pick me, I know that one - 9.
How many frontline FJ Sqns does the RN have? Ooh ooh, me again - 0. Although I acknowledge there is a cadre currently operating in the US (I know most of them).
So here is my question which I hall leave you to debate. Since UK PLC is currently out of the habit of operating FJs from boats (I say that deliberately because I know how it annoys the Fishheads) who would you turn to in order to reinstigate the capability? The organization that has no FJs but a lot of (historic) carrier experience, or the organization with lots (relatively speaking) of FJs but much less carrier experience? Which organization should take primacy in such a situation?
Or could they indeed work together towards a common goal (as is currently the plan!)?
BV

In reply to other posters.

There is a significant and increasingly Joint presence with the USN.

The point about JHC is interesting, mainly because JHC does of course contain the CHF, a bunch of SH chaps who specialise in amphibious ops. Their existence could be used as a foil to the notion of the independent air force.

The parallels with JFH and 360 squadron are interesting too. With the exception of a single light blue squadron OC, JFH was awesome at the working level. Above that it wasn't much short of an disaster and despite attempts by command to keep high level (well puerile and childish actually) politics from effecting day-to-day work, well....they did.

Let's have flexible forces? Couldn't agree more. Joint forces? Don't believe in them anymore myself. So which would you rather have and which is safer to assure? Maritime specialists who occasionally turn the anti skid on and operate from land or land based chaps who occasionally go to the boat? Why not copy JHC exactly and have the FAA FW as a self governing entity?

Last point. The success of RAF Harrier crews in Corporate and subsequently right through to GR9 retirement (and lets add in all the RN sons of Herrick with pitifully few Deck Landings here) is unchallenged. This was only possible, however, because the inexperienced were able to 'plug in' to the socket of experience that was available (and still is in glowing ember form in the USN). As has been noted elsewhere the inexperienced did a great job - but let's be careful about what could be viewed as a 'standing start', but wasn't.

Are these not the facts:

1. The Navy got rid of the Sea Harrier during Gordon Brown's tenure because they (The Sea Lords) decided that they could not afford it whilst the surface and submarine fleets might face the wielding of the Defence Budget axe, despite the fact that air defence of the fleet would be compromised!

2. Some Navy pilots were absorbed into Harrier Force and formed a Navy badged Harrier GR9 Squadron (with help from the RAF in manning terms) to take to sea on the one remaining carrier!

3. The Harrier GR9 was incapable of carrying Storm Shadow. During the Operational Requirement stage of its procurement, we tried to fit CASOM to the Harrier when I was in OR(Air) but there were ship magazine issues and carriage limitation issues which, in the end, were financially insurmountable.

4. Returning to the deck with an asymmetric bomb load (Paveway III, for example) on Harrier GR9 was a non-starter and would have had to result in the jettison of valuable weapons into the sea!

5. Tornado GR4 suffered from none of the above and whilst it could not launch from a carrier with a Conventionally Armed Stand Off Missile (Storm Shadow) or any other weapon it could reach many targets that the Harrier could not!

It was a no-brainer really and whilst the RN will continue to blame the RAF for the loss of the Sea Harrier (when they really mean Harrier GR, in which they are wrong too) they do so from a very myopic point of view ignoring the facts as above!

Tornado GR4 may be getting long in the tooth and it may have its problems BUT as a weapons delivery platform of ALL the air-to-surface weapons in the UK MOD's inventory it beats the Harrier GR hands down.

Sorry! But these are the facts (although I may have forgotten some of the detail as the grey matter grows increasingly forgetful)!

Bloggs
Fg Off
OC Bogs & Drains (and, in a previous incarnation, procurer in OR(Air) of most of the air-to-surface weapons currently in our inventory)
:ok::ok::ok:

Come on Orca, you know the rules. You've got to give enough of a 'nickname' so that the person can be identified but not name him directly so as to avoid any "legal" issues! Something similar to The Bungling Baron, The Scottish Group Captain, The Bearded Bull$hitter or the Irish Air Marshal would do!! ;):E

I can see

becoming the case - as the cost of F35 goes up, and the number being procured goes down, it won't be long before the RAF switches tack for the -A as a "replacement" for the GR4 (unless it goes UAV only of course...) leaving a much reduced -B purchase, and the associated costs, to the RN.

In reality though, money will still be the stumbling block and the in fighting will lead to the whole UK F35 purchase being cancelled. The UK will end up with either the two biggest helicopter carriers in the world or renting out deck space to the USMC AV8/GR9s......

Fg Off Bloggs (and others)

Sorry, but I really have to come in here. You start your post with the stament 'are these not the facts' - err... not really, sorry. Taking your 'facts' in turn:

1. 'The Navy got rid of the Sea Harrier during Gordon Brown's tenure because they (The Sea Lords) decided that they could not afford it whilst the surface and submarine fleets might face the wielding of the Defence Budget axe, despite the fact that air defence of the fleet would be compromised!' - wrong on all counts. The Sea Harrier was canned soon after it was transferred to the RAF. The RAF offered it up as a savings measure. It was an RAF owned asset that the RAF decided could not be afforded, in large part because the GR7/9 upgrade costs had ballooned more than four fold. It was an RAF decision. Fact.

2. 'Some Navy pilots were absorbed into Harrier Force and formed a Navy badged Harrier GR9 Squadron (with help from the RAF in manning terms) to take to sea on the one remaining carrier!' - again, plain wrong. JFH was formed with three SHAR squadrons and four RAF squadrons. On cancellation of the SHAR, a plan was hatched to form five squadrons (2 RN 'heavy', 2 RAF 'heavy' plus one joint OCU). The RN formed the first 'RN heavy' GR squadron, (800), and were in course of setting up the second (801) when the RAF unilaterally imposed RAF manning criteria they knew the RN could not immediately meet. Soon after, the RAF decided to unilaterally ditch the UK's maritime strike capability. Fact.

3. 'The Harrier GR9 was incapable of carrying Storm Shadow. During the Operational Requirement stage of its procurement, we tried to fit CASOM to the Harrier when I was in OR(Air) but there were ship magazine issues and carriage limitation issues which, in the end, were financially insurmountable.' - I worked in DA Arm at the time for this one. Storm Shadow NEVER had a ship carriage requirement, nor a requirement to recover to the ship on a GR anything. GR7 could carry a SS with conventional TO and rolling landing, but with severe limitations, not surprising for such a big weapon. No money was ever put aside to get the weapon to sea. Want to trade facts? Ready and waiting.

4. 'Returning to the deck with an asymmetric bomb load (Paveway III, for example) on Harrier GR9 was a non-starter and would have had to result in the jettison of valuable weapons into the sea!' - God, I don't know where to start on this one. Let's try. The GR9, GR7, and FA2 were perfectly capable of getting back to the deck with an asymmetric 1000lb weapon load (PW2, PW4). PW3 was a 2000 lb weapon, and once again never required to go to sea. (By the way, if you are the genius in OR(Air) that paid out hundreds of thousands of taxpayers' money to have the PW3 modified to remove the thermal safety coating from the bomb, so rendering it unsafe to go on board our ships, I'd love to meet you and have a chat).

5. 'Tornado GR4 suffered from none of the above and whilst it could not launch from a carrier with a Conventionally Armed Stand Off Missile (Storm Shadow) or any other weapon it could reach many targets that the Harrier could not!' - you are perfectly correct that the GR4 could land on with a SS or a PW2. However, to the best of my knowledge, it couldn't launch off a carrier AT ALL. Care to specify 'many targets'? Libya? Well, yes, plus hours of flying plus a tanker or two. Oh, could the Tornado land back on on land with a loaded JP233 fitted? Come on, let's have some 'facts'.

Look, I don't mind anyone having a view. That's why we have a free society and free blogs. But please, for the love of all that's holy, please don't rewrite history and then try to use it to justify the RAF's point of view. Harrier's gone. Damn shame, but it was a political choice. Move on. But let's leave facts as 'sacred', shall we?

Best Regards as ever

Engines

just another jocky
You have stated
“try separating the facts from the lies.....too monumental a task. And so how does anyone know which bits are worth heeding and which ignoring? His love of the Harrier is easy to see, but he cares not a jot for those who love the Tornado which has had a longer operational service than the Harrier (ie ON ops) and has been incredibly successful, increasing the theatre capability when it took over from the Harrier back in 09.”

and then

“He does, but try sifting those out from the bitter inaccuracies and downright lies.”

Are you sure that your own statements are also actually correct? Whilst the UK may have lost the use of its Harriers, other nations have of course continued to use theirs in Libya (Italian) and Afghanistan (US).
If the UK still had Sea Harriers then they would have also no doubt been used in Libya along with the Italian Harriers. Here is an interesting link about that -
A tale of two Harriers: How Italy held on to carrier strike - Defence Management

I also believe that the US are now looking to extend the use of their Harriers until 2030. Therefore the Harrier may well end up having a longer operational service use than the Tornado.

Fg Off Bloggs
Tornados are no doubt good at doing what they do but the Navy need to rely on a capability that is able to focus on their maritime defence needs and those that require their support a long way from any friendly land base that ‘may’ let the RAF use it. When at sea it is best to have dedicated Navy air defence aircraft already with you. If it was you out there on RN or merchant ships, surely even you would want Sea Harrier air defence/ reconnaissance/ strike capability (or any other more modern Navy fixed wing aircraft) support with you. That is much more preferable than having to hope that the RAF may be able to support you when you actually need them.
Not even the best aircraft in the world is any good if it is unable to support you when you may urgently need it! Those that understand and depend on maritime operations should therefore be responsible for it. If they are trained to carry out such demanding operations anywhere in the world from both sea and land, then that force can be used wherever it is needed, including from the UK when required.

Oh Dear!!
 

I have watched this thread and promised myself that I would not respond.............

But here I go!!

Sharkey was no braver than any other Harrier participant in '82, so let's not overdo what he did. He is just more vociferous and he gets more attention thanks to modern communications!!

After the 1 May encounter, as far as I recall, no Argentinian fighter armed with air-to-air missiles entered the Falklands airspace. If they did, then they certainly did not use them.

Thank you Black Buck for that!

I seem to recall that some/many Mirage fighters were held back to defend the mainland in case Maggie decided to attack the Argie Heartland!! Unlikely, perhaps, but good spoof, so well done Maggie and the Vulcan Team!!

As far as the Sea Jets were concerned, it quickly became a "Turkey Shoot" when they encountered Argie aircraft.

Big Strategic/Tactical error by the Argie heirarchy.

When the RAF GR3s arrived - mid May - the RN Sea Jets gave up attacking land targets, apart from the occasional radar offset toss/loft dumb bomb attacks which were conducted clear from any ground defence threat..

Sharkey and his boys - and the greater number of Sea Jet folk on HERMES - spent most of the conflict at medium altitude, seeking aircraft which did not have missile escort so, once seen, a quick turn for pursuit without looking for escort fighters was the way to go, given that the Sea Jet did not have speed superiority over the Mirage or the A-4. Great effort by all those involved, and those that achieved "kills" deserve credit for all that they did.

On HERMES, we got on extremely well with our RN colleagues, and I am unaware of any significant or worthwhile inter-Service difficulty above the rank of Lt Cdr/ Sqn Ldr. But I do think that very few of us got on well with the heirarchy that were telling us what to do.

Many - perhaps all - those involved in flying operations did a good job - as did the supporting troops who kept the jets flying under some pretty extreme and difficult circumstances. I, again, am not aware of any inter-Service difficulty between the light/dark blue folk that kept the jets flying.

But let's keep a sensible perspective.

I spent 3 years on exchange with the USN, and I am a firm believer that Carriers have a great power projection role. For the particular circumstances of the Falklands in 82, they were an essential item - but you need to have enough of them to be reliable and available wherever you need them, and they need to be big enough to have the necessary power projection to be worth the cost and effort of the self defence and support that they need.

Can we, as a nation, now afford to do that?

Now, hypothetically, if that exocet in '82 had found INVINCIBLE instead of ATLANTIC CONVEYOR....................

What might have been the current debate???

Is our employment of our first 5th generation, LO platform going to be dictated by where we happen to land, or what we do while airborne?

If the former, then the RN would seem to have an argument. Personally, I think the latter is far more important, especially as most of the scenarios the UK is likely to get involved in would involve operating from land bases. Due to the inherent limitations of carrier ops, land basing allows much more effective generation of air power capability. Lightning II should therefore be operated by this country's professional air power experts - the RAF. Even the USN admit that the USAF are far more effective than themselves at employing air power.

However, as has been mentioned, the USN have enough mass to justify their own specialist fixed wing air arm. In this era of financial austerity, can we really justify keeping a fixed wing FAA, with its own structures and overheads, to man 42% of a single FJ squadron?

Gullwings: you've pretty much nailed the point, but I will spin it in a slightly different way

That is that if the Royal Navy think/thought organic fleet air defence and carrier strike indispensable, and requiring to be manned by sailors rather than airmen then (regardless of conspiracy theories as to who sabotaged what) the Royal Navy should have put its hands in its pockets and bloody well prioritised and paid for that capability.
If it was the RAF's green eyes seeing the utter awesomeness of the SHAR and how much of a threat it was to light blue aviation and hence set about trashing the FAA, then surely the ADMIRALS' duty was to protect not give up that capability.
That they didn't is a failing of the Royal Navy, and while the demise of the RAF's Harrier force was extremely regrettable, it really wasn't an anti Navy conspiracy but protection of a much larger force when the threat was an economic one.
The pissing contest of which aircraft type was the most capable will never be won, because neither side will modify their quasi fanatical views on their chosen champion, but quantity was the trump card when salami slicing was an invalid cost cutting technique and the loss of an entire type was the only answer.
Sharkey and his ilk need to direct their ire somewhere it's just a shame that it turns out to be paranoid and misplaced in large part when there could be some decent points to be made and sometime respected credibility to be used rather than ridiculed.

TTH,

Yours is another of the many posts on PPrune that state 'as a fact' that the RN ditched the Sea Harrier. Sorry, wrong.

To use your words, the RN had 'put its hand in its pocket', 'bloody well prioritised' and paid for the Sea Harrier, and then the FA2. By 2000, that aircraft was, by some distance, the UK's most effective in service AD aircraft. Fact.

In 2000, that fleet of aircraft was transferred to the RAF to form Joint Force Harrier, with a complementary strike (GR7) and AD (FA2) capability. Fact. No contest over 'which aircraft was best', but a force with both capabilities capable of both land and sea based ops. There was no 'threat to light blue aviation' from the Sea Harrier. The RAF owned it as of 1 Apr 2000. Fact.

It was the RAF who decided to offer up the Sea Harrier to pay for the GR9 programme. Fact. They owned it. It wasn't a Navy decision. Fact.

In 2010, the RAF (CAS and CDS) decided that 'maritime strike' was a capability that had to go to support the RAF's budget. Fact.

Opinion is one thing. These forums are full of them, and long may that continue. But facts, people, are supposed to be sacred.

Best Regards as ever to those (of all cloths) trying to pick up the pieces,

Engines

BomberH: Sharkey was no braver than any other Harrier participant in '82, so let's not overdo what he did.

Lt Cmdr Ward had 3 kills along with Flt Lt Morgan. He was also leading 800 NAS and several of his pilots were lost. Without doubt a very intense experience that would mark anyone

Engines. I am aware of your heritage and so please don't take this to be disrespectful, even if I find your penchant 'fact' at the end of your statements childish.

If you look at your facts, it still looks like a failing in the Navy hierarchy on the count of protecting its assets and its organic capability. And if you come forth and tell me that the RAF conned the Navy out of its jets then you are condemning your leadership to the charge of being foolish for giving something so important up.

The RAF quite rightly didn't prioritise Maritime fast air. Because its the Navy's business, and should have been kept the Navy's business by the Navy.

Perhaps Engines feels the need to highlight the 'facts' because his adversaries seem to believe that their 'personal opinions/pseudo-facts' hold equal weight in the argument if expressed with sufficient derision?

TTH,

Sorry, and this will be my last post on the subject. and no 'facts'. And no, no disrespect seen. As ever, happy to engage.

I absolutely agree with you that maritime air was the Navy's business and they should have kept charge of it. However, as directed by their political masters, the RN handed its assets over to the RAF.

If you are now saying that the Navy should have defended its assets better - yes, I agree. But, and this is sort of the point, they weren't their assets any more. The RAF had been given, and taken responsibility for, the business of maritime air. They ditched it as soon as they decently could.

No, I am not going to 'come forth' and tell you that the RN were 'conned' out of anything. Outmanoeuvred? Outguessed? Guilty of naivety? Yes to all three.

But please, let's stick to the truth here. The Navy didn't ditch the Sea Harrier or the Harrier, or 'maritime air'. Those decisions were the RAF's and the RAF's alone.

But hey, all done, all dusted, all in the past. Time for the new generation to pick up the baton and run with it. And they'll do a great job. Whatever their cloth.

Best Regards to all, everywhere,

Engines

In answer to earlier debate, precisely why the RAF should not have ownership of a platform being specifically bought for Maritime Strike. Interesting that F35 A is being looked at as a serious proposition for the RAF (not withstanding its inability to AAR with any of our current or future tankers). Why didn't we stick with the C again?

Justanopinion - by "maritime strike" do you mean attacking boats or a normal strike mission, launched from the maritime environment? If the latter then that's exactly where the RAF's expertise lies, just with a different style of take off and landing, during the few occasions that the aircraft will actually have to operate from a boat. The RN, in contrast, have shown precious little understanding over the years of how actually to employ air power once the aircraft is away from the boat - IMHO. And we switched away from the C when we finally accepted that we didn't have the critical mass of the USN!

Again, the incorrect mindset as to why we are buying this platform. It is a platform to be operated primarily from sea, deploying ashore as required. Not the other way round.

The operating primarily from sea bit, and ALL that this involves, leads to Maritime Strike. It is not just another airfield that happens to be floating. Not sure how we are going to do this with the A. Oh that's right, not planning to; all of a sudden F35 is a Tornado replacement.

What, submarine launched TLAMS is an RAF speciality too? :)

Could one of the experts give us a quick dit on where the UK's swing/ multi role expertise is at the moment?

Some on this thread are saying the RAF, but I thought the RN had chaps flying Super Hornets and they are both multi and swing role where the Typhoon and Tornado aren't. Where am I mistaken?

Typhoon not swing role??? The link below suggest very otherwise.

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/r...ole-capability

This is of course the tranch 2 Typhoon and is of course currently limited to one type of AGA weapon. Plenty of EPW2's have already been dropped by Tranch 1 aircraft 2 years ago by the 2 squadrons on the windy Lincolnshire cabbage patch with the bomb symbols on the aircraft to prove it (plus of course it wasn't just EPW2 that Typhoons guided in Libya, they did guide EPW4 off Tornados as well).

Sharky Watch LIVE
 

No aircraft being currently flown by any RN or RAF pilot is really going to prepare them for the quantum leap that JSF will bring. The swing/multi role aircraft being flown by the RN guys in the US are not much different than the ones being currently operated by the RAF. Don't forget there are plenty of RAF guys on exchange too.
Since nobody answered my earlier question I will give my own slant on things. Rightly or wrongly it is now (at least partially) a numbers game. The RAF can provide a lot more pilots than the RN for the JSF force. We're not just talking line pilots but Sqn leadership as well. The majority of the RN guys currently out in the US are unlikely to be put straight into the higher echelons of our first JSF Sqn. They will, however, have an awful lot of very useful deck experience and I hope to god that knowledge is utilised correctly (provided they actually come home and don't decide to stay).
Regardless of what I say above I am sufficiently out of the loop on these matters to not be able to state anything as being fact. I will however give my standard opinion on such matters. I am very proud of all of our armed forces. I would love to see Sqns (note plural which may be ambitious) of JSF operated in the best possible fashion by individuals of any cloth who are capable of operating them effectively. If that calls on RN experience of boat ops and RAF experience of air power then so be it. Hell you could throw in some army input if it helped. I just wish that we could all remember we're on the same side and stop whining about who knows best.
I accept that I am a hopeless idealist in that respect. Fact.
BV

Justanopinion

And I thought the RAF Buccaneer Maritime Strike Force did a pretty good job when the Navy last/previously binned their FJ Force in 1978!

Bloggs:ok:

Though a very effective platform within its limitations, Buccaneer Maritime Strike was a misnomer. Land based system when in the hands of the RAF, so Littoral Strike would have been more accurate. True Maritime Strike requires a floating platform to deploy the capability out of reach of fixed land bases. Therefore must be dark blue led.

Genstabler,

Bo**ocks! ASuW (Maritime Strike) operations are equally effective from land or sea but you have to have a platform to do it; the Navy has not since 1978! The RAF Buccaneers did exactly the same role as the FAA Buccaneers and often worked in concert with 809 when both (12 Sqn) were based at Honington. I have (simulated) attacked more NATO warships in a 4-year tour on 12 (Maritime Attack) Squadron than I care to remember (actually I remember them all because it was such great fun)! I recall very few missions that were against littoral targets!

So to say that it has to be dark blue led is hoop, frankly!

Bloggs :mad:

PS. Give me a limitation of the Buccaneer, please?

JFH
 

Engines,

Check your PMs

ExMudmover

But how many ships could you not attack because they were beyond the range of a shore based system? The limitation of the Buccaneer when operated by the RAF was that it was a land based system. I rest my case.

Genstabler,

Bo**ocks! I have attacked ships in mid-Atlantic with the use of AAR! Indeed, I have crossed the Atlantic in a Buccaneer without AAR!

I rest my case.

Bloggs:ugh:

PS. Another limitation please!

Crossed the Atlantic without refuelling did you? Well you have really put me in my place!
But wait a mo. if you operated such a fantasticly capable maritime strike platform, why weren't you tasked with attacking the Belgrano?

So did I but as you well know, the RN didn't bin its FJ Force, including maritime strike, by choice. This crassness resulted from the Government's cancellation of the planned replacement CTOL carriers (CVA-01) in 1966 because the RAF guaranteed it could provide 24-hour global air cover, a promise impossible to fulfil even back then.

Irrespective of the UK's premature pull-back from East of Suez, this still left the F.I. beyond any useful RAF FJ reach and the rest is history. Thankfully, the RN had the cobbled-together ASW carriers and a handful of SHAR but their lack of critical AEW and AAR led directly to most, if not all, of the casualties sustained by the Task Force.

As the ball appears to be back in the RAF's court pending the arrival of the QE class carriers, what does its current Maritime Strike Force comprise and how quickly could it react to an urgent requirement or sudden window of opportunity hundreds/thousands of miles from its land base?

Genstabler,

Because to attack the Belgrano in the South Atlantic, even using AAR from Ascension, was a bit further than crossing the Atlantic by the Great Circle route! Moreover, the launch to strike time from Ascension would have been poor and might have let the boat escape - better to use HMS Conqueror who had been tracking her for some time and required just 3 torpedoes to do the deed!

Actually, the longest route planned without AAR for a RAF Buccaneer was from Hickom AFB in Hawaii to McLelland AFB in California 2300nm with a full fuel load of 23,000lbs! It was certainly doable but the plan never came to fruition!

RAF Buccaneers did deploy to the Falklands with AAR after the conflict to prove that, if required, we were available to deter any further Argentinian aggression.

So not trying to put you in your place just trying to educate you!

Bloggs:)

Genstabler,
Since... ...why were the carrier based aircraft there not tasked with attacking the Belgrano?
[Rhetorical question!]

...why were the carrier based aircraft there not tasked with attacking the Belgrano?

Because the RN no longer had embarked aircraft with a maritime strike capability. Why? Because the more senior colleagues of Bloggs had persuaded the ignorant politicians that the Crabs could do it all from ashore.

Bloggs' first paragraph in his last post sums up very well why a RN embarked and controlled maritime strike capability is needed. Unfortunately the damage inflicted by their Airships will continue with the introduction of the new so-called carriers and the Micky mouse aircraft chosen for them by the Crabs.

Sharkey. My sympathy with you increases with every new post!

Now if we're going to be accurate here, that's another bit of disinformation.

1. The RN did not have a choice in the F4/Bucc/Gannet/Ark retirement in 1978. That choice had been removed in Mr Healey's 1966 review, where the "plan" appeared to involve this

http://www.modelblokez.org.au/bthpix...1/f111base.jpg

but in fact ended up with aircraft designed from the start to operate from aircraft carriers! You might say that the RAF ended up with such high-performance cabs because of the Navy.....I wouldn't make the same argument for the AEW radar on the Shack though!

2. Errrr, this little beast was OK, although granted not at the extended range possible with a naval aircraft designed for catapult launch.

http://i2.wp.com/basenaval.com/wp-co...size=450%2C230

and that missile system stayed in service till the mid-90s. Lynx & Sea Skua have a rather good record for sinking ships as well, although I'll happily admit that is vs small ships.

3. On one level yes, it's hoop. But on the more practical level where actions speak louder than words, as others have noted, the RAF has consistently argued for responsibility for Maritime air operations and once secured, divested itself of the ability to do them as quickly as it could. To the point where today in 2013, the RAF has no capability to attack maritime vessels mounting any sort of modern PDMS. In fact, you can sum up the attitude to maritime by the rather pitiful "Anti-shipping" entry on the RAF website...

RAF - Anti-Shipping

That's a long way from the ATP34 that I remember.

You may well suggest that the Navy ought to be providing that anti-shipping capability. But the unpalatable truth is that the Navy have in all cases given up that air capability at the behest of the RAF, only to the see the RAF then decide they don't need to do it and bin it shortly thereafter. Whether it's naivete or indifference in senior RN or active manoeuvring by senior RAF is largely irrelevant. It has been a consistent result and goes a long way to explaining why the Navy are so suspicious of the RAF and their motives.

Must be getting close to five pages now!

Marham and Lossiemouth - the homes of the Panavia Tornado Multi Role Combat Aircraft (to use its original name). :p ;)

Does that multi-role capability include air-to-air? Or is that another limitation that the Buccaneer shared?
I am only an innocent Pongo!

Don't go there Genstabler! The RAF Buccaneers were fitted with Sidewinder, which although limited in their performance gave the aircraft an air-to-air capability (were some fighter pilot stupid enough to drop into our Box formation at 100 feet either over sea or overland!)

Take my advice, as a Pongo, you really do need to undertake more research!

Not_a_boffin,

I know, I know and they didn't have much of a choice when the Government stole SHAR either and, as I stated earlier, it was a no-brainer when the RAF gave up Harrier instead of Tornado, which had a superior weapons delivery capability! I am sure we are all on the same side but, just like it was in the bar at Honington in the 70s, it's good to tweak the Navy's tail on occasions and PPRuNe allows it!!!

Bloggs:p

Wow! It was a fighter too! Thanks for educating me Bloggs. But tell me, as you maintain that the Buccaneer could fulfil every role and had no limitations, why isn't it still in service?

I really really don't know, Genstabler! Maybe it was because it was rotting in the main spar and had served its time with pride going out with a bang in Gulf War 1 where it took over self-designation of its own LGBs from the Tornado (which had called on the Buccaneer to designate for its LGBs) to allow the latter to take on other duties!

Don't get me wrong, I never said it was a fighter just that it had an air-to-air capability, which it had - a live Sidewinder firing is an exciting experience on Aberporth range but it was definitely not as good fun as the day I fired a MARTEL TV Missile which had a great deal more thrust and a far greater range (actually, thinking about it, during Trial MISTICO 2 in 1976, when we (and 809 Sqn) fired TV MARTELs on Aberporth, the last missile misbehaved, vanished vertically into cloud and just missed the port wing of an RAF F4 that was tasked with trying to gain a missile lock on the missile as part of the trial - so maybe the Buccaneer's air-to-air capability was greater than I gave it credit for!).

Bloggs:\

PS. How's the research going? Anything else I can help you with?

No thanks Bloggs! I think you have very effectively confirmed all of my preconceptions!