What concerns me is the number of BoI reports that present causal factors as revelations, despite them having been identified early on, formally notified and staff instructed to ignore the risk when there was an opportunity to mitigate it long before the aircraft entered service. Nimrod, Hercules XV179, Tornado ZG710, Sea King ASaCs are some of the well known ones.

If permitted to get on with the job and implement regulations, risks are generally reduced to ALARP. The prevailing ethos I describe is what must change.

Yes, some UORs are delivered quicker but the safety obligation is not allowed to be ignored. It is the foreshortening of the approvals process that makes it seem quicker. If a Project Manager ignores instructions from above and simply follows the mandated regulations, he is just as likely to meet the UOR timescales we see.

And senior staffs don't like the concept of "standing risks" but the sensible PM knows what they are. Typically, Build Standards, and hence Safety Cases, will not have been maintained (for example, all the above cases). Some because it has never been contracted in the first place; others (e.g. ASaC) where it was contracted but then cancelled by a non-engineer who deemed it unnecessary. It is the very first question a PM asks of the Design Authority. His answer determines your workload and risk mitigation for the entire Concept, Assessment and Development Phases; and to a great extent helps establish an accurate cost. The problem is MoD has too few who know how to do this, even if they were allowed to, which is why so many projects are "over budget" but do not exceed a fair and reasonable cost.

Why RJ is Not Commercial Maintained?
 

Your comment shows a misunderstanding of commercial vs. military use. Commercial aircraft are used at high intensity levels with, usually, a multiple flight cycles each day. Maintenance is a profit costing item and only those required inspections are accomplished.
Commercial aircraft do not undergo major upgrades every few years where most of the interior is removed, equipment and structure inspected and upgraded.

RJs are on a modification cycle that requires upgrades to current Block standards. This is a continuing cycle and the entire RJ fleet is NEVER the same Block version. For example, RAF RJs will be Block 11, I believe. USAF RJs delivered last year were Block 10s. Those in 2014 will probably be Block 14s.
This is NOT a commercial-type program.

If everyone is so concerned with using the -135 airframe, I am sure L-3 would modify any new, comparable airframe to a SIGINT platform. Of course, 40 years of working RFI and other mission-related issues would need to be worked from scratch. How many other RAF units, of the diminished number remaining, is MoD willing to cut to pay the enormous bill this would require.

One question I have with modern aircraft, especially those designed only for airliners, is how robust the basic structure is when you cut and add all the different bits to make an RJ-like aircraft? The -135 was very overbuilt and has had many, many mods involving holes, cheeks, noses, antennas, blisters, probes and other things added and removed all over the airframe. Will the composite aircraft of the future be able to take all this needed work without a complete (costly) redesign?

Previous quote: "The most impartial review of 135 accidents easily available is Wikki (and doesn't that say a whole lot about where we're at?) With engine and tail separations alone a noted feature, you seem to demand a lot of your pilots and little of their superiors. Self Regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation It Kills!'

I mentioned only RCs, where I am familiar with all accidents. Only the Rivet Amber could possibly be attributed to not implementing a required upgrade.
I know of no situation where the USAF does not take responsibility. The comment about "Self regulation" is confusing. Who would take responsibility for a military aviation incident? In the US NTSB is not involved in military accidents.

NVN:-
The UK AAIB (Air Accident Investigation Board) is not responsible for investigating UK Military Air Accidents, but may be involved if invited. The MAAIB is the responsible body which, together with its stable-mate the MAA, is part of the MOD. Thus a similar set up exists in the UK and the USA, whereby Military Airworthiness Regulation and Air Accident Investigation are subsidiary functions of the owner/operators, ie the DOD/MOD and their dependent Services. That is why UK Military Airworthiness and Air Accident Investigation are both in a state of crisis.

You ask who would take responsibility for investigating Military Air Accidents. I would suggest that whoever it might be, they must be separate from, and independent of, the DOD/MOD and the Airworthiness Authority, which must be separate and independent also. Easy to say and very difficult to do, I admit, but the last 30 years has shown that the clash of interests that the present incestuous system allows for has cost much blood and treasure.

In short, in the UK the MAA and MAAIB must become separate and independent of the MOD and of each other. Only then can we expect Airworthiness Provision and Air Accident Investigation that can be relied upon. I would respectfully suggest that a similar course might benefit US Military Aviation Safety also.

"Commercial aircraft do not undergo major upgrades every few years where most of the interior is removed, equipment and structure inspected and upgraded"

Yes, they do. Boeings commonly have C & D checks at which seating positions are often changed. This type of modification, as you should know, means Primary Structural changes to the whole airframe to protect the passengers new positions.

And because civil aircraft of the same type do so many different flight profiles the inspection severity and periodicity is adapted to suit each particular airframe and/or operation. This could mean that civil aero-maintenance companies would reduce the inspections of (as Nova Nav implies) low-use airframes because over-maintenance is also a waste of time and money. The military "norm" (from my past experience) is to continue with whatever (single) maintenance policy is published/available whatever the use of any airframe within any fleet - a really big mistake in my humble opinion.

Another major principle of PRACTICE states that, if you keep messing with structural loadings you will eventually weaken some part of it in a way you did not intend...

By the way; I have no doubt that all of the employees at Boeing, L3 and all those others trying to ensure the best outcome of these events are doing their utmost, honest and best work. I am just trying to put across the notion that even the best of intentions sometimes has unexpected outcomes and old aeroplanes are old aeroplanes whatever the work conducted on them.

Here's a link to a US website archiving the world of Air refuelling (with an obvious American bias) listing all known 135 hull losses.
Hull Loss « Air Refueling Archive
The RC135R retains many systems of the original KC135A, therefore I still find this a worrying list even if all piloting/non CFM56 engine incidents are discounted.

With respect, Chugalug, you are talking a bit out of your backside.

For example, in the USN & USMC, there are a minimum of two accident investigations for any mishap: a safety investigation, usually led by an O-5 or higher from squadron other than the one who had the crash and with safety privilege as a method that American courts have supported over and over ... and a JAG manual (criminal) investigation, which does not offer privilege that the safety investigation does.

I've been involved in both.

When findings are presented, they are subject to minute scrutiny and endorsement (and not infrequently, inquiries for more info/clarification) from within and without the operational chain of command.

Your accusation that this investigation method, which has been going on for about fifty years, is insufficient or not impartial is loaded with crap.

I'll add to my dismay at your post that it is insulting to a hell of a lot of officers and ranks who get assigned to those investigations (which are exhaustive and exhausting) and the Safety Center who provides a hell of a lot of technical support.

The USAF has a similar set up but I won't comment further on them, as I wasn't USAF.

On top of that, in the Navy, if pilot error is suspected or shown to be a causal factor, another investigation (Field Naval Aviator Evaluatoin Board) is convened to make recommendations to the convening flag officer regarding whether or not the pilot/pilots/aircrew ought to fly anymore, or not. (Providing they are still alive).

Now, is there a problem with manufacturers having to get their teeth pulled in some cases to get critical performance or spec info during such an investigation? Yes, sometimes.

Are there problems with the endorsing chain disagreeing with one another on the import of the findings? I have seen it.

Is that your concern, or are you on the "the military is involved in a cover up" bandwagon ? :mad:

Lonewolf, I am not insulting anyone, our people are just as diligent, dedicated, and hard working as those you mention. The subversion of airworthiness and investigatory procedures here happened at the top of the food chain. They happened because they could. That was a great shock to me, having served in the RAF and been proud of its Flight Safety record.

Threads on this very forum account for 62 deaths in airworthiness related fatal accidents, 29 of which occurred in one tragedy alone. The deceased pilots were found Grossly Negligent by Higher Command. Only many years later was that finding set aside, but still the Gross Unairworthiness of the aircraft at RTS has still to be acknowledged.

Under an independent and separate MAAIB inquiry that injustice could have been avoided and the Airworthiness Authority brought to account. This is not just about justice, it is about life and death, about maintaining operational effectiveness. In short it is about ensuring that our military airpower is sustained and not lost to avoidable accidents and death.

Now, it is of course your prerogative to reject all that I warn of. I would suggest though that the possible award of an RTS into the RAF makes the issue our business. Hence this thread. Hence my remarks.

I don’t think Chug was calling into question the US system or the 135. I certainly wasn’t, although you are right, Lonewolf, to mention that certain companies are less than helpful. From our (UK) perspective, the problem is the toothless system and spineless leadership that allows them to do this and protects them at every turn. Chinook ZA721, Mt Pleasant Feb 1987 is a good example. Essential safety modifications arising from our AAIB investigators’ report remained unschemed, never mind embodied, when ZD576 crashed in June 1994. What Chug is referring to, in part, is this rendered the aircraft unairworthy, compounded by the RAF completely omitting the requirement from certification. We don't trust a system which allows, in fact encourages, this behaviour.





We share a concern that our Military Aviation Authority (MAA) is equally spineless and ineffective, continuing in the same vein as their predecessors to whom, in many cases, the hierarchy owe their elevated rank. They have existed for 3 years now and, very recently (last month), were party to Ministerial briefings and correspondence openly criticising anyone connected with MoD who advocates airworthiness and adherence to mandated regulations. With leadership like that, even a perfectly airworthy RC-135 Rivet Joint soon won’t be!

RAF, USAF work on Rivet Joint refueling deal
I/C

First Airseeker Ops in UK..
 

will be from RAF Mildenhall, alongside the USAF, as it appears the Waddington runway will be closed for repairs.

One of the problems we had in planning ops in the '70s and '80s from the UK was the lack of long runways at RAF bases. It appears only Marham, Brize and Fairford have 10000+ ft runway lengths. A serious lack that should be been identified and corrected decades ago. I'm sure this is one reason Brize is the UK base for deployed B-52s.

Buy back Manston 10/28 : 2748 x 61 m :ok:

Ogin on the doorstep ... North Sea access not a problem ... Quick transit down the Channel ... Western Approaches and the North Atlantic all in easy reach.

USAF Bomber FOLs in UK
 

NoVANav,

RAF Fairford (not RAF Brize Norton) is the designated USAF heavy bomber FOL in Europe. Following GW2, it was significantly upgraded with: 50+ heavy bomber parking slots for B-2A/B-1B/B-52H, 4 x large Jet Fuel Supply Installations, hydrant refueling, a Bomber Operations Facility (adjacent to ATC) and a 2-dock B-2 hangar. Although all uniformed USAF personnel have been withdrawn, it is still kept on a "care and maintenance" basis by personnel assigned to 420 ABS under 501 CSW.

Also, most of the 10,000 ft runways in the UK were actually built specifically for use by SAC B-47s and later B-52s - Brize Norton (now full of RAF stuff !), Fairford, Greenham Common (closed) and Upper Heyford (closed).

On the other hand there is always the 10500 ft runway at MOD Boscombe Down, of course its not exactly flat.

BCE would be a good home for Rivet Joint, plenty of room and a nice big shed when needed.

Machrahanish?

Milo,

Machrihanish was sold by MOD for GBP 1 in May 2012 !

BBC News - Sale of former RAF airbase at Machrihanish confirmed

Surely that was only so it could be bought back for a few million quid later, thus injecting some cash into the local dignataries pockets (sorry I mean local economy)

What a complete and utter cluster. Why didn't anyone spot this when the idea of acquiring these brand-new 50 year old aircraft was first proposed?

Renegotiate the Voyager programme to include 3 x Voyagers with booms - the RAF could even support its C-17A and E-3D AAR needs (although the latter is also probe-and-drogue capable) as well as supporting ATARES F-16 requirements for NATO.....

Beags,

Everything you say points to the necessity for "joined up thinking"? The state that MOD is in we will be lucky to see any thinking that makes sense. In an age that the likes of yourself and I could only dream of (computers, efficient planning) we can clearly see that little or no money or time is spent on coordination, planning and preempting. It's sad, how much better it all could be.

Smudge