Gunners and other Pongos take a rubber-hosing from the MAA
 

I've just read the latest Service Inquiry report on the recent Hermes 450 accident and there would seem some significant training deficiencies have been found in the Royal Arty's "pilots".

Read here... Page not found (the link works by the way!)

This has been a long time coming since the H450 that allegedly smashed into the Basrah Terminal Building, because the RA thought they would have a "plucky stab" at a circling approach they'd seen once and "it can't be that hard can it?". :ugh:

Luckily no-one was hurt...

LJ

A very interesting read.
Ooh, guess what? a thousand hours on Microsoft Flight Sim does not make you an aircraft Captain.
I'm glad they exonerated all the operators and blamed the system.

Leon,

Interesting reading. Aim interested to understand your wording of the title, as in the recommendations section of the report 1 Arty Bde (RA) 83 EAG and AOC 1 Gp have recommendations made to them....

I might have missed it.....but where are the comments about other pongos?

I have only just scanned the document quickly.....but am interested to know if there were any other cap badges implicated/investigated who are involved in the operation of UAS?

Regards

Ralph

Ralph

Again, I have not read this in complete depth, but there is JHC mentioned that is hosted in LF with a significant amount of brown-job representation plus the REME have been looking after engineering and there was an oil loss problem; so there appears to be "other pongos" with their fingerprints on this...

LJ

Pongos = rofl
 

So why was this worthy of comment?

Other than the obvious: as an excuse for your brilliant and highly original use of the words 'brown' and pong' with hilarious suffixes.

Well done to the MAA for highlighting that this is yet another "Lessons Not Learned" case.

But am I the only one appalled at the bald admission that UORs are introduced without functional safety being ensured? The report implies the associated risks are taken into account and assessed, but this was not the case when the policy was "don't bother".

And nowhere does it say that it was stated policy since about 1996 NOT to modify simulators or address training which, by definition, means one cannot declare airworthiness. That omission is crucial. (Fox3, quite right).

I think this says more abojut the procurement of "cheap" UAS' and the sales staff at IAI/Hermes?

Well done guys! You sold something quite good to a group incapable of using it properly...another replacement will be in the order books soon.

Basrah H450
 

Leon
I was there at the time and seem to recall that the cloud as 8/8s at zero feet - but what goes up must come down. Clearly, they had no all-weather "pilots" and no met-man!

The oil loss problem is extensively and carefully identified in the report as being caused by "sludge" like deposits in the feed pipe and some evidence of filter blockage. It appears the REME Artificer may well have been one of the few staff involved in operating this RA system with the appropriate level of aviation training, and his/her post-crash actions are commended in the report. Aside from the matter of daily oil replenishments not being correctly recorded (noted as not contributory to the crash but adding to the difficulty of obtaining an accurate oil burn history for this engine) the actions of the REME and "other pongos" appear to be nothing but positive and professional.

Discovering that Royal Artillery soldiers may not possess the required level of Airmanship for the safe and continued operation of a complex air vehicle (introduced under a UOR) may be the most blinding statement of the obvious I have read in some time. This report attempts to obfuscate and dilute that point to the Nth degree by listing 68 recommendations!

Is this what we can expect from the MAA now, an absolute cast iron piece of CYA report writing that almost misses the point with its circuitous nature?

100% agree. It seems like the average time between crash and crash mag is something like 3 years now, which strikes me as ridiculous. In the majority of cases I reckon the main cause has been identified fairly swiftly; the trouble is that every slight inconsistency uncovered during the investigation seems to get utterly pulled apart, and even if it's of no consequence to the accident, attracts criticism and supervisory hand-wringing.

Given the choice between a "bring in the guilty bastard" kangaroo court and a pedestrian, plodding but fair investigation, I'd choose the latter. However in the process of dotting every 'i' and crossing every 't', I believe the glacial pace of reporting in the last few years is posing its own risks. Many of us have our own understanding of what happened to Red 4 at Bournemouth, for example, by reading between the lines of the directives that emanate from higher command every time the SI makes a behind-the-scenes interim report. "We should be told" is the appropriate cliche, I feel. As an even more ridiculous example, look at the Harrier landing crash at KAF in 2009. The report was published in 2012, by which time a similiar situation could easily have arisen several more times, even if the aircraft type hadn't left service. But it was a thorough report :hmm:

2's in and Easy - I agree with both of your sentiments but there are obvious sensitivities with this report and at least it took less than a year!!!

I don't know the composition of the board (would be interested) but as it would need to be flying (and pref UAV) experienced but not from the unit in question I am sure there was a large RAF presence. There is therefore the danger of it looking like an inter-services slagging match so everything had to be painfully laid out. A quick "Well you are the Royal Artillery of course you don't understand flying" wouldn't have gone down well - and more importantly probably achieved nothing.

Read the report in that light and some of the phrasing is quite fascinating.

It is disappointing to see that many years of RAF/RN/AAC flying experience (nearly 100 for the former, slightly over for the others!) seems to have been largely ignored. Still gunners always know best, thank goodness they control the SAMs!;)

If this only stops the Army saying "over" on the radio all the time it will be a result, imho.

I can't help but recognise that my previous point might have come over as slightly sarcastic.

2's in and some of Backward's posts made my point though. The lesson here shouldn't be that artillery is incapable of operating UAV because they are stupid brown jobs.

The report makes dozens of recommendations, none of them include "pongos should never have been given access to flying machines in the first place".

Wow, by looking at the picture of the crashed aircraft I'm amazed that the crew got out alive.

What is the point of redacting the word Israel when they openly admit that the instructors communicate with ATC in Hebrew?

Of course the RAF haven't Cat4/5'ed ANY Reapers in theatre have they!

Not the point. The Hermes suffered a technical failure that could befall any manned or unmanned platform irregardless of the nature of the operator. The fairly eye-popping parts of this report are the puddle-deep levels of aviation experience of the operators along with the quality of the "training" they received.

I couldn't give a toss who operates UASs or where they go but I do expect that those tasked with the job have half a clue about aviation and the basic tenets of airmanship. Those involved in this mishap clearly didn't although it was no fault of their own; they were just products of a flawed system.

I note that the pilot's rank was a lance corporal or the gunner equivalent. Do they get wings?

Stoppers

Wholeheartedly agree with you sentiments, but "irregardless" - are you related to George Dubya Bush by any chance?:E

Mister B

Looks like stoppers has been doing some decent CRM and error causation training recently with his new company!

Stoppers, I agree and Annex 1 of ICAO is quite clear that to fly an aircraft you should be a pilot and to fly it IFR you must be rated. I don't see the Gunners are achieving anything like the spirit implied in this internationally agreed document.

There's a good reason why Predator and Reaper use aircrew - they need to be qualified and rated on type. Even those used that have not done the full recognised aircrew courses for manned aircraft - such as the Uk's Project DAEDALUS - have flown solo in a manned aircraft and have completed a course of recognised trg. On completion of the course they were awarded Unmmaned Aircrew wings and are, to all intents and purposes, de facto aircrew, with at least 170-190hrs of experience like that for a baby ME pilot in the RAF.

I think the Gunners need to seriously rethink their trg and at the very least ask their AAC cousins for some help - Regimental pride has no place in aviation...

LJ